The First Profitable Half in the Company's History
Delivery Hero's operating result for H1 2025 was +€4.7 million - a genuinely new number, the first time the consolidated operating result has ever been positive in the company's public history, versus -€390.5 million a year earlier. Revenue grew 19.2% to €6,879.5 million, Adjusted EBITDA» grew 71% year-over-year to €410.7 million (a margin of 1.7% of GMV», up from 1.0% a year earlier), and the net result narrowed from -€720.2 million to -€356.3 million. Two structural items explain a meaningful part of this half's swing beyond ordinary operating improvement: the EU antitrust investigation that had been escalating since the FY2024 post reached a settlement in this half, releasing a €71.0 million provision reversal against a €225.5 million expense a year earlier - a €296.5 million favorable swing in a single line item; and the €220.9 million Uber breakup fee (booked as a gain when the Taiwan sale collapsed in FY2024) was actually received in cash, €211.9 million of it, in April 2025.
None of that makes the underlying delivery business's improvement fake - GMV growth accelerated to 11% year-over-year on a like-for-like basis by Q2 2025, and Total Segment Revenue growth of 18.9% continued to outpace GMV growth, the healthy divergence flagged in the prior post. But a reader crediting "first-ever profitable half" purely to operating leverage, without separating out the one-time-favorable antitrust reversal, would be overstating how much of this half's improvement is durable versus a resolved legal matter unwinding in the company's favor.
The Prescription
Delivery Hero should keep using its now-settled EU antitrust matter as proof that resolving legacy legal overhangs, rather than merely provisioning for them indefinitely, actually improves reported earnings quality - a €71.0 million reversal this half is a direct, quantifiable payoff from getting a multi-year regulatory dispute behind the company. The same logic should now apply urgently to the unresolved Glovo courier-reclassification matter in Spain (see Beyond the Usual): the sooner that's negotiated to a defined number rather than left as an open-ended range, the sooner the market can stop discounting the stock for an unquantified tail risk.
What it should stop doing is disclosing a contingent liability of up to €860 million - more than 10% of Delivery Hero's own market capitalization at this period's close - without recognizing any provision against it, on the stated basis that Glovo intends to keep contesting the self-employed classification through every available legal instance. That's a defensible legal strategy, but the accounting treatment (zero provision recognized against a range whose low end alone, €520 million, would be a material item on this balance sheet) reads as more optimistic than the facts on the ground support: by the company's own disclosure, actual reclassification decisions had already been issued and totaled roughly €450 million in requested payments as of July 31, 2025, sitting within the disclosed range rather than at some theoretical worst case.
Key Financial Metrics
H1 2025 vs. H1 2024, consolidated, reported in EUR (also shown in USD)
FX: EUR 1 = USD 1.1787 (June 30, 2025 close, this period's actual period-end date).
| Metric | H1 2025 (EUR) | H1 2025 (USD) | H1 2024 (EUR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | €6,879.5M | ~$8,109.7M | €5,772.3M | ✅ +19.2% |
| Total Segment Revenue | €7,185.8M | ~$8,469.7M | €6,043.7M | ✅ +18.9% |
| Gross profit | €1,733.9M | ~$2,044.0M | €1,639.6M | ✅ +5.8% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | €410.7M | ~$484.1M | €240.6M | ✅ +70.7% |
| Operating result (EBIT) | €4.7M | ~$5.5M | -€390.5M | ✅ first-ever positive half |
| Net result | -€356.3M | ~-$420.0M | -€720.2M | ✅ loss narrowed 50.5% |
| Diluted/basic EPS | -€1.34 | — | -€2.58 | ✅ loss per share narrowed |
| Cash and cash equivalents (period-end) | €2,808.1M | ~$3,310.5M | €1,755.9M (Jun 30, 2024) | ✅ higher YoY, though down from €3,808.7M at Dec 31, 2024 on convertible-bond buybacks (see below) |
Key Operational Metrics
- GMV: €24.62 billion for H1 2025 (+3.9% reported, +7.0% constant-currency), accelerating to 11% YoY on a like-for-like basis by Q2 2025 once operations exited or divested during FY2024-25 (Slovakia, Slovenia, Denmark, Ghana, Thailand and others) are excluded.
- Net debt fell further: liabilities to banks plus convertible bonds totaled roughly €4.12 billion against €2.81 billion cash, for net debt of roughly €1.31 billion - continuing the deleveraging trend from FY2024, achieved this half specifically through €895.9 million of nominal convertible-bond buybacks (part of the ~€1 billion tender offer flagged as a subsequent event in the FY2024 post) rather than fresh operating cash flow alone.
- talabat paid its first-ever dividend to non-controlling interests, €20.1 million in May 2025 - the first cash return to talabat's public minority shareholders since the December 2024 Dubai listing.
- Deliveroo's Hong Kong assets were acquired (completed March 2025), generating €17.5 million of newly recognized goodwill - a small bolt-on, not a repeat of the divestment-heavy pattern of 2023-24.
Four Segments Still Diverging in Different Directions
- MENA grew Adjusted EBITDA 22.2% to €256.2 million (from €209.7 million a year earlier), though its margin held roughly flat at 3.5% of GMV (versus 3.5% in H1 2024) rather than continuing FY2024's expansion to ~3.7% - the fastest-growing segment on GMV (+22.4% reported) is no longer also the fastest-improving on margin.
- Asia, still the largest segment by GMV (€10.59 billion) but shrinking for a third straight year (-10.4% YoY reported in H1 2025, deeper than H1 2024's -6.5%), improved its Adjusted EBITDA margin to 1.7% of GMV from 1.3% - the same "shrinking but more profitable" pattern flagged in the FY2024 post continues, and unlike that post, the segment's Adjusted EBITDA figure (€176.3 million) is now disclosed for the half rather than marked "n/a."
- Europe widened its Adjusted EBITDA loss to -€50.8 million (a -1.1% GMV margin) from -€39.6 million (-0.9%) a year earlier - the one segment moving the wrong direction on profitability even as its GMV (+11.6%) and revenue (+28.9%) growth stayed healthy.
- Americas continued improving, reaching a positive 2.3% Adjusted EBITDA/GMV margin (from -0.8% a year earlier) - the clearest margin turnaround of any segment, now the best-margin non-MENA segment.
- Integrated Verticals narrowed its loss to -1.0% of GMV (from -5.5%) - continued, real progress toward breakeven in the Dmart/logistics business, consistent with management's FY2024 guidance that this segment would keep improving into FY2025.
Segment comparison: MENA remains the profitability anchor in absolute euro terms, but the rate of margin improvement this half actually favors Americas and Integrated Verticals - both moving from meaningfully negative toward breakeven - while Europe is the one segment where the margin trend reversed.
Beyond the Usual
An up-to-€860 million Spain contingent liability, with zero provision recognized and actual claims already exceeding half that figure
Glovo's courier fleet in Spain is under active reclassification proceedings that could convert self-employed riders to employee status, exposing the Group to social security contributions, late-payment charges, fines, and VAT claims that Delivery Hero itself now sizes at between approximately €520.0 million and €860.0 million. Delivery Hero has recognized no provision against this range, stating Glovo will continue defending the self-employed classification through all available legal instances. As of July 31, 2025 - after this period's close but before the report's August 27, 2025 authorization - Glovo had already received final reclassification decisions from local authorities requesting approximately €450.0 million in social security liabilities and fines, a figure that sits squarely within the disclosed range rather than at some remote tail scenario. This is a materially larger, still-unresolved version of the antitrust-provision pattern flagged in the prior post, except here the company has chosen to recognize nothing at all rather than an escalating estimate.
Delivery Hero discloses a contingent liability of up to €860 million tied to Spanish courier reclassification - more than 10% of the company's own market capitalization at this period's close - and has booked no provision against any of it, even though actual demand letters received after period-end already total roughly €450 million.
The EU antitrust case that was escalating for two straight years just settled
The provision that grew from €35.0 million (2023) to €225.5 million (2024) - flagged as an escalating risk in the FY2024 post - reached a settlement agreement with the European Commission in H1 2025, producing a €71.0 million reversal that shows up as net income from "certain legal matters" this half (versus a €226.4 million expense in H1 2024, a swing of roughly €297.5 million in that specific line). This is a genuine resolution of a multi-year overhang, not a continuation of the pattern - worth tracking as a template for how the Spain matter above might eventually resolve, though the euro amounts at stake in Spain are potentially far larger.
A Taiwan sale that collapsed in FY2024 delivered real cash in this half anyway
The Uber breakup fee first flagged as a non-cash "gain" in the FY2024 post - booked when the Foodpanda Taiwan/DH Stores Taiwan sale to Uber fell through after Taiwanese regulatory disapproval - converted to an actual €211.9 million cash receipt in April 2025, slightly below the €220.9 million gain originally recognized (the difference reflecting the derivative's fair value at settlement versus when it was first booked). Delivery Hero still owns the Taiwan business outright; the breakup fee compensates for the failed sale, it isn't proceeds from one.
Convertible-bond buybacks, not fresh operating cash, drove the visible cash decline this half
Cash and cash equivalents fell from €3,808.7 million (Dec 31, 2024) to €2,808.1 million (Jun 30, 2025) - a decline that could look concerning read in isolation after the prior post's story of a swelling cash pile. The decline is explained almost entirely by €895.9 million of nominal convertible-bond repurchases (Convertible Bonds I, II and III) executed as part of the deleveraging tender offer flagged as a subsequent event in the FY2024 post - a deliberate use of the talabat IPO proceeds to retire debt ahead of schedule, not a sign of the business consuming cash.
A new CFO, and the first talabat dividend to outside shareholders
Marie-Anne Popp was appointed CFO and Management Board member in January 2025, while Martin Enderle resigned from the Supervisory Board (effective June 18, 2025) with his duties transitioning fully to Supervisory Board chair Kristin Skogen Lund. Separately, talabat paid its first-ever dividend to non-controlling interests (€20.1 million, May 2025) - the first cash return to the minority shareholders who bought into December 2024's Dubai IPO, a modest but real signal of the subsidiary distributing cash rather than only retaining it.
Related-party dealings with a UAE logistics affiliate continue at a steady, modest scale
Delivery Hero's subsidiaries in the United Arab Emirates continue using third-party logistics services from Zone Delivery Services L.L.C., a related party: €10.5 million of expenses and €0.2 million of period-end payables in H1 2025, alongside separate related-party transactions elsewhere in the Group totaling €12.7 million of expenses and €0.2 million of income. These are modest, recurring intercompany-adjacent relationships rather than a new disclosure, but worth tracking given how much of Delivery Hero's MENA profitability now runs through talabat and its UAE operations specifically.
Target Valuation Range
Implied enterprise value of ~€8.06 billion (~$9.50 billion), roughly 0.58x trailing-twelve-month Total Segment Revenue and ~9.3x trailing-twelve-month Adjusted EBITDA. Still fairly valued to modestly undervalued at that level on an operating-improvement basis, but the unrecognized Spain contingent liability is large enough relative to the current market cap that it, not the operating turnaround, is now the dominant swing factor for the stock.
Delivery Hero SE closed this period's final trading day, June 30, 2025, at €22.97 per share. With 293,900,000 shares outstanding at period-end (subscribed capital of €293.9 million at €1.00 nominal value, up from 287,385,940 at December 31, 2024, reflecting share-based compensation vesting), and total interest-bearing debt (liabilities to banks of €1,635.2 million plus convertible bonds of €2,485.9 million) of approximately €4.12 billion against €2.81 billion cash, for net debt of roughly €1.31 billion:
| Market cap → enterprise value | H1 2025 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | €22.97 |
| Shares outstanding | 293,900,000 |
| Market capitalization | ~€6.75B (~$7.96B) |
| Total liabilities (banks + convertible bonds) | ~€4.12B |
| Less: cash and equivalents | ~€2.81B |
| Enterprise value | ~€8.06B (~$9.50B, net debt ~€1.31B) |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | FY2024 | H1 2025 (TTM) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise value | ~€9.69B | ~€8.06B | ✅ down |
| EV/Total Segment Revenue (TTM, ~€13.94B) | ~0.76x | ~0.58x | ✅ down, reflecting both the lower market cap and the larger revenue base |
| EV/Adjusted EBITDA (TTM, ~€862.6M) | ~14.0x | ~9.3x | ✅ down, even as Adjusted EBITDA grew, because the share price declined more than earnings improved |
No directly comparable pure-play global food-delivery peer has been covered on this site yet at a similar reporting date, so a peer-multiple sanity check isn't available for this post.
The share price move this half was unremarkable on its own (down roughly 15% from €27.12 at FY2024's close to €22.97, within the broader two-year range already covered in the FY2024 post), so it's folded into this valuation section rather than given its own heading. Delivery Hero has not split its stock over this window, so these remain actual nominal prices.
A real DCF still isn't attempted here: H1 2025 is only the second consecutive period of a positive operating result trend (the first was the full FY2024 Adjusted EBITDA improvement; this is the first actual positive operating result), and one clean half - itself boosted by a one-time-favorable antitrust settlement reversal - isn't yet a reliable enough multi-period base to project forward with confidence, particularly with an unresolved, potentially nine-figure-to-ten-figure Spain contingent liability sitting off the balance sheet. A reverse DCF is similarly premature for the same reason. The multiples above remain the more honest tool until the Spain matter is either resolved or provisioned for at a defensible figure.
Delivery Hero finally has the operating-profitability story its GMV scale always implied it could produce - but a reader who stops at "first profitable half" without checking Beyond the Usual would miss that the single largest unresolved number in this report isn't on the P&L at all: it's an up-to-€860 million liability the company has chosen not to book.
Delivery Hero SE's Half-Year Financial Report 2025 (unaudited condensed consolidated interim financial statements and interim group management report for the six months ended June 30, 2025, authorized by the Management Board August 27, 2025) and its Q2 2025 Trading Update presentation, via Delivery Hero's investor relations page.