Two Ways to Read the Same Improving Quarter
GoTo's third quarter is the cleanest "the turnaround is real" data point this series has seen: Group Adjusted EBITDA» turned positive for a second time in company history and hit its highest-ever level of Rp137 billion (~$9.0 million), a ninth consecutive quarter of year-on-year improvement, up from a pro forma loss of Rp559 billion a year ago - a Rp696 billion swing CEO Patrick Walujo cited directly on the call. Pro forma Group GTV» grew 37% year-on-year to Rp137.4 trillion and Core GTV» grew 74% to Rp72.0 trillion, both continuing the acceleration flagged last quarter. FinTech's own improvement was fast enough that management pulled its Adjusted EBITDA breakeven guidance for the segment forward by a full year - to positive for the whole of Q4 2024, instead of "by the end of 2025" as guided as recently as Q2's post.
The second read of the same quarter is less clean: on September 16, 2024, GoTo shut down its entire Vietnam on-demand operation - not a segment reshuffle or a reporting-basis change like the last three quarters have brought, but a full country exit. Management mentioned it once, in passing, as the reason certain growth figures now "exclude Vietnam." Nothing in the interim financial statements quantifies what closing an entire country's ride-hailing and delivery business actually cost - no restructuring charge, no discrete write-off, no line item. The only trace in the filed notes is a pre-existing footnote describing a cash-settled compensation program for Vietnamese employees (see Beyond the Usual below) - the kind of housekeeping disclosure that would exist whether or not the business had just been wound down. A company can genuinely be improving its core economics and quietly exiting a market in the same quarter; the second fact just isn't one a reader gets from the numbers alone.
The Prescription
GoTo should keep pressing the FinTech/On-Demand cross-sell loop that's now visibly working - consumer loans outstanding roughly tripled year-on-year to Rp4.3 trillion, NPL» held near 1%, and management now guides to doubling the loan book again by the end of 2025, a full year ahead of where it thought FinTech breakeven would even arrive back in June. The mechanism is proven: mass-market GoPay and Gojek users convert into lending customers at a rate high enough that management is willing to accelerate guidance twice in six months on the strength of it. That's a real, differentiated moat few emerging-market super-apps can replicate.
What GoTo should stop doing is treating a full-country exit as a footnote instead of a disclosed event. Closing Vietnam is very likely the right capital-allocation call - a company managing toward group-level breakeven has no business subsidizing a fourth geography while its core Indonesian ecosystem is still the thing actually working - but a decision that material deserves a quantified cost, a stated rationale, and a clear statement of what happens to the entities and employees left behind, not a single clause on an earnings call and a compensation footnote that predates the closure. Investors reading only the filed financial statements would have no way to know Vietnam closed at all.
Key Financial Metrics
Q3 2024 vs. Q3 2023 (three months ended September 30), as reported in GoTo's unaudited interim consolidated financial statements, derived by subtracting the filed H1 2024 cumulative figures from the filed 9M 2024 figures. Pro forma figures (Tokopedia and GoTo Logistics excluded from both periods) shown separately where the as-reported YoY comparison is distorted - see below.
FX: IDR 15,138 = USD 1 (Bank Indonesia middle rate, period-end, 30 September 2024), applied to both periods for comparability.
| Metric | Q3 2024 (IDR) | Q3 2024 (USD) | Q3 2023 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Revenue | Rp3,926B | ~$259.3M | Rp3,627B | ⚠️ +8.2% as reported (not like-for-like - see below) |
| Loss from Operations | -Rp324B | ~-$21.4M | -Rp2,690B | ✅ Improved 88.0% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | Rp137B (+3% of Gross Revenue) | ~$9.0M | -Rp942B (-16% of Gross Revenue) | ✅ Turned positive - highest-ever level, 9th straight quarter of YoY improvement |
| Net Loss (for the period) | -Rp1,693B | ~-$111.8M | -Rp2,387B | ✅ Improved 29.1% |
| Free Cash Flow (OCF - capex) | -Rp462B | ~-$30.5M | -Rp1,165B | ✅ Improved 60.3% YoY |
| Total Cash & Equivalents (period-end) | Rp20,537B | ~$1,356.4M | Rp24,612B (Sep 2023) | ⚠️ -16.6% YoY, +2.1% vs Jun 2024's Rp20,118B |
As-reported Net Revenue's +8.2% YoY is the least trustworthy number in this table for the same reason flagged the last two quarters: Q3 2023's Rp3,627 billion base still includes a full quarter of Tokopedia's consolidated revenue, while Q3 2024 doesn't include Tokopedia at all (only the equity-method service fee). On the pro forma basis both quarters actually share, Group Net Revenue grew 106% year-on-year (Rp3,926B vs Rp1,905B) and pro forma Group Gross Revenue grew 34% (Rp4.7 trillion vs Rp3.5 trillion) - the more meaningful read, consistent with Core GTV's 74% growth. Total assets fell further to Rp43,825 billion from Rp54,097 billion at December 2023 (-19.0%), continuing the mechanical post-deconsolidation contraction: Investment in Associates - now carrying both the Tokopedia and Bank Jago stakes - rose to Rp10,292 billion from Rp3,120 billion at year-end, largely reflecting the TOKO fair-value re-measurement, even as Tokopedia's own accumulated losses under the equity method keep eating into that mark (see Beyond the Usual). Total liabilities fell to Rp12,167 billion (-33.8% vs. Dec 2023) and total equity fell to Rp31,659 billion (-11.4%), driven mostly by the share-based compensation reserve dropping to Rp5,789 billion from Rp11,233 billion as prior grants vested and were settled.
Key Operational Metrics
Q3 2024, pro forma basis unless noted
Group MTU» grew 21% year-on-year, in line with Q2's 20%, and Group Core GTV's 74% growth outpaced headline GTV growth (37%) by an even wider margin than last quarter's 28-point gap - the growth keeps concentrating in genuine transaction volume rather than FinTech's lower-margin merchant payment gateway pass-through. The consumer lending book grew to Rp4.3 trillion outstanding, roughly tripling year-on-year, with NPL holding near 1% for a fourth straight quarter; management disclosed a new origination cut this quarter (roughly 45% of loans from e-commerce users, 40% from On-Demand Services users, the remainder from GoPay app users) rather than repeating last quarter's "80% of loans channeled through Bank Jago" figure - a genuine change in what's disclosed, not necessarily a worse one, but the Bank Jago channeling percentage itself wasn't repeated this quarter. Management said one in seven transacting users of GoPay and Gojek over the trailing twelve months applied for credit, and guided to doubling loans outstanding versus September 2024 levels by the end of 2025. GoFood Express (launched last quarter) reached 22% of GoFood GTV, and advertising revenue grew 96% year-on-year to 1.3% of Food GMV. LTM Annual Transacting Users remains undisclosed for a third straight quarter running.
Three Segments, One Flywheel - Minus One Country
GoTo still reports the same three segments as last quarter - On-Demand Services, Financial Technology, and E-Commerce - with On-Demand's Vietnam operations closed mid-quarter (September 16, 2024) and excluded from the growth figures below. Figures are as-reported for the three months ended September 30, 2024, the same basis used since these two segments were never distorted by Tokopedia's consolidation in the first place.
On-Demand Services
GTV grew 21% year-on-year to Rp16.6 trillion (25% excluding Vietnam), and orders grew 30%. Gross Revenue grew 22% to Rp3.7 trillion (15% excluding Vietnam and adjusting for the delivery revenue-recognition change enacted in Q1 2024). Contribution Margin improved to 5.0% of GTV from 4.9%, and Adjusted EBITDA improved to +0.9% of GTV from -0.3% a year ago (+129bps) - management called out a further 36-basis-point sequential improvement versus Q2, attributing it to three levers: optimizing mass-market incentive spend, expanding premium tiers (GoFood Express), and growing advertising revenue. President Catherine Hindra Sutjahyo again described the competitive environment in food delivery and mobility as "intense," language consistent with every quarter this series has recorded since 2023. Outside Indonesia, GoTo's remaining On-Demand presence is now effectively just Singapore, following the Vietnam closure.
Financial Technology
GTV grew 38% to Rp130.6 trillion and Core GTV grew 82% to Rp64.6 trillion, both accelerating further from Q2's 27% and 65%. Gross Revenue grew 128% to Rp1.0 trillion, while recurring cash fixed costs grew only 26% - real operating leverage, per Vice President Director Thomas Husted, driven by demand for lending (particularly cash loans, the more profitable product) exceeding what the segment's own guidance had assumed. Adjusted EBITDA loss narrowed 83% year-on-year to -Rp65 billion (-0.05% of GTV, from -0.4%), and management now guides to the segment being Adjusted-EBITDA-positive for the whole of Q4 2024 - a full year ahead of the "by end of 2025" target reaffirmed just last quarter.
E-Commerce
E-Commerce remains almost entirely the Tokopedia consultancy-and-support fee introduced two quarters ago: GoTo booked its second full quarter of it, a Rp191 billion gross cash inflow (Rp172 billion net of VAT), essentially flat versus Q2's Rp171 billion gross / Rp157 billion net despite Tokopedia and Shop Tokopedia's combined GMV growing roughly 9.5% quarter-on-quarter per an analyst's own estimate on the call - a fee tied to GMV that isn't tracking GMV growth one-for-one is a gap CEO Walujo didn't address when asked about it directly, deferring instead to TikTok's "full control" of Tokopedia as the reason GoTo "cannot comment on their behalf." The segment posted a positive Rp144 billion result from operations, in line with its now-established profile as a fee-collection line rather than an operating e-commerce business.
Segment Comparison
| Segment | GTV YoY | Contribution Margin (% of GTV) | Adjusted EBITDA (% of GTV) |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-Demand Services | ✅ +21% (+25% ex-VN) | ✅ 5.0% | ✅ +0.9% |
| Financial Technology | ✅ +38% (Core GTV +82%) | ✅ 0.4% | ⚠️ -0.05% |
| E-Commerce | n/a - fee-based, not GTV-driven | n/a | ✅ Rp144B (fee income) |
| Group (Pro Forma) | ✅ +37% | ✅ 32% of Gross Revenue | ✅ +3% of Gross Revenue (Rp137B profit) |
FinTech is still the only segment with a negative Adjusted EBITDA margin, but the gap closed further and faster than any prior quarter in this series, and management's own guidance now says it closes entirely next quarter. On-Demand strengthened its position as the segment with the highest Adjusted EBITDA margin even after absorbing the Vietnam wind-down. E-Commerce continues to sit outside the comparison entirely - a quarterly fee with no GTV of its own, and one that (see above) isn't obviously scaling with the underlying business it's tied to.
Beyond the Usual
GoTo closed its entire Vietnam operation with no quantified cost anywhere in the filed financial statements
On the earnings call, management noted in passing that certain On-Demand Services growth figures now "exclude Vietnam due to the closure of our Vietnamese operations on September 16th" - a full country exit, not a reporting-basis refinement like the changes flagged in Q1 and Q2. Nothing in the interim consolidated financial statements discloses a restructuring charge, an impairment, or any discrete cost tied to this closure - the only related note is a pre-existing "Vietnamese Employee Cash-Settled Compensation Program," a housekeeping disclosure about how vested share options are paid out in cash to Vietnamese staff (who can't hold GoTo shares directly under Vietnamese law), which would exist whether or not the underlying business had just shut down. A reader relying only on the filed statements - as opposed to catching one sentence on the call - would have no way to know GoTo exited an entire market this quarter, let alone what it cost.
Related-party revenue jumped nearly tenfold as a share of the business, almost entirely because Tokopedia is now a related party
Note 30's related-party disclosure shows Rp610,224 million of net revenue from related parties for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 - 5.23% of total net revenue, up from just 0.54% (Rp57,168 million) in the same period a year ago. Almost the entire increase is TOKO (Tokopedia): Rp559,231 million of the total, essentially the E-Commerce service fee itself, now booked from an entity GoTo no longer controls but still transacts with as its single largest revenue counterparty outside its own consolidated operations. This isn't wrongdoing - it's the mechanical result of the TikTok deconsolidation making Tokopedia a related party by definition - but a tenfold jump in related-party revenue concentration inside one year is exactly the kind of shift this section exists to flag, since GoTo's negotiating leverage over that fee arrangement is now weaker than when Tokopedia was a subsidiary it controlled outright.
A tenth of GoTo's total assets now sits as cash at an affiliated bank it no longer controls
Note 30's related-party balances show Rp4,420,098 million in cash and cash equivalents held at Bank Jago (JAGO), an equity-method associate, equal to 10.09% of GoTo's total assets - up from 7.77% (Rp4,202,722 million) at December 2023. JAGO is the same bank that channels roughly 80% of GoTo's consumer lending book, per Q2's disclosure, so the relationship runs in both directions: GoTo parks a growing share of its own cash at Jago while Jago originates the large majority of GoTo's loan book. Neither fact is disclosed as a risk in the filing itself, but the concentration is real and growing.
Tokopedia's own quarterly loss stopped compounding, even if it's still historically large
Note 14's summary financials for TOKO disclose Rp15,895,503 million net revenue and Rp10,023,497 million net loss for the eight months from February 1 to September 30, 2024 (the period since deconsolidation, on a 100% basis). Subtracting H1 2024's disclosed Rp8,576,846 million net revenue and Rp5,875,545 million net loss implies Tokopedia's Q3-alone net loss was roughly Rp4,148 billion - still a large number, but essentially flat versus the roughly Rp4,734 billion implied for Q2 alone, breaking the quadrupling trend flagged last quarter rather than extending it. GoTo's own equity-method share of associates' net losses came to Rp2,448 billion for the nine months (mostly attributable to TOKO), a real and continuing drag on GoTo's own P&L even as the trend itself stopped worsening.
The $200 million buyback finally picked up pace, and a treasury-share cancellation is due to complete in November
By September 30, 2024, roughly four months into the buyback flagged as underused last quarter, GoTo had repurchased 14.1 billion shares for approximately Rp743 billion (~$49 million) - about 24.5% of the $200 million authorization, up sharply from the ~6% utilized as of the June quarter-end. Separately, an August 2024 shareholder meeting approved cancelling 10.26 billion treasury shares outright (reducing Series A shares in circulation), which management said on the call it expects to complete in early November 2024 - after this quarter closes, so its effect on the share count isn't yet reflected in these results.
Management's First Call Under a New CFO
This was incoming CFO Simon Ho's first earnings call after joining the board (introduced but silent on Q2's call), and the framing shifted from Q2's "disappointed by our share price" candor to an unambiguous victory-lap tone: Walujo opened by saying the business is "accelerating" with "all cylinders firing," and closed by reiterating confidence "increased by the new administration and President Prabowo Subianto and its vision for the country" - a political reference not present in prior quarters' calls. Notably absent this quarter: any repeat of the shareholder "overhang" language from Q2's call that management never elaborated on. In its place, Walujo highlighted that Alibaba - a long-standing shareholder - had "reaffirmed its commitment" to maintain its current GoTo shareholding for at least the duration of a newly signed five-year cloud infrastructure agreement with Alibaba and Tencent (expected to cut cloud costs more than 50% once migrated). Whether that commitment addresses the overhang management alluded to without naming it last quarter isn't something the call clarified either way. On Tokopedia, when Citi's Ferry Wong asked directly about competitive dynamics and a potential TEMU entry into Indonesia, Walujo again deferred to TikTok's "full control" of the entity rather than engaging with the question - continuing the pattern from Q2 of management declining to discuss the associate it no longer controls in any depth, even as it remains GoTo's largest related-party revenue source (see Beyond the Usual above).
GoTo's Share Price Since the IPO
GoTo closed the quarter at Rp66 on September 30, 2024 - up 32% from Q2's post-IPO low of Rp50, the stock's first quarterly gain since Q4 2023, though still down 22.4% year-on-year (from Rp85 at end of September 2023) and 80.5% below its Rp338 IPO price. GoTo has not split its stock since its IPO, so Rp66 is the actual nominal price quoted on the exchange, not a split-adjusted figure. Over the trailing two years the stock has ranged from a high of Rp246 (September 2022) to a low of Rp50 (June 2024), a peak-to-trough decline of roughly 80% - the recovery this quarter is real but leaves the stock well within the same depressed range it's traded in since late 2023, and nothing on the call attributed the rebound to a specific catalyst rather than the accumulating weight of nine straight quarters of Adjusted EBITDA improvement.
Target Valuation Range
Enterprise value ~Rp70,923 billion (~$4.69B), implying ~4.5x EV/TTM Net Revenue - up from ~3.4x last quarter, driven entirely by the share-price recovery. GoTo still looks cheap relative to its own operating trajectory, but less dramatically than last quarter - the share price partially caught up to the operating improvement rather than the operating improvement catching up to the share price, and the market's structural skepticism (FinTech still the only loss-making segment, E-Commerce a fee arrangement rather than a business, and now a country exit disclosed only in passing) still has real basis.
| Market cap → enterprise value | 3Q24 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp66 |
| Shares outstanding | 1,201.41B (flat since Q2 2024; treasury-share cancellation hadn't completed as of quarter-end) |
| Market capitalization | Rp79,293B (~$5.24B) |
| Total liabilities | ~Rp12.2T |
| Less: cash and equivalents | ~Rp20.5T |
| Enterprise value | Rp70,923B (~$4.69B) |
Market cap is up from ~$3.66B at Q2's close, tracking the quarter's 32% share-price recovery on a flat share count.
| Peer-multiple sanity check | 2Q24 (TTM) | 3Q24 (TTM) |
|---|---|---|
| Net revenue | Rp15,638B (~$952M) | Rp15,937B (~$1,053M) |
| Enterprise value | ~$3.22B | ~$4.69B |
| EV/Net Revenue | ~3.4x | ~4.5x |
TTM Net Revenue sums 4Q23's Rp4,274B, 1Q24's Rp4,079B, 2Q24's Rp3,658B, and this quarter's Rp3,926B, on an as-reported basis - the same basis-mixing caveat flagged every quarter since Q1 still applies. The multiple expansion is driven entirely by the share-price recovery, since the four underlying quarters' net revenue again moved within a narrow band.
DCF (base/bull/bear, illustrative only): The scenarios turn on whether FinTech actually delivers the pulled-forward Q4 2024 breakeven, and whether the Vietnam exit and other cost actions (the Alibaba/Tencent cloud migration) show up as durable margin gains rather than one-off adjustments. In place of a full DCF, each scenario applies an illustrative EV/TTM-Net-Revenue multiple to the same Rp15,937B TTM net revenue used in the Current row, then bridges to market cap/per-share price using the current Rp12.2T liabilities and Rp20.5T cash - a sanity-check exercise, not a modeled DCF:
| Scenario | Key assumption | Multiple | Implied value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Current (3Q24 close) | actual market price, for reference | ~4.5x EV/TTM Net Revenue (implied) | Rp66/share (~$4.69B EV) |
| Bear | FinTech's Q4 2024 breakeven slips as loan-book growth (guided to double again by end-2025) requires provisioning that outpaces revenue, On-Demand's competitive intensity compresses the newly positive margins, and the undisclosed cost of the Vietnam exit turns out to be larger than priced in | ~3.2x, compressing back toward the multiple seen two quarters earlier | ~Rp49/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF |
| Base | FinTech hits its pulled-forward Q4 2024 Adjusted EBITDA target as guided, On-Demand holds its improving margin trajectory, the Alibaba/Tencent cloud migration delivers on its claimed 50%+ cost reduction, and Group Adjusted EBITDA stays positive into 2025 | ~4.5x, roughly the current multiple holding flat | ~Rp66/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF |
| Bull | the lending flywheel scales faster than the already-aggressive "double the book by end-2025" guidance, the buyback accelerates further from this quarter's improved 24.5% utilization pace, the treasury-share cancellation completing in November meaningfully shrinks the float | ~6x, re-rating toward a premium multiple as sustained profitability gets priced in | ~Rp87/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF |
Reverse DCF: A stock still trading 80% below its IPO price in the same quarter it posted record Adjusted EBITDA and a ninth straight quarter of improvement implies the market is still pricing in structural risk beyond this quarter's disclosed numbers - most plausibly FinTech's unproven path to sustained profitability at scale, E-Commerce's dependence on a fee arrangement with a controlling shareholder GoTo can't influence, and now the precedent that a material operational decision (exiting an entire country) can happen without a corresponding financial disclosure.
GoTo's 3Q 2024 Results presentation and earnings call transcript (October 2024), and GoTo's own unaudited interim consolidated financial statements as of and for the nine-month period ended 30 September 2024.