Records Everywhere Except the Bottom Line and the Stock Price
Over these 12 quarters: share price $3.37 to $3.11 (-8%); operating income -46.0 to 108.0 US$ million; operating income margin -7.0% to 9.7%. One graph in actual numbers: bars are the quarter's operating income, over them the share price at quarter-end (left axis) and the operating income margin (right axis); each line is fitted to its own range, so read the timing, not the heights. Prices are adjusted for splits.
Operating profit nearly quadrupled and every core segment turned profitable, but profit for the period rose almost nothing, and the stock closed the quarter at its lowest level in two years.
Grab's third quarter looks like its best ever: revenue, Adjusted EBITDA» and On-Demand GMV» all hit new highs, and Financial Services crossed into profitability for the first time. None of that reached the number that matters most on paper, or the number the market actually prices: profit for the period barely moved, and the stock fell to a two-year low in the same quarter. Judge the quarter by operating profit and the segment story below, not by profit for the period or the share price.
Operating profit rose $81 million. Profit for the period rose $1 million.
Operating profit improved year over year to $108 million, but non-operating items gave back nearly all of that gain in profit for the period. CFO Peter Oey's own breakdown: a $47 million larger net fair-value loss on financial assets and liabilities (mostly the embedded derivative in Grab's $1.5 billion of convertible notes, a volatility source every quarter since they were issued in Q2 2025), a $12 million decrease in finance income, a new $12 million impairment loss on an equity-accounted investee that neither the press release nor the prepared remarks name (see Beyond the Usual), and $5 million of higher income tax expense. Oey told investors that, excluding $68 million of the quarter's non-cash charges, profit attributable to owners of the Company would have been $95 million, or $0.02 per share, instead of the $0.01 actually reported.
All three core segments were Segment Adjusted EBITDA-profitable, for the first time
Financial Services turned Segment Adjusted EBITDA-positive for the first time, at $12 million, which means Deliveries, Mobility and Financial Services were all profitable on this measure in the same quarter for the first time in Grab's history. The loss has narrowed every quarter for a year: from $28 million in Q3 2025 to $25 million, $17 million, $15 million, and now a $12 million profit in Q3 2026. Gross Loan Portfolio nearly tripled year over year to $2.7 billion (up 115% excluding Superbank's contribution), while non-performing loans held at 2.6% - inside the 2%-to-3% range management says has held since early 2025. Deliveries and Mobility both expanded or held segment margin in the same quarter (2.7% of GMV, up from 2.1%; 8.9%, flat), so the fintech milestone didn't come by starving the core business.
The stock closed at a two-year low the same quarter the business set records
Grab's stock closed the third quarter at $3.11, its lowest month-end close in at least two years, even as revenue, Adjusted EBITDA and On-Demand GMV all reached new highs. That's down 17.5% from $3.77 three months ago, and down 48.3% from the $6.02 high reached in September 2025. What that did to Grab's own trading multiples is in Target Valuation Range below.
The Prescription
Grab should keep running exactly the playbook that just turned Financial Services profitable: distribute lending and digital banking through an ecosystem that gives it near-zero incremental customer acquisition cost. The evidence this quarter is specific, not just directional - GXS Bank's new credit card lifted card-holder spending more than 25% against matched non-card users within five weeks of first use, GXBank's FlexiCredit disbursals grew 169% year over year, and Superbank grew its loan book 265% while serving 8.5 million customers, up 73% - and Grab should keep consolidating Stash's wealth-management products the same way rather than letting them sit as a bolt-on.
What it should stop doing: folding an acquisition that is a year from even attempting to close into its public long-term targets. The 2028 Financial Services target of $500 million Segment Adjusted EBITDA and a loan book above $6 billion explicitly includes the pending acquisition of Atome, which Grab's own supplemental presentation says is "subject to closing, which is expected to take place in Q3 2027" - in the same set of materials that discloses a regulator just rejected a comparable cross-border acquisition (foodpanda Taiwan) after roughly seven months of trying, at a cost of $60 million for nothing. A company that just watched one pending deal fail for reasons outside its control has a live example, in its own quarter, of why baking an unclosed one into a headline target is a credibility risk it doesn't need to take.
Key Financial Metrics
US$ million; margin is operating income as a percent of net revenue, per quarter.
Q3 2026 vs. Q3 2025 - consolidated, reported in USD
Grab reports natively in US dollars, so no FX conversion is needed here.
| Metric | Q3 2026 | Q3 2025 | YoY | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| On-Demand GMV | $6,835M | $5,774M | +18% | +22% constant-currency |
| Revenue | $1,112M | $873M | +27% | +30% constant-currency; new all-time high |
| Total Segment Adjusted EBITDA | $338M | $231M | +46% | Outpaced revenue growth |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $237M | $136M | +73% | Record; per Grab's earnings press release, its nineteenth straight quarter of sequential growth (see Trailing Eight Quarters) |
| Operating profit (IFRS) | $108M | $27M | +297% | The number closest to actual operating improvement |
| Profit for the period | $18M | $17M | +5% | A $47M larger fair-value loss and a new $12M impairment offset most of the $81M operating-profit gain (see above) |
| Net cash from operating activities | $55M | $(127)M | NM | $404M more in digital-bank deposit inflows, partly offset by $294M more in loan disbursals |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow (quarter) | $286M | $203M | +41% | |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow (trailing 12 months) | $533M | $283M | +88% | A new high, reversing last quarter's first-ever sequential decline |
| Balance sheet metric | Sep 2026 | Dec 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | $14,208M | $11,983M | +19% |
| Total Liabilities | $6,953M | $5,226M | +33% |
| Total Equity | $7,255M | $6,757M | +7% |
Both sides of the balance sheet kept growing for the same reason as last quarter - Financial Services' scale-up, not organic growth in the core business: digital-banking customer deposits rose to $2,703 million from $1,629 million (+66%), and loan receivables in the Financial Services segment (current and non-current combined) rose to $2,534 million from $1,180 million (+115%), consistent with the Gross Loan Portfolio figure in Key Operational Metrics below. Gross cash liquidity fell to $7,114 million from $7,397 million three months ago, and net cash liquidity fell to $5,044 million from $5,364 million (see Target Valuation Range). Year-to-date profit for the period is $373 million, against $47 million a year ago - a jump still dominated by the one-time $307 million Superbank consolidation gain booked in Q2 2026, not by this quarter's performance.
Trailing Eight Quarters
| Period | Revenue | Adjusted EBITDA | Profit/(Loss) for the Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 2024 | $764M | $97M | $11M |
| Q1 2025 | $773M | $106M | $10M |
| Q2 2025 | $819M | $109M | $20M |
| Q3 2025 | $873M | $136M | $17M |
| Q4 2025 | $906M | $148M | $153M |
| Q1 2026 | $955M | $154M | $120M |
| Q2 2026 | $997M | $168M | $235M |
| Q3 2026 | $1,112M | $237M | $18M |
Adjusted EBITDA improved sequentially every quarter shown in this table. Grab's earnings press release quotes CFO Peter Oey describing this quarter as the company's "nineteenth consecutive quarter" of sequential Adjusted EBITDA growth - a forward count from last quarter's "eighteenth," which itself duplicated Q1 2026's identical "eighteenth" claim, an inconsistency flagged in both of the last two posts and still unreconciled from the disclosed information alone. Profit for the period stays the volatile line in this table: Q4 2025's $153 million was driven by a convertible-notes derivative fair-value swing, Q2 2026's $235 million by the one-time Superbank gain, and this quarter's $18 million sits far below both - closer to Q3 2025's $17 million than to either of the two spikes on either side of it, which is why operating profit, not this line, is the better read on the trend.
Where Q3 2026's Revenue Went
Net revenue, and how much of it was left as operating profit and net income, in one view. Figures are the same standalone-quarter figures as the metrics table.
US$ billion, Q3 2026. Thin slices are drawn at a minimum height so they stay visible; the printed values and percentages are exact. Operating costs are net revenue less operating income; other items & tax are operating income less net income.
Key Operational Metrics
Q3 2026, per Grab's earnings press release, supplemental presentation and prepared remarks
Arrow = the way the number moved against a year earlier. Green = good for Grab, red = bad, grey = flat.
- On-Demand GMV per MTU: $135, +2% year-on-year (+5% constant-currency).
- Group Monthly Transacting Users (MTUs)»: 57.2 million, +20% year-on-year, a new record.
- Gross Loan Portfolio: $2,711M, +200% year-on-year (+115% excluding Superbank's contribution).
- Non-Performing Loans, 90 days past due: 2.6% of Gross Loan Portfolio, within the 2%-to-3% range management says has held since early 2025; Expected Credit Loss reserves were 6.5% of the portfolio, about 2.4x coverage.
- Deliveries Segment Adjusted EBITDA margin (% of GMV): 2.7%, up 65 basis points from 2.1% a year ago.
- Mobility Segment Adjusted EBITDA margin (% of GMV): 8.9%, flat year-on-year.
- Financial Services Segment Adjusted EBITDA margin (% of revenue): +37.1pp year-on-year, to a 6.0% profit margin from a 31.1% loss margin.
- Regional Corporate Costs (% of Group revenue): 9.2%, down from 10.8% a year ago.
Grab also disclosed a new metric this quarter, Lending Risk Adjusted Margin (lending revenue less cost of funds and credit costs, annualized, as a percentage of Gross Loan Portfolio), at 7% against a targeted steady state of 10% to 12% - see Beyond the Usual for what that gap is actually measuring.
Segment Results
Q3 2026, four reportable segments
Grab reports four segments - Deliveries, Mobility, Financial Services, and Others - unchanged since Q1 2024's restructuring.
| Segment | GMV (Q3'26) | YoY | Revenue (Q3'26) | Segment Adj. EBITDA (Q3'26) | Margin | YoY Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deliveries | $4,500M | +21% (+24% CC) | $561M | $123M | 2.7% (of GMV) | vs 2.1% in Q3'25 |
| Mobility | $2,335M | +14% (+17% CC) | $349M | $207M | 8.9% (of GMV) | vs 8.9% in Q3'25 |
| Financial Services | n/a (see Gross Loan Portfolio) | — | $201M | $12M | 6.0% (of revenue) | vs (31.1)% in Q3'25 |
| Others | n/a | — | $1M | $(4)M | NM | n/a |
Not attributed to any segment
The segment table above is on Segment Adjusted EBITDA, the profit measure Grab itself uses for its segments. It stops short of the group's operating profit, and the table below shows every step between the two, as Grab's own reconciliation lists them (US$ million, three months ended September 30).
| Step | Q3 2026 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Deliveries Segment Adjusted EBITDA | 123 | 78 |
| Mobility Segment Adjusted EBITDA | 207 | 181 |
| Financial Services Segment Adjusted EBITDA | 12 | (28) |
| Others Segment Adjusted EBITDA | (4) | under 1 |
| Total Segment Adjusted EBITDA | 338 | 231 |
| Regional corporate costs - not attributed to any segment | (101) | (95) |
| Adjusted EBITDA (the group figure on the same measure) | 237 | 136 |
| Depreciation and amortization | (66) | (46) |
| Share-based compensation expenses | (49) | (55) |
| Costs related to mergers and acquisitions | (2) | (2) |
| Day-1 expected credit loss on an acquired loan portfolio | - | - |
| Restructuring costs | (4) | (2) |
| Legal, tax and regulatory settlement provisions | (12) | (4) |
| Impairment losses on goodwill and non-financial assets | - | - |
| Net other income | 4 | under 1 |
| Operating profit | 108 | 27 |
Grab's reconciliation again shows no elimination line between the segments and the group, so regional corporate costs are the only amount it labels as not attributed to any segment. That $101 million (cloud computing, software costs and professional fees that Grab does not assign to a segment) takes $338 million of segment profit to $237 million of Adjusted EBITDA, and a further $129 million of items Grab leaves out of Adjusted EBITDA and the segments - mostly depreciation and amortization ($66 million) and share-based compensation ($49 million) - takes it to $108 million of operating profit. The group's operating profit is about $230 million below the sum of the segments, which is why it looks so small beside them.
Deliveries
US$ million; margin is Segment Adjusted EBITDA as a percent of segment revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment revenue (press release); profit is the segment Adjusted EBITDA.
Deliveries revenue grew 21% year over year (22% constant-currency) to $561 million, and GMV grew 21% (24% constant-currency) to $4.5 billion - growth Grab attributes primarily to Food and Groceries GMV expansion and improving Advertising monetization. Segment Adjusted EBITDA grew 58% to $123 million, with margin on GMV improving 65 basis points to 2.7%, which Grab credits to higher Advertising contribution and operating leverage. Average monthly active merchant-partners grew 7% year over year, average merchant-partner earnings grew 15%, and quarterly active advertisers on the self-serve platform grew 39% with average advertiser spend up 13% - the same advertising-monetization story the margin line shows.
Mobility
US$ million; margin is Segment Adjusted EBITDA as a percent of segment revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment revenue (press release); profit is the segment Adjusted EBITDA.
Mobility revenue grew 10% year over year (12% constant-currency) to $349 million, and GMV grew 14% (17% constant-currency) to $2.3 billion, with transactions growing 21% - meaningfully outpacing GMV growth, which Grab attributes to affordable product tiers bringing more users onto the platform at lower average fares. Segment Adjusted EBITDA grew 15% to $207 million, with margin on GMV essentially flat at 8.9%. Active driver-partners grew 20% year over year to a new high, as Grab invested in supply incentives partly to support the transition to electric vehicles; EV penetration of completed four-wheel trips reached 18%, up from 13% in Q1 2026.
Financial Services
US$ million; margin is Segment Adjusted EBITDA as a percent of segment revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment revenue (press release); profit is the segment Adjusted EBITDA.
Financial Services revenue more than doubled year over year, up 124% (132% constant-currency) to $201 million, which Grab attributes to higher lending contributions across GrabFin and its digital banks, the continuing consolidation of Superbank, and the addition of Stash's results beginning this quarter. Segment Adjusted EBITDA turned positive for the first time, improving $40 million year over year to $12 million from a $28 million loss - the segment's first quarter of profitability since Grab began reporting it separately. Gross Loan Portfolio scaled 200% year over year to $2.7 billion, or 115% excluding Superbank; total loans disbursed grew 115% to $1.9 billion in the quarter; and total customer deposits across GXS Bank, GXBank and Superbank grew to $2.7 billion.
Others
Others revenue was $1 million, down 17% year over year, and Segment Adjusted EBITDA was a $4 million loss against a loss of less than $1 million a year ago. Grab gives no further breakdown of this segment.
Beyond the Usual
Grab's Q3 2026 source documents are the earnings press release (also furnished to the SEC as a 6-K exhibit with the full unaudited financial statements attached, identical in substance), the supplemental investor presentation, and CEO/COO/CFO prepared remarks. No annual 20-F and no separate Interim Report were filed this quarter, so the dormant legal/governance threads from earlier posts (the GrabMart trademark suit, the Singapore tax assessments, the Toyota framework agreement) have no new company-disclosed developments.
A $600 Million Acquisition Collapsed, and the Break Fee Lands Next Quarter
In October 2026, Taiwan's Fair Trade Commission rejected Grab's proposed acquisition of Delivery Hero's foodpanda Taiwan business - first disclosed as a pending deal in Q1 2026's post and still unclosed as of Q2 2026's post. CFO Peter Oey's prepared remarks give the deal's size for the first time, calling it "our proposed $600 million acquisition of Foodpanda Taiwan," and Grab will record a $60 million break fee in the fourth quarter of 2026 - a merger-and-acquisition cost that will hit IFRS results but be excluded from Adjusted EBITDA, equal to 10% of the deal's disclosed value. Grab's statement is respectful of the regulator and gives no further detail on why the deal was rejected.
The 2028 Targets Already Assume an Acquisition That Won't Close for Another Year
Grab's reiterated 2028 targets - 30%+ Group Revenue CAGR, $1.7 billion Adjusted EBITDA, $500 million Financial Services Segment Adjusted EBITDA, and a Gross Loan Portfolio above $6 billion - explicitly include the pending acquisition of Atome, a consumer-lending deal Grab disclosed for the first time this quarter. The supplemental presentation states plainly that the deal is "subject to closing, which is expected to take place in Q3 2027," nearly a year away. In the same set of materials, a comparable cross-border acquisition - foodpanda Taiwan, above - just failed regulatory approval after roughly seven months of pursuit. Grab's own materials don't draw the connection between the two.
The Press Release Books a $12 Million Impairment Without Naming the Investee
The reconciliation from profit for the period to Adjusted EBITDA adds back a new $12 million "impairment loss on equity-accounted investee" this quarter, with a nil comparative a year ago. A search of the press release, the supplemental presentation and the prepared remarks for "equity-accounted investee" or "associate" returns only the line item itself - none of the three names which associate or joint venture took the charge. Grab's own "Associates and joint venture" balance-sheet line has fallen to $57 million at quarter-end from $309 million at the end of 2025, a drop driven mostly by Superbank's move from equity-accounted associate to full consolidation last quarter; this quarter's unnamed charge is against whatever remains in that now much smaller pool.
Two Fintech Acquisitions, Two Different Day-1 Accounting Charges
When Superbank crossed Grab's 50% ownership threshold and consolidated last quarter, it brought a one-time $15 million "Day-1 expected credit loss on an acquired loan portfolio" charge - the standard provision booked against a loan book the moment it's absorbed onto the balance sheet. Stash, which began consolidating this quarter, brought no such charge: the line reads nil for both Q3 2026 and Q3 2025. Grab doesn't explain the difference directly, but it's consistent with the two businesses' different models - Superbank is a lender with a loan book to provision against on day one, while Grab's own description of Stash is "retail wealth management and investment services," not a lending business.
Non-Controlling Interests Have Grown More Than Seventeenfold Since the Start of the Year
Equity attributable to non-controlling interests rose to $503 million at September 30, 2026, from $29 million at the end of 2025 - more than seventeen times higher - as Grab's roughly-49% partners in Superbank (consolidated in Q2 2026) and its minority partners in Stash (a 50.1% stake at closing, with the balance paid over a three-year post-closing period, per Q2 2026's post) both now sit inside Grab's own equity statement. The cash flow statement shows a $137 million "acquisition of subsidiaries with non-controlling interests, net of cash acquired" outflow this quarter, against essentially nil a year ago - consistent with Stash's first full quarter of consolidation landing in this period.
A New Disclosed Metric Explains Why Fintech Profitability Still Looks Thin
Grab disclosed a new metric this quarter, Lending Risk Adjusted Margin - lending revenue less cost of funds and credit costs, annualized, as a percentage of Gross Loan Portfolio - at 7% for Q3 2026, against a targeted steady state of 10% to 12%. Management's own explanation for the gap is structural rather than a credit-quality problem: Grab provisions for expected credit losses at the moment it disburses a loan, so its fastest-growing lending products carry the heaviest provisioning today, before the interest income on those same loans has had time to build up against the reserve. Grab's Expected Credit Loss» reserves stood at 6.5% of Gross Loan Portfolio at quarter-end, about 2.4 times its 2.6% non-performing-loan ratio.
CEO Anthony Tan's Case For Acceleration, and What He Didn't Connect
Tan built his opening remarks around three structural arguments for why On-Demand growth can keep accelerating: user penetration is still low relative to developed markets, affordable product tiers keep bringing in users at price points Grab couldn't previously serve profitably, and engagement keeps deepening (daily transacting user growth outpacing monthly user growth). He framed the AI-First-with-Heart initiative - a 42% quarter-on-quarter drop in cost per AI interaction, a new OpenAI partnership to train 30,000 driver- and merchant-partners - as a margin lever rather than a cost center, and mentioned, almost in passing, that he has personally purchased additional Grab shares - a detail that sits awkwardly next to the stock's two-year low without either document connecting the two explicitly.
On the foodpanda Taiwan rejection, Oey was direct rather than vague: he named the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission, respected its mandate, and disclosed the $60 million break fee and its accounting treatment in the same breath. That directness continues a pattern from Q2 2026's call, when Tan named Uber's departing board representative and the circumstances of his 2018 board seat explicitly rather than leaving the change to a filing footnote. What neither Tan nor Oey did was connect the Taiwan outcome to the Atome acquisition's own risk - a pending cross-border deal of the kind that just failed once this quarter, already built into a 2028 target (see Beyond the Usual above).
Target Valuation Range
Grab's own multiple compressed sharply this quarter, on a falling stock price rather than a richer business, and it is now cheaper than Sea and Uber on revenue. At $3.11 Grab trades at roughly 1.9x trailing EV/Revenue, down from 2.7x three months ago, against Sea's ~2.1x and Uber's ~3.3x (both from their own June quarters) and roughly level with GoTo's 1.53x - though GoTo's own multiple this quarter is itself distorted by a one-time price-floor removal, so that particular comparison carries its own caveat.
In plain words: enterprise value (EV) is what the market says the whole business is worth - the value of all the shares, less the net cash Grab holds - and EV/Revenue divides it by a year of sales so companies of different size can be compared. EV/Adjusted EBITDA divides it by a year of the profit measure Grab guides to. The takeaway: at $3.11 the stock trades at a lower revenue multiple than either Sea or Uber, a reversal from last quarter.
Using the 4,081,422 thousand weighted-average basic shares Grab discloses for the quarter (the same basis as the last two posts): Grab also discloses the period-end Class A and Class B share count this quarter - 3,942 million plus 95 million, or 4,037 million total as of September 30, 2026 - which is slightly lower, reflecting the September buybacks; using it instead would put market capitalization about 1.1% lower and enterprise value about 1.8% lower. The comparison across quarters below keeps the weighted-average basis for consistency with the last two posts.
| Market cap → enterprise value | Q3 2026 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | $3.11 |
| Shares outstanding | ~4.081B |
| Market capitalization | ~$12.69B |
| Total liabilities | n/a (net cash basis used) |
| Less: net cash liquidity | $5.04B |
| Enterprise value | ~$7.65B |
Market cap fell 17.6% from Q2 2026's ~$15.4B, driven almost entirely by the share-price decline - shares outstanding barely moved. Net cash liquidity fell a smaller 6.0%, from $5.364 billion to $5.044 billion, which is why enterprise value fell further in percentage terms (23.8%) than market cap did: EV strips out an amount of cash that didn't shrink nearly as fast as the share price.
| Peer-multiple sanity check | Q2 2026 | Q3 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise value | ~$10.0B | ~$7.65B | down sharply |
| EV/Revenue (trailing four quarters) | ~2.7x | ~1.9x | down sharply |
| EV/Revenue (annualized run-rate) | ~2.5x | ~1.7x | down sharply |
| EV/Revenue (FY guidance) | ~2.4x | ~1.8x | down sharply |
| EV/On-Demand GMV (annualized run-rate) | ~0.39x | ~0.28x | down sharply |
Enterprise value here does not add non-controlling interests ($503 million at September 30, 2026), although revenue and On-Demand GMV are consolidated; adding them would put EV/Revenue (trailing four quarters) at about 2.05x instead of 1.93x.
| Company (latest post) | Period and basis | EV/Revenue | EV/Adjusted EBITDA | P/E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grab (this post) | Q3 2026, September 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap - net cash liquidity; trailing four quarters of revenue ($3,970M) | ~1.9x | ~9.6x (FY2026 guidance midpoint, $795M) | not in this post |
| GoTo | Q3 2026, September 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap + total liabilities - cash; trailing twelve months of net revenue; price distorted this quarter by an exchange floor-price removal | 1.53x (1.34x on owner-held shares) | ~9.1x (FY2026 guidance midpoint) | not in that post |
| Sea | Q2 2026, June 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap + convertible notes - cash and cash equivalents; trailing four quarters | ~2.1x | ~16.1x (trailing) | ~36.1x |
| Uber | Q2 2026, June 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap + total liabilities - cash; trailing twelve months of revenue | ~3.3x | not in that post | not in that post |
On revenue, Grab (~1.9x) is now priced below both Sea (~2.1x) and Uber (~3.3x), a reversal from last quarter, when it traded close to GoTo and below Uber alone. The GoTo comparison is the least clean in the table this quarter: GoTo's own post flags that its multiple is depressed by a one-time exchange floor-price removal, not a change in its business, so Grab's rough parity with GoTo should be read as two different distortions landing near each other, not as the two companies converging on fundamentals. On guided Adjusted EBITDA, Grab (~9.6x) and GoTo (~9.1x) now sit close together, both well below Sea's trailing ~16.1x.
Grab's stock closed the quarter at $3.11, its lowest month-end close in at least two years - down 17.5% from Q2 2026's $3.77 close and down 48.3% from the $6.02 high reached in September 2025. Q1 2026's post already flagged a two-year low at $3.66; this quarter's close is lower still, and the decline has now run for three consecutive quarters (Q1, Q2 and Q3 2026) against a business that set revenue, Adjusted EBITDA and GMV records in every one of them. None of the quarter's source documents names a specific cause for the share-price move.
Grab Holdings Limited's Q3 2026 earnings press release, supplemental investor presentation, and CEO/COO/CFO prepared remarks (all dated November 3, 2026).