GOTO Who Rewrites the Formula Behind Its Own First Profitable Year?

A Record Quarter, Measured With a Ruler That Just Got Shorter

GoTo opened 2025 with what management fairly calls its best quarter ever: Group Adjusted EBITDA^» hit a record Rp393 billion (~$23.7 million) on a pro forma basis, up Rp494 billion year-on-year, while Group Core GTV^» and Net Revenue grew 54% and 37% respectively. Both FinTech and On-Demand Services posted their highest-ever segment Adjusted EBITDA in the same quarter - FinTech's second straight profitable quarter after Q4 2024's wafer-thin Rp14 billion breakeven, and On-Demand's third consecutive quarter of margin expansion.

The complication is that the Rp393 billion figure, and every prior quarter it's compared against, is no longer measured the same way it was when this site last wrote about GoTo. CFO Simon Ho disclosed on the call that GoTo has changed its Adjusted EBITDA definition to exclude realized foreign exchange gains and losses - and applied the change retroactively to every quarter back through 1Q 2024. The stated reason is reasonable (rupiah volatility has made realized FX gains material enough to distort the metric), but the effect is that Q4 2024's as-published Rp399 billion Adjusted EBITDA - the number GoTo used to declare its first profitable full year - is now restated to Rp326 billion, an 18% cut, and FY2024's full-year pro forma total falls from the Rp386 billion this site reported in March to roughly Rp313 billion once all four restated quarters are added up. That's not a small technical footnote - it's the yardstick a "beat our own guidance" narrative was built on, quietly getting shorter the quarter after the narrative landed.

The Prescription

GoTo should keep doing exactly what's driving the actual operating improvement: On-Demand Services' Mobility and Delivery units, reported separately for the first time this quarter, both posted their third consecutive quarter of margin expansion (Mobility +61 basis points YoY to 3.76% of GTV, Delivery +72 basis points to 1.36%), and management's described mechanism - refined incentive targeting, premium-product mix shift, and advertising scaling toward 1.7% of Food GMV - is producing genuine, compounding margin gains rather than one-off cost cuts. FinTech's net revenue also grew 90% year-on-year on GTV growth of just 25%, a sign the lending book (now Rp5.7 trillion, +108% YoY) is doing real monetization work that GTV alone doesn't capture.

What GoTo should stop doing is treating a change to its own headline metric as a footnote rather than a disclosure event. Redefining Adjusted EBITDA to exclude realized FX gains may well be the more analytically honest choice - but doing it silently inside a presentation deck's reconciliation slide, in the same quarter the company is still riding a "first profitable year, beat our own guidance" narrative built on the old definition, invites exactly the skepticism a company should want to avoid when its profitability story is this new and this thin. A company confident its 2024 turnaround was real should be the first to flag that the number underpinning it just got smaller - not leave a reader to notice it three slides into a Non-IFAS reconciliation table.

Key Financial Metrics

Q1 2025 vs Q1 2024 (three months ended March 31), as disclosed in GoTo's unaudited interim consolidated financial statements. FX: IDR 16,588 = USD 1 (Bank Indonesia middle rate, period-end, 31 March 2025), applied throughout for comparability.

Metric	Q1 2025 (IDR)	Q1 2025 (USD)	Q1 2024 (IDR)	YoY
Net Revenue	Rp4,231B	~$255.1M	Rp4,079B	⚠️ +3.7% as reported (distorted - see below); +37% pro forma ✅
Loss from Operations	-Rp193B	~-$11.7M	-Rp942B	✅ Improved 79.5%
Adjusted EBITDA (restated definition)	Rp393B (9% of Net Revenue)	~$23.7M	-Rp146B (-4% of Net Revenue)	✅ +Rp539B, record quarter
Net Loss (for the period)	-Rp367B	~-$22.1M	-Rp937B	✅ Improved 60.9%
Free Cash Flow (OCF - capex)	+Rp157B	~$9.4M	-Rp5,507B	⚠️ Not comparable - see below
Total Cash & Equivalents (period-end)	Rp19,136B	~$1,153.7M	n/a (BS compares to Dec 2024 only)	⚠️ -0.2% vs Dec 2024's Rp19,178B

As-reported Net Revenue's +3.7% YoY is, for what should be the last time in this series, an artifact of the Tokopedia deconsolidation base effect flagged every quarter since Q1 2024: Q1 2024's reported base still includes January 2024's single month of Tokopedia consolidation (deconsolidation was effective February 1, 2024), while Q1 2025 doesn't include Tokopedia at all. On the pro forma basis both quarters actually share, Group Net Revenue grew 37% (Rp4,231B vs Rp3,078B pro forma) and Group GTV grew 24% (Rp144,560B vs Rp116,506B pro forma) - Core GTV's 54% growth again comfortably outpacing headline GTV, the same quality-outrunning-quantity pattern this series has tracked since early 2024. Q1 2024's Free Cash Flow figure of -Rp5,507B is not a meaningful comparison at all: it's dominated by one-off cash effects of the Tokopedia deconsolidation itself (a Rp4,437B "net cash released due to loss of control in subsidiary" outflow and a Rp5,390B intangible-asset purchase tied to the same transaction), not recurring capex - excluding those, Q1 2025's positive Rp157 billion free cash flow is GoTo's second consecutive positive free-cash-flow quarter, following Q4 2024's first-ever positive quarter. Total assets rose modestly to Rp43,741 billion from Rp43,208 billion at December 2024 (+1.2%), while total liabilities rose faster, to Rp13,965 billion (+9.1% vs Dec 2024), and total equity fell to Rp29,775 billion (-2.1%). Loss per share improved to Rp(0.27) from Rp(0.80) a year ago.

Key Operational Metrics

Q1 2025, pro forma basis unless noted

Group MTU^» and take rate both improved: Group take rate reached 2.9% of GTV (pro forma), up from 2.6% a year ago. The consumer lending book grew to Rp5.7 trillion outstanding, up 108% year-on-year, and FinTech Monthly Transacting Users reached 20.6 million (+30% YoY). Starting this quarter, GoTo disclosed two new breakdowns it hadn't before: On-Demand Services' GTV/Net Revenue/Adjusted EBITDA split between Mobility and Delivery specifically, and a loan-book delinquency schedule (see Beyond the Usual below for what that schedule shows). GoPay Hadiah THR, a Ramadan-specific digital gifting product, drove a 35% month-on-month increase in transfer MTUs in March alone. Food Express extended its streak to a fifth consecutive quarter of rising share of total Food GTV, and premium Mobility completed orders grew 156% year-on-year. Advertising revenue grew 45% year-on-year and reached 1.7% of Food GMV, up from 1.3% a year ago. Management flagged that Q1 2025 contained the entirety of Ramadan's 30 fasting days, versus only 20 days falling in Q1 2024 - a seasonal headwind for Mobility and Delivery transaction volume (people travel and order food less while fasting) and a seasonal tailwind for Payments (gifting and online shopping both spike around Lebaran), which is worth keeping in mind when reading this quarter's segment growth rates against last year's differently-timed comparison. LTM Annual Transacting Users remains undisclosed for a sixth straight quarter.

Three Segments, Two Now Reported at Business-Unit Level

GoTo still reports the same three segments - On-Demand Services, Financial Technology, and E-Commerce - with Vietnam remaining excluded from On-Demand's Core GTV and growth figures a full year after the September 2024 country exit. Figures below are as-reported for the three months ended March 31, 2025, unless noted as excluding Vietnam.

On-Demand Services (Mobility & Delivery)

For the first time, GoTo broke out Mobility and Delivery as separate reporting units rather than a single On-Demand blend. Mobility: GTV grew 17% year-on-year to Rp5.9 trillion, Net Revenue grew 20% to Rp752 billion, and Adjusted EBITDA grew 33% to Rp222 billion - a margin of 3.8% of GTV, up 61 basis points year-on-year and the segment's third straight quarter of margin gains. Delivery: GTV also grew 17% to Rp9.8 trillion, but Net Revenue grew faster, 39%, to Rp2.3 trillion, and Adjusted EBITDA more than doubled (+142%) to Rp133 billion - a margin of 1.4% of GTV, up 72 basis points year-on-year. Combined, On-Demand Services Adjusted EBITDA reached Rp314 billion (2.0% of GTV, an all-time high, +89% YoY), on Rp15.7 trillion of GTV (+17%) and Rp3.0 trillion of Net Revenue (+33%). President Catherine Hindra Sutjahyo attributed the gap between revenue and GTV growth to incentive-spending efficiency, premium-product mix shift (Food Express, premium Mobility rides), and advertising growth - not incremental price increases - while reiterating that Indonesia's on-demand market remains under-monetized relative to more developed peers.

Financial Technology

Q1 GTV grew 25% to Rp138.4 trillion and Core GTV grew 57% to Rp76.1 trillion - both a step down from Q4 2024's 33% and 71% growth rates, though still comfortably ahead of Group GTV's 24% pace. Net Revenue grew 90% to Rp1.2 trillion, a pace CFO Simon Ho attributed on the call to consumer lending growth (the loan book itself grew 108% YoY) rather than the payments-dominated Core GTV metric, which doesn't capture lending revenue. Adjusted EBITDA reached Rp47 billion (0.03% of GTV, from -Rp248 billion/-0.22% a year ago) - a 236% increase quarter-on-quarter from Q4 2024's Rp14 billion, and FinTech's second consecutive profitable quarter. No FinTech-specific FY2025 Adjusted EBITDA target was restated on this call or in this quarter's presentation (management had previously guided to at least Rp300 billion for the segment for full-year 2025); only the Group-level Rp1.4-1.6 trillion FY2025 target was reiterated, unchanged and without an explicit statement of whether it reflects the old or the restated Adjusted EBITDA definition (see Beyond the Usual).

E-Commerce

E-Commerce remains the Tokopedia consultancy-and-support fee established in Q1 2024: the Q1 2025 fee reached a record Rp217 billion, up from Rp183 billion in Q4 2024, which CFO Simon Ho attributed to Lebaran's seasonal e-commerce strength. He also cautioned that a clean year-on-year comparison isn't possible, since Q1 2024 only recognized two months of the fee following the arrangement's late-2023 start. The segment posted Adjusted EBITDA of Rp190 billion in Q1 2025, up from a restated Rp127 billion a year ago (the prior year figure includes a large one-off adjustment tied to the Tokopedia deconsolidation itself, not repeatable operating performance). Ho reiterated that GoTo's 24.99% stake means it doesn't manage Tokopedia's day-to-day operations - and, asked directly about Tokopedia's own Q1 profitability, said it "is still a small negative, but it's improved dramatically" (see Beyond the Usual for what the filed numbers actually show).

Segment Comparison

Segment	GTV YoY (Q1)	Adjusted EBITDA (Q1, % of GTV)	vs. Q4 2024
On-Demand Services	✅ +17%	✅ +2.0% (Rp314B) - all-time high	✅ Up from +1.6% (Rp267B)
Financial Technology	✅ +25% (Core GTV +57%)	⚠️ +0.03% (Rp47B) - second profitable quarter	✅ Up from +0.0% (Rp14B, restated)
E-Commerce	n/a - fee-based, not GTV-driven	✅ Rp190B (fee income)	✅ Up from Rp174B
Group (Pro Forma)	✅ +24%	✅ 9% of Net Revenue (Rp393B)	✅ Up from restated Rp326B

FinTech's Adjusted EBITDA more than tripled quarter-on-quarter (Rp14B → Rp47B), the segment's steepest sequential improvement yet, but it remains the smallest of the three profitable segments in absolute terms and the one whose profitability history is shortest - two quarters, against On-Demand's now-multi-year run. On-Demand's margin keeps compounding in the same direction it has for three straight quarters, arguably the more durable trend of the two. E-Commerce's economics remain entirely a function of the Tokopedia fee arrangement - the segment doesn't have its own GTV to compare growth against, and its Adjusted EBITDA is essentially the fee revenue passing through with minimal cost.

Beyond the Usual

Adjusted EBITDA got redefined the same quarter its FY2024 track record was still being celebrated

CFO Simon Ho disclosed that, starting this quarter, GoTo excludes realized foreign exchange gains and losses from its Adjusted EBITDA calculation, applied retroactively to every quarter back to 1Q 2024. The stated rationale - rupiah volatility has made realized FX gains material given GoTo's USD net asset position - is a defensible methodology change on its own terms. But the retroactive restatement is substantial: Q4 2024's Adjusted EBITDA falls from the as-published Rp399 billion to Rp326 billion (an 18% cut), and summing all four restated quarters puts FY2024's pro forma Group Adjusted EBITDA at roughly Rp313 billion, down from the Rp386 billion figure GoTo itself published and this site reported when the "first profitable full year, beat our own guidance" narrative was current. Ho quantified the specific driver - Rp73 billion of realized FX gains inflated Q4 2024's figure alone - but neither the presentation nor the call stated whether the FY2025 Group Adjusted EBITDA guidance of Rp1.4-1.6 trillion, reiterated unchanged this quarter, is measured on the old basis or the new one. A reader trying to judge whether GoTo is on track for that guidance currently has no way to know which yardstick is being used.

Tokopedia's implied Q4 profit didn't last - it's a loss again

Last quarter, this site flagged that subtracting cumulative disclosures implied Tokopedia swung to a ~Rp773 billion Q4 2024 net profit, with no explanation given anywhere in GoTo's filings or call. This quarter's associate-disclosure note gives a direct, non-cumulative figure for the first time: Tokopedia and its subsidiaries posted Rp11,452,216 million in net revenue and a Rp368,676 million net loss for the three months ended March 31, 2025 (a 100% basis). Asked directly on the call, CFO Simon Ho confirmed Tokopedia's Q1 profitability "is still a small negative, but it's improved dramatically" over recent quarters - consistent with the filed number, and a more candid framing than last quarter's silence on the implied swing. The practical read: whatever drove Q4 2024's implied profit wasn't a durable change in Tokopedia's underlying economics, since the very next quarter reverted to a loss - the mystery wasn't a hidden gain being under-disclosed, it was more likely quarter-to-quarter noise in an equity-method associate GoTo doesn't operate and can't fully explain.

The newly disclosed loan-book delinquency schedule shows its first real deterioration

This is the first quarter GoTo has disclosed a delinquency schedule for its consumer lending book (on- and off-balance-sheet combined), and it shows five quarters of history: total overdue loans held in a stable 5.3-6.0% range from March 2024 through December 2024, then jumped to 7.8% at March 2025 - the highest in the disclosed series. The >90-days-past-due bucket specifically went from 0.4% at December 2024 to 1.1% at March 2025, nearly tripling. Vice President Director Thomas Husted described the lending business as being "effectively managed" on the call, emphasizing the loan book's short average duration as a lever to tighten underwriting quickly if needed - a genuine structural advantage this site has noted before - but this quarter is the first time the delinquency data itself shows a real move in the wrong direction, on a loan book that's still growing over 100% year-on-year. One quarter isn't a trend, but it's the one to watch most closely next quarter, especially alongside the finding below.

GoTo is now funding a growing share of its own consumer loans directly

Asked about the split of loan funding between GoTo and its lending partner Bank Jago, Husted disclosed that Jago funded "around 70%" of the loan book in Q1 2025, down "a couple percentage points" over recent quarters, because GoTo has started funding some loans directly from its own balance sheet - explicitly "as a yield enhancement tool" for the P&L. This is a real shift in what kind of business FinTech's lending arm is: from a business that mostly originates loans funded by third parties (Bank Jago, off-balance-sheet channelling partners) to one increasingly taking direct credit exposure onto GoTo's own books. Husted framed this as deliberate and conservative ("we remain very conservative when it comes to managing our own capital and balance sheet"), but it means a larger share of any future credit deterioration - like the delinquency uptick noted above - would land directly on GoTo's own balance sheet rather than a funding partner's, a detail worth tracking as the loan book keeps compounding.

A five-year cloud commitment's rupiah value grew - the dollar commitment didn't

The five-year Alibaba Cloud/Tencent Cloud infrastructure agreement, first quantified last quarter at USD67,025,000, carries the identical USD67,025,000 total minimum contractual commitment as of March 31, 2025 - but its rupiah-equivalent value rose from Rp1,083,258 million to Rp1,111,811 million, purely a function of the rupiah's depreciation against the dollar over the quarter (the same depreciation CFO Simon Ho cited as the reason for excluding realized FX gains from Adjusted EBITDA, see above). A small but clean illustration of how a fixed-dollar liability grows in local-currency terms as the currency weakens, independent of anything GoTo did operationally.

Related-party revenue from Tokopedia keeps climbing as a share of the total

Net revenue from related parties reached 5.67% of Group net revenue in Q1 2025, up from 4.74% a year ago - almost entirely the Tokopedia service fee, which is now categorized as related-party revenue since Tokopedia became a 24.99%-owned associate. This is a mechanical consequence of the 2024 deconsolidation rather than a new development, but the percentage itself is still rising each quarter as the fee grows, meaning an increasing share of GoTo's reported top line comes from a single related entity GoTo doesn't control operationally.

JAGO's market value fell by more than a third while its carrying value barely moved

GoTo discloses both an equity-method carrying amount and a supplemental fair-value figure for its 21.40% stake in Bank Jago, since JAGO is separately listed on the IDX. The equity-method carrying amount actually rose slightly, from Rp2,829,430 million (December 2024) to Rp2,844,697 million (March 2025). But the disclosed fair value of that same stake - what the market is actually pricing it at - fell from Rp7,206,760 million to Rp4,344,816 million, a 39.7% decline in one quarter. The two figures diverging this sharply is a reminder that GoTo's balance sheet reflects Jago at its accounting carrying value, not its market value, and that a reader relying on the balance sheet alone would have no idea the market's view of this specific holding had fallen by more than a third.

Management's "Best Quarter Ever" Message, With a New Reporting Overhaul Attached

CEO Patrick Walujo opened the call framing Q1 2025 as "another record breaking profitable quarter across our ecosystem," emphasizing that this was achieved despite the entire 30-day Ramadan fasting period falling within the quarter - typically a growth headwind at the group level. He credited "disciplined execution" and ecosystem synergies (mass-market users adopting FinTech products, affluent users adopting On-Demand premium services) rather than any single new initiative. CFO Simon Ho used his opening remarks to disclose three reporting changes at once: the Mobility/Delivery segment split, the new loan-delinquency schedule, and the Adjusted EBITDA redefinition (see Beyond the Usual above for what each actually shows) - bundling a genuine transparency improvement (more granular segment and credit disclosure) together with a change that quietly shrinks the company's own recent track record, in the same breath. Asked directly about the long-running Grab merger speculation, Walujo gave the identical non-denial as last quarter: pointing analysts back to a February 2025 Indonesia Stock Exchange disclosure and stating "nothing has changed since then," declining further comment on "market rumors and speculation" - the speculation remains unresolved, not denied, three months on. Vietnam was not mentioned at all on this call, continuing the pattern since the September 2024 exit: still no quantified P&L cost for the closure has ever appeared in a GoTo filing or call. Management also addressed US tariff policy for the first time, with Ho stating GoTo has no direct exposure (it doesn't export) and is monitoring only indirect consumption effects, none observed yet.

Target Valuation Range

Enterprise value ~Rp93,694 billion (~$5.65B), implying ~5.84x EV/TTM Net Revenue - up from ~4.9x last quarter, a real re-rating. GoTo looks fairly valued to modestly cheap on a peer-multiple basis given a third straight quarter of both price gains and operating improvement, but the Adjusted EBITDA redefinition genuinely complicates any read of the FY2025 guidance trajectory, and the newly disclosed delinquency uptick is a real, unresolved question the market hasn't fully priced one way or the other yet.

GoTo's share count held at 1,191,144,997,220 shares as of March 31, 2025, unchanged from December 2024 - no new treasury-share cancellation occurred this quarter, though the Company's own directly-held treasury shares grew to 25,824,342,403 (from 20,291,442,703 at Dec 2024) as the buyback continued. The stock closed March 2025 at Rp83 (March 27 close), up 18.6% from Q4 2024's Rp70 close - GoTo's third consecutive quarter of share-price gains.

Market cap → enterprise value	1Q25
Share price (period-end)	Rp83
Shares outstanding	1,191,144,997,220
Market capitalization	Rp98,865B (~$5.96B)
Total liabilities	~Rp13,965B
Less: cash and equivalents	~Rp19,136B
Enterprise value	Rp93,694B (~$5.65B)

Market cap is up from ~$5.16B at Q4 2024's close.

Peer-multiple sanity check	4Q24 (TTM)	1Q25 (TTM)
Net revenue	Rp15,894B (~$983M)	~Rp16,046B (~$967M)
Enterprise value	~$4.76B	~$5.65B
EV/Net Revenue	~4.9x	~5.84x

TTM Net Revenue sums Q2 2024 + Q3 2024 + Q4 2024 + Q1 2025, all on a clean post-deconsolidation as-reported basis. The re-rating is driven by both the higher share price and the modestly higher enterprise value.

DCF (base/bull/bear, illustrative only): The scenarios turn on whether the Adjusted EBITDA redefinition and the delinquency uptick are genuinely benign, or early signs of the FY2025 guidance trajectory being harder to hit than the headline numbers suggest. In place of a full DCF, each scenario applies an illustrative EV/TTM-Net-Revenue multiple to the same ~Rp16,046B TTM net revenue used in the Current row, then bridges to market cap/per-share price using the current Rp13,965B liabilities and Rp19,136B cash - a sanity-check exercise, not a modeled DCF:

Scenario	Key assumption	Multiple	Implied value
Current (1Q25 close)	actual market price, for reference	~5.84x EV/TTM Net Revenue (implied)	Rp83/share (~$5.65B EV)
Bear	the loan-book delinquency increase (5.7% to 7.8% total overdue in one quarter) proves the start of real credit-quality deterioration, the FY2025 Rp1.4-1.6T guidance turns out measured on the old (pre-redefinition) Adjusted EBITDA basis, and the Grab merger speculation resolves unfavorably	~4x, compressing as credit-quality deterioration and an unfavorable merger resolution both weigh on the multiple	~Rp58/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF
Base	FinTech's Adjusted EBITDA continues compounding quarter-on-quarter toward a full-year positive result, On-Demand holds its three-quarter margin-expansion streak, the delinquency uptick proves a single-quarter blip, and Group Adjusted EBITDA tracks toward the Rp1.4-1.6T FY2025 range	~5.84x, roughly the current multiple holding flat	~Rp83/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF
Bull	FinTech and On-Demand both beat guidance on a comparable basis, the buyback (49.5% utilized as of end-March 2025) accelerates toward full $200M utilization, a Grab-related corporate action resolves favorably for GoTo shareholders	~7.5x, re-rating further on durable guidance-beating profitability and a favorable Grab resolution	~Rp105/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF

Reverse DCF: A stock still trading roughly 75% below its IPO price, even after three consecutive quarters of gains and a second straight positive free-cash-flow quarter, implies the market still isn't fully convinced the turnaround is durable - and this quarter added two genuinely new reasons for that hesitation (a redefined profit metric with an unclear guidance basis, and the first real crack in loan-book credit quality) on top of the ones already priced in from prior quarters (the unresolved Grab speculation, Tokopedia's volatile associate-level results).

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