SWIGGY Two Straight Quarters of a Shrinking Loss, Bought With an 11.5% Dilution and a Quick-Commerce Business Going the Wrong Way

The Loss Keeps Shrinking. The Segment That's Supposed to Justify the Valuation Doesn't.

For a second consecutive quarter, Swiggy's consolidated net loss narrowed sequentially: Rs. 1,065 crore for the quarter ended December 31, 2025, down from Rs. 1,092 crore in the September quarter and Rs. 1,197 crore in the June quarter - the first genuine multi-quarter trend of sequential improvement this backfill has recorded. The year-over-year comparison improved even more sharply: the loss widened 33.3% against the year-ago quarter, a real deceleration from the 74.4% year-over-year widening reported last quarter.

Read only the headline, and the story is one of a maturing business finally bending its loss curve. Read the segment table, and a different story sits underneath it: Quick Commerce - Instamart, the segment central to Swiggy's entire long-term valuation case - had its worst quarter yet on both directions at once. Its segment loss widened to -Rs. 791 crore from -Rs. 739 crore quarter-over-quarter (a 7.0% deterioration) and from -Rs. 528 crore a year earlier (49.8% worse), while its own revenue growth decelerated sharply - up only 3.7% quarter-over-quarter, its slowest sequential pace in this backfill, and 76.1% year-over-year, down from 100.0% last quarter and 115.5% the quarter before that. Analyst Sachin Salgaonkar of Bank of America put the tension to CFO Rahul Bothra directly on the call: "When we look at the revenue growth, it's lower as compared to the last few quarters. When we look at absolute losses, it's actually higher."

What actually narrowed the consolidated loss this quarter wasn't Quick Commerce getting better - it was everything around it. Food Delivery's profit grew again, Supply Chain and Distribution's loss kept shrinking, other income rose, and share-based payment expense fell. Layered on top, two long-running corporate-action threads from last quarter's post both resolved this quarter: the Rapido stake sale proceeds were actually received, and the QIP^» capital raise actually happened - Rs. 10,000 crore at Rs. 375 a share, diluting existing shareholders by roughly 11.5%. See Beyond the Usual below for both, plus a newly surfaced footnote about an old, previously undisclosed embezzlement incident and a real disclosure step-down this quarter.

The Prescription

Instamart CEO Amitesh Jha said something worth holding the company to on this call: "we are not going to throw good money at bad growth... we may compromise bad growth and something that we are willing to do as well because we don't believe that is going to be a sustainable advantage in the future." That's the right instinct, and Swiggy should keep acting on it - refusing to chase order-count growth from customers who show no retention, even while a well-capitalized rival reportedly keeps discounting harder. The one place this quarter actually demonstrates the instinct in numbers, not just words, is the admitted reversal of the sub-Rs. 299 no-fee campaign: CFO Rahul Bothra confirmed it cost "in the zipcode" of Rs. 70-80 crore in reported revenue and EBITDA, found "limited adoption and retention," and is already being wound back. Correctly identifying and killing a failed experiment inside a single quarter, rather than nursing it for another two, is exactly the discipline a company burning this much cash needs to show more of.

What it should stop doing: treating a full investor presentation as optional. Every one of the last several quarters in this backfill included a corporate deck disclosing Instamart's net new dark stores, GOV^», contribution margin^» as a percentage of GOV, and store footprint - the actual evidence base a reader needs to judge whether "we are being disciplined" is true or just asserted. This quarter, for the first time in the second half of this backfill, no such deck exists among the documents Swiggy made available, and the same quarter happens to be the one where Quick Commerce's own numbers went the wrong way and a CFO had to describe positive-contribution stores using a redefined unit ("polygon," not "store") that isn't directly comparable to the 25% figure disclosed last quarter. A company asking shareholders to accept a diluted share count and a widening quick-commerce loss on faith that the underlying trend is fine owes those same shareholders the disclosure that would let them check it.

Key Financial Metrics

Q3 FY26 (quarter ended December 31, 2025) vs. Q2 FY26 (quarter ended September 30, 2025) vs. Q3 FY25 (quarter ended December 31, 2024) - consolidated, Ind AS, unaudited (limited review), reported in INR crore and USD

USD figures use each period's own period-end INR/USD rate: Rs. 89.7694/$1 for December 31, 2025; Rs. 88.8407/$1 for September 30, 2025; Rs. 85.7866/$1 for December 31, 2024.

Metric	Q3 FY26	Q2 FY26	Q3 FY25	YoY	QoQ
Revenue from Operations	Rs. 6,148cr ($684.9M)	Rs. 5,561cr ($626.0M)	Rs. 3,993cr ($465.4M)	✅ +54.0%	✅ +10.5%
Total Income (incl. other income)	Rs. 6,244cr ($695.6M)	Rs. 5,620cr ($632.6M)	Rs. 4,096cr ($477.4M)	✅ +52.4%	✅ +11.1%
Operating Loss¹	-Rs. 1,054cr (-$117.4M)	-Rs. 1,091cr (-$122.8M)	-Rs. 802cr (-$93.5M)	⚠️ Widened by 31.4%	✅ Narrowed by 3.4%
Net Loss (Loss for the period)	-Rs. 1,065cr (-$118.7M)	-Rs. 1,092cr (-$122.9M)	-Rs. 799cr (-$93.1M)	⚠️ Widened by 33.3%	✅ Narrowed by 2.5%

¹ Reconstructed the same way as every prior quarter's post: Total Income minus Total Expenses, before share of loss of an associate^», exceptional items, and tax. Swiggy's filed statutory statements still don't disclose this as a line item.

Adjusted EBITDA^» isn't recorded in this table this quarter: last quarter's post flagged the corporate presentation's first-ever full consolidated Adjusted EBITDA reconciliation as a genuine disclosure upgrade - and this quarter has no corporate presentation at all among the documents Swiggy made available, so no equivalent figure exists to cite (see Beyond the Usual below). No balance sheet or cash-flow statement was filed this quarter either, consistent with SEBI Listing Regulations requiring both only at half-year and year-end dates - the same gap flagged for the June 2025 quarter. Total cash and free cash flow for this specific quarter aren't independently verifiable from a filed document, even though this was almost certainly Swiggy's best quarter yet for cash generation on paper: the QIP brought in Rs. 10,000 crore and the Rapido sale proceeds of Rs. 2,399 crore were actually received during the quarter (see Beyond the Usual). One analyst on the call, Vijit Jain of Citi, referenced a cash balance of "almost $2 billion" - an unverified, verbally-stated figure from the call, not a number in the Statement itself, and should be read with that caveat.

Total segment result across all five segments came to -Rs. 549 crore this quarter - worse year-over-year (-Rs. 416 crore in Q3 FY25, a 32.0% deterioration) and essentially flat quarter-over-quarter (-Rs. 545 crore in Q2 FY26, a 0.7% deterioration). That's a meaningfully different picture than the headline net loss narrowing: the net loss improved because of items below the segment-result line (higher other income, lower share-based payment expense), not because the underlying businesses collectively got better - see Segment Comparison below for the full breakdown.

Key Operational Metrics

Disclosed on the Q3 FY26 earnings call - no investor presentation deck was available as a downloadable source for this quarter, a step down from the prior two quarters (see Beyond the Usual)

Metric	Q3 FY26	Change
Food Delivery GOV growth (management's own framing)	+20.5% YoY	✅ Accelerated from +18.8% YoY the prior two quarters
Food Delivery MTU» growth	+22% YoY	New disclosure this quarter
Food Delivery contribution margin (QoQ change)	+30 bps	⚠️ Slower pace than the +40bps reported last quarter
Instamart contribution margin per order	-Rs. 19/order	⚠️ "Worsened," per analyst Ankur Rudra of JPMorgan, not disputed by CFO Rahul Bothra
Instamart contribution-margin-positive footprint	~30-35% of "polygons"	Redefined from "~25% of stores" last quarter - not a clean like-for-like comparison (see Beyond the Usual)
Instamart contribution-margin breakeven guidance	"AMJ'26" (Apr-Jun 2026)	✅ Held for a third consecutive quarter
No-fee (sub-Rs. 299) campaign cost	"zipcode" of ~Rs. 70-80cr reported revenue/EBITDA, per CFO	⚠️ Confirmed as a failed experiment, already being scaled back
Domestic shareholder base	~47%	✅ Up from >43% last quarter, aided by the QIP's domestic-heavy allocation

Since no corporate presentation exists this quarter, the granular Instamart metrics that filled this table in the prior two quarters' posts - net new dark stores, GOV, footprint in cities and square footage, orders per dark store per day - aren't available from any document Swiggy made available this quarter. What is available comes entirely from the call, and it paints a genuinely mixed picture: Food Delivery's GOV growth actually accelerated to 20.5% year-over-year (from 18.8% the prior two quarters) even as management kept its 18-20% guidance range unchanged, with CEO of Food Marketplace Rohit Kapoor saying the company would "like to watch it another quarter maybe" before getting more confident, but that "at least at the input level we are feeling more confident about hovering near the upper end of the range." Instamart, by contrast, saw analyst Ankur Rudra state on the call that contribution margin per order had "worsened to INR19 per order this time" - a claim CFO Rahul Bothra didn't dispute, instead redirecting to a redefined unit of measurement (see Beyond the Usual below).

Food Delivery

Food Delivery's segment result came to Rs. 282 crore this quarter - up 12.4% quarter-over-quarter from Rs. 251 crore in Q2 FY26, and up 46.1% year-over-year from Rs. 193 crore in Q3 FY25. Segment revenue grew 24.7% year-over-year (Rs. 1,635cr to Rs. 2,039cr) and 6.1% quarter-over-quarter, a step up from last quarter's revenue growth rate and consistent with GOV growth accelerating to 20.5% year-over-year, per CEO of Food Marketplace Rohit Kapoor's own framing on the call. This is now the fourth consecutive quarter of year-over-year profit growth for the segment in this backfill.

Contribution margin improved 30 basis points quarter-over-quarter - a smaller gain than the 40 basis points reported last quarter, though CFO Rahul Bothra reiterated the medium-term 4.5%-5% Adjusted EBITDA margin (as a percentage of GOV) guidance without committing to a date, noting "over the last four quarters, you may have observed that we've added 70 basis points on operating leverage." Kapoor attributed the improvement to a mix of roughly seven or eight cost components rather than delivery-worker cost cuts specifically, and addressed India's incoming Labour Codes directly, saying the company sees "no shock element" and expects "a small impact" that would be "a pass-through impact and therefore no impact on our P&L."

Quick Commerce (Instamart)

Instamart's segment revenue grew 76.1% year-over-year (Rs. 577cr to Rs. 1,016cr) and just 3.7% quarter-over-quarter - its slowest sequential growth in this backfill, down from 21.6% last quarter and 17.0% the quarter before that. Its segment loss widened on both counts this quarter, unlike the prior quarter's sequential narrowing: down to -Rs. 791 crore from -Rs. 739 crore quarter-over-quarter (a 7.0% deterioration) and from -Rs. 528 crore a year earlier (49.8% worse).

CFO Rahul Bothra framed this as the deliberate cost of a competitive response, not a loss of discipline: "we called out that this would be the peak of the investments. And from here on, gradually, you will see that reduction happening." He and CEO of Instamart Amitesh Jha both attributed the widening loss to elevated marketing and cart-level discounting spend against what Jha called continued "irrationality in the market," while drawing a hard line against "throw[ing] good money at bad growth" - a distinction the two executives repeated to nearly every analyst who pushed on the trade-off between growth and contribution-margin breakeven. Jha reiterated the "AMJ'26" (April-June 2026) contribution-margin breakeven guidance without moving the date, the third consecutive quarter this specific guidance window has held without slipping, after holding for the first time in the June 2025 quarter.

One concrete example of the "bad growth" management now says it's pulling back from: a sub-Rs. 299 no-fee delivery campaign, which analyst Sudheer Guntupalli of Kotak Mahindra noted in the shareholders' letter had consumed roughly 90 basis points of contribution-margin improvement. Asked to confirm the resulting hit to reported revenue and EBITDA was "in the zipcode" of Rs. 70-80 crore, Bothra agreed, declining to give a more precise number but confirming "most of the gains got reinvested" into the campaign after management saw "limited adoption and retention" among the new users it targeted. On the broader structural-improvement path, Bothra separately reiterated a three-quarter target of 260 basis points of contribution-margin gain, with "250 basis points" of that target still to be delivered "over the next two quarters" through a mix of reversing campaigns like this one and further cost discipline.

Asked how much of Instamart's footprint is now contribution-margin positive, Bothra gave an answer that doesn't map cleanly onto last quarter's disclosed figure of "~25% of stores": "the store itself is not a determinant or a unit of our P&L, right? So while we talk in the sense of a store, what we really look at is a polygon... today, that number would be closer to 30%-35%." See Beyond the Usual below for why this redefinition matters for comparability.

Supply Chain and Distribution

This B2B segment - warehousing, logistics, and distribution services run substantially through the Lynks business - grew revenue 76.1% year-over-year (Rs. 1,693cr to Rs. 2,981cr) and 16.4% quarter-over-quarter, again the fastest revenue growth of any segment. Its segment loss narrowed sharply on both counts: down 87.3% year-over-year (-Rs. 63cr to -Rs. 8cr) and 55.6% quarter-over-quarter from -Rs. 18 crore in Q2 FY26 - continuing the improvement flagged last quarter and now the segment's best quarter yet by a wide margin. As in the prior two quarters, neither management nor analysts spent material time on this segment on the call.

Out-of-Home Consumption

Out-of-Home Consumption (Dineout's restaurant reservations and payments, plus Scenes'/SteppinOut's ticketed events) posted its fourth consecutive profitable quarter, at +Rs. 8 crore - up 33.3% quarter-over-quarter from +Rs. 6 crore in Q2 FY26, and a continued swing from a -Rs. 8 crore loss a year earlier. Segment revenue grew 56.1% year-over-year (Rs. 66cr to Rs. 103cr) and 17.0% quarter-over-quarter, continuing the growth trajectory first described as this segment's turnaround. This remains the smallest consumer-facing segment by revenue, but it's now four straight quarters of genuine profitability.

Platform Innovations

Platform Innovations - the incubator segment for Private Brands, Swiggy Genie, Swiggy Minis, Insanely Good, Swiggy Sports, Snacc, Pyng, and Toing - continued shrinking on revenue: down 59.1% year-over-year to Rs. 9 crore and 25.0% quarter-over-quarter from Rs. 12 crore. Segment loss narrowed quarter-over-quarter (-Rs. 45cr to -Rs. 40cr, an 11.1% improvement) but widened sharply year-over-year (-Rs. 10cr to -Rs. 40cr, a 300.0% deterioration) - broadly the same pattern flagged last quarter: a small, shrinking-revenue segment still absorbing a meaningfully larger loss than a year ago even as it improves sequentially.

Segment Comparison

Consolidated segment revenue and result, quarter ended December 31, 2025 vs. September 30, 2025 vs. December 31, 2024

Segment	Revenue (Q3 FY26)	Revenue YoY	Segment Result (Q3 FY26)	Segment Result (Q2 FY26)	Segment Result (Q3 FY25)
Food Delivery	Rs. 2,039cr	✅ +24.7%	✅ +Rs. 282cr	+Rs. 251cr	+Rs. 193cr
Quick Commerce	Rs. 1,016cr	⚠️ +76.1% (decelerating)	⚠️ -Rs. 791cr	-Rs. 739cr	-Rs. 528cr
Supply Chain & Distribution	Rs. 2,981cr	✅ +76.1%	✅ -Rs. 8cr	-Rs. 18cr	-Rs. 63cr
Out-of-Home Consumption	Rs. 103cr	✅ +56.1%	✅ +Rs. 8cr	+Rs. 6cr	-Rs. 8cr
Platform Innovations	Rs. 9cr	⚠️ -59.1%	⚠️ -Rs. 40cr	-Rs. 45cr	-Rs. 10cr
Total	Rs. 6,148cr	+54.0%	-Rs. 549cr	-Rs. 545cr	-Rs. 416cr

Total revenue growth of 54.0% year-over-year is essentially unchanged from the 54.4% reported last quarter, but the composition shifted: Quick Commerce's revenue growth decelerated meaningfully (76.1% this quarter, down from 100.0% and 115.5% the two prior quarters), while Supply Chain & Distribution held its pace at 76.1% and Food Delivery's actually accelerated to 24.7%. On segment results, three of five segments (Food Delivery, Supply Chain & Distribution, Out-of-Home Consumption) improved on both counts again, matching last quarter's pattern - but Quick Commerce broke from that pattern this time, worsening on both counts after narrowing sequentially last quarter, and it's the largest-loss segment by a wide margin, so its reversal outweighs the other four segments' collective improvement in the total-segment-result line.

Beyond the Usual

Both threads flagged last quarter as unresolved - the Rapido sale and the QIP - closed this quarter

Last quarter's post tracked the Rs. 2,399 crore Rapido stake sale as signed but still pending Competition Commission and shareholder approval, and a QIP board meeting called the same quarter management said no raise was needed. Both resolved this quarter. The Rapido sale received shareholder approval via postal ballot on November 1, 2025, and this filing states the Company "has received the sale consideration" subsequent to the December 31, 2025 quarter-end - the cash is actually in hand. Separately, during the quarter Swiggy allotted 26,66,66,663 equity shares to Qualified Institutional Buyers at Rs. 375 per share (a Rs. 374 premium to the Rs. 1 face value), raising Rs. 10,000 crore and diluting the roughly 232 crore shares outstanding at the end of the prior quarter by approximately 11.5%. The Rs. 375 issue price was itself a discount of roughly 11.3% to the Rs. 422.95 closing price recorded at the end of the prior quarter. CFO Rahul Bothra also confirmed on this call that the QIP's heavier domestic-investor allocation pushed Swiggy's domestic shareholder base to "roughly 47%," up from the ">43%" disclosed last quarter as the threshold being tracked toward an eventual conversion to an inventory-led model (an IOCC^» structure).

The company's own footprint metric for Instamart profitability changed units mid-thread, without a reconciling comparison

Last quarter, CFO Rahul Bothra disclosed that "~25%" of Instamart's active stores were contribution-margin positive. This quarter, asked the same question, Bothra answered in a different unit entirely: "the store itself is not a determinant or a unit of our P&L, right? So while we talk in the sense of a store, what we really look at is a polygon... today, that number would be closer to 30%-35%." A polygon - a geographic delivery zone that may be served by more than one dark store - isn't the same denominator as a store count, so the jump from 25% to 30-35% isn't a clean, directly comparable improvement, even though it was presented in direct response to a question about the same underlying metric. Nothing here suggests the redefinition was made to flatter the number, but a reader relying on this figure to track Instamart's path to breakeven should treat the two quarters' answers as measuring different things, not as one number improving into the next.

No investor presentation deck exists this quarter, removing the granular Instamart disclosures the prior two quarters' posts relied on

Last quarter's post specifically flagged Swiggy's corporate presentation as a genuine disclosure upgrade - the first quarter with a full segment-by-segment Adjusted EBITDA reconciliation. This quarter, no corporate presentation exists among the documents Swiggy made available at all. That means several metrics that appeared in each of the prior several quarters' posts - Instamart's net new dark stores, GOV, footprint (cities, square footage), contribution margin as a percentage of GOV, and orders per dark store per day - simply aren't independently verifiable this quarter from any company document, only from scattered, qualitative references on the call. This is precisely the quarter in which Quick Commerce's segment result worsened on both counts and its own contribution-margin-positive metric changed units (see above) - the quarter a reader most needs the granular deck, and the quarter it wasn't provided.

An embezzlement incident from nearly two years ago surfaces for the first time, through an insurance-recovery footnote

A new note in this quarter's consolidated results states that "the Group received Rs. 31 crore under its Employee Dishonesty Insurance Policy (Crime policy), against a claim of Rs. 33 crore, in respect of an embezzlement incident reported during the financial year ended March 31, 2024." Nothing in this backfill's earlier posts - covering the September 2024 quarter onward - found any prior disclosure of this incident; it surfaces here only because the insurance recovery happened to land in this quarter's results, as Other Income. No detail is given on the nature, scale, or resolution of the underlying embezzlement itself beyond the claim and recovery amounts. The insurance recovery covering roughly 94% of the claimed loss, and the incident predating this backfill by more than a year, both point toward a contained, already-resolved matter rather than an ongoing governance problem - but a reader has no way to independently confirm that from what's disclosed here, since the incident itself was never separately flagged when it reportedly occurred.

A new, one-time exceptional item shows up this quarter for a straightforwardly disclosed reason: India's consolidation of 29 labour laws into four new Labour Codes took effect November 21, 2025, and Swiggy recognized an additional Rs. 10 crore gratuity liability (consolidated; Rs. 9 crore standalone) as a non-recurring "Statutory impact of new Labour Codes" exceptional item, driven by a change in the codes' wage definition. This is a government-mandated, industry-wide accounting change, not a company-specific event, and management said on the call it expects no further P&L impact from the codes beyond a possible "pass-through" cost. Separately, the related-party deposit impairment tracked across the last several quarters' posts posted zero again in this quarter's standalone exceptional-items note - now four consecutive disclosed quarters without a new charge.

Management's Reversal Was the Most Direct Admission of Failure in This Backfill

Unlike the September quarter's call, which surfaced its most newsworthy items only under direct questioning, this call's most notable moment was volunteered candidly once asked: CFO Rahul Bothra directly confirmed the sub-Rs. 299 no-fee campaign's cost and that it had produced "limited adoption and retention," and that management had already "decided to change some of these constructs." That's a clean, quantified admission that a specific growth initiative didn't work - a rarer thing on these calls than the more common pattern of reframing a soft number rather than naming the failed bet directly.

The rest of the call repeated a consistent framing across both Rahul Bothra and Amitesh Jha: growth and contribution margin are treated as two separate levers, with "bad growth" - cart-count driven by discounting rather than genuine retention - explicitly disposable, even at the cost of a widening quick-commerce segment loss this quarter. Asked directly by analyst Aditya Soman of CLSA why Instamart's growth trailed "let's say, Blinkit," Jha didn't dispute the gap, arguing instead that competitors "going after the vanity metric of orders" rather than genuine retention isn't a race Swiggy intends to win on the same terms: "if the ambition is real market leadership, it's never going to happen by spending tons of good money on honestly buying growth." MD & Group CEO Sriharsha Majety didn't speak on this call at all beyond the standard sign-off - a departure from the September quarter, where he personally defended Swiggy's margin-over-volume trade-off against a competitor comparison; this quarter, the equivalent question and answer stayed with Jha rather than escalating to the CEO.

Target Valuation Range

No independent fair-value range can be stated yet - only the market's own implied price, roughly Rs. 1,00,425 crore of market cap at ~4.8x trailing revenue, can be reported, down from 5.2x last quarter as the shares fell 8.7% and the QIP diluted the share count. A real DCF still isn't responsible with no balance sheet this quarter to check the QIP and Rapido proceeds against, and the Eternal peer comparison that would sharpen this into an actual target is still missing - so this section can describe the third straight quarter of multiple compression, but not yet independently judge whether ~4.8x is cheap or expensive.

Swiggy's shares closed the quarter at Rs. 386.25 on December 31, 2025 - down 8.7% from Rs. 422.95 at the end of the prior quarter, and now essentially flat (roughly 1% below) the Rs. 390 IPO price from November 2024, giving back the modest premium reported last quarter. Using the Rs. 260 crore paid-up share capital disclosed this quarter (roughly 260 crore shares at Rs. 1 face value - a cleaner reconciliation than the prior quarter's precision caveat, since this quarter's 28-crore-share increase from 232 crore lines up closely with the QIP's 26.67 crore new shares plus roughly 0.78 crore shares issued to employees exercising options).

Market cap → enterprise value	Q3 FY2026 (Dec 2025)
Share price (period-end)	Rs. 386.25
Shares outstanding (approx., paid-up share capital)	2,600 million
Market capitalization	Rs. 1,00,425 crore (~$11.19B)

Peer-multiple sanity check	Q2 FY2026 (Sep 2025)	Q3 FY2026 (Dec 2025)
TTM Revenue	Rs. 18,925 crore	Rs. 21,080 crore
Market capitalization	Rs. 98,124 crore (~$11.04B)	Rs. 1,00,425 crore (~$11.19B)
P/S (TTM)	~5.2x	~4.8x

Continuing a third straight quarter of multiple compression. Unlike the prior two quarters, where the multiple fell even as the share price rose (because revenue grew faster), this quarter's compression is driven by both forces at once: the share price actually declined, and the QIP mechanically added roughly 28 crore new shares to the denominator of any per-share valuation metric.

A real DCF still isn't responsible to publish: Swiggy has never posted a profitable quarter or year at the consolidated level, no balance sheet or cash-flow statement exists this quarter to check the QIP and Rapido proceeds against a verified cash position (see Key Financial Metrics above), and the segment central to the long-term profitability case - Quick Commerce - just had its worst quarter yet by both growth and loss even as its own disclosure got thinner (see Beyond the Usual above). What would need to be true for today's ~4.8x revenue multiple to look cheap in hindsight: Instamart's contribution-margin breakeven guidance, now held for a third consecutive quarter at "AMJ'26," actually arriving on schedule; Quick Commerce's segment loss resuming the narrowing trend it broke this quarter; and a return to full investor-presentation disclosure that lets a reader verify the underlying store-level and GOV trends directly rather than relying on unit-redefined figures from the call. A peer-multiple comparison against Eternal (formerly Zomato), India's other listed food-delivery and quick-commerce platform, remains the natural next step for sharpening this range, but isn't responsible to publish here without that company's own comparable-period figures independently verified from its filed results first.

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