BHARTIARTL Profit Jumped 505%. A Joint Venture Turning Into a Subsidiary Is Why.

The Watch Item Finally Landed on the Balance Sheet

The last post covered on Bharti Airtel flagged a specific, narrow risk as something to watch rather than act on: Indus Towers, the tower joint venture Bharti co-owns, had crossed a 50% ownership stake but stayed off Bharti's consolidated balance sheet because Bharti didn't control its board. That stopped being a hypothetical this quarter. With effect from the close of business on November 18, 2024, a change in Indus's board composition gave Bharti control under Ind AS 110, and Indus is now fully consolidated - not just equity-accounted - for the first time in any quarter covered on this site. The accounting mechanics of that switch are the entire story behind this quarter's headline number: net income attributable to Bharti's own shareholders jumped 505% YoY, to Rs14,781.2 crore, and the reason is a one-time, non-cash Rs10,702.5 crore gain from remeasuring Bharti's existing Indus stake to fair value on the date control was obtained - a standard requirement under Ind AS 103 for a business combination achieved in stages, not new cash or new earnings power.

Strip out every exceptional item and the picture is still good, just far less dramatic: net income before exceptional items grew a genuine 121.3% (Rs2,492 crore → Rs5,514 crore), alongside EBITDA up 24.1% and EBIT up 33.3% - both the fastest growth rates of any quarter covered on this site, helped by roughly six weeks of Indus's own operations now flowing through as a consolidated segment rather than a below-the-line equity pickup. Consolidation also reshaped the balance sheet overnight: total assets rose 8.6% and total liabilities rose 28.2% in a single quarter (see Key Financial Metrics) - exactly the "materially different balance sheet" this site warned about last quarter.

Two strategic moves surfaced on the call worth tracking ahead of the numbers below. First, Bharti and its subsidiary Bharti Hexacom are planning to transfer roughly 16,100 telecom towers (about 12,700 from Bharti Airtel, 3,400 from Bharti Hexacom) to the now-consolidated Indus, on the logic - in Gopal Vittal's words - that "this business is best managed by Indus since they know how to do this better than us." Second, management confirmed a decision to exit the low-margin "commodity voice and wholesale" portion of Airtel Business, which CFO commentary flagged will hit that segment's topline for roughly six months starting February 2025 with "insignificant impact on the margins" - a real, dated commitment rather than the vaguer "seasonality" framing criticized in an earlier post.

The Prescription

Bharti should keep doing exactly what it announced on this call: walking away from low-margin commodity revenue on a stated timeline, in public, before the numbers force the decision. Management said plainly that exiting commodity voice and wholesale within Airtel Business "will have an impact on the topline in the coming quarters" over roughly six months, while insisting the EBITDA effect will be negligible because "this is a very negligible margin business." That's a specific, falsifiable commitment a reader can hold the company to next quarter and the one after - a sharp contrast with the passive "seasonality...will unwind" language criticized in an earlier Airtel Business quarter. Pair it with the other real discipline story this quarter: management confirmed it has now prepaid every deferred spectrum liability with an interest cost above 8.65%, closing out a prepayment program that's been a running thread on this site since Q1 FY25.

What it should stop doing: disclosing three different leverage ratios in the same release without picking one to track consistently. This quarter's press release reports Net Debt/EBITDA at "2.26 times on a comparable basis," "1.98 times on a reported basis" (with Indus consolidated), and a third figure - Net Debt excluding lease obligations to the newly-introduced EBITDAaL^» metric - at 1.56 times. Each of those numbers tells a genuinely different story about how levered the business is, and a reader is left to guess which one the company actually wants tracked quarter to quarter. Introducing EBITDAaL as "a true reflection of our underlying health," in Vittal's own words on the call, is a defensible disclosure upgrade - lease payments are real cash commitments a standard EBITDA measure ignores - but it should replace the older ratios in the headline commentary, not just get added alongside them.

Key Financial Metrics

Q3 FY25 (quarter ended Dec 31, 2024) vs. Q3 FY24, consolidated

No investor presentation was among this quarter's source documents, so unlike prior quarters covered on this site, the FX rates below come from independently-sourced month-end market quotes rather than the company's disclosed RBI reference rate: INR 84.78 = USD 1 (average of the October, November, and December 2024 month-end quotes) for income-statement lines; INR 85.79 = USD 1 (December 31, 2024 quote) for balance-sheet and market-cap figures.

Metric	Q3 FY25 (INR)	Q3 FY25 (USD)	Q3 FY24 (INR)	YoY
Revenue	Rs45,129.3 crore	~$5.32B	Rs37,899.5 crore	✅ +19.1%
Adjusted EBITDA» (company-reported)	Rs24,880 crore	~$2.93B	Rs20,044 crore	✅ +24.1%, margin 55.1% vs 52.9% - a new high across every quarter covered here
EBITDAaL» (new disclosure this quarter, EBITDA after lease payments)	Rs21,474 crore	~$2.53B	n/a (not previously disclosed)	margin 47.6%, up 26.1% YoY per company disclosure
Operating Income» (EBIT, company-reported)	Rs13,126 crore	~$1.55B	Rs9,844 crore	✅ +33.3%, margin 29.1% vs 26.0%
Profit before tax (statutory, incl. exceptional items)	Rs16,891.9 crore	~$1.99B	Rs4,108.4 crore	✅ +311.2%
Net Income» before exceptional items (company-wide, like-for-like basis)	Rs5,514 crore	~$650M	Rs2,492 crore	✅ +121.3%, the real growth rate
Net Income (total profit for the period, after exceptional items)	Rs16,134.6 crore	~$1.90B	Rs2,876.4 crore	✅ +461.0%
...of which, attributable to Bharti Airtel's own shareholders	Rs14,781.2 crore	~$1.74B	Rs2,442.2 crore	✅ +505.2% (almost entirely a one-time Indus consolidation gain - see above)
...of which, attributable to non-controlling interests»	Rs1,353.4 crore	~$160M	Rs434.2 crore	✅ +211.7%
Basic EPS	Rs25.54	~$0.301	Rs4.27	✅ +498.1%
Capex	Rs9,161 crore	~$1.08B	not sourced this quarter	✅ +19.4% QoQ vs Sep-24's Rs7,674.9 crore
Operating Free Cash Flow» (EBITDA minus capex, company-reported style)	Rs15,719 crore	~$1.85B	Rs10,770.3 crore	✅ +46.0%, a new high above Sep-24's Rs14,346 crore
Total Cash	not available	not available	not available	⚠️ no cash flow statement or balance sheet was among this quarter's source documents

Balance sheet metric	Dec 2024 (INR)	Dec 2024 (USD)	Dec 2023 (INR)	YoY
Total Assets (consolidated segment note)	Rs500,863.6 crore	~$58.38B	Rs445,692.7 crore	⚠️ +12.4% (+8.6% QoQ vs Sep-24, almost entirely Indus consolidation)
Total Liabilities (consolidated segment note)	Rs449,431.3 crore	~$52.39B	Rs342,145.8 crore	⚠️ +31.4% (+28.2% QoQ, Indus's own debt now on the consolidated balance sheet)
Book value (paid-up equity capital + other equity)	Rs103,507.5 crore	~$12.06B	Rs79,085.4 crore	✅ +30.9%
Book value per share	Rs178.66	~$2.08	Rs138.19	✅ +29.3%
Debt/Equity» (company's own Regulation 52(4) disclosure)	0.89x		1.43x	✅ improved
Debt Service Coverage Ratio» (DSCR)	3.04x		2.77x	✅ improved
Interest Service Coverage Ratio (ISCR)	5.54x		5.01x	✅ improved
Net Debt/EBITDA (annualized, company-reported "comparable basis")	2.26x		n/a	⬇️ improved vs 2.50x as of Sep-24 (both figures per this quarter's own company disclosure)

This quarter's 505% net income headline overstates the real story by roughly four-fold. Net income before exceptional items grew a genuine 121.3% - the strongest underlying quarter covered on this site - but the reported figure is dominated by a Rs7,545.6 crore net exceptional gain (Rs14,322.5 crore of gains from the Indus business combination, chiefly the Rs10,702.5 crore fair-value remeasurement of Bharti's pre-existing stake, partly offset by a Rs6,358.6 crore regulatory-levy charge and a Rs1,740.4 crore intangible impairment) plus a Rs2,121.7 crore net tax benefit tied to the same event.

Trailing quarters show this is a genuine acceleration, not just a one-quarter blip dressed up by Indus: EBITDA margin has now improved for two straight quarters after the three-quarter decline flagged in the Jun-24 post - 52.1% (Mar-24) → 51.8% (Jun-24) → 53.1% (Sep-24) → 55.1% (Dec-24), a new high across every quarter this site has covered. Net income before exceptional items has also grown every quarter this year: Rs2,492 crore (Dec-23) → Rs2,925.1 crore (Mar-24, per the prior post) → Rs3,911.5 crore (Sep-24) → Rs5,514 crore (Dec-24) - a real, compounding improvement in the underlying business, running well ahead of the noisy, exceptional-item-driven headline net income line that's dominated every quarter covered here since 2023-03.

Key Operational Metrics

A press release and earnings call transcript are available for this quarter; no investor presentation was downloaded or found for this period, so some metrics normally sourced from the deck (customer-base breakdowns by product, Africa Mobile Money figures) are marked not available below rather than dropped silently.

Metric	Dec-24	Dec-23	YoY
Total customer base (consolidated, India + Africa)	~576,975,000	~551,193,000	✅ +4.7%
India customer base	~413,869,000	~397,012,000	✅ +4.2%
Africa customer base	~163,106,000	~151,171,000	✅ +7.9%
Mobile Services India ARPU»	Rs245	Rs208	✅ +17.8%
Postpaid net additions (India, quarter)	0.6 million (reaching 25.3 million base)	not sourced this quarter
Smartphone data customers added (India, YoY)	+25.2 million (75.8% of mobile base)		✅
5G customer base (India, per management commentary)	~120,000,000	~105,000,000 (Sep-24, per prior post, QoQ)	✅ +14.3% QoQ
Mobile data consumption per customer	24.5 GB/month	not sourced this quarter	✅ +23.2% YoY
Homes Services net additions (quarter)	674,000 (reaching a 9.2 million base)		✅ new quarterly high
Digital TV (DTH») net additions (quarter)	29,000
Africa Mobile Money transaction value / revenue	not available this quarter		⚠️ not disclosed in this quarter's sourced materials

Management framed the quarter's ARPU line as the tail end of a now-familiar story rather than new news: tariff repair's "residual flow-through" continued to lift Mobile Services India ARPU to Rs245 (+17.8% YoY), but Vittal was explicit that the underlying drivers - "feature phone to smartphone upgrades, prepaid to postpaid upgrades, data monetization, and growth of international roaming" - matter more going forward than any further tariff step-up, a shift in framing from the "two more quarters of flow-through" language used a quarter ago. Postpaid net adds of 0.6 million reaching a 25.3 million base is a small number against Vittal's own stated ambition on the call - he described an addressable 80-90 million credit-worthy prepaid base that could convert to postpaid over "the next few years," an opportunity size disclosed for the first time this quarter, worth tracking against actual net-add pace in future posts.

Segment Comparison

Bharti Airtel now reports seven consolidated segments (an eighth, Mobile Services South Asia, remains disposed since June 2024 and reports nil): Mobile Services India, Mobile Services Africa, Airtel Business, Passive Infrastructure Services (new this quarter - Indus Towers, now consolidated rather than equity-accounted), Homes Services, Digital TV Services, and Others. The company's own note states plainly that prior-period numbers for this segment structure "are not comparable" given the Indus consolidation, so the Passive Infrastructure Services row below is shown without a forced YoY comparison.

Segment	Revenue (Q3 FY25)	Revenue (Q3 FY24)	YoY	Segment Result (Q3 FY25)	Margin (Q3 FY25)	Margin (Q3 FY24)
Mobile Services India	Rs26,268.7 crore	Rs21,638.6 crore	✅ +21.4%	Rs7,498 crore	✅ 28.5%	22.2%
Mobile Services Africa	Rs10,703.2 crore	Rs10,297.2 crore	⚠️ +3.9%	Rs3,176 crore	⚠️ 29.7%	33.2%
Airtel Business	Rs5,646 crore	Rs5,194.8 crore	✅ +8.7%	Rs1,382.8 crore	⚠️ 24.5%	28.9%
Passive Infrastructure Services (Indus Towers, newly consolidated)	Rs3,529 crore	n/a - not comparable		Rs2,784.3 crore
Homes Services	Rs1,509.2 crore	Rs1,271.8 crore	✅ +18.7%	Rs329.3 crore	⚠️ 21.8%	23.6%
Digital TV Services	Rs760.7 crore	Rs783.7 crore	⚠️ -2.9%	Rs31.3 crore	⚠️ 4.1%	11.6%
Others	Rs87.3 crore	Rs49.6 crore	✅ +76.0%	Rs69.4 crore
Total segment revenue	Rs48,504.1 crore	Rs39,330.2 crore	✅ +23.3%	Rs15,271.1 crore

("Segment Result" here is profit before finance costs, charity/donation, and exceptional items and tax - effectively an EBIT-level margin; no deck was available this quarter to source a separate EBITDA-level segment split, unlike the prior two posts.)

Ranked by what's actually carrying the business: Mobile Services India remains both the largest segment and the one with the strongest margin improvement (22.2% → 28.5%), extending the reversal flagged last quarter. Africa's rupee-reported revenue growth (+3.9%) continues to badly understate its real performance - constant-currency Africa revenue grew 21.3% per the company's own disclosure, meaning currency devaluation erased roughly 17 points of real growth in the consolidated figures, a continuation of the same translation gap flagged in the last two posts. Airtel Business's margin kept compressing (28.9% → 24.5%), but this quarter has an explicit, dated explanation rather than an open-ended one - see below.

Mobile Services India

Revenue growth of 21.4% combined tariff repair's residual flow-through with steady net additions, and segment-result margin expanded to 28.5% from 22.2% - the strongest margin level for this segment across any quarter covered on this site. The segment rolled out roughly 5,200 towers and 16,300 mobile broadband stations during the quarter, part of a YoY total of ~27,100 new towers and ~47,100 km of fiber, though management indicated on the call that the pace of tower rollout "will come down meaningfully" from here since coverage is now largely complete outside a handful of states.

Mobile Services Africa

Africa's headline rupee revenue grew a modest 3.9%, but the underlying business grew far faster: constant-currency growth of 21.3% (per the company's own disclosure) means currency devaluation alone wiped out roughly 17 percentage points of real growth once translated into rupees - a continuation of the gap flagged in both prior posts. Segment-result margin also compressed to 29.7% from 33.2%, and the company's own constant-currency EBITDA margin fell too (down ~1.1 percentage points YoY per the press release), so - as in prior quarters - this isn't purely a translation story; the underlying African business is also carrying somewhat softer margins even as its top line keeps growing strongly. Africa Mobile Money figures, which appeared in the last two posts sourced from the investor deck, aren't available this quarter since no deck was found for this period.

Airtel Business, the tower transfer, and the smaller segments

Airtel Business's margin decline finally comes with an exit date attached. Management confirmed on the call that Airtel Business is "in the middle of comprehensive re-tooling" of its portfolio, actively shedding the low-margin commodity voice and wholesale business - a "very negligible margin" segment, in Vittal's words - while stepping up investment in Cloud, Security, IoT, and CPaaS. The topline impact "will take about six months to play out" starting this quarter, with management insisting the EBITDA impact will be immaterial since the exited business barely contributed to profit anyway. This is the same underlying mix-shift first explained last quarter (lower-margin CPaaS/Cloud/Security growing faster than legacy connectivity), now paired with an actual decision to cut the lowest-margin piece outright rather than simply accept its drag. Homes Services hit a new quarterly high of 674,000 net additions, driven by accelerating FWA rollout - on the call, CFO Soumen Ray confirmed the incremental home-segment capex increase is specifically FWA-router and CPE spend, not core radio capex, since FWA connections share the same underlying network as mobile. Digital TV's segment-result margin held at a thin 4.1% (down from 11.6% a year ago) on revenue that fell 2.9% YoY, even as the business kept adding customers (29,000 net in the quarter) - a continuation of the segment's flat-to-declining trend flagged in the last two posts. Passive Infrastructure Services (Indus Towers) contributed Rs3,529 crore of revenue and Rs2,784.3 crore of segment result in its first (partial, ~43-day) quarter as a consolidated segment - separately, management disclosed plans to transfer a further 16,100 towers (12,700 from Bharti Airtel, 3,400 from Bharti Hexacom) into Indus, which CFO Soumen Ray said should be "not very material to the overall P&L" at a net-income level once consummated, since the towers' economics stay within the now-consolidated group either way.

Beyond the Usual

The Indus Towers customer-concentration risk is no longer one step removed - it's now on Bharti's own consolidated balance sheet

Indus Towers' own results, cited in Bharti's filing, again flag that one large customer (the same counterparty risk tracked since the 2023-03 post) "accounts for substantial part of revenue from operations" and "a significant part of trade receivables outstanding and unbilled revenue," with Indus stating it "believes that it will realise the carrying amount of receivable...and property, plant and equipment associated with the said customer." What's changed this quarter is materiality of exposure, not the underlying language: with Indus now fully consolidated rather than equity-accounted, this customer's receivables and unbilled revenue sit directly on Bharti's own consolidated balance sheet for the first time, rather than being one step removed inside a joint-venture equity value. The company states provisioning has already been done against the outstanding amount, but a reader should note that Bharti's own balance-sheet exposure to this counterparty just changed in kind, not just in degree.

The 16,100-tower transfer to Indus is a real capital-allocation choice, not a formality

Management's stated logic for moving roughly 16,100 towers (12,700 from Bharti Airtel, 3,400 from Bharti Hexacom) into the now-consolidated Indus is that Indus "know[s] how to do this better than us" and can "free up management's bandwidth" while creating "greater efficiency, scale and ultimately long-term value." On the Bharti Hexacom side of the same call, CFO Soumen Ray acknowledged the deal will cause "some dilution in the EBITDA" at Hexacom specifically - IP fees replace directly-owned tower economics - even while stating it shouldn't be "very material" to net income once cash proceeds are reinvested or used to pay down debt. Since Indus is now part of the same consolidated group, the net effect on Bharti's own consolidated numbers should indeed be limited, but the transaction still reallocates which legal entity carries the debt, the capex, and the operating risk on ~13% of the group's tower footprint - worth tracking once the transfer actually closes and its terms are disclosed in full.

Bharti's Africa subsidiary, Malawi's local operations, and its underlying spectrum position all saw smaller footnote-level developments this quarter, none of them criticisms of the company:

Malawi's currency crisis triggered hyperinflationary accounting for the first time

Bharti applied hyperinflationary accounting (Ind AS 29) to its Malawi operations for the first time this quarter, after the IMF's consumer price index data confirmed Malawi met the technical criteria for a hyperinflationary economy. The change reduced profit after tax by Rs83.8 crore in the quarter and increased non-monetary net assets - and correspondingly equity - by Rs3,471.2 crore, of which Rs2,565.9 crore was booked as an opening balance sheet adjustment retroactive to April 1, 2024. This is a mechanical accounting response to Malawi's currency crisis, not a sign of trouble specific to Bharti's own operations there.

The multi-quarter spectrum-prepayment program is now complete

The company completed its multi-quarter spectrum deleveraging story this quarter: a further Rs3,626.3 crore was paid to the Department of Telecommunications, and with it, Bharti has now prepaid every deferred spectrum liability carrying an interest cost above 8.65% - closing out the prepayment program first flagged as a capital-allocation highlight in the Q1 FY25 post.

FCCB conversions, the Airtel Africa buyback, and a cost reclassification all continued at a steady, unremarkable pace

FCCB^» conversions and Airtel Africa's share buyback both continued at steady, unremarkable paces this quarter - 2,678,535 new equity shares allotted against USD 19.15 million of bond conversions (plus a further 3,328,592 shares against USD 23.8 million just after quarter-end), in line with the "small, steady trickle" pace flagged last quarter rather than a return to the sharper pace seen in Q1 FY25. Separately, Airtel Africa completed its first $100 million buyback tranche and began a second $100 million programme (in two $50 million tranches) on December 23, 2024, lifting Bharti's effective economic stake in the subsidiary from 57.06% to 57.09% by quarter-end - the same mechanical stake-creep flagged in each of the last two posts.

The Group also reclassified certain distribution costs relating to its Africa mobile money business this quarter, moving them from other operating expenses into sales and marketing expenses (with prior-period comparatives restated to match) to "better reflect the nature of these costs." The change shuffles cost lines below EBITDA but doesn't affect total expenses, revenue, or any headline profit figure - a benign presentation change worth noting only because it's exactly the kind of footnote a reader should check doesn't flatter a number, and in this case it doesn't.

Management's Framing: A New Metric, and a Quiet Confidence About Indus

Gopal Vittal opened the call by leading with the tower transfer plan (see above) before turning to the quarter itself, calling it "another consistent quarter" and spending real time introducing EBITDAaL as the metric management will now be "accountable for" - a genuine change in what the company is signaling it wants tracked (see The Prescription). Notably, unlike the Indus customer-concentration disclosure buried in the filing's footnotes (see Beyond the Usual above), Vittal's opening remarks and the analyst Q&A never once referenced that counterparty risk directly - the questions instead focused on capex trajectory, free cash flow deployment, and the mechanics of the coming tower transfer. That's consistent with the pattern flagged last quarter, where the story has moved from "actively discussed" to something management no longer feels needs active reassurance on the call - even though, as noted above, the balance-sheet exposure to it just increased in kind. On capex, Vittal was specific rather than vague: capex as a share of revenue "will continue to trend downwards and soon be at the levels of global peers," with FY2025's capex already lower than FY2024's and further moderation expected into FY2026 - a concrete forward commitment a reader can hold the company to.

The Stock Fell This Quarter Even as the Headline Profit Number Exploded

Bharti Airtel's shares closed around Rs1,587.75 on the NSE on December 31, 2024 (an independently-sourced month-end closing quote, since no company-disclosed closing price was available without an investor presentation this quarter). That's down 7.1% from the roughly Rs1,709.55 close on September 30, 2024 covered in the last post - the first quarterly decline in the share price across any quarter covered on this site, arriving in the same quarter the company reported its largest-ever headline net income jump. That's a useful real-time reminder of this site's own recurring point that the stock price and the headline profit number don't have to move together, especially when the profit number is dominated by a one-time accounting item the market can see through. Zooming out, the stock is still up roughly 97% over the two years to December 31, 2024 (from about Rs806.10 on December 30, 2022) - a smaller two-year gain than the 114% figure covered last quarter purely because this quarter's own decline shrinks the trailing window's endpoint, not because the earlier gains reversed. The company has not split its stock since 2009, so no split adjustment is needed for either price.

Target Valuation Range

P/B eased to 8.89x from 11.20x last quarter - but this is a balance-sheet effect of the one-time Indus gain, not a market re-rating, and shouldn't be read as the stock getting cheaper. This quarter's own numbers can't support a clean multiple-based verdict: the reported P/E is meaningless because of the one-time Indus gain, and EV/EBITDA and a reverse DCF aren't computable at all this quarter because the investor presentation that normally discloses market capitalization, enterprise value, and net debt wasn't among this quarter's source documents.

Using an independently-sourced December 31, 2024 closing price (Rs1,587.75, ~5,794 million shares outstanding per the company's own disclosed paid-up capital of Rs2,897 crore at Rs5 face value) against the company's own disclosed book value (paid-up equity capital plus other equity, Rs103,507.5 crore, or Rs178.66 per share):

Market cap → enterprise value	Q3 FY25
Share price (period-end)	Rs1,587.75
Shares outstanding	~5,794 million
Book value/share	Rs178.66 (Rs103,507.5 crore equity ÷ ~5,794 million shares)
Total debt / cash	not disclosed this quarter - no investor presentation available
Enterprise value	not computable - the investor presentation that normally discloses market cap, EV, and net debt wasn't among this quarter's source documents

Peer-multiple sanity check	Q2 FY25	Q3 FY25
P/B	11.20x	8.89x - down, but purely because book value jumped from the Indus consolidation gain while the share price actually fell; not a signal the stock got cheaper on a like-for-like basis
P/E	79.07x	not meaningfully computable - reported EPS is distorted by the one-time exceptional gain, and there isn't a verified owners'-share breakdown of net income before exceptional items for all four trailing quarters to build a like-for-like alternative
EV/EBITDA	14.14x	not computable - requires a verified net-debt figure and enterprise value that this quarter's source documents don't provide

What the company did disclose - Net Debt/EBITDA improving to 2.26x on a comparable basis, from 2.50x as of Sep-24 per this quarter's own filing - points toward continued deleveraging, consistent with the DSCR and ISCR improvements in Key Financial Metrics above, but isn't itself a substitute for a verified enterprise value.

The honest read this quarter is that the real business - before Indus's one-time accounting effects - kept improving at its fastest pace on this site (EBITDA margin at a new high, net income before exceptional items up 121.3%), while the valuation conversation has to wait for the missing disclosure to catch back up.

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