Three Stakes, Three Different Pandemics
PT Indoritel Makmur Internasional Tbk is the same pure holding company covered in the previous post: one consolidated fiber-optic subsidiary (FiberStar, via 98.09%-owned PT Mega Akses Persada) and three equity-method» stakes in Indonesian consumer names — 40% of PT Indomarco Prismatama (Indomaret minimarkets), 35.84% of PT Fast Food Indonesia Tbk (Indonesia's sole KFC franchisee), and 25.77% of PT Nippon Indosari Corpindo Tbk (Sari Roti). This is the Company's fiscal year 2020 annual report (period ended December 31, 2020), the first full year of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia, and it's a rare case where a single filing shows three genuinely different businesses absorbing the same shock in three genuinely different ways.
FiberStar had a good pandemic: consolidated revenue rose 89.6% to Rp488.9 billion as homebound Indonesians paid for broadband. But FiberStar isn't what determines whether this stock is worth owning — the associate stakes are, and they didn't have FiberStar's year. Indomaret's own net profit fell 16.6% as store hours and footfall were restricted; Sari Roti's fell 28.6% as office-adjacent sales dried up; and Fast Food Indonesia — dependent on dine-in traffic and mall footfall — didn't just decline, it swung to a Rp377.2 billion net loss for the year, against a Rp241.5 billion profit in 2019. The Company's combined share of profit from its three associates fell 48.8% to Rp346.1 billion, and that's why consolidated net income fell 37.0% to Rp327.1 billion even as the one business the Company actually runs nearly doubled its top line. A holding company's fortunes are a weighted average of its stakes' fortunes, not of its own operating momentum — and in a pandemic year, essential retail, packaged bread, and dine-in fried chicken are not remotely the same bet.
The Prescription
FiberStar's 2020 was the strongest evidence yet that the buildout this Company actually controls is the right lever to keep pulling: home-passed» coverage grew 45.6% to 656,975 and, more tellingly, home-connected subscribers grew 146.8% to 165,305 — pushing the connect-through rate from 14.8% to 25.2% of homes passed, the first year this backlog-to-subscriber conversion is even disclosed well enough to calculate. That's real demand catching up to the network the Company has been laying since 2014, and a pandemic that pushed work and school online only accelerated it. Management should keep funding this buildout aggressively, ideally by leaning harder on the retail/FTTH side that grew 144.96% this year against corporate's 64.75% — retail is where the structural, COVID-proven demand actually is.
What it should stop doing: letting FiberStar's own ownership structure quietly dilute while insisting FiberStar is the crown-jewel lever it controls. During 2020, PT Mega Akses Perkasa ("MAK") — a minority co-shareholder in PT Mega Akses Persada (MAP), the entity that actually owns FiberStar — converted Rp200.5 billion of mandatory convertible notes into new MAP equity, lifting MAK's own stake and increasing non-controlling interests» on the Company's balance sheet by Rp149.0 billion (see Beyond the Usual). If FiberStar is genuinely the one asset worth funding aggressively, the Company's own economic claim on it shouldn't keep shrinking every time a co-investor's notes come due — either the Company should be the one converting capital into equity there, or it should renegotiate the note structure so growth capital doesn't arrive at the cost of its own ownership percentage.
Key Financial Metrics
FY 2020 vs. FY 2019, consolidated
FX: IDR 14,105 = USD 1 (December 31, 2020 rate) and IDR 13,901 = USD 1 (December 31, 2019 rate), both per the Company's own financial statements.
| Metric | FY 2020 (IDR) | FY 2020 (USD) | FY 2019 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp488.887B | ~$34.66M | Rp257.798B | ✅ +89.63% |
| Share of profit of associates | Rp346.100B | ~$24.54M | Rp675.692B | ⚠️ -48.77% |
| Operating Income» | Rp385.244B | ~$27.31M | Rp575.641B | ⚠️ -33.08% |
| Net Income» | Rp327.052B | ~$23.19M | Rp519.144B | ⚠️ -37.00% |
| Net income attributable to owners | Rp328.827B | ~$23.31M | Rp523.050B | ⚠️ -37.13% |
| Total comprehensive income | Rp465.685B | ~$33.02M | Rp408.703B | ✅ +13.94% |
| EPS (basic) | Rp23.18 | ~$0.00164 | Rp36.88 | ⚠️ -37.15% |
| Balance sheet / cash flow | FY 2020 (IDR) | FY 2020 (USD) | FY 2019 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp17,223.362B | ~$1.221B | Rp15,484.343B | ✅ +11.23% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp7,087.541B | ~$502.5M | Rp5,949.260B | ⚠️ +19.13% |
| Total Equity | Rp10,135.821B | ~$718.6M | Rp9,535.082B | ✅ +6.30% |
| Total bank loans | Rp6,853.507B | ~$485.9M | Rp5,875.000B | ⚠️ +16.66% |
| Cash and cash equivalents | Rp177.359B | ~$12.57M | Rp158.254B | ✅ +12.07% |
| Operating cash flow | -Rp310.074B | ~-$21.98M | -Rp531.706B | ✅ Use eased |
| Free Cash Flow» (op. cash flow - capex) | ~-Rp785.130B | ~-$55.66M | ~-Rp1,054.522B | ✅ Use eased |
"Adjusted EBITDA" still isn't a metric this Company reports, and it still doesn't map onto a pure holding company's accounts — Operating Income above embeds Rp346.1 billion of non-cash equity-method associate profit, down from Rp675.7 billion in 2019, so an EBITDA add-back would double-count a number that's already shrinking for reasons that have nothing to do with FiberStar's own cost structure.
Total comprehensive income rose 13.94% even as net income fell 37%, the mirror image of last year's divergence — this time driven by a Rp136.2 billion positive swing in the Company's share of its associates' other comprehensive income (2019's Rp109.5 billion negative swing from associates' own actuarial losses reversed direction in 2020). Operating cash flow improved to negative Rp310.1 billion from negative Rp531.7 billion, and free cash flow to roughly negative Rp785.1 billion from negative Rp1,054.5 billion — still burning cash, but burning less of it, even in a year net income fell by more than a third. Total bank loans grew 16.66% to Rp6.854 trillion, adding a Rp900 billion facility in November 2020, on the same collateral structure flagged in the previous post — the Company borrowed more against stakes whose earnings power was shrinking, not growing, this year.
Retail Nearly Doubled Its Share — And One Line Item Went Dark
FiberStar's own revenue splits into three reported segments: Corporate (fiber connectivity sold to telcos, banks, and enterprises), Retail (FTTH broadband to homes), and Other (access-point rental income plus e-commerce daily deals).
| Segment | 2020 Revenue | 2019 Revenue | YoY | % of Total 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate | Rp263.866B | Rp160.168B | ✅ +64.75% | 54.0% |
| Retail | Rp197.475B | Rp80.615B | ✅ +144.96% | 40.4% |
| Other | Rp27.547B | Rp17.014B | ✅ +61.90% | 5.6% |
| Total | Rp488.887B | Rp257.798B | +89.63% | 100% |
Retail nearly doubled its share of the mix, from 31% to 40%, the clearest fingerprint the pandemic left on this business — a broadband subsidiary that used to earn most of its money from corporate connectivity now earns almost as much from homes. Corporate still grew a healthy 64.8%, so this isn't a story of enterprise demand collapsing, just retail growing faster.
The Other segment folds in e-commerce daily deals (OgahRugi) alongside access-point rental income — and this year, unlike the last, OgahRugi's own revenue isn't separately disclosed at all (see Beyond the Usual). Revenue concentration in FiberStar's customer base also tightened further: PT Cyberindo Aditama alone accounted for 47.39% of total revenue in 2020, up from 40.47% in 2019, while PT XL Axiata Tbk's share fell from 14.63% to 9.57% — the two together still represent 56.96% of revenue, essentially unchanged from 2019's 55.1%, but the mix shifted toward a single counterparty being an even larger share of the total.
Key Operational Metrics
- FiberStar Home Passed»: 656,975 (2020) vs. 451,266 (2019), ✅ +45.6%
- FiberStar Home Connected: 165,305 (2020) vs. 66,976 (2019), ✅ +146.8% — first year connected-subscriber counts are disclosed, implying a connect-through rate of ~25.2% of homes passed in 2020, up from ~14.8% in 2019
- FiberStar fiber-optic length: 28,714 km vs. 17,661 km, ✅ +62.6%
- FiberStar city/regency coverage: 135 vs. 103, ✅ +31.1% (30+ new cities/regencies added in 2020)
- Trade receivables collectability: improved to 138 days outstanding (2020) from 170 days (2019)
- Ownership stakes (equity-method associates): Indomarco Prismatama (Indomaret) 40%, Fast Food Indonesia (KFC) 35.84%, Nippon Indosari Corpindo (Sari Roti) 25.77% — unchanged
- FiberStar consolidation: 98.09% total ownership (68.30% direct + 3.58% via IPN at the FiberStar operating-entity level; 93.21%/4.88% at the MAP holding level)
- Not available this quarter: a standalone ARPU or take rate broken out by retail vs. corporate customer; OgahRugi's own revenue, no longer separately disclosed this year.
Three Associates, Diverging Hard
Indomaret, Sari Roti, and Fast Food Indonesia aren't consolidated segments — they're equity-method associates, each reporting its own full financial statements that the Company discloses in its footnotes. 2020 is the first year in this backfill where their trajectories genuinely diverge, and the divergence maps cleanly onto how exposed each business is to physical footfall and discretionary spending.
| Associate | 2020 Net Sales | 2019 Net Sales | 2020 Profit (Owners) | 2019 Profit (Owners) | Profit YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indomarco Prismatama (Indomaret) | Rp86,121.454B | Rp81,804.826B | Rp1,073.613B | Rp1,287.851B | ⚠️ -16.64% |
| Nippon Indosari Corpindo (Sari Roti) | Rp3,212.035B | Rp3,337.022B | Rp215.051B | Rp301.002B | ⚠️ -28.56% |
| Fast Food Indonesia (KFC) | Rp4,840.364B | Rp6,706.376B | -Rp377.185B | Rp241.548B | ❌ Swung to loss |
Indomaret held up best: net sales actually grew 5.28% as the Company opened additional stores and distribution centers even through the pandemic, but rising store-network costs meant net profit still fell 16.6% — a minimarket chain selling daily necessities is about as COVID-resilient as physical retail gets, but it wasn't immune. Sari Roti's packaged bread is similarly non-discretionary, but its sales skew toward office-adjacent and modern-trade channels that WFH policies hit directly, so its profit fell further. Fast Food Indonesia had no such cushion: KFC's business is dine-in and mall-adjacent by nature, restricted operating hours and visitor limits gutted its revenue by 27.8%, and the swing from a Rp241.5 billion profit to a Rp377.2 billion loss is the single largest number in this entire filing. The Company's own equity-method pickup of Fast Food Indonesia's loss — roughly Rp137.6 billion, consistent with its 35.84% stake — is what turned an otherwise-growing consolidated business into a 37% profit decline.
Beyond the Usual
The annual report's own English section states Indomaret's profit moved the wrong way
The Company's Management Discussion and Analysis states that "Indomaret booked a 5.28% increase in net profit from 2019 due to the COVID-19 pandemic." The audited financial statement notes disclosed in the same filing show the opposite at the level that actually matters to a reader: Indomarco Prismatama's net sales grew 5.28% (from Rp81,804.8 billion to Rp86,121.5 billion, an exact match to the MD&A's figure), but its net profit attributable to owners fell 16.64% (from Rp1,287.9 billion to Rp1,073.6 billion) over the same period. The original Indonesian text uses "pendapatan bersih" ("net revenue"), which the English section translates as "net profit" — an error, not a fabrication, but one that leaves an English-language reader of the Company's own annual report believing an associate's profit grew when its own audited figures, a few dozen pages later in the same document, show it shrank by double digits.
FiberStar's ownership is quietly diluting while the Company keeps calling it the lever it controls
PT Mega Akses Persada (MAP), the entity that actually owns FiberStar, has financed part of its growth since 2018 through mandatory convertible notes subscribed by PT Mega Akses Perkasa ("MAK"), a minority co-shareholder in MAP distinct from the Company itself. During 2020, MAK converted Rp200.5 billion of these notes (Rp120.0 billion matured, Rp80.5 billion not yet matured) into new MAP share capital, increasing MAP's issued capital from Rp549.7 billion to Rp750.2 billion — entirely taken up by MAK, not the Company. The result was a Rp149.0 billion increase in non-controlling interests» on the Company's consolidated balance sheet as of December 31, 2020. The Company's own stated strategy is to keep funding FiberStar aggressively (see The Prescription); this structure means some of that funding arrives in a form that dilutes the Company's own economic claim on the very asset it's being praised for building.
The e-commerce segment that was 0.01% of revenue last year no longer has a disclosed number at all
Last year's filing broke out OgahRugi, the Company's e-commerce daily-deals business, as its own line in the segment footnote: Rp26.8 million of revenue, 0.01% of the Company's total. This year's segment note folds OgahRugi into a combined "Other" category alongside access-point rental income, with no separate figure for either component. OgahRugi's own website and customer-service line are still referenced elsewhere in the filing as an active business, so this isn't obviously a wind-down — but a reader can no longer verify whether OgahRugi's revenue grew, shrank, or vanished this year, where last year's more granular disclosure would have shown it plainly.
FiberStar itself — not the consolidated segment revenue figure, but PT Mega Akses Persada as a standalone reporting entity — posted a comprehensive loss of Rp87.4 billion in 2020, improved from a Rp206.1 billion loss in 2019, on entity-level assets of Rp2.384 trillion against liabilities of Rp1.993 trillion. The business the Company holds up as its one genuinely controlled, aggressively-funded lever is still not profitable on its own books, even as its revenue nearly doubled — a capital-intensive buildout still working through depreciation and its own interest expense before it turns a standalone profit.
Two subsequent events worth noting: after year-end, MAP received a Rp553.1 million VAT underpayment assessment (SKPKB) for the January–November 2019 period, which it accepted without dispute, alongside a Rp37.8 million VAT overpayment refund (SKPLB) for December 2019 matching its own claimed amount — both routine and immaterial. Separately, Sari Roti's shareholders approved a Rp86.9 billion cash dividend for fiscal year 2020 at their May 2021 AGM, continuing to return cash to shareholders (including the Company, pro-rata to its 25.77% stake) despite the year's profit decline. The Company also adopted three new Indonesian accounting standards effective January 1, 2020 (PSAK 71, 72, and 73, covering financial instruments, revenue recognition, and leases), with combined day-one equity adjustments of roughly Rp14.9 billion — immaterial next to Rp10.1 trillion of total equity — and lease-liability payments now appearing as their own financing cash outflow for the first time (Rp18.1 billion principal, Rp6.2 billion interest). Checked and found nothing further notable: the Company states it and all members of management were not involved in any legal cases or administrative sanctions as of December 31, 2020, matching last year's statement.
Target Valuation Range
Bottom line: richer than a year ago, on fundamentals that got weaker, not stronger — the illiquidity explanation from the previous post still fits better than a genuine re-rating. The Company's own P/E roughly doubled and the implied multiple on its unlisted Indomaret stake rose from ~76x to ~102x, while the associate profits underneath both multiples actually fell.
The Company's shares closed 2020 at Rp3,390 (December 30, 2020, per the Company's own annual report). No stock split has occurred for this ticker since the 2019 filing, so this price remains directly comparable to the Company's own historical reporting.
| Market cap → book value | FY2019 | FY2020 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp3,070 | Rp3,390 | ⚠️ up |
| Shares outstanding | 14,184,000,000 | 14,184,000,000 | ➖ unchanged |
| Market capitalization | ~Rp43.545 trillion | ~Rp48.084 trillion (~$3.41 billion) | ⚠️ up 10.4% |
| Basic EPS | Rp36.88 | Rp23.18 | ⚠️ down (net income -37%) |
| P/E» | ~83.2x | ~146.2x | ⚠️ up |
| Book value per share | Rp672 | Rp714.55 | ✅ up |
| P/B» | ~4.6x | ~4.74x | ⚠️ up slightly |
The P/E nearly doubled, driven almost entirely by the profit decline rather than any further price appreciation (the shares were already up sharply by mid-2020).
| Sum-of-the-parts sanity check | FY2019 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|
| Fast Food Indonesia stake, at market | ~Rp1.823 trillion | ~Rp1.559 trillion |
| Nippon Indosari Corpindo (Sari Roti) stake, at market | ~Rp2.073 trillion | ~Rp2.168 trillion |
| Non-associate net assets | ~Rp0.289 trillion | ~Rp0.453 trillion |
| Sum, excluding Indomaret | ~Rp8.78 trillion (incl. Indomaret book value floor) | ~Rp4.180 trillion |
| Company's market capitalization | Rp43.545 trillion | Rp48.084 trillion |
| Implied value of 40% Indomaret stake | ~Rp39.4 trillion | ~Rp43.904 trillion |
| Implied value of all of Indomaret | ~Rp98.4 trillion (~76x FY2019 net income) | ~Rp109.760 trillion (~102.2x FY2020 net income) |
That's richer than the ~76x implied a year ago, even though Indomaret's actual profit fell 16.6% in the interim - the market's implied valuation of an unlisted minimarket chain got more demanding in the same year that chain's own earnings got worse. Public ownership rose slightly to 8.75% (from 7.53%), and quarterly trading volume through 2020 ranged from 829,700 to 1,857,100 shares against 14.184 billion outstanding - still under 0.02% of shares changing hands in a typical quarter. The stock's own quarterly closes moved within a fairly narrow Rp2,910–Rp3,690 band across the year, while the associate profits underneath it swung by double digits in both directions - a price this stable, on volume this thin, is again more consistent with a market that isn't actively re-pricing this stock than one that is.
A full discounted cash flow model still isn't attempted here, for the same reason as the previous post: this Company's fair value depends on three underlying operating businesses' multi-year trajectories, and this is only the second quarter of coverage. The sum-of-the-parts and reverse-valuation reads remain the honest lens; a full DCF becomes worth building once FiberStar, Indomaret, Fast Food Indonesia, and Sari Roti each have more history in this backfill. A stock that got more expensive in the same year its three biggest bets got weaker isn't being re-rated — it's just not being watched.
PT Indoritel Makmur Internasional Tbk's fiscal year 2020 Annual Report, including its audited consolidated financial statements (KAP Purwantono, Sungkoro & Surja, a member firm of Ernst & Young Global), filed via the Company's investor relations disclosures.