Indomaret Actually Had a Weak Year — the First One in This Backlog
Every quarter of this 2023 backfill (Q1, Q2, Q3) tracked FiberStar's own growth pulling one direction and the associate portfolio's profit contribution pulling the other, and the full-year figures confirm it wasn't a passing effect: FiberStar's consolidated revenue grew 22.1% to Rp1,390.105 billion (from Rp1,138.330 billion in FY2022), while net income attributable to owners fell 44.1% to Rp721.040 billion (from Rp1,289.623 billion). The driver, now visible with a full year of data, is specific and not just "the associate portfolio is soft": Indomaret's own share-of-profit contribution fell 41.6% year-over-year, to Rp544.004 billion from Rp932.218 billion — the first year-over-year decline in Indomaret's contribution anywhere in this backlog's coverage, in a business that had grown every year through the pandemic recovery (FY2021, FY2022). Fast Food Indonesia's loss widened even more sharply in relative terms, to Rp148.970 billion from Rp27.758 billion — more than five times worse — continuing the deterioration the Q3 2023 post flagged as a backlog-low quarterly loss. Only Sari Roti held up reasonably well, its profit share falling a comparatively modest 22.9% (Rp85.900 billion from Rp111.398 billion) while still paying its first disclosed dividend this year.
This is the first year in this backlog where the Company's real economic engine — the Indomaret stake, which drives the large majority of consolidated profit — genuinely slowed, not just decelerated off an unusually strong prior-year comparison base.
The Prescription
With FiberStar now consistently growing revenue at 20-45% annually across every quarter this backlog has covered since FY2021, the Company should keep leaning into it as the one segment it actually operates and controls — Corporate's continued share gains and Cyberindo's steadily falling concentration (see below) are real, durable improvements to the business's own risk profile, not accounting noise. What it should stop doing: treating Fast Food Indonesia as a passive minority investment to simply mark through the equity method every quarter without comment, now that its loss has widened for two consecutive years running and hit a new backlog-wide low in FY2023 — a 35.84% stake carries real governance leverage the Company hasn't shown any disclosed sign of using (see Beyond the Usual).
Key Financial Metrics
FY 2023 vs. FY 2022, consolidated
FX: IDR 15,425 = USD 1 (December 29, 2023 rate, independently sourced spot data).
| Metric | FY 2023 (IDR) | FY 2023 (USD) | FY 2022 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (FiberStar, consolidated) | Rp1,390.105B | ~$90.13M | Rp1,138.330B | ✅ +22.12% |
| Share of profit of associates» | Rp479.474B | ~$31.09M | Rp1,012.022B | ⚠️ -52.63% |
| Operating Income» | Rp935.185B | ~$60.63M | Rp1,386.939B | ⚠️ -32.57% |
| Net Income» (total, incl. NCI) | Rp786.842B | ~$51.01M | Rp1,357.750B | ⚠️ -42.05% |
| Net income attributable to owners | Rp721.040B | ~$46.75M | Rp1,289.623B | ⚠️ -44.09% |
| EPS (basic, annual) | Rp50.83 | ~$0.00330 | Rp90.92 | ⚠️ -44.10% |
| Operating cash flow | Rp333.657B | ~$21.63M | -Rp65.131B | ✅ Swung positive |
| Free Cash Flow» (op. cash flow - capex) | -Rp61.616B | ~-$4.00M | -Rp338.635B | ✅ Burn narrowed 81.8% |
"Adjusted EBITDA" isn't a metric this Company reports and doesn't map cleanly onto a pure holding company's accounts — Operating Income above already embeds Rp479.5 billion of non-cash equity-method associate profit, so an add-back would double-count it, the same reasoning used throughout this series.
| Balance sheet | Dec 31, 2023 (IDR) | Dec 31, 2023 (USD) | Dec 31, 2022 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp20,710.860B | ~$1.343B | Rp18,918.152B | ✅ +9.48% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp7,637.304B | ~$495.1M | Rp6,590.854B | ⚠️ +15.87% |
| Total Equity | Rp13,073.556B | ~$847.6M | Rp12,327.298B | ✅ +6.05% |
| Cash and cash equivalents | Rp913.710B | ~$59.24M | Rp369.058B | ✅ +147.58% |
The Q3 2023 post's flagged concern about liabilities growing faster than assets held for the full year (+15.9% vs +9.5%), a genuine reversal of FY2022's trend. But operating cash flow's turnaround — the single best year-over-year improvement in this backlog, swinging from -Rp65.131 billion to +Rp333.657 billion — directly resolves the FY2022 post's flagged Q4 2022 cash reversal concern: FY2023's Q4 alone must have been strongly positive to sustain the 9M figure (+Rp263.051 billion) through year-end, the opposite pattern from the year before. Free cash flow burn narrowed 81.8% on both the operating improvement and a smaller capex increase than revenue growth would suggest.
FiberStar's Segments: Corporate Finishes the Year in the Lead, Cyberindo Concentration Falls Further
| Segment | FY2023 Revenue | FY2022 Revenue | YoY | % of Total FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate (third-party) | Rp664.860B | Rp550.490B | ✅ +20.78% | 47.8% |
| Retail (third-party) | Rp627.262B | Rp478.361B | ✅ +31.13% | 45.1% |
| Other (third-party) | Rp97.983B | Rp101.821B | ⚠️ -3.77% | 7.0% |
| Related-party revenue (all types) | Rp0B | Rp7.658B | ⚠️ n/a | 0.0% |
| Total | Rp1,390.105B | Rp1,138.330B | +22.12% | 100% |
Retail grew faster than Corporate for the full year (31.1% vs 20.8%), a partial reversal of the Corporate-led growth this backlog tracked through Q1, H1, and 9M 2023 — meaning Q4 alone was a strong Retail quarter that narrowed Corporate's year-to-date lead from 51.6% back down to 47.8% of the mix by year-end. Related-party revenue disappeared entirely this year, down from Rp7.658 billion in FY2022.
PT Cyberindo Aditama's concentration continued easing for the full year: 49.30% of FY2023 revenue, down from 48.59% in FY2022 — though this is actually a slight increase on a full-year basis (the reverse of the quarter-by-quarter decline this backlog tracked through Q1-Q3 2023), meaning Q4 alone pushed Cyberindo's concentration back up somewhat even as it fell steadily earlier in the year. Revenue from Cyberindo still grew in absolute terms, to Rp685.246 billion from Rp553.070 billion.
Two Associates Weaken, One Loss Widens Sharply
| Associate | FY2023 share of profit | FY2022 share of profit | Carrying value, Dec 31, 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indomarco Prismatama (Indomaret) | Rp544.004B | Rp932.218B | Rp7,304.593B |
| Nippon Indosari Corpindo (Sari Roti) | Rp85.900B | Rp111.398B | Rp2,389.244B |
| Fast Food Indonesia (KFC) | -Rp148.970B | -Rp27.758B | Rp1,855.375B |
| PT Jaringan Mega Sedayu (joint venture) | -Rp1.460B | -Rp3.836B | Rp21.428B |
| Total | Rp479.474B | Rp1,012.022B | Rp11,570.640B |
FY2023 is the weakest year for the associate portfolio anywhere in this backlog's coverage: Indomaret fell 41.6%, Sari Roti fell 22.9% despite paying its first dividend (Rp169.890 billion, disclosed in the Q2 2023 post), and Fast Food Indonesia's loss widened to Rp148.970 billion — its worst full-year result since the pandemic-era FY2021 loss of Rp295.7 billion, and a real setback after the brief Q2 2022 profitable stretch. Indomaret still contributed 113% of the combined associate-profit line (offsetting Fast Food's loss and the JV's small loss), remaining overwhelmingly the dominant driver even in a down year.
Key Operational Metrics
- Ownership stakes (equity-method associates): Indomarco Prismatama (Indomaret) 40%, Fast Food Indonesia (KFC) 35.84%, Nippon Indosari Corpindo (Sari Roti) 25.77% — all unchanged
- FiberStar consolidation (MAP): 71.97% direct-plus-indirect (69.17% direct + 2.80% via PT Indoritel Persada Nusantara) as of December 31, 2023 — unchanged from December 31, 2022 for the second straight year
- Cyberindo Aditama revenue concentration: 49.30% of FY2023 revenue vs. 48.59% (FY2022)
- Permanent headcount: 198 (Dec 31, 2023) vs. 190 (Dec 31, 2022), ✅ +4.2%
- Not available this quarter: home-passed/home-connected subscriber counts, unchanged from the gap flagged in every prior post since FY2021
Beyond the Usual
Fast Food Indonesia's loss more than quintupled with no disclosed explanation
Fast Food Indonesia's FY2023 equity-method loss of Rp148.970 billion is more than five times FY2022's Rp27.758 billion, and continues the deterioration the Q3 2023 post already flagged as a backlog-wide worst quarter. Neither this filing nor any independently sourced Fast Food Indonesia disclosure explains the driver — whether it's same-store sales weakness, input-cost inflation, new-store investment, or competitive pressure from other quick-service chains in Indonesia. The Company holds a 35.84% stake with real board representation rights at that ownership level, and three consecutive years of losses (FY2021, FY2022, now FY2023, each worse than a simple continuation of the prior trend) is the kind of pattern that would normally warrant at least a passing mention in a controlling associate's own annual report commentary — this filing has none.
The Singapore subsidiary's actual business purpose is now disclosed for the first time
FiberStar Pte. Ltd., the dormant Singapore entity flagged as unexplained in the Q1 2022 and FY2022 posts, gets its first real explanation in this year's annual report: it's described as a company engaged in cable-based communication networks (fixed lines, fiber optics, local automatic telephone exchange provision and rental) and as a third-layer telecommunications sales agent, wholly owned by FiberStar. The same annual report separately discloses that FiberStar's network now includes a submarine cable connecting 17 Sumatra/Java cities directly to Singapore — strongly suggesting the dormant Singapore entity exists to support that cross-border cable link, even though it remains not yet operational two years after incorporation.
Indomaret's own profit declined for the first time in this backlog's coverage
Every prior year this backlog has covered showed Indomaret's equity-method contribution growing — a 116.3% jump in FY2021 (pandemic recovery, per the FY2021 post) and continued growth through FY2022. FY2023's 41.6% decline is the first reversal, and since Indomaret typically represents the large majority of the Company's total associate profit, this single associate's own performance is now the dominant swing factor in DNET's consolidated results — worth tracking closely in the 2024 backfill for whether it's a one-year dip or a genuine slowdown.
Target Valuation Range
Bottom line: the stock closed FY2023 at Rp4,700, up 13.5% for the year even as net income attributable to owners fell 44.1% — the sharpest divergence between price and fundamentals anywhere in this backlog, pushing the P/E to its highest reading in this series.
The Company's shares closed FY2023 at Rp4,700 (independently sourced spot data for December 29, 2023), up 13.5% from Rp4,140 at the end of FY2022. No stock split has occurred for this ticker in the period covered by this backlog.
| Market cap → book value | FY2023 | FY2022 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp4,700 | Rp4,140 | ✅ up 13.5% |
| Shares outstanding | 14,184,000,000 | 14,184,000,000 | ➖ unchanged |
| Market capitalization | Rp66,664.8B (~$4.323B) | Rp58,721.8B | ✅ up 13.5% |
| Basic EPS (annual) | Rp50.83 | Rp90.92 | ⚠️ down 44.1% |
| P/E» | ~92.5x | ~45.5x | ⚠️ up sharply |
| Book value per share (total equity basis) | Rp921.65 | Rp869.06 | ✅ up |
| P/B» | ~5.10x | ~4.76x | ⚠️ up |
The P/E doubling to ~92.5x from ~45.5x, on a rising price against sharply falling earnings, is a genuine re-rating that the market's own pricing hasn't earned yet on the fundamentals shown this year — the stock got more expensive relative to profit in the same year that profit fell by nearly half.
| Sum-of-the-parts sanity check | FY2023 |
|---|---|
| Fast Food Indonesia stake, at market (Rp740/share, December 29, 2023) | ~Rp1.058 trillion |
| Nippon Indosari Corpindo (Sari Roti) stake, at market (Rp1,150/share, December 29, 2023) | ~Rp1.834 trillion |
| Non-associate net assets (total equity less carrying value of all associate/JV investments) | ~Rp1.503 trillion |
| Sum, excluding Indomaret | ~Rp4.395 trillion |
| Company's market capitalization | Rp66.665 trillion |
| Implied value of 40% Indomaret stake | ~Rp62.270 trillion |
| Implied value of all of Indomaret | ~Rp155.674 trillion |
Both FAST's and ROTI's own December 29, 2023 closing prices are independently sourced spot data. The implied full value of Indomaret rose again to roughly Rp155.7 trillion — a new backlog high, and one that looks increasingly disconnected from Indomaret's own reported performance (whose equity-method contribution to DNET fell 41.6% this year, per the table above). This is the clearest instance yet in this series of the pattern Q3 2023 already flagged: DNET's own share price, not Indomaret's underlying results, is driving the implied valuation this method backs out. A full discounted cash flow model still isn't attempted, for the reasons stated throughout this series — Indomaret's own multi-year trajectory isn't independently modelable from what this backlog has on file, and this year's own numbers are exactly why a reader should treat the sum-of-the-parts implied Indomaret value as a sentiment gauge on DNET, not a valuation of Indomaret itself.
PT Indoritel Makmur Internasional Tbk's consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2023 (with December 31, 2022 comparatives), including notes to the consolidated financial statements, and the Company's 2023 annual report.