GOTO GoTo Just Posted Its Best Growth Quarter Since the Turnaround. Its Stock Hit an All-Time Low Anyway

The Mass-Market Flywheel Finally Turned

GoTo's second quarter is the clearest evidence yet that the "reset button" CEO Patrick Walujo described hitting throughout 2023 has flipped from cost-cutting to actual growth. Pro forma Group GTV^» - the like-for-like basis excluding Tokopedia and GoTo Logistics from both years, the same convention introduced last quarter - grew 26% year-on-year to Rp121,451 billion, and Core GTV (which strips out FinTech's low-margin merchant payment gateway) grew an even faster 54% to Rp63,192 billion, both the fastest readings since GoTo began prioritizing profitability in early 2023. Group MTU^» grew 20% year-on-year, and management was explicit on the call that this isn't incentive-fueled growth: On-Demand Services cut incentive and marketing spend even as GTV accelerated, and a quarter of new/reactivated users came through mass-market products rather than promotions.

The mechanism behind this is a real feedback loop, not just a marketing line. GoTo's mass-market push (an affordable two-wheel ride product, an improved affordable food-delivery tier) pulls in price-sensitive users who wouldn't have converted on the platform's premium tier; those users, once onboarded, show a higher propensity to also use GoTo's lending products than average - "frequent mass market product users are also more likely to use our lending products," per Walujo - which is exactly why Financial Technology's Core GTV grew 65% year-on-year even faster than the consumer-facing side. More mass-market users → more cross-sell into lending → a stickier, higher-frequency user who also subscribes (Gojek PLUS subscribers now account for 20% of Indonesia On-Demand GTV, having doubled since January) → more data to underwrite the next loan. It's the ecosystem argument GoTo has always made about itself, but this is the first quarter since the 2023 cost-cutting cycle where the numbers actually show it compounding rather than just being asserted.

The tension is that none of this shows up in the share price. GoTo closed the quarter at Rp50 on June 28, 2024 - a new post-IPO closing low, below even October 2023's previous low of Rp60 - and Walujo addressed the gap directly when an analyst asked about it on the call: "we at GoTo and I personally, have been disappointed by our share price performance... it doesn't reflect the strong performance of the underlying business." He attributed part of it to "an overhang in our stock, relating to the situation of some of our shareholders that we believe has nothing to do with the performance of the company" - a reference the call didn't elaborate on further. See GoTo's Share Price Since the IPO below for the numbers behind that gap.

The Prescription

GoTo should lean harder into the cross-sell flywheel it just proved works this quarter - specifically, extending BNPL^» from Gojek and Tokopedia into the newly launched Shop|Tokopedia (TikTok's marketplace) and treating the mass-market ODS funnel as a lending-acquisition channel first and a transport/delivery product second, since the data now shows mass-market users convert into lending customers at a higher rate than the base. This is a genuinely differentiated position - a competitor without GoTo's payments and lending stack can't replicate the economics of a cheap ride turning into a profitable loan customer eighteen months later.

What GoTo should stop doing is treating its own $200 million buyback authorization as a slow-burn, low-urgency program while simultaneously telling investors the stock is undervalued. By June 30, 2024, five months after shareholders approved the buyback, GoTo had spent only about $12 million - roughly 6% of the authorized amount - repurchasing 3.8 billion shares. A management team that says on the same call that it's "disappointed" by the share price and doesn't believe the discount reflects fundamentals has the tools to act on that belief at a scale that would actually move the float; spending 6% of an authorization over five months while the stock keeps hitting new lows reads as a hedge against being wrong, not conviction that the market is mispricing the business.

Key Financial Metrics

Q2 2024 vs. Q2 2023 (three months ended June 30), as reported in GoTo's unaudited interim consolidated financial statements. Pro forma figures (Tokopedia and GoTo Logistics excluded from both periods) shown separately where the basis materially changes the picture - see [The Mass-Market Flywheel Finally Turned](#the-mass-market-flywheel-finally-turned) above.

FX: IDR 16,421 = USD 1 (Bank Indonesia middle rate, period-end, 28 June 2024), applied to both periods for comparability.

Metric	Q2 2024 (IDR)	Q2 2024 (USD)	Q2 2023 (IDR)	YoY
Net Revenue	Rp3,658B	~$222.8M	Rp3,552B	✅ +3.0% as reported (+115% pro forma, Rp3,518B vs Rp1,633B - see below)
Loss from Operations	-Rp785B	~-$47.8M	-Rp2,064B	✅ Improved 61.9%
Adjusted EBITDA	-Rp70B (-2% of Gross Revenue)	~-$4.3M	-Rp1,208B (-21% of Gross Revenue)	✅ Improved 94.2% YoY (pro forma: -Rp48B vs -Rp885B, improved 94.6%)
Net Loss (for the period)	-Rp1,909B	~-$116.3M	-Rp3,313B	✅ Improved 42.4%
Free Cash Flow (OCF - capex)	-Rp520B	~-$31.7M	-Rp1,226B	✅ Improved 57.6% YoY, though worse than Q1 2024's -Rp117B
Total Cash & Equivalents (period-end)	Rp20,118B	~$1,225.1M	Rp25,437B (Jun 2023)	⚠️ -20.9% YoY, -0.9% vs Mar 2024's Rp20,311B

Net Revenue's headline YoY (+3.0% as reported) is arguably the least informative number in this table - the as-reported comparison is still distorted by one full quarter of Tokopedia consolidation a year ago against none this quarter, the same basis problem flagged last quarter. The pro forma comparison (+115%) is the real story, though it's inflated by 2Q23's unusually low pro forma base (Rp1,633 billion, before FinTech's lending business had scaled and before the On-Demand agency-to-principal revenue recognition change); management's own more conservative estimate, adjusting 2Q23 for the accounting change alone, put pro forma revenue growth at 25% - a figure worth anchoring to over the headline 115%. Total assets fell to Rp46,386 billion from Rp54,097 billion at December 2023 (-14.3%), continuing (not just repeating) Q1's mechanical deconsolidation-driven contraction: intangible assets fell a further 91% to Rp717 billion as GoTo Logistics' remaining trademark, customer-contract, and customer-relationship intangibles were derecognized when that business fully deconsolidated in May (see Beyond the Usual), and Investment in Associates - the line carrying GoTo's 24.99% Tokopedia stake - actually fell to Rp11,326 billion from Rp12,411 billion just one quarter earlier, as Tokopedia's own losses under the equity method^» ate into the fair-value mark GoTo booked at deconsolidation. Total liabilities fell to Rp12,869 billion (-30.0% vs. Dec 2023) and total equity fell modestly to Rp33,517 billion (-6.2%), the first quarter since the deconsolidation where equity moved meaningfully rather than staying flat.

Key Operational Metrics

Q2 2024, pro forma basis unless noted

Core GTV growth (+54% YoY) outpaced headline GTV growth (+26%) by the widest margin yet in this series, meaning the growth is concentrated in genuine transaction volume rather than FinTech's lower-margin merchant payment gateway pass-through. The consumer lending book grew to Rp3.5 trillion outstanding, up roughly 3.5x year-on-year and +26% quarter-on-quarter, with NPL^» holding flat at 1.3% for a second straight quarter - management fielded a direct question on the call about credit-quality deterioration seen at other Indonesian lenders (Bank Rakyat Indonesia was named specifically) and said GoTo's own book "hasn't seen any deterioration," attributing the resilience partly to the loan book's short BNPL/cash-loan duration allowing faster course-correction than longer-tenor lending. Roughly 80% of total loans outstanding are now channeled through Bank Jago, up from "roughly 75%" last quarter. GoPay app cumulative downloads passed 30 million (from 20 million at end of Q1), and a new BNPL product launched inside Shop|Tokopedia (TikTok's marketplace) in June - the first lending product GoTo has placed directly inside the TikTok-controlled e-commerce entity since the deconsolidation. LTM Annual Transacting Users, absent from the deck and transcript entirely last quarter, remains undisclosed this quarter as well - two consecutive quarters now with no ATU figure at all, not just at reduced granularity.

Three Segments, One Flywheel

GoTo reports three segments this quarter - On-Demand Services, Financial Technology, and E-Commerce - after GoTo Logistics stopped being reported standalone last quarter and was then fully deconsolidated in May (see Beyond the Usual). All figures below are as-reported for the three months ended June 30, 2024, since On-Demand and FinTech were never distorted by Tokopedia's consolidation in the first place.

On-Demand Services

GTV grew 14% year-on-year to Rp15,505 billion (18% in Indonesia specifically, reaching an all-time high), and completed orders grew 20% - both the fastest since the 2023 profitability push began. Contribution Margin improved to 5.0% of GTV from 4.6%, and Adjusted EBITDA turned positive again at +Rp90 billion (+0.6% of GTV, from -1.2% a year ago), an improvement management called out specifically as achieved "while we also steadily improved adjusted EBITDA compared to the previous quarter." President of On-Demand Services Catherine Hindra Sutjahyo was candid on the call that the sequential margin dip investors were asking about reflects a genuine product-mix shift toward mass-market and away from premium tiers - not a cost-discipline slip - and that she expects margins to hold "similar to slightly better" for the rest of the year while the segment still targets mid-teens full-year GTV growth. Singapore contributed too: GoTo estimates a 3-percentage-point market share gain there in Q2, helped by an April partnership with ComfortDelGro addressing local driver-supply constraints.

Financial Technology

GTV grew 27% to Rp115,309 billion and Core GTV grew 65% to Rp56,213 billion, both accelerating from Q1's already-strong 21% and 40%. Gross Revenue nearly doubled (+97% to Rp788 billion), and Adjusted EBITDA loss narrowed 67% year-on-year to -Rp168 billion (-0.1% of GTV, from -0.6%) - still the only segment losing money at the Adjusted EBITDA line, but closing the gap fastest of the three. Management's framing was that FinTech is "beginning to bear fruit": revenue is scaling while recurring cash fixed costs actually fell 7% year-on-year, driven by IT infrastructure cost reduction rather than volume-driven expense growth - a genuinely favorable operating-leverage signal for a segment still guided to reach Adjusted EBITDA breakeven only "by the end of 2025."

E-Commerce

E-Commerce is now almost entirely the Tokopedia consultancy-and-support fee introduced last quarter: GoTo booked a full quarter of it in Q2, a Rp171 billion cash inflow (Rp157 billion net of VAT), scaling from the roughly Rp110 billion collected in just February-March. On a segment basis this produced a positive Rp25 billion segment result from operations and Rp157 billion of segment Adjusted EBITDA - a business that was booking hundreds of billions in quarterly losses as a consolidated e-commerce operator a year ago is now, structurally, closer to a fee-collection line item than an operating business. CEO Walujo called this fee "in line with our initial projection" on the call, and separately said he expects the fee to "see improvement in growth in coming quarters" as the TikTok-Tokopedia partnership deepens - but see Beyond the Usual for a complication in that story the presentation itself doesn't surface.

Segment Comparison

Segment	GTV YoY	Contribution Margin (% of GTV)	Adjusted EBITDA (% of GTV)
On-Demand Services	✅ +14%	✅ 5.0%	✅ +0.6%
Financial Technology	✅ +27% (Core GTV +65%)	0.3%	⚠️ -0.1%
E-Commerce	n/a - fee-based, not GTV-driven	n/a	✅ Rp157B (fee income)
Group (Pro Forma)	✅ +26%	✅ 1.0% of GTV	⚠️ -0.0% (Rp48B loss)

FinTech is still the only segment losing money at the Adjusted EBITDA line, but it's also compounding the fastest and closing that gap quickest - the growth engine and the margin drag are the same business unit. On-Demand is now both the largest contributor to Contribution Margin and solidly Adjusted-EBITDA-positive, a genuine change from the segment that spent most of 2022 and 2023 subsidizing growth with losses. E-Commerce has effectively exited the segment-comparison exercise entirely - it no longer has a GTV or a real operating cost base to compare against the other two, just a quarterly fee.

Beyond the Usual

Tokopedia's own net loss roughly quadrupled quarter-on-quarter, even as the fee GoTo collects from it barely moved

Note 14's summary financials for TOKO (Tokopedia and its subsidiaries) disclose a Rp8,576,846 million net revenue and Rp5,875,545 million net loss for the five months from February 1 to June 30, 2024 (the period since deconsolidation, on a 100% basis) - up sharply from the Rp2,897 billion net revenue and Rp1,142 billion net loss for February-March alone disclosed last quarter. Subtracting the two implies Tokopedia's Q2-alone net loss was roughly Rp4,734 billion - more than four times the prior two-month figure - while the E-Commerce service fee GoTo itself collects (tied to Tokopedia's GMV, not its profitability) barely grew, from ~Rp110 billion over two months to Rp171 billion over a full quarter. A JPMorgan analyst asked management directly on the call whether a bigger or smaller Tokopedia net loss is better for GoTo, and specifically flagged that the e-commerce service fee appeared to be declining month-on-month even as Tokopedia's net loss grew. CEO Walujo's answer addressed the fee ("that is cash that is paid to us... a core interest for GoTo") and called the net loss "still an accounting loss" that "all parties have common interest to make... profitable" - without engaging with the arithmetic of the loss actually widening, or explaining why. GoTo's own P&L absorbs 24.99% of this loss through the equity method (Rp1,432 billion of "share of net losses in associates and joint ventures" for the six months, most of it attributable to TOKO), so a Tokopedia loss that keeps growing is a real drag on GoTo's own reported numbers even though the cash fee arrangement is structured to be insulated from it.

GoTo divested the last of GoTo Logistics for Rp14.7 billion in cash - and booked a Rp379 billion loss doing it

In April 2024, GoTo signed a Conditional Share Purchase Agreement to sell 100% of PAB and its subsidiaries (SSS and SLS, which included GoTo Logistics' merchant fulfillment activities) to a third party for cash consideration of just Rp14.7 billion (~$0.9 million). The transaction closed in May 2024, completing the standalone-segment wind-down flagged last quarter, and GoTo recognized a Rp379 billion loss on losing control, recorded in "other expenses, net." The businesses being divested carried Rp795 billion of assets and Rp432 billion of liabilities on GoTo's books - meaning the Rp14.7 billion in cash received was a small fraction of even the disclosed net asset value being given up, consistent with a business GoTo was actively trying to exit rather than sell competitively.

A tiny digital-identity acquisition triggered an outsized purchase-price allocation that the filing doesn't fully explain

Note 12's intangible asset roll-forward shows Rp3,702 billion added to "business licenses" and Rp1,762 billion added to "customer contracts" during the first half of 2024, both described as "identifiable assets for the business combination transaction with SNI" - PT Solusi Net Internusa, a digital-certificate and identity-verification provider that GoTo's own group-structure disclosure lists with total assets of just Rp11.3 billion before elimination. The scale mismatch between a target with Rp11.3 billion of disclosed assets and a Rp5.5 trillion combined purchase-price allocation isn't reconciled anywhere in the notes, and the filing itself flags the accounting as provisional ("the initial accounting for these transactions has not been completed"). Whether this reflects a materially larger transaction than SNI's own balance sheet suggests, or a placeholder allocation pending finalization, isn't something this quarter's filing resolves.

The Rp5.4 trillion "purchase of intangible assets" swamping the cash flow statement almost entirely happened in Q1, not Q2

The six-month cash flow statement shows Rp5,405 billion spent on "purchase of intangible assets" - a figure that would suggest an unusually capital-intensive first half. Comparing it against Q1 2024's own filing shows Rp5,390 billion of that was already spent in the first three months of the year; Q2's own addition was a trivial Rp15 billion. A reader relying only on the six-month cash flow statement, without the Q1 filing for comparison, would have no way to tell that virtually the entire year-to-date figure landed in a single quarter that's now over.

JAGO's own market value kept falling even as GoTo's equity-method carrying value of the stake barely moved

The fair value of GoTo's listed stake in Bank Jago (JAGO), disclosed for impairment-testing purposes, fell to Rp7,147 billion from Rp8,601 billion at year-end 2023 (-16.9%) - yet the equity-method carrying value of the same stake on GoTo's balance sheet actually rose slightly, to Rp2,809 billion from Rp2,790 billion, since equity-method accounting tracks JAGO's own earnings and book value rather than its traded price. The two numbers are tracking genuinely different things by design, but the gap is a reminder that GoTo's most liquid minority stake has been losing market value throughout the same period the accounting carrying value looks stable.

What Management Emphasized on the Call

The framing shifted again from Q1's "reinvestment after the reset" to something closer to a victory lap on the CEO's first year in the role: Walujo used a significant portion of his prepared remarks to summarize his year-one achievements as GoTo CEO (appointed June 2023) - the Rp12.3 trillion cut in reported Adjusted EBITDA losses through 2023, the TikTok partnership turning E-Commerce cash-generative, the GoPay app launch, and the loan book's growth - concluding that "the company's fundamentals have never been stronger." That retrospective, paired with his direct acknowledgment of disappointment in the share price (see The Mass-Market Flywheel Finally Turned above), is the clearest the CEO has been yet about the gap between operational and market performance. On the Tokopedia net-loss question specifically, management's response stopped short of engaging with the trend flagged in Beyond the Usual above. This was also outgoing CFO Jacky Lo's final earnings call - incoming CFO Simon Ho, joining the board in August subject to shareholder approval, was introduced and took no questions himself, giving no early signal of any strategic shift under new financial leadership.

GoTo's Share Price Since the IPO

GoTo closed the quarter at Rp50 on June 28, 2024 - a new post-IPO closing low, surpassing October 2023's previous low of Rp60, and down 27.5% from Q1's Rp69 close. GoTo has not split its stock since its IPO, so Rp50 is the actual nominal price quoted on the exchange, not a split-adjusted figure. The stock is now down 54.5% year-on-year (from Rp110 at end of June 2023) and 85.2% below its Rp338 IPO price - the steepest post-IPO discount this series has recorded, arriving in the same quarter as the fastest pro forma GTV and Core GTV growth since the 2023 turnaround began. That combination - accelerating operating momentum against a deepening share-price discount - is the central tension of this quarter, addressed directly by management on the call (see above) but not resolved by anything in the results themselves.

Target Valuation Range

Enterprise value ~Rp52,822 billion (~$3.22B), implying ~3.4x EV/TTM Net Revenue - down further from ~4.8x last quarter, driven entirely by the share-price decline. GoTo looks undervalued relative to its own operating trajectory - Core GTV growth accelerating to 54% and Adjusted EBITDA improving for an eighth straight quarter are not what a stock hitting new all-time lows usually looks like - but the market's skepticism has a real basis in the segment mix: the fastest-growing segment (FinTech) is still the only one losing money, and E-Commerce's headline profitability is now a fee arrangement rather than an operating business.

Market cap → enterprise value	2Q24
Share price (period-end)	Rp50
Shares outstanding	1,201.41B (flat since year-end 2023)
Market capitalization	Rp60,071B (~$3.66B)
Total liabilities	~Rp12.9T
Less: cash and equivalents	~Rp20.1T
Enterprise value	Rp52,822B (~$3.22B)

Market cap is down from ~$5.23B at the Q1 close, tracking the quarter's 27.5% share-price decline on a flat share count. EV fell as the falling market cap outweighed the balance sheet's own continued shrinkage.

Peer-multiple sanity check	1Q24 (TTM)	2Q24 (TTM)
Net revenue	Rp15,532B (~$980M)	Rp15,638B (~$952M)
Enterprise value	~$4.74B	~$3.22B
EV/Net Revenue	~4.8x	~3.4x

TTM Net Revenue sums 3Q23's Rp3,627B, 4Q23's Rp4,274B, 1Q24's Rp4,079B, and this quarter's Rp3,658B, on an as-reported basis - the same basis-mixing caveat flagged last quarter still applies, since two of these four quarters include a full Tokopedia consolidation and two don't. The multiple compression is driven entirely by the share-price decline - net revenue across the four quarters moved within a narrow band, not a trend in either direction.

DCF (base/bull/bear, illustrative only): The scenarios turn on whether FinTech's accelerating growth converts into Adjusted EBITDA breakeven on schedule, and whether the market's share-price skepticism proves right or wrong about the underlying business. In place of a full DCF, each scenario applies an illustrative EV/TTM-Net-Revenue multiple to the same Rp15,638B TTM net revenue used in the Current row, then bridges to market cap/per-share price using the current Rp12.9T liabilities and Rp20.1T cash - a sanity-check exercise, not a modeled DCF:

Scenario	Key assumption	Multiple	Implied value
Current (2Q24 close)	actual market price, for reference	~3.4x EV/TTM Net Revenue (implied)	Rp50/share (~$3.22B EV)
Bear	FinTech's 65% Core GTV growth continues to require investment that outpaces its narrowing losses, competitive intensity compresses On-Demand's newly positive margins, and the FY2024 group Adjusted EBITDA breakeven guidance slips into 2025	~2.5x, compressing further toward the all-time-low multiple this quarter's price already implies	~Rp39/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF
Base	the flywheel keeps compounding through H2, On-Demand holds its mid-teens full-year GTV growth target while maintaining profitability, FinTech's losses keep narrowing at the current pace, and GoTo lands on full-year group Adjusted EBITDA breakeven for 2024 as reaffirmed	~3.4x, roughly the current multiple holding flat	~Rp50/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF
Bull	the cross-sell flywheel scales faster than guided, the Shop|Tokopedia BNPL launch and the TikTok e-commerce service fee both grow meaningfully, and the buyback (so far only 6% utilized, see The Prescription above) accelerates enough to meaningfully shrink the float	~4.8x, re-rating back toward the multiple seen just one quarter earlier	~Rp68/share - illustrative sanity check, not a modeled DCF

Reverse DCF: A stock posting a new all-time low in the same quarter its core operating metrics hit multi-year highs implies the market is pricing something beyond the disclosed numbers - most plausibly the shareholder overhang Walujo referenced without elaborating, or a broader discount for emerging-market tech names, rather than a rational read of this quarter's segment-level results, which were broadly positive on their own terms.

---