The Ratio That Narrowed in Q3 Broke Instead of Widening in Q4
Bank Jago closed FY2022 with net income of Rp15.9 billion - down 81% from FY2021's Rp86.0 billion. That headline alone reads like a bad year. It wasn't, on the metric that should matter most: income before tax actually rose 123.6%, to Rp20.4 billion from Rp9.1 billion. The entire gap between "profit nearly doubled" and "profit collapsed" is a single line - deferred tax. FY2021's Rp86.0 billion net income included a Rp76.9 billion deferred tax benefit, the one-off credit the FY2021 post flagged as roughly 89% of that year's entire reported profit. FY2022 got no such gift: the same line turned into a Rp4.5 billion expense. Strip the tax line out of both years and the underlying banking business improved substantially; leave it in, as the headline net income figure does, and the year looks like a collapse.
That's one twin-track story this annual report tells. The other is the one this backfill has followed for six straight posts running. The Sharia business unit - barely 18 months old - earned Rp264.6 billion in net income for FY2022, against the consolidated bank's Rp15.9 billion. That's 16.6x the whole bank's own profit, arithmetic that implies the conventional banking business - the app, the ecosystem lending, the legacy Artos back book - lost approximately Rp248.7 billion for the year. It's also a new high for this ratio, and it arrived the quarter after the 9M 2022 post reported the first-ever narrowing, to roughly 3.5x in Q3 alone. Backing out Q4 using both posts' own published numbers - Sharia's Rp45.5 billion (Rp264.6 billion full-year less the 9M post's Rp219.1 billion) against consolidated's negative Rp24.7 billion (Rp15.9 billion full-year less the 9M post's Rp40.6 billion) - the standalone fourth quarter didn't just widen the ratio again. It broke it: the whole bank posted a net loss for the quarter - its first loss-making quarter since Q2 2021, before Q3 2021's first-ever profitable quarter - while the Sharia unit had its best quarter yet. A ratio can't meaningfully describe "profitable unit vs. lossmaking whole" when the whole itself goes negative - Q3's improvement turned out to be one good data point bracketed by worse ones on both sides.
The Prescription
Bank Jago should keep pushing the CASA-funded, ecosystem-embedded model that got total funding to Rp8.3 trillion (+125% YoY) at a 2.6% cost of funds - that's the actual structural advantage a GoTo-adjacent digital bank has over a conventional lender, and it's working. But it needs to stop letting a single accounting line item - deferred tax this year, loan-write-off recoveries the year before (see Beyond the Usual) - do the work of making an unprofitable core banking business look profitable on the bottom line. A reader who only sees "net income Rp15.9 billion, down 81%" or, worse, last year's "first annual profit" headline, has no way to know that pre-tax income actually improved, or that the business generating basically all of that pre-tax income is a unit less than two years old running a materially riskier loan book than the one it's carrying (see Key Operational Metrics). Publish the Sharia-versus-conventional pre-tax split as a standard annual disclosure, not something a reader has to reconstruct from Note 41 - the bank clearly already tracks it internally to close its own books.
Key Financial Metrics
FY 2022 vs. FY 2021 - PT Bank Jago Tbk, consolidated
FX: IDR 15,620.0 = USD 1 (December 30, 2022 close); IDR 14,285.2 = USD 1 (December 31, 2021 close, used for FY2021 conversions, consistent with the FY2021 post).
| Metric | FY 2022 (IDR) | FY 2022 (USD) | FY 2021 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net interest and Sharia income ("Net Revenue" equivalent) | Rp1,352,996M | ~$86.62M | Rp589,738M | ✅ +129.4% |
| Other operating income | Rp78,023M | ~$5.00M | Rp55,691M | ✅ +40.1% |
| Provision for impairment losses | -Rp392,669M | -~$25.14M | -Rp92,346M | ⚠️ +325.2%, loan book growth plus rising NPL |
| Other operating expenses (G&A, personnel, other) | -Rp1,418,300M | -~$90.80M | -Rp634,926M | ⚠️ +123.4% |
| Operating income | Rp12,719M | ~$0.81M | Rp10,503M | ✅ +21.1% |
| Income before income tax | Rp20,428M | ~$1.31M | Rp9,134M | ✅ +123.6% |
| Income tax (expense)/benefit | -Rp4,515M | -~$0.29M | Rp76,890M | ⚠️ An expense, not last year's one-off benefit - see above |
| Net income for the year | Rp15,913M | ~$1.02M | Rp86,024M | ⚠️ -81.5%, despite pre-tax income nearly doubling |
| Earnings per share (full amount, basic and diluted) | Rp1.15 | ~$0.0001 | Rp6.48 | ⚠️ -82.3% |
Operating income (above) is the closest equivalent measure for a bank; Adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow aren't included, consistent with the rest of this backfill.
| Balance sheet metric | Dec 2022 (IDR) | Dec 2022 (USD) | Dec 2021 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp16,965,295M | ~$1,086.13M | Rp12,312,422M | ✅ +37.8% |
| Loans and Sharia financing (net) | Rp9,157,817M | ~$586.29M | Rp5,241,783M | ✅ +74.7% |
| Total Funding (current accounts, savings, time deposits, Sharia mudharabah) | Rp8,274,385M | ~$529.73M | Rp3,677,572M | ✅ +125.0% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp8,175,479M | ~$523.33M | Rp3,952,606M | ⚠️ +106.8% |
| Temporary Sharia (Syirkah) Funds | Rp526,059M | ~$33.68M | Rp110,361M | +376.7% |
| Total Equity | Rp8,263,757M | ~$529.05M | Rp8,249,455M | Essentially flat, +0.17% |
The number worth remembering isn't "net income fell 81%" or "pre-tax income rose 123.6%" in isolation - it's that both are true at once, for the same year, because of a single tax line, while the funding side of the business (+125% total funding at a falling 2.6% cost of funds) kept compounding exactly as this backfill has tracked since FY2020.
Key Operational Metrics
- CASA ratio»: 68.56% (Dec 2022, per the bank's own filed figures) vs. 70.6% (Sep 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) vs. 45.6% (Dec 2021) - essentially flat over Q4 after climbing every quarter this backfill has tracked it, and still 23 points above where FY2021 ended.
- Loan-to-Deposit Ratio»: 113.76% (Dec 2022, per the bank's own filed ratios) vs. 111.96% (Sep 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) vs. 145.86% (Dec 2021) - a small uptick in Q4 after four straight quarters of decline, still well below where the year started.
- NIM» (blended, per the bank's own filed ratios): 10.45% (FY 2022) vs. 7.42% (FY 2021) vs. 10.5% (9M 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) - essentially flat across Q4.
- NPL»: 1.82% gross / 0.55% net (Dec 2022, blended, per the bank's own filed ratios) vs. 2.10%/0.95% (Sep 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) vs. 0.58%/0.04% (Dec 2021) - both ratios improved in Q4, continuing 9M's first-ever improvement, even as the loan book's dollar-quality split below stayed lopsided.
- Split by book (Note 10's collectability table): conventional loans' own gross NPL is 1.16% (Rp83,796M of Rp7,225,388M) versus Sharia financing's 3.96% (Rp87,292M of Rp2,202,599M) - Sharia's rate is still roughly 3.4x the conventional book's, essentially the same multiple the 9M 2022 post found (4.21% vs. 1.28%, ~3.3x). Sharia special-mention balances (Rp248,536M, 11.28% of that book) remain far above the conventional book's 3.27% share - the riskier book is also the one still building up pre-NPL stress.
- CAR»: 82.75% (Dec 2022, per the bank's own filed ratios) vs. 97.50% (Sep 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) vs. 169.92% (Dec 2021) - continuing to fall every quarter as capital gets deployed into risk-weighted loans, still more than 8x OJK's 10% minimum.
- ROE» / ROA» (FY 2022, per the bank's own filed ratios): 0.21% / 0.14%, versus 1.28% / 0.10% (FY 2021) - ROE fell despite equity staying essentially flat, a direct consequence of the tax-driven net income drop discussed above.
- Cost-to-Income» (per the bank's own filed ratios): 71.67% (FY 2022) vs. 89.05% (FY 2021) vs. 70% (9M 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) - holding roughly at 9M's improved level.
- Cost of Funds (end of period, per the annual report's own management discussion): 2.6% (FY 2022) vs. 2.0% (Sep 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) - a modest uptick as Bank Indonesia's rate-hiking cycle started reaching deposit pricing.
- Related-party loan concentration: 5.53% of the loan book (Dec 2022, Rp399,262M) vs. 3.39% (Sep 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) - a new high for this backfill, surpassing even Q1 2022's 5.37% - see Beyond the Usual.
- Undrawn loan commitments: Rp1,578,886M (Dec 2022) vs. Rp1,099,880M (Sep 2022, per the 9M 2022 post) vs. Rp446,623M (Dec 2021) - up a further 43.6% in Q4, and now more than 3.5x where the year started.
- Headcount: 417 permanent employees (plus 22 contract staff, 439 total) at 31 December 2022, down from 423 at 30 September 2022 - the second straight quarter of headcount declining rather than growing.
- Branch network: 1 non-operational head office, 2 branch offices, 2 sub-branch offices, 1 Sharia branch office, 4 ATMs - one fewer branch office than the 3 reported at 30 September 2022.
- KYC-verified customers: "close to 7 million," including more than 5.1 million Jago App users, per the FY2022 investor presentation - not a clean 31 December balance-sheet-date figure, consistent with every prior quarter in this backfill.
The Stock's Worst Full Year in This Backfill
Bank Jago's shares closed at approximately Rp3,720 on 30 December 2022, down 76.75% from Rp16,000 a year earlier - and down 43.6% just in Q4, from Rp6,600 at the end of September. Rp3,720 is the lowest close anywhere in this backfill, extending Q3's new low for a fourth straight quarter. No stock split has occurred at any point since the company's IPO, so Rp3,720 is the actual nominal price quoted on the IDX at the time, not a split-adjusted figure. The stock is now down 79.3% from its highest close in this backfill, Rp17,950 in July 2021.
As the 9M 2022 post argued, this quarter's own operating numbers - improving NPL, falling CAR off a still-comfortable base, a first-ever narrower Sharia-versus-conventional gap in Q3 - were, if anything, incrementally encouraging relative to the numbers behind Q2's crash. The stock falling further and faster than either of those quarters makes the same point yet again: 2022's global growth-stock de-rating and Bank Indonesia's continued rate tightening remain the more plausible full-year explanation, not this specific quarter's results. A bank still priced mostly on an ecosystem narrative rather than proven core-banking earnings is exactly the kind of asset that gets marked down hardest when growth-stock multiples compress broadly.
Beyond the Usual
A related-party loan that disappeared for six quarters just came back larger than any related-party loan in this backfill
The 9M 2022 post reported two related-party loans outstanding at September 2022: Trimegah's familiar Rp100,000 million, and PT GOFIN Karya Anak Bangsa's Rp99,707 million. By 31 December 2022, GOFIN's loan is gone entirely - no balance is disclosed - while PT BFI Finance Indonesia Tbk, whose original Rp250 billion loan (shared with Trimegah) was reported fully repaid by September 2021, reappears with a Rp299,259 million balance - 4.14% of the entire loan book on its own, and larger than any single related-party loan disclosed anywhere in this backfill. Combined with Trimegah's unchanged Rp100,000 million, total related-party loan concentration reaches 5.53% of the loan book, a new high surpassing Q1 2022's 5.37%. The pattern first flagged in the FY2021 post - a related-party borrower cycling to zero and reappearing, sometimes at a much larger balance, without explanation in the filing - continues, and this cycle's reappearance is the largest yet.
The bank stopped disclosing PT GoTo Gojek Tokopedia's current-account share on its own
Every prior post in this backfill - most recently 9M 2022, at a backfill-high 91.47% - has tracked PT GoTo Gojek Tokopedia's individual share of current-account deposits, because the bank's own related-party note broke that single entity out by name. This annual report's related-party note no longer does: it collapses PT GoTo Gojek Tokopedia together with eight other same-ownership entities (Tokopedia, Midtrans, Infoflow Solutions, Dompet Anak Bangsa, Dkatalis Digital Lab, Mapan Global Tech, Mapan Global Reksa, and Gofin) into a single "companies with the same ownership as the shareholders" line, which totals 91.03% of current accounts (Rp2,628,253 million of Rp2,886,303 million). That combined figure sits roughly where the single-entity number was trending, but it can no longer be read as a like-for-like continuation of the metric this backfill has followed since FY2020 - a genuine reduction in disclosure granularity on the single most-tracked concentration risk in this entire backfill, whether or not it was intentional.
The Sharia mudharabah deposit product is now nearly half funded by the bank's own related parties
The same related-party note shows GoTo-family entities holding Rp256,501 million, or 48.76%, of the Rp526,059 million total balance in temporary Sharia (syirkah) funds - a product that held essentially none of this related-party balance a year earlier (Rp1 million, 0.00%). This is a separate concentration from the current-account one above, in the Sharia unit's own funding line rather than the conventional bank's: nearly half of the deposits funding the Sharia unit's own lending book now come from companies under common ownership with the bank's shareholders, not from independent third-party depositors.
FY2021's profit was flattered by a one-off recovery income line that all but disappeared in FY2022
Note 31 shows "recovery income from written-off loans" - money recovered on loans the bank had already charged off - at just Rp183 million for FY2022, down from Rp36,159 million in FY2021. That single line was nearly 4x FY2021's entire pre-tax income (Rp9.1 billion) - a genuinely one-off item propping up a year this backfill's own FY2021 post already flagged as manufactured mostly by a deferred tax credit. Its near-total absence this year is a second, smaller reason FY2021's underlying profitability looked better than FY2022's, even though FY2022's pre-tax income was actually the larger of the two. A partial offset showed up in the same note: "other provision and commission income" rose to Rp68,816 million from Rp9,210 million, but that increase wasn't large enough to fully replace what the recovery-income line lost.
The geographic segment note tells a different story than the nine-month version did
The 9M 2022 post reported the Bandung/West Java segment - home to the bank's original, pre-transformation Artos operations - posting a Rp226,878 million nine-month pre-tax profit, while DKI Jakarta (the digital bank and Sharia unit) posted a Rp174,529 million nine-month pre-tax loss. For the full year, West Java's segment profit is just Rp26,001 million and Jakarta's loss narrowed to just Rp5,573 million - meaning Q4 alone saw West Java's segment income fall by roughly Rp200,877 million while Jakarta's improved by roughly Rp168,956 million. Since the Sharia unit (based in Jakarta) grew its own profit from Rp219.1 billion at nine months to Rp264.6 billion for the full year, the swing implies Jakarta's non-Sharia digital-banking operations had a materially better fourth quarter than West Java's legacy book did - the opposite emphasis from what the nine-month numbers alone would have suggested about which segment was carrying the year.
Target Valuation Range
Market cap Rp51.55 trillion (~$3.30 billion), ~6.2x P/B, ~3,235x P/E. Bottom line: still overvalued on a book-multiple basis, even at the lowest multiple recorded anywhere in this backfill - the core conventional banking business lost approximately Rp248.7 billion for the year, and the multiple compressing further doesn't yet make that math work.
Bank Jago's shares closed at approximately Rp3,720 on 30 December 2022, down 76.75% for the year (see above). At 13,856,250,000 shares outstanding (unchanged since the March 2021 rights issue), that implies a market capitalization of approximately Rp51.55 trillion (~$3.30 billion).
| Market cap → book value | Q4 2022 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp3,720 |
| Shares outstanding | 13,856,250,000 |
| Market capitalization | Rp51.55 trillion (~$3.30 billion) |
| Total equity (book value) | Rp8,263,757M |
| Book value per share | Rp596.42 |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | Q3 2022 | Q4 2022 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/B | 11.0x | 6.2x | down |
| P/E | >1,600x | 3,235x | up |
P/B»: ~6.2x, using book value» per share of Rp596.42 (Rp8,263,757M total equity ÷ 13,856,250,000 shares) - down from ~11.0x three months ago, the lowest book multiple anywhere in this backfill, driven almost entirely by the falling share price rather than any material change in book value, which grew only 0.17% for the entire year. P/E»: technically positive on a full-year basis for the first time in this backfill (FY2021's positive EPS was a one-off; see above), but at FY2022 EPS of Rp1.15, the implied multiple is roughly 3,235x - still too thin an earnings base to support a real earnings multiple. A full DCF still isn't appropriate, for the same reason every prior post in this backfill has given: a genuine full-year profit has happened only twice since the "Becoming Jago" transformation began, and in both cases (this year's tax swing, last year's deferred tax credit) a large share of the headline number traces to something other than repeatable operating earnings. The peer-multiple read stays the honest one, and it keeps moving toward a more defensible level - ~6.2x book is the cheapest this backfill has recorded, but it's still a real premium for a bank whose conventional lending business lost close to a quarter of a trillion rupiah this year on its own.
PT Bank Jago Tbk's audited financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2022 (with 31 December 2021 comparatives), included within the company's Integrated Annual Report 2022, and the company's "FY 2022 Results" investor presentation, dated March 2023.