SUPERBANK Superbank's First Full-Year Report Reveals a Rp1 Trillion Asset Sale to Its Old Owner

The First Year With the Full Notes Attached

PT Super Bank Indonesia's filing for the year ended December 31, 2024 is the first quarter in this blog's coverage backed by a complete audited annual report, rather than the bare regulatory publication banks file every quarter. The difference matters: this is where a consortium bank's real ownership history, related-party dependencies, and legacy-asset cleanup actually show up, none of which the quarterly filings disclose. The consortium itself is unchanged from prior quarters - Emtek's PT Elang Media Visitama (31.28%), Singtel Alpha Investments Pte. Ltd. (20.56%), Grab's PT Kudo Teknologi Indonesia (19.26%), A5-DB Holdings Pte. Ltd. (11.58%), and KakaoBank Corp. (10.00%) - and the audited statements were signed off by Siddharta Widjaja & Rekan (KPMG's Indonesian member firm) with an unqualified opinion dated March 17, 2025.

By the numbers Superbank itself highlighted, 2024 was a strong growth year: total assets more than doubled to Rp11.4 trillion (+105% YoY), loans grew 120% to Rp6.4 trillion, and third-party deposits jumped 436% to Rp4.9 trillion - largely on the back of Grab's app integration, which the bank credits directly for customer acquisition. Net interest margin^» improved to 7.88% from 7.18%, and gross NPL^» fell to 2.27% from 3.80%. What neither language version of the press release mentions is that Superbank still lost Rp366.4 billion for the full year - an improvement of only 4.9% from FY2023's Rp385.1 billion loss, despite net interest income more than doubling. The footnotes behind that headline turn out to be more interesting than the headline itself.

The Prescription

Superbank's FY2024 numbers show real progress on the two things that actually determine whether a digital bank survives its build-out phase: net interest margin held above 7.8% even as the loan book more than doubled, and the loan-to-deposit ratio^» fell from 316.89% to 130.01% as third-party deposits finally started funding a meaningful share of lending instead of shareholder capital. The move that compounds from here is pushing that funding mix further - at 130% LDR, Superbank is still lending out more than it holds in deposits, meaning further loan growth still needs either more deposits or more capital, and deposits are now growing fast enough (436% YoY) to be the cheaper of the two.

What it should stop doing: letting cost growth track loan-book growth roughly one-for-one. Personnel expense actually barely moved (Rp415.9 billion vs Rp414.9 billion YoY) but promotional expense more than tripled (Rp202.8 billion vs Rp6.2 billion) to fund the Grab-integration customer push - a reasonable one-time acquisition cost, but one that needs to taper as the customer base matures, or BOPO^» (still 148.63%, barely improved from 239.67% off an extreme base) will stay stuck well above the 100% break-even line for another year. A bank that's cut its capital-adequacy cushion by nearly half in twelve months (see below) doesn't have unlimited runway to keep growing into profitability at this pace.

Key Financial Metrics

FY2024 vs. FY2023 (P&L, year ended December 31), and Dec 2024 vs. Dec 2023 (balance sheet) - bank-only ("Individual")

FX: IDR 16,086 = USD 1 (December 31, 2024 close, applied throughout for consistency).

Metric	FY2024 (IDR)	FY2024 (USD)	FY2023 (IDR)	YoY
Net Interest Income ("Net Revenue" equivalent)	Rp609,500M	~$37.89M	Rp301,104M	✅ +102.4%
Operating Income	Rp(388,685)M	~-$24.17M	Rp(494,107)M	✅ loss narrowed 21.3%
Net Income	Rp(366,367)M	~-$22.78M	Rp(385,101)M	⚠️ loss narrowed just 4.9%

Balance sheet metric	Dec 2024 (IDR)	Dec 2024 (USD)	Dec 2023 (IDR)	YoY
Total Assets	Rp11,395,094M	~$708.4M	Rp5,556,074M	✅ +105.1%
Loans (Kredit yang diberikan)	Rp6,426,416M	~$399.5M	Rp2,920,823M	✅ +120.0%
Total Deposits (Giro + Tabungan + Deposito)	Rp4,942,826M	~$307.3M	Rp921,706M	✅ +436.2%
Total Liabilities	Rp6,147,562M	~$382.1M	Rp1,187,736M	✅ +417.5%
Total Equity	Rp5,247,532M	~$326.2M	Rp4,368,338M	✅ +20.1%

Superbank is a bank; Adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow aren't meaningful for a deposit-taking institution and are omitted, and the annual report's own cash flow statement (pages 5-6 per the table of contents) wasn't extracted for this post - the bank discloses no standalone "free cash flow" measure of its own in any case. Operating Income is the bank's disclosed "Laba (Rugi) Operasional" line (net interest income plus net non-interest result); net income narrowing by only 4.9% while operating income narrowed 21.3% reflects a smaller non-operating swing and a larger deferred-tax benefit in FY2023 than FY2024 - see Beyond the Usual below.

Net interest income more than doubled and the net loss barely moved - a cost base still scaling in step with the loan book, not yet a business with real operating leverage.

Key Operational Metrics

Funding & Liquidity

• Loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR^»): 130.01% (Dec 2024), down sharply from 316.89% (Dec 2023) - the single biggest structural improvement of the year, showing deposits are finally catching up to the loan book instead of the bank relying almost entirely on shareholder capital to fund lending.

Credit Quality

• NPL^» ratio - gross: 2.27% (Dec 2024), down from 3.80% (Dec 2023).
• NPL ratio - net: 0.35% (Dec 2024), down from 1.06% (Dec 2023).
• CAR^» / KPMM (capital adequacy): 95.84% (Dec 2024), down from 185.63% (Dec 2023) - nearly halved year-on-year, still almost ten times the regulatory minimum but the clearest sign of how fast rapid loan growth is consuming Superbank's capital base.

Profitability & Efficiency

• NIM^»: 7.88% (FY2024), up from 7.18% (FY2023) - well above what a conventional Indonesian bank earns, though still far short of the 16%+ margins SeaBank reported for the same year, a gap consistent with Superbank's more partnership/collaboration-driven lending mix (see Note 25 below) rather than SeaBank's high-yield micro-lending book.
• ROA: -4.93% (FY2024), improved from -10.86% (FY2023).
• ROE: -7.50% (FY2024), improved from -10.70% (FY2023).
• BOPO^»: 148.63% (FY2024), improved from 239.67% (FY2023).
• Cost-to-Income Ratio^» (CIR): 139.16% (FY2024), improved from 209.33% (FY2023).

For comparison, SeaBank Indonesia closed the same year already solidly profitable (Rp378.8 billion net income, +56.9% YoY, 6.93% ROE) on a balance sheet roughly three times Superbank's size. Superbank remains earlier in the same trajectory: a fully consortium-funded digital bank still working through its initial loss-making build-out, one year behind where SeaBank already was.

Beyond the Usual

The old Bank Fama headquarters was sold to a former shareholder for Rp221.0 billion

The annual report's Note 14 discloses that in November 2023, Superbank agreed to sell its Bandung head-office land and building - the physical legacy of the bank's pre-2021 life as PT Bank Fama International - to a former shareholder, PT Surya Putra Mandiri Sejahtera, for Rp220,986M. The agreement required the buyer to place a deposit equal to the full transaction value before closing. The sale completed in February 2024, netting Superbank Rp197,971M after a Rp21,040M impairment and selling costs, with the associated Rp6,456M fixed-asset revaluation reserve moved directly to retained earnings. This is a clean, disclosed wind-down of the bank's old physical footprint as it becomes a fully app-based digital lender - genuinely interesting color a reader wouldn't get from either the quarterly filings or the press release, and not evidence of anything irregular, but worth knowing when a former owner shows up as the counterparty on a nine-figure transaction.

KakaoBank's 2023 entry priced its stake at more than 3.5x the shares' nominal value

Note 19 discloses that when KakaoBank Corp. subscribed for 2,653,551,303 new shares in September 2023 (the transaction that brought it to a 10.05% stake at the time), it paid Rp924,412M above the shares' Rp265,355M nominal value - a premium of roughly 3.5 times face value, booked entirely as additional paid-in capital. None of Superbank's quarterly filings before this annual report broke out that premium separately from the rest of the bank's paid-in capital movements; it only becomes visible with the full footnote disclosure. The premium is a reasonable proxy for how the consortium itself was valuing Superbank's equity at the point KakaoBank joined, a full year before the bank's app relaunched publicly in June 2024.

Related-party funding fell from over a third of liabilities to almost none

Superbank's Note 25 shows deposits from related parties (shareholders, their affiliated companies, and key management) fell from Rp416,183M - 35.04% of total liabilities - at the end of 2023 to just Rp137,606M, or 2.24% of total liabilities, by the end of 2024. Related-party loans stayed roughly flat at Rp134,710M (1.18% of total assets). This is the clearest footnote-level evidence that Superbank's 436% deposit growth this year is genuinely third-party retail money, not shareholders and affiliates recycling funds through the bank's own balance sheet to make its deposit base look bigger than it is.

Employees are being paid partly in equity through a dedicated share trust

Note 19 discloses that Superbank has issued incentive shares to "certain employees" under a long-term incentive program in at least three tranches since mid-2023 (373,204,000 shares in August 2023, at a Rp19,216M fair value against a nominal value of just Rp373M; a further 126,796,000 shares in April 2024, generating Rp6,402M of additional paid-in capital), with the shares held on employees' behalf through a vehicle called Bersama Sustainability Trust rather than issued to individuals directly. The fair-value-over-nominal difference is booked as personnel expense each time - a real, disclosed labor cost, not a free source of retention the headline personnel-expense line alone would suggest.

The 2023 loss carryforward is still growing the bank's deferred tax asset

Deferred tax assets rose to Rp199,356M at the end of 2024 from Rp167,241M a year earlier, continuing to reflect Superbank's accumulated tax losses carried forward against profits it expects to earn in future periods. A deferred tax asset that keeps growing precisely because the bank keeps posting losses is a completely standard accounting treatment, not a red flag on its own - but it's a footnote-level reminder that FY2024's narrower loss, not yet a profit, is still adding to the pile of tax losses this asset represents.

Two years of strong headline growth still haven't produced a profitable bank

Both the Indonesian and English press releases for this filing lead entirely with growth metrics - assets, loans, deposits, NIM, capital ratio - and neither mentions that Superbank remains loss-making for the second straight full year, with net loss narrowing only 4.9% despite net interest income more than doubling. This is the same framing pattern flagged in the September 2024 post: genuinely strong operational growth presented without any acknowledgment that the bottom line barely moved.

Target Valuation Range

No numeric valuation range is computable for Superbank: it has no independently traded equity or debt, so no share price, market cap, or P/E/P/B multiple exists to anchor one.

Superbank has no independently traded equity or debt - its shareholders are a fixed consortium of strategic investors (Emtek, Singtel, Grab, KakaoBank, and several smaller Indonesian holding entities), and none has floated any portion of the bank publicly. Note 19's disclosure of KakaoBank's 2023 share premium gives a rough sense of how the consortium itself valued the bank's equity at that point in time, but a single capital-raise premium from over a year before this filing isn't a current valuation and shouldn't be treated as one. There is no share price, no market capitalization, and no P/E or P/B multiple that can honestly be built for this entity, so none is estimated here.

FY2024 shows Superbank executing the acquisition and funding-mix side of the digital-bank playbook about as well as a two-year-old bank can - the open question, going into 2025, is whether cost discipline can catch up to growth before the capital cushion that's been absorbing the losses runs materially thinner.

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