SUPA Superbank Went Public at Rp635 a Share. The Market Priced It 47% Higher Within Two Weeks.

From First Profitable Quarter to First Public Shareholders, in the Same Year

Superbank's FY2025 - covering the year ended December 31, 2025, audited by Siddharta Widjaja & Rekan (KPMG International) and signed March 9-11, 2026 - closes out a year that opened with Q1's first-ever profitable quarter, carried through Q2's first-ever half-year profit and Q3's eased loan-to-deposit ratio, and ends with the bank no longer private at all. On December 17, 2025, PT Super Bank Indonesia Tbk listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange under the ticker SUPA, issuing 4,406,612,300 new shares (13% of post-IPO capital) at Rp635 per share - a Rp2.79 trillion gross offering, Rp2.73 trillion after issuance costs. The listing also pushed Superbank up a regulatory tier, into the KBMI^» 2 core-capital bracket from KBMI 1.

The stock didn't sit at its offer price. By the last trading day of 2025 (December 30), SUPA closed at Rp935 - up 47.2% from the Rp635 offering price in under two weeks of trading. For the full year, Superbank posted its first-ever annual profit (Rp99.7 billion, on profit before tax of Rp143.3 billion), a reversal from FY2024's Rp366.4 billion loss. But the balance sheet questions flagged in the two quarters before the IPO haven't gone away: CASA^» funding is still stuck near a fifth of total deposits, gross NPL is higher than a year ago, and - despite the fresh IPO capital - the bank's capital adequacy ratio actually fell year-on-year, because risk-weighted assets grew even faster than the new capital did.

The Prescription

Superbank should use the post-IPO capital cushion and its new KBMI 2 status to do the thing its funding mix has needed since Q2: build real CASA share, not just grow total deposits. The Rp2.73 trillion in net IPO proceeds and a freshly-public brand are exactly the kind of trust signal that should make a retail current-account and savings pitch land better with Indonesian consumers than a private, little-known digital bank could manage - Superbank now has the credibility to compete for cheap deposits directly, not just through Grab/OVO ecosystem plumbing.

What it should stop doing: treating "third-party funds grew 139% YoY" as the headline funding metric when the composition hasn't shifted. CASA sat at roughly 21% of deposits in Q2 and Q3 2025, and FY2025's own year-end mix (Rp2.53 trillion CASA against Rp9.30 trillion Deposito) shows the same 21.4% split - a full year of "ecosystem-based savings innovation" messaging hasn't moved this number at all. A newly public bank that keeps citing total deposit growth while its actual funding mix stays exactly where it was as a private company is postponing, not solving, its cost-of-funds problem.

Key Financial Metrics

FY2025 vs. FY2024 (P&L, year ended December 31), and Dec 2025 vs. Dec 2024 (balance sheet) - bank-only ("Individual")

FX: IDR 16,709 = USD 1 (December 31, 2025 close, applied throughout for consistency).

Metric	FY2025 (IDR)	FY2025 (USD)	FY2024 (IDR)	YoY
Net Interest Income ("Net Revenue" equivalent)	Rp1,580,354M	~$94.6M	Rp609,500M	✅ +159.3%
Operating Income	Rp143,875M	~$8.6M	Rp(388,685)M	✅ swung to profit
Profit Before Tax	Rp143,273M	~$8.6M	Rp(391,193)M	✅ swung to profit
Net Income	Rp99,684M	~$6.0M	Rp(366,367)M	✅ swung to profit

Balance sheet metric	Dec 2025 (IDR)	Dec 2025 (USD)	Dec 2024 (IDR)	YoY
Total Assets	Rp21,282,312M	~$1.27B	Rp11,395,094M	✅ +86.8%
Loans (Kredit yang diberikan)	Rp9,618,259M	~$576M	Rp6,426,416M	✅ +49.7%
Total Deposits (Giro + Tabungan + Deposito)	Rp11,827,129M	~$708M	Rp4,942,826M	✅ +139.3%
Total Liabilities	Rp13,117,718M	~$785M	Rp6,147,562M	✅ +113.4%
Total Equity	Rp8,164,594M	~$489M	Rp5,247,532M	✅ +55.6%

A bank has no Adjusted EBITDA, and free cash flow/total cash aren't available - this remains the bare regulatory publication format Indonesian banks are required to file, with no accompanying cash flow statement even in the annual filing. All figures above are the bank's own audited "Individual" (bank-only) basis, matching the prior two quarters' convention.

Total assets grew 86.8% and net interest income grew 159.3%, but almost all of the balance-sheet growth is funded by higher-cost Deposito - CASA's share of total deposits hasn't moved from roughly a fifth of the book all year.

Key Operational Metrics

Funding & Liquidity

• Loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR): 81.32% (Dec 2025), down from 130.01% (Dec 2024) and down from Q3's 92.06% - the healthiest year-end reading in this filing history, as deposit growth outpaced loan growth over H2 2025.
• CASA ratio (derived: Giro + Tabungan ÷ total DPK): 21.4% (Rp2,528,697M of Rp11,827,129M) - essentially identical to Q2's 21.2% and Q3's 20.9%. A full year of quarterly filings shows no meaningful shift in funding composition despite deposits nearly tripling in absolute terms.

Credit Quality

• NPL ratio - gross: 2.60% (Dec 2025), up from 2.27% (Dec 2024) - worse year-on-year, though down from Q3's 2.83% within the year.
• NPL ratio - net: 0.68% (Dec 2025), up from 0.35% (Dec 2024) - also worse year-on-year, continuing the deterioration flagged in Q3's post.
• CAR / KPMM: 93.24% (Dec 2025), down from 95.84% (Dec 2024) - see Beyond the Usual for why this fell despite the IPO's Rp2.73 trillion capital injection.

Profitability & Efficiency

• NIM: 10.64% (FY2025), up from 7.88% (FY2024) - unchanged from Q3's 10.64%, suggesting Q4 alone held margin roughly flat rather than expanding further.
• ROA: 0.92% (Dec 2025), up from -4.93% (Dec 2024).
• ROE: 1.97% (Dec 2025), up from -7.50% (Dec 2024) - the first full year of positive ROE in this filing history, though still thin, and now measured against a much larger equity base after the IPO diluted existing per-share economics.
• BOPO: 93.53% (Dec 2025), down from 148.63% (Dec 2024).
• Cost-to-Income Ratio (CIR): 70.52% (Dec 2025), down from 139.16% (Dec 2024) - essentially flat against Q3's 70.14%, consistent with NIM's flat readout above.

Not available in this filing: a segment or product-level loan breakdown beyond the retail/UMKM split, and any deposit-cost (funding rate) disclosure.

Trailing Quarters: A Full Year of the Same Funding Pattern

Quarter	Net Interest Income (cumulative, IDR bn)	Net Income (cumulative, IDR bn)	LDR	CASA Ratio	Gross NPL
H1 2025	667.4	20.5	99.09%	21.2%	2.70%
9M 2025	1,101.1	60.1	92.06%	20.9%	2.83%
FY2025	1,580.4	99.7	81.32%	21.4%	2.60%

Every income-statement line in this filing is a cumulative year-to-date figure, so the trailing view above shows the same pattern each of the four Recursive Gains posts on this bank has now confirmed: profitability keeps improving every period, LDR moves around depending on which side (loans or deposits) grows faster in a given stretch, and CASA hasn't budged from roughly a fifth of total funding all year.

Beyond the Usual

Capital adequacy fell year-on-year despite a Rp2.73 trillion IPO capital injection

Tier 1 core capital rose 57.8% year-on-year (Rp4.81 trillion to Rp7.60 trillion), reflecting the December IPO proceeds landing just before year-end. But the KPMM (capital adequacy) ratio still fell, from 95.84% to 93.24%, because risk-weighted assets grew even faster - up 62.2% to Rp8.25 trillion as the loan book scaled through the year. This isn't a governance or disclosure issue; it's simple arithmetic that a reader skimming only the "IPO raised Rp2.73 trillion" headline could easily miss. Even at 93.24%, the ratio remains extraordinarily high (over 9x the regulatory minimum) by any bank's standards - the point worth flagging is the direction, not the level.

Reliance on related-party spending fell sharply, a genuine governance improvement

Related-party transactions accounted for 7.47% of total general and administrative expense in FY2025, down from 36.40% in FY2024 - a real reduction in a bank whose earliest cost base leaned heavily on payments to its own shareholder-affiliated entities (PT Elang Media Visitama, PT Kudo Teknologi Indonesia, and others). Related-party loans also fell to 0.36% of total assets (from 1.18%), and related-party time deposits fell to 0.25% of total liabilities (from 1.84%). Unlike SeaBank's FY2025 filing, where 82% of Giro turned out to be related-party funded, Superbank's related-party exposure is modest and shrinking across every category this filing discloses.

A pre-IPO reverse stock split reclassified capital without changing the balance sheet total

Ahead of the IPO, a November 11, 2025 notarial deed executed a share-premium capitalization and reverse stock split of all Series B shares, moving Rp64.35 billion from share premium (agio) into issued share capital - a Rp64.35 billion increase in "Modal disetor" offset by an equal decrease in "Agio saham," with no net change to total equity. This is a standard pre-listing cosmetic step (aligning share count and par value for the offering), not a capital event in itself, but it explains why the paid-in-capital and share-premium lines both move in the notes without a matching change in the balance sheet's own equity total.

Key management compensation rose faster than net income

Compensation and benefits for the Board of Commissioners, Board of Directors, and executive officers totaled Rp148.2 billion in FY2025, up 11.4% from Rp132.9 billion in FY2024 - a smaller percentage increase than net income's swing from loss to Rp99.7 billion profit, but worth tracking in a bank that only became profitable this year and is now under public-company scrutiny for the first time.

A newly-public shareholder bought aggressively in the two months right after the reporting date

The subsequent-events note discloses that A5-DB Holdings Pte. Ltd. - already an existing shareholder holding 10.03% at year-end - acquired 362,716,600 shares on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in January 2026, followed by a further 1,582,895,025 shares in February 2026. Both transactions are disclosed as transfers between existing shareholders rather than new capital raised by the bank, but the scale is notable: 1.95 billion shares is roughly 5.7% of Superbank's total shares outstanding, bought on-market within two months of the IPO's first trading day. Neither filing states who sold, or why.

Intangible-asset spending from related parties nearly doubled, holding steady as a share of total assets

Intangible assets acquired from related parties rose to Rp101.4 billion in FY2025 from Rp52.8 billion in FY2024 - a near-doubling in absolute terms - but held flat at 0.48% (from 0.46%) as a share of total assets, since the balance sheet itself grew just as fast. This is consistent with continued technology/platform spending tied to shareholder-affiliated vendors as the bank scales, not a disproportionate related-party dependency.

The commitments and contingencies note stays small and simple

Unused committed loan facilities were Rp400.0 billion at year-end (down slightly from Rp425.8 billion a year earlier), with no guarantees given or received, no letters of credit, and - as in every prior quarter this blog has covered - no FX or interest-rate derivative positions of any kind. No litigation, tax dispute, or contingent liability is disclosed anywhere in the notes. For a bank that just completed an IPO and a KBMI tier upgrade in the same year, this is a genuinely uncomplicated commitments footnote.

Target Valuation Range

A conventional-bank anchor (1.0x-1.5x book) puts fair value at roughly Rp241-361/share (~Rp8.16-12.24 trillion, ~$0.49-0.73 billion) - Superbank, at Rp935/share (~Rp31.7 trillion, ~$1.90 billion), trades well above even the top of that band. A genuine valuation range beyond this anchor isn't buildable yet: there's no multi-year public earnings history, no analyst consensus to reverse-engineer growth expectations from, and only around two weeks of trading data as of this filing's period-end - but the first move was decisively upward, not down.

Superbank now has a real, if extremely young, public market to work with.

Market cap / book value	FY2025 (Dec 2025)
Share price (period-end)	Rp935
Shares outstanding	33,897,017,650
Market capitalization	Rp31.7 trillion (~$1.90B)
Book equity (FY2025)	Rp8.16 trillion
P/B	~3.9x

Peer-multiple sanity check	FY2025 (Dec 2025)
Net income (FY2025)	Rp99.7 billion
Market capitalization	Rp31.7 trillion (~$1.90B)
P/E	~318x
P/B	~3.9x

That P/E is not a useful multiple on its own: most of FY2025's profit came from a bank that was still loss-making a year earlier, and the market is clearly pricing in the growth trajectory (86.8% asset growth, first full year of profitability) rather than trailing earnings. The P/B multiple of roughly 3.9x is a more grounded starting point - a meaningful premium to book for a bank still building out its deposit franchise, and one that assumes continued execution on the CASA problem flagged throughout this post.

A genuine DCF or reverse-DCF isn't buildable yet: there's no multi-year public earnings history, no analyst consensus to reverse-engineer growth expectations from, and only around two weeks of trading data as of this filing's period-end. Revisit this section once Superbank has several quarters of public trading and disclosed earnings guidance to work from.

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