GOTO GoTo's Numbers Just Got 9% Smaller and 63% Bigger, Depending on Which One You Read

Two Sets of Books, One Real Business

Every number in this post about GoTo comes in a pair now. Group GTV^» fell 9% year-on-year on an as-reported basis (Rp134.8 trillion, down from Rp148.5 trillion) - but the same GTV, recalculated on a pro forma basis that assumes Tokopedia and GoTo Logistics had been deconsolidated since January 1, 2023, grew 20% (Rp116.5 trillion, up from Rp97.0 trillion). Group Net Revenue tells the same split story: +22% as reported (Rp3,332 billion → Rp4,079 billion), or +63% pro forma (Rp1,886 billion → Rp3,078 billion). Neither number is wrong. They're answering different questions - one is "how did GoTo Group's consolidated financial statements compare year-on-year" (distorted by the fact that Q1 2024 includes only one month of Tokopedia's results, versus three full months a year earlier), and the other is "how did the business GoTo will actually report going forward perform" (a genuine like-for-like comparison). This is the structural shift flagged as "worth watching" in the 4Q23 post - Tokopedia's dilution to 24.99% and deconsolidation, closed January 31, 2024, effective February 1 - and it's now live in the numbers.

To its credit, GoTo's own disclosure of this shift is genuinely thorough: CFO Jacky Lo told the call directly that management "prepared pro forma operating and financial figures at the Group level to facilitate like-for-like sequential and year-on-year comparisons," with as-reported figures included "in the appendix... for reference" - the reverse of what a company trying to obscure a bad comparison would do, which would be to lead with the flattering pro forma number and bury as-reported in a footnote. GoTo did neither: both bases sit side by side throughout the earnings presentation's summary financials table, labeled plainly. The much harder question - whether Tokopedia's own equity-method^» contribution as a 24.99%-owned associate is disclosed with the same clarity - has a good answer too: Note 14 of the unaudited interim financial statements gives Tokopedia's full summarized balance sheet and P&L for the two months it's been an associate (Rp2,897 billion net revenue, a Rp1,142 billion net loss on a 100% basis), GoTo's exact 24.99% carrying value (Rp9,427 billion, including a Rp737 billion goodwill component), and the mechanics of the gain recognized on losing control - see Beyond the Usual below for that last piece, which resolves a question the 4Q23 post left open.

The other headline number moved the wrong way. Group Adjusted EBITDA^» turned negative again - -Rp139 billion as reported, -Rp102 billion pro forma - a quarter after 4Q23's first positive reading in company history. CEO Patrick Walujo and CFO Jacky Lo were both direct about the cause on the call: a deliberate ramp-up in FinTech investment and "seasonality in On-Demand Services in January and February" - both framed as planned, not as guidance slipping, with FY2024's full-year group Adjusted EBITDA breakeven target (guided last quarter as a full-year rather than quarterly commitment) reaffirmed unchanged. Whether that reaffirmation holds is exactly what the next three quarters of this series will need to test.

The Prescription

GoTo should lean fully into pro forma-only reporting for GTV and Net Revenue starting next quarter, rather than continuing to carry both bases side by side. The as-reported numbers this quarter aren't a second useful data point - they're an artifact of exactly how many days of Tokopedia happened to be consolidated before a preannounced, already-closed deconsolidation, and every quarter forward will make the as-reported comparison less relevant, not more. Keeping it around past this transition quarter would only invite the kind of "GTV fell 9%" headline that undersells a business actually growing at 20% on a comparable basis - the opposite problem from the gross-metrics-hiding-a-weak-net-number pattern this series usually flags, but a real distortion either way. What GoTo should stop doing is treating LTM ATU as a metric it can simply drop from the deck rather than continue disclosing on the granular basis this site has asked for since 3Q23 - see Beyond the Usual below. Two stabilized quarters of -1M QoQ readings through 4Q23 was the moment to publish more detail, not the moment the metric quietly disappeared from the presentation altogether.

Key Financial Metrics

Q1 2024 vs. Q1 2023 (three months ended March 31), as directly disclosed in GoTo's unaudited interim consolidated financial statements

FX: IDR 15,848 = USD 1 (period-end rate, March 29, 2024), applied to both periods for comparability.

Metric	Q1 2024 (IDR)	Q1 2024 (USD)	Q1 2023 (IDR)	YoY
Net Revenue	Rp4,079B	~$257.4M	Rp3,332B	✅ +22.4% (as reported; +63% on a pro forma basis excluding Tokopedia from both periods - see below)
Loss from Operations	-Rp942B	~-$59.4M	-Rp4,045B	✅ Improved 76.7%
Adjusted EBITDA	-Rp139B (-3% of Gross Revenue)	~-$8.8M	-Rp1,597B (-27% of Gross Revenue)	⚠️ Improved 91% YoY, but turned negative again after 4Q23's first-ever positive quarter
Net Loss (for the period)	-Rp937B	~-$59.1M	-Rp3,899B	✅ Improved 76.0%
Free Cash Flow (OCF - capex)	-Rp117B	~-$7.4M	-Rp1,984B	✅ Improved 94.1%
Total Cash & Equivalents (period-end)	Rp20,311B	~$1,281.6M	Rp26,771B (Mar 2023)	⚠️ -24.1% YoY, -19.2% vs. Dec 2023's Rp25,144B

Total assets fell to Rp47,736 billion from Rp54,097 billion at December 2023 (-11.8%), almost entirely a mechanical consequence of the deconsolidation: Goodwill dropped to Rp671 billion from Rp4,066 billion (-83.5%, the Rp3,385 billion balance allocated to the E-Commerce CGU derecognized on loss of control - see Beyond the Usual), while Investment in Associates rose to Rp12,411 billion from Rp3,120 billion (+298%), reflecting Tokopedia's carrying value moving from "consolidated subsidiary" to "line item on the balance sheet." Total liabilities fell to Rp12,570 billion from Rp18,377 billion (-31.6%), mostly Tokopedia's own liabilities (~Rp11.6 trillion) leaving the consolidated balance sheet entirely. Total equity was essentially flat at Rp35,165 billion versus Rp35,720 billion (-1.6%) - the deconsolidation nets out close to equity-neutral by design (a subsidiary's net assets leaving the balance sheet is offset by recognizing the retained stake at fair value), unlike the FY2023 goodwill write-off that hit equity directly.

Key Operational Metrics

Q1 2024 vs. Q1 2023

Metric	Q1 2024 (As Reported)	Q1 2023 (As Reported)	YoY	Q1 2024 (Pro Forma)	Q1 2023 (Pro Forma)	YoY
GTV	Rp134,792B	Rp148,538B	⚠️ -9%	Rp116,506B	Rp97,013B	✅ +20%
Gross Revenue	Rp5,304B	Rp5,981B	⚠️ -11%	Rp4,165B	Rp3,523B	✅ +18%
Take Rate»	3.9%	4.0%	steady	3.6%	3.6%	steady
LTM Annual Transacting Users	not available	58M	⚠️ Metric dropped from the deck and transcript entirely this quarter - see Beyond the Usual

Core GTV (GTV excluding the merchant payment gateway in FinTech, the same lens management introduced in 3Q23) grew a stronger +32% year-on-year on a pro forma basis, ahead of the headline pro forma GTV growth rate - a sign the growth is concentrated in the core marketplace and lending flows rather than gateway pass-through volume. GoPay app cumulative downloads passed 20 million by end of March, and the consumer lending book grew to Rp2.7 trillion outstanding (+43% quarter-on-quarter, more than tripling year-on-year), with NPL^» holding at 1.3% - continuing the scale-up flagged last quarter, with roughly 75% of the book channeled through Bank Jago.

On-Demand Services

Period	GTV (As Reported)	Gross Revenue	Contribution Margin (% of GTV)	Adjusted EBITDA (% of GTV)
Q1 2023	Rp13,738B	Rp2,988B	3.8%	-1.8%
Q1 2024	Rp13,891B (+1%)	Rp3,342B (+12%)	✅ 5.9%	✅ +1.2%

On-Demand is the one segment whose "as reported" and pro forma bases are essentially the same, since it was never mixed up with Tokopedia's consolidation - so its numbers here are genuinely like-for-like, unlike the group totals. GTV was roughly flat (+1% as reported, "0%" per management's own rounding) despite a 38% year-on-year cut in incentives and product-marketing spend, with Indonesia GTV specifically up 3%. Contribution Margin^» continued climbing to 5.9% of GTV from 3.8% a year ago, and Adjusted EBITDA turned positive as a share of GTV (+1.2%, from -1.8%) - the same margin-over-volume tradeoff flagged in 4Q23 continuing into a new quarter. Two changes affect how this segment's numbers compare to prior periods: the delivery-fee business model switched from agency to principal accounting in January 2024 (delivery fees now flow through Gross Revenue and driver payouts through Cost of Revenue, rather than netting against each other), and the GTV definition was revised to include tolls and tips - GoTo restated 2023 figures on both changes, and the numbers above use the restated basis.

E-Commerce

GoTo's earnings materials this quarter, for the first time in this series' coverage, don't give E-Commerce its own dedicated GTV/Gross Revenue/Adjusted EBITDA page - the segment now only surfaces inside the consolidated segment-reconciliation tables buried later in the deck. What's visible there: E-Commerce's segment loss from operations was +Rp534 billion (positive) in Q1 2024, against -Rp889 billion in Q1 2023, with Contribution Margin of Rp421 billion (against Rp178 billion) and Adjusted EBITDA of Rp127 billion (against -Rp523 billion). None of this is a like-for-like comparison - the Q1 2024 figure includes only January's results (the one month Tokopedia was still consolidated before the February 1 deconsolidation), while Q1 2023 includes all three months, so the apparent swing to profitability says as much about which weeks of Tokopedia's results are even in the number as it does about the business improving. One real, quantifiable data point survives the basis change: GoTo booked approximately Rp110 billion (~$6.9 million) in "E-Commerce Service Fee" revenue in February-March from the Consultancy Services and Support Agreement it signed with Tokopedia in January 2024, under which GoTo provides ongoing services to Tokopedia (now TikTok's majority-owned entity) for a fee tied to Tokopedia's GMV - the first real revenue line this series has seen from GoTo's post-deconsolidation relationship with its former subsidiary, and one management said on the call it expects to grow "as our partnership deepens."

Financial Technology Services

Period	GTV	Core GTV	Gross Revenue	Contribution Margin (% of GTV)	Adjusted EBITDA (% of GTV)
Q1 2023	Rp91.5T	Rp34.6T	Rp0.4T	0.02%	-0.6%
Q1 2024	Rp111.0T (+21%)	Rp48.4T (+40%)	Rp0.7T (+57%)	✅ 0.2%	✅ -0.2%

FinTech remains the fastest-growing segment by a wide margin (GTV +21%, Core GTV +40%, Gross Revenue +57%), continuing the pattern flagged in 4Q23 of carrying the group's only meaningful volume growth. Contribution Margin improved to +0.2% of GTV - its best reading yet, though still the thinnest of the segments - while Adjusted EBITDA margin improved to -0.2% of GTV from -0.6%, still the group's only segment with a negative Adjusted EBITDA margin this quarter. Management explicitly attributed this quarter's overall Adjusted EBITDA dip to "ramping up of investments in Fintech," and separately guided that the segment specifically is "on track to become Adjusted EBITDA positive by the end of 2025" - a segment-specific target distinct from the group-level FY2024 breakeven guidance, worth tracking as its own line going forward.

GoTo Logistics — No Longer a Reported Segment

GoTo stopped reporting GoTo Logistics as a standalone segment this quarter. CFO Jacky Lo said this directly on the call: it's "due to the upcoming divestment of a number of its businesses associated with Tokopedia in the second quarter" - Logistics' delivery and fulfillment operations were tied closely enough to Tokopedia's e-commerce volume that they're being unwound together with the TikTok transaction. This is the second consecutive quarter Logistics' revenue and Adjusted EBITDA have been shrinking as pure cost-reduction infrastructure for the other segments' delivery economics; now it's disappearing from segment reporting altogether rather than continuing to shrink in place.

Segment Comparison

As reported, Q1 2024. E-Commerce and All Other Segments figures reflect a partial period of Tokopedia consolidation - see caveats above.

Segment	Contribution Margin (Q1 2024)	Adjusted EBITDA (Q1 2024)	GTV YoY
On-Demand Services	✅ Rp815B (5.9% of GTV)	✅ Rp166B (+1.2% of GTV)	+1% (like-for-like)
E-Commerce	Rp421B (not comparable - partial month)	Rp127B (not comparable - partial month)	n/a - no longer disclosed standalone
Financial Technology Services	✅ Rp191B (0.2% of GTV)	⚠️ -Rp248B (-0.2% of GTV)	✅ +21%
All Other Segments (incl. former GoTo Logistics)	Rp29B	⚠️ -Rp87B	n/a - Logistics no longer disclosed standalone
Group (As Reported)	Rp1,423B	⚠️ -Rp139B	⚠️ -9%
Group (Pro Forma)	Rp1,148B (1.0% of GTV)	⚠️ -Rp102B (-0.1% of GTV)	✅ +20%

On-Demand is the only segment whose numbers this quarter are genuinely comparable to a year ago without a basis caveat attached - and it's also the only one that's both Contribution-Margin-positive and Adjusted-EBITDA-positive at the same time. FinTech is growing fastest but is still the only segment losing money at the Adjusted EBITDA line. E-Commerce and the former Logistics segment are both effectively unreadable this quarter on a standalone basis - not because the underlying business did anything unusual, but because the reporting perimeter itself changed mid-quarter.

GoTo's Share Price Since the IPO

GoTo closed at Rp69 on March 28, 2024 (the last trading day of the quarter), down from 4Q23's Rp86 close - a 19.8% drop in a single quarter, the steepest quarterly decline since the Rp147-to-Rp85 slide through mid-2023. The quarter's news flow was arguably positive on paper (the TikTok deal closed as planned, E-Commerce turned cash-flow positive per management's own framing) - the price move instead lines up more closely with the return to a negative Adjusted EBITDA reading and the loss of the clean, single group-level profitability narrative that had driven 4Q23's recovery. GoTo has not split its stock since its IPO, so Rp69 is the actual nominal price quoted on the exchange, not a split-adjusted figure. The stock remains down 80% from its Rp338 IPO price - deeper than 4Q23's -75%, the worst point in this series' coverage since October 2023's post-IPO low of Rp60.

Beyond the Usual

The gain from losing control of Tokopedia was Rp202 billion - a rounding error next to the Rp78.8 trillion write-off that preceded it

GoTo's year-end 2023 filing had said the gain or loss from losing control of Tokopedia, flagged in the 4Q23 post, was still being assessed. Note 34c of this quarter's interim statements discloses the actual figure: the Company recognized a gain of Rp202,385 million (~$12.8 million), recorded in "other income, net," calculated as the fair value of the retained 24.99% stake (Rp9,792,795 million) plus the carrying value of non-controlling interests and other equity components, less the reversal of the goodwill previously recognized at consolidation (Rp3,384,860 million) and the reversal of TOKO's net assets (a negative Rp1,032,946 million, since TOKO's liabilities exceeded its assets at the point of deconsolidation). The number itself is almost incidental - a Rp202 billion gain sitting three months after a Rp78.8 trillion non-cash write-off is a footnote by comparison - but it's the kind of number that's easy to lose track of if a reader doesn't specifically go looking for it, since it landed in "other income" rather than anywhere the headline P&L narrative would draw attention to it.

LTM ATU disappeared from the earnings materials entirely this quarter

After two consecutive quarters of a stabilizing -1M QoQ reading that this series flagged as a genuinely encouraging signal, LTM Annual Transacting Users^» is absent from both the 1Q24 presentation and the earnings call transcript - not just left undisclosed at the granular level this site has asked for since 3Q23, but dropped as a headline metric altogether. Management did reference "user growth" qualitatively multiple times on the call (citing March/April momentum specifically), but gave no number to go with it. Whether this is a temporary casualty of the quarter's broader reporting overhaul (pro forma basis, business-model changes, GTV redefinition, discontinued Logistics segment) or a deliberate step back from a metric that's been in decline for six straight quarters isn't something the materials answer - but a metric disappearing from the deck the same quarter as several other definitional changes is worth specifically re-checking next quarter rather than assuming it was incidental.

The Google Cloud commitment fell again, for an eighth consecutive post in this series

GoTo's disclosed Google Cloud/Maps purchase commitment continued its multi-year decline, a trend first flagged in the 1Q22 post and tracked every quarter since, including most recently at Rp139.8 billion as of December 2023. The pattern of an unexplained shrinking commitment - down more than 88% from its year-end 2022 level even before this quarter - continues to reflect what last quarter's post confirmed as declining reliance on third-party mapping technology as in-house alternatives mature, rather than any change flagged specifically for this quarter.

The business-model and GTV-definition changes both restate 2023 - and both flatter the comparison

Two accounting changes took effect in On-Demand Services this quarter, both disclosed on the call and in the deck: delivery-fee revenue recognition moved from an agency model (netting the delivery fee against driver payouts) to a principal model (recording the full delivery fee as Gross Revenue, with driver payouts as a separate Cost of Revenue), and On-Demand's GTV definition was broadened to include tolls and tips. GoTo restated all of 2023's quarterly figures on both bases to keep the comparison consistent, which is the right way to handle a definitional change - but it's also true that both changes mechanically inflate the reported Gross Revenue and GTV bases going forward relative to the old definitions, on top of - not instead of - the much larger Tokopedia deconsolidation basis change covered in the opening section. A reader comparing this quarter's On-Demand numbers to anything published before 4Q23 (when the restated 2023 figures first appeared) should use the restated columns, not the originally reported ones.

What Management Emphasized on the Call

Patrick Walujo's framing shifted from 4Q23's survival narrative to a growth-and-reinvestment one: having "hit the reset button" in 2023, the message this quarter was "we must build on that foundation by accelerating growth and investing for the future." That framing does real work in explaining why Adjusted EBITDA fell back into negative territory right after its milestone positive quarter - management is presenting the dip as a deliberate reinvestment choice consistent with a full-year breakeven target, not a sign the cost discipline from 2023 has slipped. On the TikTok partnership specifically, Walujo said Tokopedia's Q1 performance was "better than expected" and that the combined entity is "now in full compliance with the relevant regulations" set by Indonesia's Ministry of Trade during the transition period - addressing, without naming it directly, the regulatory uncertainty that shadowed the deal's announcement last quarter. Neither Walujo nor CFO Jacky Lo addressed the LTM ATU metric's disappearance from the deck on the call, consistent with the pattern flagged in Beyond the Usual above - a call that discussed "user growth" repeatedly in qualitative terms never once cited the number this series has tracked every quarter since coverage began.

Target Valuation Range

Enterprise value ~Rp75,156 billion (~$4.74B), implying ~4.8x EV/TTM Net Revenue - down from ~6.5x last quarter, EV falling faster than revenue grew. GoTo looks fairly valued to slightly undervalued at its Rp69 quarter-end close, but this is the hardest quarter yet to price with real confidence - the pro forma growth story (+20% GTV, +63% net revenue) is genuinely strong, while the as-reported numbers and the return to negative Adjusted EBITDA are exactly what a cautious market would want to see clear before re-rating the stock.

Market cap → enterprise value	1Q24
Share price (period-end)	Rp69
Shares outstanding	1,201.41B (flat versus year-end 2023)
Market capitalization	Rp82,897B (~$5.23B)
Total liabilities	~Rp12.6T
Less: cash and equivalents	~Rp20.3T
Enterprise value	Rp75,156B (~$4.74B)

Market cap is down from ~$6.70B at the 4Q23 close, tracking the quarter's 19.8% share-price decline on a flat share count. EV fell even more sharply than market cap since the deconsolidation also reduced on-balance-sheet liabilities and cash.

Peer-multiple sanity check	4Q23 (FY2023 actuals)	1Q24 (TTM, as-reported)
Net revenue	Rp14.79T (~$0.96B)	Rp15,532B (~$980M)
Enterprise value	~$6.26B	~$4.74B
EV/Net Revenue	~6.5x	~4.8x

TTM Net Revenue sums 2Q23, 3Q23, 4Q23, and this quarter's Rp4,079 billion, on an as-reported basis. A comparable TTM Gross Revenue multiple isn't recomputed this quarter, since the deconsolidation changes what "Gross Revenue" even includes partway through the trailing-twelve-month window, making a blended figure genuinely apples-to-oranges.

DCF (base/bull/bear, illustrative only): With the pro forma basis now the more meaningful lens on growth and FY2024 guided only to full-year group Adjusted EBITDA breakeven, the scenarios turn on whether the pro forma growth rate holds and whether the reinvestment driving this quarter's Adjusted EBITDA dip pays off within the year. In place of a full DCF, each scenario applies an illustrative EV/TTM-Net-Revenue multiple to the same Rp15,532B TTM net revenue used in the Current row, then bridges to market cap/per-share price using the current Rp12.6T liabilities and Rp20.3T cash - a sanity-check exercise, not a modeled DCF:

Scenario	Key assumption	Multiple	Implied value
Current (1Q24 close)	actual market price, for reference	~4.8x EV/TTM Net Revenue (implied)	Rp69/share (~$4.74B EV)
Bear	FinTech's investment ramp and On-Demand's reinvestment strategy don't convert into enough incremental Contribution Margin to offset them, group Adjusted EBITDA stays negative through mid-2024, and the FY2024 breakeven guidance slips	~3.5x, compressing further as negative Adjusted EBITDA persists	~Rp52/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF
Base	the seasonality genuinely reverses as management indicated (citing "promising results" in March and April already), pro forma GTV growth continues in the 15-20% range, and GoTo lands on full-year group Adjusted EBITDA breakeven as guided	~4.8x, roughly the current multiple holding flat	~Rp69/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF
Bull	the TikTok partnership's Rp110B quarterly service fee scales meaningfully as integration deepens, FinTech's growth (+21% GTV, +57% Gross Revenue) continues compounding toward its own late-2025 Adjusted EBITDA-positive target	~6.5x, re-rating back toward the multiple seen just one quarter earlier	~Rp90/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF

Reverse DCF: The 19.8% single-quarter price decline against unchanged guidance and genuinely strong pro forma growth numbers suggests the market is pricing the return to negative Adjusted EBITDA and the reporting-basis complexity more heavily than the underlying pro forma growth story - consistent with the bottom-line verdict above that this is a business whose real performance is currently harder to read from the headline numbers than in any prior quarter this series has covered.

---