A Genuinely Good Half, Overshadowed by What Came Three Weeks After It Ended
Delivery Hero's first half of 2024 is, on its own numbers, the strongest half-year this site has covered: Adjusted EBITDA of the segments reached €240.5 million, up from €9.2 million a year earlier - a 26-fold increase - and operating cash flow turned positive for the first time in the company's public history, at €103.2 million versus a €177.2 million outflow a year ago. GMV grew 6.3% to €23.7 billion, again outpaced by Total Segment Revenue at +19.1% to €6.0 billion, continuing the revenue-per-order trend flagged across the H1 2023 and FY2023 posts. The net result also improved (-€720.2 million from -€772.1 million, restated), though a smaller improvement than the Adjusted EBITDA swing would suggest, for reasons detailed below.
Then, on July 23, 2024 - three weeks after this period's June 30 close, but disclosed as a subsequent event in this same report - the European Commission announced it had opened a formal investigation into Delivery Hero SE and Glovo over alleged anti-competitive conduct (market allocation, sharing of commercially sensitive information, no-poach agreements) predating Delivery Hero's 2022 acquisition of full Glovo ownership. Delivery Hero increased its own provision for the matter to €403 million as of June 30, 2024 - up from the €225.5 million already booked earlier in the half - meaning the company itself now estimates this single legal matter at nearly double the size of its entire H1 2024 Adjusted EBITDA. A half that would otherwise read as the clearest evidence yet that the turnaround is real gets overshadowed by a regulatory bill the company itself is now sizing at nine figures (see Beyond the Usual).
The Prescription
Delivery Hero should keep leaning into what's actually working: AdTech revenue, subscription models and the continued own-delivery share expansion (up to 52.0% in Asia from 44.7%, and 76.8% in MENA from 68.0%) are driving Total Segment Revenue growth well ahead of GMV growth across every region, and the Platform segments' Adjusted EBITDA of €314.2 million (more than double a year earlier) shows the model scaling the way management has been promising since the 2018 post. The planned Talabat IPO on the Dubai Financial Market - flagged for Q4 2024 in this period's materials - and the agreed sale of Foodpanda Taiwan to Uber for $950 million both look like sensible portfolio moves: monetizing a strong regional asset and exiting a shrinking, competitive Asian market, respectively.
What it should stop doing is treating governance and disclosure around the EU antitrust matter as a routine risk-factor update. The provision nearly doubled within this half alone (to €403 million as of the balance-sheet date) and the underlying conduct being investigated predates Delivery Hero's full acquisition of Glovo - meaning the company inherited (or created, depending on when the alleged coordination stopped) a liability now sized at a level that would wipe out roughly 1.7x this half's entire Adjusted EBITDA. A €403 million number of this magnitude, tied to specific alleged conduct (market allocation, no-poach agreements) rather than a generic legal-risk boilerplate, deserves more prominence in investor communications than a footnote and a risk-factor update.
Key Financial Metrics
H1 2024 vs. H1 2023 (restated), reported in EUR (H1 2024 also shown in USD)
FX: EUR 1 = USD 1.0735 (June 28, 2024 month-end close, the last trading day of the period).
Delivery Hero restated H1 2023's net result again this half - the fourth restatement of a prior comparative this site has tracked across its DHER posts (see Beyond the Usual) - moving H1 2023's net loss from -€832.3 million (as reported in the H1 2023 post) to -€772.1 million.
| Metric | H1 2024 (EUR) | H1 2024 (USD) | H1 2023 (restated) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Segment Revenue | €6,043.1M | ~$6,487.3M | €5,075.6M | ✅ +19.1% |
| Revenue (net of vouchers) | €5,772.3M | ~$6,196.2M | €4,839.0M | ✅ +19.3% |
| Adjusted EBITDA (segments) | €240.5M | ~$258.2M | €9.2M | ✅ +€231.3M |
| Operating result (EBIT) | -€390.5M | ~-$419.2M | -€466.8M | ✅ loss narrowed 16.4% |
| Net result | -€720.2M | ~-$773.1M | -€772.1M | ✅ loss narrowed 6.7% |
| Operating cash flow | €103.2M | ~$110.8M | -€177.2M | ✅ turned positive |
| Free cash flow (proxy: OCF less capex)* | -€31.6M | ~-$33.9M | -€289.9M | ✅ outflow narrowed sharply |
| Cash and cash equivalents (period-end) | €1,755.9M | ~$1,885.0M | €1,924.1M | ⚠️ -8.7% |
*Free cash flow» isn't a metric Delivery Hero defines the same way every period; the figure above is operating cash flow less capex (property/plant €63.1M and intangibles €71.7M in H1 2024; €62.8M and €49.9M in H1 2023). Delivery Hero's own investor materials describe a different, more favorable "Free Cash Flow" concept that excludes payment-service-provider receivable movements and treats interest separately, which the company reports reached breakeven in H1 2024 - a different, non-comparable calculation from the proxy above.
| Balance sheet | Jun 30, 2024 | Dec 31, 2023 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total assets | €10,397.9M | €10,487.8M | -0.9% |
| Total equity | €1,244.9M | €1,649.4M | ⚠️ -24.5% |
| Net debt (estimated) | ~€3,327.6M | €3,554.7M | Improved slightly |
The €231.3 million Adjusted EBITDA improvement and the swing to positive operating cash flow are the real story of the half's operating performance. But net result improved by only €51.9 million - a much smaller number - because income tax expense jumped to €141.6 million (from €12.8 million restated), largely tied to the antitrust provision and other timing effects, eating most of the operating gain before it reached the bottom line. Equity fell by nearly a quarter in six months, continuing the trend flagged in the FY2023 post, even after a €277.9 million capital increase tied to Uber's investment in the company (part of the Foodpanda Taiwan transaction, see Beyond the Usual).
Adjusted EBITDA nearly tripled and operating cash flow turned positive for the first time - genuine, structural progress. But net income tax expense rose more than tenfold, largely on provisions tied to the EU antitrust matter, meaning most of this half's operating improvement didn't reach shareholders as improved net income.
Key Operational Metrics
| Metric | H1 2024 | H1 2023 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| GMV | €23,687.4M | €22,282.7M | ✅ +6.3% |
| Adj. EBITDA/GMV margin | 1.0% | 0.0% | ✅ +1.0pp |
| Own delivery share, Asia | 52.0% | 44.7% | ✅ improved |
| Own delivery share, MENA | 76.8% | 68.0% | ✅ improved |
| Average employees | 43,292 | 47,981 | Headcount fell 9.8% |
Segment Results
H1 2024, five reportable segments: four regional (Asia, MENA, Europe, Americas) plus Integrated Verticals (own-warehouse Dmarts)
| Segment | Revenue (H1'24) | YoY | Adj. EBITDA (H1'24) | Adj. EBITDA/GMV | H1'23 margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asia | €1,969.1M | ✅ +7.5% | €156.8M | +1.3% | +1.4% |
| MENA | €1,631.8M | ✅ +32.2% | €209.8M | +3.5% | +2.4% |
| Europe | €898.9M | ✅ +23.2% | -€39.5M | -0.9% | -2.7% |
| Americas | €433.3M | ✅ +16.3% | -€12.9M | -0.8% | -3.7% |
| Integrated Verticals | €1,285.3M | ✅ +26.1% | -€73.8M | -5.5% | -11.6% |
Asia's revenue grew this half (+7.5%) after shrinking in both H1 2023 and FY2023 - a genuine reversal, though GMV still fell (-6.5%), meaning the segment continues to extract more revenue per order even as order volume itself contracts, on the back of intensified competition and market normalization. MENA is now the company's clearest profit engine on a margin basis - 3.5% of GMV, ahead of Asia's 1.3% for the first time in the periods this site has tracked - continuing its multi-year recovery from the collapse first flagged in the 2018 H1 post. Europe and Americas both narrowed their losses meaningfully (Europe's margin improved to -0.9% from -2.7%; Americas to -0.8% from -3.7%), continuing the trend across every non-Asia region this half. Integrated Verticals remains the deepest loss-maker by margin (-5.5%) but has now improved for three consecutive periods this site has covered, alongside a shrinking store count (834 stores in 50 countries, down from 932 in 57 a half-year earlier) - the segment is getting smaller and less lossy at the same time, the same pattern flagged for Asia's GMV above.
Beyond the Usual
An EU antitrust investigation, and a provision that nearly doubled within the half
The European Commission announced on July 23, 2024 - after this period's June 30 close but before the report's August 27 authorization - that it had opened a formal investigation into Delivery Hero SE and Glovo, examining alleged market allocation, sharing of commercially sensitive information, and no-poach agreements predating Delivery Hero's 2022 acquisition of full Glovo ownership. Delivery Hero had already booked a €225.5 million antitrust provision during H1 2024 itself (disclosed in the period's own general-administrative-expense note, described only as relating to "the ongoing inspection by the European Commission," before the formal investigation was publicly announced); as a subsequent event, the company increased that provision to €403 million as of the June 30, 2024 balance-sheet date - nearly double the amount booked just weeks earlier, and a number the company itself is now attaching to specific, named alleged conduct rather than a generic contingency.
Delivery Hero's own provision for the European Commission's antitrust investigation into pre-2022 Glovo conduct grew to €403 million within a single half-year - a number now larger than any single Adjusted EBITDA figure this company has ever reported for a half-year period, tied to specific alleged conduct (market allocation, no-poach agreements) rather than a routine legal-risk disclosure.
The CFO resigned mid-year with no permanent successor named in this report
Emmanuel Thomassin resigned as CFO at the end of June 2024, with CEO Niklas Östberg transitionally assuming responsibility for Finance, Procurement, Legal, Investor Relations, Internal Audit, Governance, Risk Management and Compliance - a wide span of functions for a CEO to absorb on an interim basis, disclosed in a single sentence in the report's Group Profile section with no permanent-replacement timeline given. A CFO departure landing in the same half as a near-doubling antitrust provision and a fourth consecutive comparative restatement (see below) is a combination worth watching into the next reporting period.
Delivery Hero's CFO resigned at the end of H1 2024 with the CEO temporarily absorbing Finance, Legal, Investor Relations, Risk Management and Compliance - a broad interim mandate with no permanent-successor timeline disclosed in this report.
A fourth consecutive restatement of a prior comparative period
H1 2023's net result was restated again in this report (from -€832.3 million as reported in the H1 2023 post to -€772.1 million here), following the H1 2022 restatement flagged in that same earlier post. This is the second time in three consecutive half-years this site has covered that Delivery Hero has revised a previously published comparative - each individually described as a "correction of an error," each with no cash impact, but a pattern worth naming given how many of this company's own year-over-year growth claims depend on the comparative base being stable.
A related-party Colombian loan is being converted to equity rather than repaid
The Inversiones CMR S.A.S. (Colombia) loan receivable - fully written off as of December 31, 2023 per the FY2023 post - is now disclosed as partially converted into equity as of June 30, 2024, with the remaining balance "pending equity conversion." A related-party lending relationship with a joint venture Delivery Hero co-owns has gone from performing, to fully written off, to being restructured into an equity stake within about 18 months - a genuinely unusual progression worth tracking in future periods.
Uber became a Delivery Hero shareholder as part of the Taiwan asset sale
On May 14, 2024, Delivery Hero agreed to sell its entire Foodpanda Taiwan and DH Stores Taiwan shareholdings to Uber Technologies for $950 million (closing expected H1 2025, subject to antitrust approval), and as part of the same transaction, Uber made a €277.9 million capital contribution to Delivery Hero, becoming a shareholder in the company itself. Two direct on-demand-delivery competitors now hold a mutual commercial and equity relationship - a genuinely notable structural development for the sector that gets one paragraph in this report's Divestments section.
Beyond the Usual (Regulatory Risk Update)
Delivery Hero's own updated risk report notes that "the majority of courts in Portugal have ruled that the riders were correctly classified as self-employed workers, contrary to the local authorities' assessments" - a favorable development on one of the several courier-classification disputes tracked across this site's DHER posts, even as the much larger Spain exposure (€260-430 million, disclosed in the FY2023 post) remains open and unresolved.
Target Valuation Range
Implied enterprise value of ~€9.63 billion (~$10.34 billion), roughly 0.8x annualized Total Segment Revenue (~12.8x FY2024's guided Adjusted EBITDA midpoint of €725-775 million) - cheap on an operating-improvement basis, but the market is pricing the EU antitrust exposure as a real, material risk, given this multiple is cheaper than either prior period this site has covered despite Adjusted EBITDA nearly tripling.
Delivery Hero SE closed at €22.15 on June 28, 2024. With approximately 284.3 million shares outstanding (subscribed capital of €284.3 million at €1.00 nominal value per share, up from 270.7 million at year-end 2023 mainly on the Uber capital increase and share-based-compensation vesting), and net debt at period-end of approximately €3.33 billion (total debt of roughly €5.08 billion in bank borrowings and convertible bonds, against €1.76 billion of cash):
| Market cap → enterprise value | H1 2024 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | €22.15 |
| Shares outstanding | ~284.3M |
| Market capitalization | ~€6.30B (~$6.76B) |
| Total liabilities (bank borrowings + convertible bonds) | ~€5.08B |
| Less: cash and equivalents | ~€1.76B |
| Enterprise value | ~€9.63B (~$10.34B, net debt ~€3.33B) |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | FY2023 | H1 2024 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise value | ~€10.33B | ~€9.63B | ✅ down |
| EV/Total Segment Revenue | ~1.0x | ~0.8x (annualized) | ✅ down, continuing the downward trend from ~1.4x → ~1.0x → ~0.8x even as Adjusted EBITDA improved at every step |
| EV/Adjusted EBITDA | ~40.7x (FY actual) / ~13.8x (FY2024 guidance) | ~20.0x (annualized) / ~12.8x (FY2024 guidance midpoint) | ✅ down sharply |
Peer cross-check: Grab Holdings posted Deliveries-segment Adjusted EBITDA of 1.5% of GMV in Q2 2024 (down slightly from Q1's 1.6%) alongside a positive Adjusted Free Cash Flow quarter - both companies are tracking similar profitability trajectories on similar timelines, though Grab's overall balance sheet (cash liquidity of $5.6 billion against a much smaller debt load) carries far less leverage risk than Delivery Hero's.
A reverse DCF is more tractable this period than at either prior post: at a ~20.0x annualized EV/EBITDA multiple against Delivery Hero's own FY2024 guidance of €725-775 million Adjusted EBITDA for the full year (guidance reaffirmed in this report), the ~€9.63 billion EV works out to roughly 12.8x the guided FY2024 midpoint - a genuinely ordinary multiple for a business still growing double-digit Total Segment Revenue, suggesting the market isn't pricing pure operating momentum unreasonably. What the multiple doesn't obviously price is the €403 million EU antitrust provision disclosed as a subsequent event after this period closed - if that provision is ultimately paid in full, it alone represents roughly 4% of the company's entire enterprise value, a real but not overwhelming hit relative to the size of the business.
The share price fell from €44.78 (December 2022) through €25.01 (December 2023, per the FY2023 post) to €22.15 by this period's end - continuing a multi-year decline, though the pace of the fall has clearly slowed relative to the sharp 2022 drop. It bottomed at €21.30-21.36 in January-February 2024 before a modest recovery through spring. Delivery Hero has not split its stock since its 2017 IPO.
Three consecutive reporting periods now show the same pattern: Adjusted EBITDA improving meaningfully each time, and the stock's valuation multiple compressing anyway. Whatever the market is actually pricing at Delivery Hero, it isn't the metric management has spent five years optimizing for - and this period's €403 million subsequent-event antitrust provision, landing three weeks after an otherwise genuinely strong half closed, is as good an explanation as any for why.
Delivery Hero SE's Half-Year Financial Report 2024 (unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements and interim group management report for the six months ended June 30, 2024, prepared by the Management Board and approved by the Supervisory Board on August 27, 2024) and its Q2 2024 Trading Update presentation (dated August 29, 2024), via Delivery Hero's investor relations page.