Third Straight Profitable Quarter, Priced Through a Broken Floor
Over these 12 quarters: share price Rp86 to Rp32 (-63%); operating income -1,480 to 351 Rp billion; operating income margin -34.6% to 6.3%. One graph in actual numbers: bars are the quarter's operating income, over them the share price at quarter-end (left axis) and the operating income margin (right axis); each line is fitted to its own range, so read the timing, not the heights. Prices are adjusted for splits.
GoTo earned its third consecutive quarterly net profit on operations that are genuinely improving, and the market re-priced the stock 36% lower in the two days a regulatory price floor finally let it trade freely.
The quarter was solid: net profit of Rp441 billion, a third straight quarter of real operating income despite the 8% commission cap's first full quarter, and net revenue up 17% year-on-year.
The complication: GoTo's headlined growth number, Core GTV, grew 89% - five times faster than net revenue - because the growth sits in GoPay's lower-margin payment volume rather than higher-take-rate lending. And on September 28, two days before quarter-end, the Indonesia Stock Exchange lifted the Rp50 floor that had pinned the stock for four months - and it fell to Rp32.
Net profit held for a third straight quarter, verified quarter by quarter
GoTo's own claim of a "third consecutive quarter of net profit" checks out against the filed numbers, not just the headline. Total net profit for the period (including non-controlling interests) was a loss every quarter from Q4 2024 through Q4 2025 - Rp926 billion, Rp367 billion, Rp375 billion, Rp255 billion and Rp505 billion of losses, respectively - before turning positive at Rp171 billion in Q1 2026, Rp253 billion in Q2 2026 and now Rp441 billion in Q3 2026. That is three in a row, no more and no less, and this quarter's profit is the largest of the three. Profit attributable to owners of the parent was higher still, Rp557 billion, because non-controlling interests booked a Rp116 billion loss for the quarter (both figures are disclosed directly in the filing's own per-share footnote, which also states a Rp196 billion owners' loss for Q3 2025 as the comparison).
A payment-volume surge that doesn't reach net revenue
GoTo's own headline operating number this quarter is Core GTV», up 89% year-on-year to Rp193.9 trillion, with Group GTV up 82% to Rp321.5 trillion. Net revenue, the line that actually funds the business, grew 17% to Rp5,555 billion - a fifth of Core GTV's growth rate. The gap is not a mystery: Core GTV already excludes merchant payment-gateway volume by GoTo's own definition, so the growth sits in GoPay's consumer wallet and QRIS-type payment flow, which the Financial Technology segment's own numbers confirm carries a thinner cut than lending. Fintech's GTV grew 86% to Rp315.6 trillion while Fintech's net revenue grew 49% to Rp2,295 billion - a segment take rate» that compressed to 0.73% from 0.91% a year ago, even as the segment's own Adjusted EBITDA more than quadrupled. A company whose headlined growth metric is five times its net revenue growth, and whose underlying take rate is shrinking as that metric grows, is leading with the number that flatters the story rather than the one that funds it.
The Rp50 floor that wasn't a real price
GoTo's stock did not actually trade at Rp50 for four months - it was prevented from trading below it. The Indonesia Stock Exchange runs a minimum tick/floor price regime for stocks that fall far enough; GoTo's shares were held at exactly Rp50 from May through August 2026, a dead flat line that any genuinely freely-traded stock almost never shows for four consecutive months. On September 28, 2026 - two trading days before this quarter closed - the exchange removed that floor, and GoTo's shares were free to trade below Rp50 for the first time. By the September 30 close, the stock was at Rp32, a 36% move that happened entirely in the two days the floor was lifted, not over the quarter the floor applied. That single fact reshapes everything the valuation section below says about GoTo's price: the Rp32 close this quarter reflects two days of genuine price discovery after months of an artificial floor, not a quarter's worth of market consensus, and it collapsed GoTo's enterprise value by close to 40% on a price move alone, even as the underlying business kept its profit streak intact.
The Prescription
GoTo should lead every results package with net revenue and take rate, not Core GTV, and let the gap between gross volume and real revenue close the easy way - by growing lending and e-commerce fee revenue faster than low-margin payment throughput - rather than by habit. The business is doing several genuinely good things this quarter: a third straight profitable quarter, a real operating-income streak that survived the GoRide commission cap's first full quarter, and a Fintech segment whose Adjusted EBITDA is compounding fast. None of that needs a GTV figure growing five times faster than revenue to look good on its own terms, and continuing to headline Core GTV when the ratio between it and net revenue keeps widening invites exactly the skepticism the Target Valuation Range below applies. The thing to stop is treating the now-broken Rp50 floor as background noise in the results commentary. The floor's removal is the single biggest thing that happened to GoTo's valuation this quarter, bigger than any operating line in this post, and the company's own materials do not connect the dots between the regulatory floor being lifted two days before quarter-end and the stock falling 36% - leaving investors to work out for themselves that the real price discovery is only two days old.
Key Financial Metrics
Rp trillion; margin is operating income as a percent of net revenue, per quarter.
Q3 2026 vs Q3 2025 (three months ended September 30), derived by subtracting GoTo's six-month period ended June 30, 2026 from the nine-month period ended September 30, 2026 filed figures, and cross-checked against the as-reported quarterly figures in GoTo's own press release and presentation (which match). FX: IDR 17,965 = USD 1 (Bank Indonesia's middle rate for 29 September 2026, the last published rate before quarter-end), applied throughout for comparability.
| Metric | Q3 2026 (IDR) | Q3 2026 (USD) | Q3 2025 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Revenue | Rp5,555B | ~$309.3M | Rp4,737B | +17.3% |
| Profit from Operations (real, unadjusted) | +Rp351B | ~$19.6M | -Rp51B | Swung to a profit, but the smallest of three straight positive quarters |
| Adjusted EBITDA | Rp950B (17.1% of Net Revenue) | ~$52.9M | Rp516B (10.9% of Net Revenue) | +84.1% YoY, but down 5.9% from Q2's record Rp1,010B - the series' first sequential decline |
| Net Profit (for the period) | +Rp441B | ~$24.6M | -Rp255B | Third consecutive profitable quarter, and the largest of the three |
| Free Cash Flow (OCF - capex) | +Rp707B | ~$39.4M | +Rp185B | Fifth straight positive quarter |
| Total Cash & Equivalents (period-end) | Rp24,321B | ~$1,354.6M | Rp17,649B | +37.9% |
Profit attributable to owners of the parent was Rp557 billion (non-controlling interests booked a Rp116 billion loss for the quarter), more than the Rp441 billion total shown above. Free cash flow is derived here from the financial statements, since GoTo discloses only its own "Adjusted Free Cash Flow" measure (Rp1,209 billion this quarter) directly, a different non-IFAS construction that adds back financing and lending disbursed to users net of user-side proceeds before subtracting capex: net cash from operating activities of +Rp772 billion less capital expenditure (intangible assets plus fixed assets) of -Rp65 billion gives +Rp707 billion (~$39.4 million). Total assets grew to Rp48,563 billion (+2.3% quarter-on-quarter), total liabilities rose to Rp19,110 billion (+3.3% QoQ), and total equity reached Rp29,452 billion (+1.6% QoQ).
Key Operational Metrics
Q3 2026, per GoTo's earnings presentation and press release
Arrow = the way the number moved against a year earlier. Green = good for GoTo, red = bad, grey = flat.
- Group Annual Transacting Users»: 72.5 million, +16% year-on-year.
- Core GTV»: Rp193.9 trillion, +89% year-on-year (see the gross-vs-net finding in the opening).
- Group GTV: Rp321.5 trillion, +82% year-on-year.
- On-Demand Services GTV: Rp16.9 trillion, barely up from Rp16.7 trillion a year ago (+1% year-on-year), as mass-market order growth was offset by lower order values and GoRide pricing changes tied to the commission cap.
- Mobility margin: 2.5%, down from 3.0% a year ago (50 basis points), the direct effect of the 8% commission cap's first full quarter.
- Delivery margin: 2.1%, up from 1.8% a year ago (33 basis points).
- Fintech Monthly Transacting Users»: 30.4 million, +26% year-on-year.
- Fintech transactions: 2.8 billion, +86% year-on-year - transaction growth outpacing user growth, consistent with the take-rate compression noted above.
- Total loans outstanding: Rp12.0 trillion, +51% year-on-year (credit quality is covered in Beyond the Usual below).
This was the first full quarter under the 8% commission cap on two-wheel rides, and GoTo's own numbers show its bite. The Presidential Regulation on the protection of the digital platform-based transport ecosystem - made available in October 2026, after this quarter closed - formalizes the cap and classifies driver-partners as micro-entrepreneurs; GoTo had already been operating under it since the cap first applied. The company puts the cap's impact at roughly Rp150 billion of Adjusted EBITDA this quarter, in line with the Rp300 billion full-year guidance given in July, and Mobility's Adjusted EBITDA actually fell to Rp159 billion from Rp190 billion a year ago (-16%) even as completed orders grew - a margin-for-volume trade going the wrong way for the first time since the cap was announced. GoTo nonetheless raised its full-year Adjusted EBITDA guidance to Rp3.5-3.7 trillion (from Rp3.2-3.4 trillion), entirely on Fintech's strength (raised to Rp1.9-2.0 trillion from Rp1.7-1.8 trillion) and a widened On-Demand Services range (Rp1.4-1.6 trillion, from Rp1.4-1.5 trillion) that leaves room for further regulatory uncertainty rather than confidence that the cap's damage is now fully known.
Three Segments: Fintech Carries the Quarter While On-Demand Absorbs the Cap
GoTo still reports the same three segments - On-Demand Services, Financial Technology, and E-Commerce. The real (unadjusted) operating profit figures below are GoTo's own disclosed quarter-only figures from its Adjusted EBITDA reconciliation (not derived by subtraction), cross-checked against the financial statements' segment note on a nine-month basis; Adjusted EBITDA figures are as disclosed in the earnings materials.
On-Demand Services (Mobility & Delivery)
Rp billion; margin is segment operating profit as a percent of segment net revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment net revenue (segment note, third-party); profit is the segment operating profit. Values are standalone quarters; some are derived from half-year, nine-month or full-year figures in the filings. Shows the 11 quarters the segment's definition and disclosures allow.
On-Demand Services' real operating profit fell to +Rp264 billion from Q2 2026's +Rp423 billion (-37.6%), even though net revenue grew to Rp3,306 billion from Rp3,205 billion a year ago (+3%). Adjusted EBITDA was Rp347 billion, +3% year-on-year but down from Q2's Rp464 billion (-25.2%) - the commission cap's first full quarter interrupting a run of rising Adjusted EBITDA margin on GTV that had held every quarter since Q3 2025 (2.0%, 2.3%, 2.7%, 2.8%) before falling to 2.1% this quarter. Within the segment, Mobility's Adjusted EBITDA fell 16% year-on-year to Rp159 billion on the cap, while Delivery's rose 20% to Rp227 billion on mass-market order growth; management says GoRide itself, which turned Adjusted EBITDA negative in July, "has improved and is trending towards break-even."
Financial Technology (GoPay)
Rp billion; margin is segment operating profit as a percent of segment net revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment net revenue (segment note, third-party); profit is the segment operating profit. Values are standalone quarters; some are derived from half-year, nine-month or full-year figures in the filings. Shows the 11 quarters the segment's definition and disclosures allow.
Fintech's real operating profit reached +Rp379 billion, up from Q2 2026's +Rp272 billion (+39.3%) and from a Rp131 billion loss a year ago. Net revenue grew 49% year-on-year to Rp2,295 billion, and Adjusted EBITDA more than quadrupled to Rp550 billion from Rp136 billion (+304%). As covered in the opening, the segment's GTV grew far faster than its revenue (86% vs. 49%), and its take rate compressed to 0.73% from 0.91% - the segment is scaling on cheaper payment volume even as its profit measures improve, a combination that is not contradictory (fixed costs are being spread over much more volume) but does mean the profit growth is not simply more of the same mix, scaled up.
E-Commerce (Tokopedia service fee)
Rp billion; margin is segment operating profit as a percent of segment net revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment net revenue (segment note, third-party); profit is the segment operating profit. Values are standalone quarters; some are derived from half-year, nine-month or full-year figures in the filings. Starts at Q2 2024: earlier periods are not comparable.
E-Commerce's real operating profit was +Rp205 billion, down 4.2% from Q2 2026's +Rp214 billion but up 19.2% from Q3 2025's +Rp172 billion, on a consultancy-and-support service fee from Tokopedia that fell sequentially for a second straight quarter even as it grew year-on-year: Rp288 billion in Q1 2026, Rp263 billion in Q2, and now Rp235 billion in Q3 - a 10.6% sequential decline following Q2's 8.7% decline, but still up 11.4% from Q3 2025's Rp211 billion. Net revenue from PT Semangat Logistik Andalan (SLA), the related-party line first flagged in Q1 2026 and tracked again in Q2, also fell sharply, to roughly Rp114 billion this quarter from Q2's roughly Rp208 billion. Combined, total related-party net revenue eased to about 6.5% of Q3's net revenue (Rp363 billion of Rp5,555 billion) from Q2's 8.5%, after three straight quarters of rising concentration - a reversal driven by both of the segment's related-party revenue lines declining in the same quarter, not by an increase in unrelated-party revenue diluting the share.
Segment Comparison
| Segment | Net Revenue YoY (real) | Adjusted EBITDA | Real Operating Profit | vs Q2 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| On-Demand Services | +3.2% | Rp347B, +3% | +Rp264B | Down from +Rp423B |
| Financial Technology | +48.9% | Rp550B, +304% | +Rp379B | Up from +Rp272B |
| E-Commerce | +11.4% (fee) | Rp206B, +13% | +Rp205B | Down slightly from +Rp214B |
| Group | +17.3% | Rp950B, +84% | +Rp351B | Down from +Rp364B |
Not attributed to any segment
The table above ends at each segment's own profit. GoTo's own reconciliation (presentation p27, Three-Month Ended Sep 30 2026 column) starts from segment operating profit and shows every step up to Adjusted EBITDA, which is the reverse order GoTo's deck presents it in but the same figures:
| Step | Q3 2026 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| On-Demand Services segment operating profit | 264 | 220 |
| Financial Technology segment operating profit | 379 | (131) |
| E-Commerce segment operating profit | 205 | 172 |
| Corporate cost, not attributed to any segment | (497) | (312) |
| Group profit from operations (operating profit) | 351 | (51) |
| Depreciation and amortization | 203 | 196 |
| Non-recurring items | 356 | 224 |
| EBITDA | 910 | 369 |
| Share-based compensation cost | 36 | 148 |
| Other income/(expenses) | 4 | (1) |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 950 | 516 |
Not attributed to any segment is GoTo's head-office cost: Rp497 billion this quarter on the real operating-profit basis, up 59% from Rp312 billion a year earlier but actually down 8.8% from Q2 2026's Rp545 billion, because Rp343 billion of the Rp356 billion of non-recurring items this quarter sits there (Q2 2026's Rp405 billion of non-recurring items, first flagged then, has eased to Rp356 billion - still neither itemized by GoTo nor explained beyond its footnote description as including "restructuring costs"). Neither Adjusted EBITDA nor operating profit is after income tax.
Beyond the Usual
Bank Jago's disclosed fair value fell for a third straight quarter, and its gap to GoTo's own carrying value has widened
The market-implied fair value of GoTo's 21.40% stake in Bank Jago - the IDX-listed price of the holding, as GoTo itself discloses in its investment-in-associates note - fell to Rp2,358 billion at September 30, 2026, down from Q2 2026's Rp2,862 billion, a 17.6% single-quarter decline. That is a third straight quarterly fall and a 59.8% drop from Rp5,857 billion at the end of 2025. GoTo's own equity-method carrying amount for the stake barely moved, to Rp2,959 billion from Rp2,935 billion at June 30, so the stake is now carried Rp601 billion above its disclosed market value - a gap that has widened every quarter this has been tracked (Rp73 billion at Q2, market value above carrying amount before that). The filing discloses the fair value figure itself but does not discuss whether this persistent, growing gap was assessed for impairment under the equity method.
Total loan delinquency reached its highest level in the disclosed series, despite management calling the portfolio "stable"
Total overdue balances across GoTo's ecosystem loan book (consumer and merchant lending, on- and off-balance-sheet) reached 8.9% of the Rp11.28 trillion book at September 30, 2026 - a fifth consecutive quarterly increase (7.7% in September 2025, then 7.9%, 8.0%, 8.2% and now 8.9%), and the sharpest single-quarter rise in that run. The deck's own section heading for this data is "Stable Portfolio Quality with Low NPLs." The >90-days-past-due bucket, the figure closest to a conventional Non-Performing Loan» ratio, ticked up to 0.9% from 0.8% the prior quarter - ties its highest level in the disclosed series, matching December 2025's reading three quarters earlier, though still small in absolute terms. Most of this quarter's increase sits in the earliest-stage bucket (1-30 days past due), which jumped to 3.9% of the book from 3.1% a year ago and from 3.1% last quarter - consistent with a loan book still growing 51% year-on-year generating more early-stage overdue balances in proportion, but a fifth straight quarterly rise in the total ratio is a harder trend to square with "stable" than a single quarter would be.
GoTo's lending book runs partly through off-balance-sheet channeling arrangements with third parties, in both directions
GoTo's disclosed "loans outstanding principal" (Rp12.0 trillion this quarter) explicitly includes both on- and off-balance-sheet loans, and the financial statements' commitments note explains the mechanics: GoTo has signed channeling agreements with Bank Jago, PT Murni Aldana Manajemen and PT Maybank Indonesia under which those parties fund loans originated through GoTo's platforms, with credit risk for those loans sitting entirely with the channeling partner, not GoTo. Separately, GoTo has agreed to fund loans originated through platforms owned by PT Kredit Pintar Indonesia, PT Pembiayaan Digital Indonesia and PT Indonesia Fintopia Technology, with those balances recorded on GoTo's own balance sheet as financing and lending receivables. The arrangement runs both ways - GoTo originates and offloads credit risk through one set of partners while taking on credit risk from loans originated by another set - which means the headline loan-book growth rate mixes loans GoTo is actually exposed to with loans it is not, and the split between the two is not broken out in the disclosed figure.
GoTo will receive quarterly fees from Tokopedia tied to GMV, excluding digital goods and high-value items
The Consultancy Services and Support Agreement between GoTo and TOKO (Tokopedia), which generates the E-Commerce segment's main revenue line covered above, is structured as a quarterly fee calculated from an agreed rate applied to Tokopedia's GMV after excluding digital goods, certain high-value items and other categories the two companies agree to exclude. This is the mechanism behind the segment's revenue, not new disclosure this quarter, but it explains why the fee tracks Tokopedia's underlying commerce activity on a narrower base than Tokopedia's own headline GMV would suggest, and why a shift in Tokopedia's product mix toward excluded categories could move the fee independently of overall Tokopedia volume.
Target Valuation Range
Below GoTo's own Q1 2026 (2.88x) and Q2 2026 (2.63x) multiples, and the discount is almost entirely a function of two days of free trading, not a change in the business. Enterprise value fell to ~Rp32,906B (~$1.83B) from ~Rp54,589B last quarter, implying 1.53x EV/TTM Net Revenue (1.34x on owner-held shares) - below Grab (~2.7x), Sea (~2.1x) and Uber (~3.3x), and below GoTo's own prior lows - almost entirely because the share price fell from Rp50 to Rp32 once an exchange-mandated price floor was lifted two days before quarter-end, not because the underlying business got cheaper on its own numbers.
In plain words: enterprise value (EV) is what the market says the whole business is worth - the value of all its shares plus what it owes, less the cash it holds - and dividing it by a year of net revenue (EV/Revenue) or a year of Adjusted EBITDA (EV/Adjusted EBITDA) lets companies of different size be compared. At Rp32 a share GoTo is priced at about 1.53 times a year of net revenue and, on the Rp3.6 trillion midpoint of its own raised full-year guidance, about 9.1 times Adjusted EBITDA. The takeaway: on both measures GoTo is now priced well below every peer in the table below, a gap this large in one quarter is a price-discovery event (see the opening and the share-price discussion below), not a verdict on the operating numbers, which actually improved this quarter.
| Company (latest post) | Period and basis | EV/Revenue | EV/Adjusted EBITDA | P/E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GoTo (this post) | Q3 2026, September 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap + total liabilities - cash and equivalents, non-controlling interests not added; trailing twelve months of net revenue (Rp21,576B); the EBITDA multiple is on the FY2026 guidance midpoint (~Rp3.6T), not trailing | 1.53x (1.34x on owner-held shares, excluding 124.6 billion treasury shares) | ~9.1x (on guidance) | not in this post |
| Grab | Q2 2026, June 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap - net cash liquidity; trailing four quarters of revenue; the EBITDA multiple is on the FY2026 guidance midpoint ($730M), not trailing | ~2.7x | ~13.7x (on guidance) | not in that post |
| Sea | Q2 2026, June 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap + convertible notes - cash and cash equivalents; trailing four quarters (Q3 2025 to Q2 2026); P/E = market cap / trailing net income | ~2.1x | ~16.1x | ~36.1x |
| Uber | Q2 2026, June 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap + total liabilities - cash; trailing twelve months of revenue | ~3.3x | not in that post | not in that post |
GoTo's own multiple is now well below all three peers on revenue (1.53x against Grab's ~2.7x, Sea's ~2.1x and Uber's ~3.3x) and on guided Adjusted EBITDA (~9.1x against Grab's ~13.7x and Sea's ~16.1x trailing). None of Grab, Sea or Uber had a comparable floor-price mechanic disrupt its own quarter's closing price, so this is not a like-for-like "GoTo looks cheap" comparison - the real difference is that GoTo's stock had two days of free trading this quarter and the other three didn't, and the gap should be read with that caveat foremost, not as a verdict that GoTo is now structurally undervalued against regional and global peers.
GoTo's share count held at 1,191,144,997,220 shares issued, with 124,583,060,128 treasury shares per the balance sheet's own share-capital note (down slightly from Q2's 125,052,576,391; the announced cancellation of 32.18 billion treasury shares was approved by shareholders at an Extraordinary General Meeting on October 14, 2026, after this quarter closed, and had not yet been executed as of September 30, 2026). The stock closed September 2026 at Rp32, down 36% from Q2 2026's Rp50 close - but that fall happened entirely in the two trading days after the Indonesia Stock Exchange removed the Rp50 floor price on September 28, 2026 (see the opening); the stock had been flat at Rp50 every month from May through August 2026. No stock split falls within the two-year price window used here. Over the trailing two years, the stock ranged from a high of Rp85 (April 2025) to this quarter's new low of Rp32 - a 62.4% peak-to-trough decline, with the low driven by the floor's removal rather than a gradual decline.
| Market cap → enterprise value | Q3 2026 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp32 |
| Shares outstanding | 1,191,144,997,220 |
| Market capitalization | Rp38,117B (~$2.12B) |
| Total liabilities | ~Rp19,110B |
| Less: cash and equivalents | ~Rp24,321B |
| Enterprise value | Rp32,906B (~$1.83B) |
In rupiah, market cap fell 36.0%, from Rp59,557B at Q2 2026's close, driven entirely by the share-price fall from Rp50 to Rp32 (the share count did not change); cash rose from Rp23,465B. The dollar fall is similar in scale (from ~$3.33B to ~$2.12B for market cap), since the rupiah moved only modestly against the dollar this quarter (IDR 17,908 at Q2 2026's close against IDR 17,965 now, the Bank Indonesia reference rate for each date, as in the note above the Key Financial Metrics table).
This market capitalization multiplies the price by all 1,191,144,997,220 issued shares, which include the 124,583,060,128 treasury shares GoTo and its subsidiaries hold themselves. Counting only the 1,066,561,937,092 shares held by owners, market capitalization at Rp32 would be Rp34,130B, enterprise value Rp28,920B and EV/TTM net revenue about 1.34x. Earlier quarters' posts used the issued-share count, so the headline keeps that basis for comparability.
| Peer-multiple sanity check | Q2 2026 | Q3 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| TTM Net Revenue | Rp20,758B | Rp21,576B (~$1,205M) | +3.9% |
| Enterprise value | ~$3.05B | ~$1.83B | down |
| EV/TTM Net Revenue | 2.63x | 1.53x | down sharply - EV collapsed on the share-price move while TTM revenue kept growing |
Enterprise value here does not add non-controlling interests, which are a book deficit of Rp3.56 trillion at September 30, 2026, so no claim is counted for them.
This is GoTo's lowest EV/Revenue multiple since at least Q1 2026's 2.88x and Q2 2026's 2.63x, below both - but unlike those two declines, which tracked a business getting cheaper against a roughly flat or falling price over a full quarter, this quarter's drop happened in two days of newly-unfrozen trading, which is the central caveat of this section.
GoTo's 3Q 2026 Results presentation and press release (October 29, 2026), and GoTo's own unaudited interim consolidated financial statements as of and for the nine-month period ended 30 September 2026. No transcript of GoTo's Q3 2026 earnings call was available for this post.