ETERNAL The Best Fiscal Year Ever — So Why Did Free Cash Flow Turn Negative?

Full-Year Profit, Full-Year Cash Burn

This is Eternal Limited's (formerly Zomato Limited) Q4 FY25 (quarter ended March 31, 2025) and full FY2025 results, board-approved May 1, 2025 - the eighteenth quarter as a public company covered in this series, and the first under the company's new name throughout the filing itself. The rename from Zomato to Eternal, completed in March 2025, is now fully reflected: every page of this filing carries the "Eternal Limited (Formerly known as Zomato Limited)" header, the corporate identification number is unchanged (CIN L93030DL2010PLC198141), and Deepinder Goyal signs as Managing Director & CEO of Eternal Limited.

This is also, after two quarters of an unusually bare-bones XBRL filing with no balance sheet, no cash-flow statement, and no auditor's commentary, the fullest source document this series has had in over a year: a complete audited consolidated and standalone annual report, a full independent auditor's opinion (unmodified, from Deloitte Haskins & Sells), a complete balance sheet, a full cash-flow statement, and genuine footnotes. That matters because it resolves two threads this series has been unable to check for two straight quarters (see Beyond the Usual) - and because it reveals a full-year cash flow picture at odds with the profit headline.

Revenue from operations grew 7.9% QoQ to Rs. 5,833 crore, up 63.7% YoY, extending an unbroken growth streak. But profit before tax fell 21.8% QoQ to Rs. 97 crore (from Rs. 124 crore in Q3 FY25), and net income fell to Rs. 39 crore, down 33.9% QoQ and 77.7% YoY - the fourth straight quarterly decline in net income since it peaked at Rs. 253 crore in Q1 FY25 (Rs. 253cr → Rs. 176cr → Rs. 59cr → Rs. 39cr). The rate of decline did moderate this quarter (-33.9% versus -66.5% last quarter), but the direction hasn't changed - see Key Financial Metrics.

Zoom out to the full fiscal year, though, and the story flips: FY25 consolidated net income was Rs. 527 crore, up 50.1% from FY24's Rs. 351 crore - Eternal's first genuinely profitable fiscal year since its 2021 IPO, on revenue that grew 67.1% YoY to Rs. 20,243 crore. That's the real tension in this quarter's numbers: a fiscal year that looks like the best one yet by the income statement, built almost entirely on a strong first half, while the fourth quarter alone shows the same operating deterioration flagged in Q3 FY25's Prescription continuing rather than reversing. Quick Commerce (Blinkit) and Going-out - the two segments that swung to losses last quarter - stayed loss-making this quarter too (see Segment Results).

The bigger surprise is in the cash-flow statement, disclosed in full for the first time since the FY24 year-end. Full-year net cash generated from operating activities fell to Rs. 308 crore from Rs. 646 crore a year earlier - a 52.3% decline in a year profit grew 50.1% - almost entirely because trade receivables consumed Rs. 1,117 crore of cash this year (versus Rs. 348 crore last year), and because capital expenditure nearly quadrupled to Rs. 936 crore (from Rs. 215 crore). Operating cash flow minus capex gives an approximate full-year free cash flow of negative Rs. 628 crore, versus a positive Rs. 431 crore in FY24 - a genuine swing from cash-generative to cash-consuming in the same year net income grew by half (see Key Financial Metrics).

The Prescription

Report Quick Commerce and Going-out's losses with the same granularity the company used to disclose before the last two quarters went dark. This filing restores a real balance sheet and cash-flow statement, but it still doesn't disclose GOV, Contribution margin, or store count for Blinkit or Going-out - the same operational metrics flagged as missing for two straight quarters. Both segments have now posted losses in back-to-back quarters (Quick Commerce: Rs. (30) crore then Rs. (82) crore; Going-out: Rs. (15) crore then Rs. (44) crore - see Segment Results), and a reader still can't tell whether this is deliberate reinvestment (new dark stores, new District-branded ticketing capacity) or a genuine cost problem, because the operational metrics that would answer that question aren't in this filing either.

Stop letting full-year cash generation diverge from full-year profit without comment. FY25's headline - net income up 50.1% - reads as an unambiguous win. But operating cash flow fell by more than half in the same year, on a swelling trade-receivables balance and capex that nearly quadrupled. Management should explain, next quarter, whether the receivables buildup is a temporary working-capital swing tied to the OTPL/WEPL acquisition (see Beyond the Usual) or a structural change in how the business collects cash from partners and advertisers - because right now, a profit-only read of FY25 is materially incomplete.

Key Financial Metrics

Q4 FY25 (quarter ended March 31, 2025, audited) vs Q3 FY25 (quarter ended December 31, 2024, unaudited) and Q4 FY24 (quarter ended March 31, 2024, audited) - consolidated, reported in INR crore and USD (converted at approximately Rs. 85.50/$1 for Q4 FY25, Rs. 85.79/$1 for Q3 FY25, and Rs. 83.30/$1 for Q4 FY24)

Metric	Q4 FY25	Q3 FY25	QoQ	Q4 FY24	YoY
Revenue from Operations	✅ Rs. 5,833 crore ($682.2M)	Rs. 5,405 crore ($630.0M)	✅ +7.9%	Rs. 3,562 crore ($427.6M)	✅ +63.7%
Operating Income (Profit before tax)	⚠️ Rs. 97 crore ($11.3M)	Rs. 124 crore ($14.5M)	⚠️ -21.8%	Rs. 161 crore ($19.3M)	⚠️ -39.8%
Net Income (Profit for the period)	⚠️ Rs. 39 crore ($4.6M)	Rs. 59 crore ($6.9M)	⚠️ -33.9%	Rs. 175 crore ($21.0M)	⚠️ -77.7%
Adjusted EBITDA (management non-GAAP)	Not disclosed - no presentation filed	Not disclosed	n/a	Rs. 194 crore*	n/a
Free Cash Flow (derived, quarter-only)	Not derivable - no 9-month cumulative was disclosed last quarter	n/a	n/a	Rs. 87 crore*	n/a

*Q4 FY24's Adjusted EBITDA and FCF figures, per the Q4 FY24 post, are management's own disclosed quarter-only figures from that quarter's deck; no equivalent management deck exists for Q3 or Q4 FY25.

Full Fiscal Year FY25 vs FY24 - consolidated, INR crore

Metric	FY25	FY24	YoY
Revenue from Operations	✅ Rs. 20,243 crore ($2,368.0M)	Rs. 12,114 crore ($1,454.0M)	✅ +67.1%
Profit Before Tax	✅ Rs. 697 crore ($81.5M)	Rs. 291 crore ($34.9M)	✅ +139.5%
Net Income	✅ Rs. 527 crore ($61.6M)	Rs. 351 crore ($42.1M)	✅ +50.1%
Net cash from operating activities	⚠️ Rs. 308 crore ($36.0M)	Rs. 646 crore ($77.6M)	⚠️ -52.3%
Capital expenditure	⚠️ Rs. 936 crore ($109.5M)	Rs. 215 crore ($25.8M)	⚠️ +335.3%
Free Cash Flow (derived: op. cash flow − capex)	⚠️ Rs. (628) crore ($(73.5)M)	Rs. 431 crore ($51.7M)	⚠️ Swung negative
Total cash and cash equivalents (year-end)	✅ Rs. 666 crore ($77.9M)	Rs. 309 crore ($37.1M)	✅ +115.5%

Net income has now fallen for four straight quarters since peaking at Rs. 253 crore in Q1 FY25: Rs. 253cr → Rs. 176cr (-30.4%) → Rs. 59cr (-66.5%) → Rs. 39cr (-33.9%). Profit before tax shows almost the same shape, down every quarter since Q1 FY25's Rs. 239 crore: Rs. 237cr → Rs. 124cr → Rs. 97cr, a cumulative 59.4% drop from the peak. Revenue growth hasn't slowed at all across the same stretch (+18.1%, +14.1%, +12.6%, +7.9% QoQ) - the business keeps adding to the top line while converting steadily less of it to pre-tax profit. The FY25-vs-FY24 comparison tells the opposite story, because FY24 carried two very weak opening quarters (Q1 FY24 net income of just Rs. 2 crore) that FY25 didn't repeat - so a strong first three quarters of FY25 (Rs. 253cr + Rs. 176cr + Rs. 59cr = Rs. 488cr) is doing almost all of the full-year growth's work, with Q4 alone contributing only Rs. 39 crore of the Rs. 527 crore full-year total.

Trailing-eight-quarter view (Q1 FY24 through Q4 FY25, INR crore): revenue Rs. 2,416 → Rs. 2,848 → Rs. 3,288 → Rs. 3,562 → Rs. 4,206 → Rs. 4,799 → Rs. 5,405 → Rs. 5,833 (unbroken growth every quarter); net income Rs. 2 → Rs. 36 → Rs. 138 → Rs. 175 → Rs. 253 → Rs. 176 → Rs. 59 → Rs. 39 (a clean rise through Q1 FY25, then four straight quarters of decline). Read against this longer window, the current profit slide looks less like a one-off wobble and more like a genuine reversion after Q1 FY25's peak - three full quarters of decline is no longer a base-effect story.

The full audited cash-flow statement - the first complete one since the FY24 year-end filing - confirms total cash and cash equivalents grew 115.5% YoY to Rs. 666 crore, but that growth came entirely from financing activities (a Rs. 8,501 crore Qualified Institutional Placement^» completed earlier in the year - see Beyond the Usual), not from operations. Net cash from investing activities was negative Rs. 7,993 crore for the year, dominated by Rs. 47,326 crore invested in mutual fund units (partly offset by Rs. 46,738 crore of redemptions) and the Rs. 2,005 crore net cash outlay for the OTPL/WEPL acquisitions - i.e., most of the QIP proceeds are still parked in short-duration investments rather than deployed into the business.

Key Operational Metrics

No presentation deck or transcript was filed alongside this annual report, so - as with the last two quarters - GOV^», Blinkit store count, monthly transacting customers, restaurant-partner counts, and Contribution margin are all genuinely not available this quarter. Unlike the last two quarters, though, a full balance sheet and cash-flow statement do exist this time (see Key Financial Metrics), so this gap is now narrower than it was - it's specifically the unit-economics detail for Quick Commerce and Going-out that remains missing (see The Prescription).

Segment Results

Eternal reports five business-line segments - India food ordering and delivery, Hyperpure (B2B restaurant supply), Quick commerce (Blinkit), Going-out (dining-out, Zomato Live, and now movie/event ticketing via the OTPL/WEPL acquisitions - see Beyond the Usual), and All other segments (residual). Segment result is operating profit/loss before unallocated corporate costs (share-based payment expense, finance costs, depreciation/amortisation) and other income.

Segment	Revenue (Q4 FY25)	QoQ	Segment Result (Q4 FY25)	Q3 FY25 Result	Q4 FY24 Result
India food ordering and delivery	✅ Rs. 2,054 crore ($240.2M)	⚠️ -0.9%	✅ Rs. 439 crore (profit)	Rs. 432 crore	Rs. 281 crore
Hyperpure	✅ Rs. 1,840 crore ($215.2M)	✅ +10.1%	⚠️ Rs. (8) crore	Rs. (9) crore	Rs. (16) crore
Quick commerce (Blinkit)	✅ Rs. 1,709 crore ($199.9M)	✅ +22.0%	⚠️ Rs. (82) crore (loss)	Rs. (30) crore	Rs. 2 crore (profit)
Going-out	⚠️ Rs. 229 crore ($26.8M)	⚠️ -11.6%	⚠️ Rs. (44) crore (loss)	Rs. (15) crore	Rs. (10) crore
All other segments (residual)	Rs. 24 crore ($2.8M)	n/m	⚠️ Rs. (16) crore	Rs. 1 crore	Rs. (10) crore
Total segment result	Rs. 5,833 crore gross		⚠️ Rs. 289 crore	Rs. 379 crore	Rs. 247 crore

India food ordering and delivery stayed the only unambiguous carrier of the business, posting its best-ever segment result again (Rs. 439 crore, up 1.6% QoQ) even as its own revenue dipped slightly QoQ (-0.9%) - margin held at roughly 21.4% of segment revenue. Hyperpure kept narrowing its loss on strong revenue growth (+10.1% QoQ), continuing a multi-quarter trend. Quick commerce (Blinkit) is the real deterioration this quarter: revenue grew a healthy 22.0% QoQ, but its segment result worsened for a second straight quarter, from a Rs. 30 crore loss in Q3 to a Rs. 82 crore loss in Q4 - a segment that was solidly profitable a year ago (+Rs. 2 crore in Q4 FY24) is now losing money at nearly three times last quarter's rate. Going-out also stayed loss-making for a second straight quarter, its loss nearly tripling QoQ (Rs. 15 crore to Rs. 44 crore) even as revenue fell 11.6% - the worst combination of the four operating segments this quarter, and notably the first full quarter to include the newly acquired movie-ticketing and events businesses (see Beyond the Usual), though the filing doesn't break out their standalone contribution. All other segments swung from a small profit to a Rs. 16 crore loss, immaterial in absolute size but the segment note gives no detail on why.

Full fiscal year, the picture looks considerably better than the quarter alone suggests. FY25 segment results (INR crore): India food ordering and delivery Rs. 1,541 (FY24: Rs. 935); Hyperpure Rs. (43) (FY24: Rs. (100)); Quick commerce Rs. (21) (FY24: Rs. (253)); Going-out Rs. (30) (FY24: Rs. (2)); All other Rs. (12) (FY24: Rs. (23)). Total segment result more than doubled YoY to Rs. 1,435 crore from Rs. 557 crore - and Blinkit's full-year loss narrowed by 91.7% (from Rs. 253 crore to just Rs. 21 crore), a genuinely strong annual trajectory that the Q4-alone numbers obscure. Going-out is the one segment that got structurally worse for the full year (Rs. 2 crore loss in FY24 versus Rs. 30 crore in FY25), consistent with new losses building in the back half of the year as the segment absorbed the OTPL/WEPL acquisitions.

Beyond the Usual

This quarter's source document is a genuine audited annual report - the fullest this series has seen in over a year - so there's real footnote material to work through, unlike the last two quarters' bare XBRL filings.

Full-year operating cash flow fell by half in the same year net income rose 50%

FY25's operating cash flow fell to Rs. 308 crore from Rs. 646 crore a year earlier, even as net income grew from Rs. 351 crore to Rs. 527 crore. The gap is mostly a working-capital story - trade receivables alone consumed Rs. 1,117 crore of cash this year, more than three times FY24's Rs. 348 crore - compounded by capital expenditure that nearly quadrupled to Rs. 936 crore. Put together, derived free cash flow (operating cash flow less capex) swung from a positive Rs. 431 crore in FY24 to roughly negative Rs. 628 crore in FY25. None of this shows up if a reader only checks the net-income line, which is exactly why it's worth flagging: a profit-only read of this fiscal year is incomplete (see The Prescription).

Blinkit's cumulative losses since acquisition have reached Rs. 2,328 crore, with no impairment recognized

The standalone financial statements' parental-support note discloses cumulative losses at three subsidiaries since their respective investment dates: Zomato Hyperpure Private Limited (ZHPL) Rs. 877 crore, Zomato Entertainment Private Limited (ZEPL) Rs. 130 crore, and Blink Commerce Private Limited (BCPL, i.e. Blinkit) Rs. 2,328 crore since its August 2022 acquisition. The Board concluded no impairment is required on any of the three as of March 31, 2025. That conclusion sits against roughly Rs. 3,507 crore of goodwill originally allocated to the Blinkit acquisition (unchanged since the purchase-price allocation finalized in the Q4 FY24 post) - a cumulative loss now equal to about two-thirds of the goodwill recorded on the deal, which is the kind of ratio that eventually forces an impairment test conversation even when this quarter's judgment call is that one isn't needed yet.

The GST dispute is verifiable again, and it's now broken out by state

This is the first quarter in three that this series can actually check the standing GST show-cause-notice thread, unverifiable for the last two quarters because no auditor's report text was filed. Deloitte's audit opinion carries an Emphasis of Matter (not a qualification) over demand orders from Maharashtra GST authorities (Rs. 401 crore) and West Bengal GST authorities (Rs. 19 crore) - a combined Rs. 420 crore, matching the same Rs. 420 crore figure disclosed at the FY24 year-end, now broken out into its two constituent state-level demand orders rather than a single combined number - covering GST on delivery charges collected from end users on behalf of delivery partners for the period October 2019 to March 2022. The company has appealed both demand orders before the first appellate authorities and, per external expert advice, believes it has a strong case on merits; no provision has been booked. Nothing is resolved here - the value of this quarter's filing is that the thread is checkable again, not that it's closed.

Eternal completed its first acquisitions since Blinkit, entering movie and event ticketing by buying two businesses from Paytm's parent. On August 27, 2024, the company acquired 100% of Orbgen Technologies Private Limited ("OTPL," the movie-ticketing business) and Wasteland Entertainment Private Limited ("WEPL," the events business) from One97 Communications Limited - the parent of Paytm - for a combined Rs. 2,014 crore, split roughly Rs. 1,236 crore (OTPL) and Rs. 778 crore (WEPL), funded through a mix of secondary share purchases and primary capital infusion. The purchase price allocations recognized Rs. 514 crore and Rs. 506 crore of goodwill respectively (Rs. 1,020 crore combined), plus separately identified merchant relationships, technology, active-user, brand, and non-compete intangibles amortized over one to ten years. Both businesses now sit inside the Going-out segment, though the filing doesn't disclose their standalone revenue or profit contribution - worth watching whether that changes once a full year of consolidation has passed.

Eternal's lease footprint roughly tripled year-over-year, consistent with continued physical expansion. Right-of-use assets grew to Rs. 1,918 crore from Rs. 690 crore, and total lease liabilities (current plus non-current) grew to Rs. 2,045 crore from Rs. 749 crore. The filing doesn't break this out by segment, but the scale of the jump - alongside Blinkit's continued revenue growth and the new OTPL/WEPL ticketing footprint - points to real estate (dark stores, ticketing venues, or offices) being added faster than in any prior year in this series.

The Rs. 8,501 crore Qualified Institutional Placement^» that funded much of this year's expansion happened earlier in FY25, not this quarter. The company allotted 33,64,73,755 equity shares at Rs. 252.62 per share (including a Rs. 251.62 premium) to eligible Qualified Institutional Buyers during the year - the jump in shares outstanding from roughly 872 crore (Q2 FY25) to 906 crore (Q3 FY25) flagged in the prior post is this same raise. Separately, the company allotted 4,77,53,845 shares during the year to the "Foodie Bay Employees ESOP Trust"^» for future issuance under employee stock option plans - a real dilution overhang (roughly 0.5% of shares outstanding) that sits alongside, but is distinct from, the QIP.

The auditor's subsidiary audit-scope disclosure - dark for two quarters - returned this quarter with full detail. Two subsidiaries not directly audited by Deloitte (almost certainly OTPL and WEPL, given the ties to their August 27, 2024 acquisition date used in the disclosure) reported combined total assets of Rs. 1,949 crore and a combined net loss after tax of Rs. 48 crore for the year; a separate cohort of 7 subsidiaries plus 1 trust reported Rs. 225 crore total assets and a Rs. 54 crore net loss for the year, explicitly called immaterial to the Group; and a further 12 subsidiaries' unaudited financial information (Rs. 101 crore total assets, Rs. 1 crore net loss) was also flagged as immaterial. None of this changes the audit opinion, but it restores the kind of granular subsidiary-scope visibility this series lost after Q2 FY25.

Target Valuation Range

Eternal is trading at roughly Rs. 1,82,942 crore market cap (Rs. 1,71,129 crore EV) - 7.84x annualized and 9.04x TTM revenue (8.46x EV/revenue), down sharply from 11.65x/14.0x last quarter. Eternal's share price fell 27.5% this quarter even as revenue grew and the full fiscal year posted record profit - a genuine de-rating, not a rounding error, that has left the stock meaningfully cheaper on a sales basis than it was three months ago.

Eternal's shares closed at Rs. 201.70 on March 28, 2025 (the last trading day of the quarter), down 27.5% from the Rs. 278.05 close at the end of Q3 FY25 - the sharpest single-quarter price move in this series' two-year price-history window. No stock split has occurred in that window, so this is a like-for-like nominal comparison. The decline came alongside a broader correction across Indian internet stocks in early 2025, not something specific to a single disclosure in this filing, but it happened during the same quarter the company's own segment results deteriorated (see Segment Results), so the two are at least consistent with each other even if the price move likely reflects more than this one quarter's numbers.

With paid-up equity share capital of Rs. 907 crore at Rs. 1 face value, that implies approximately 907 crore shares outstanding at quarter-end - essentially flat versus Q3 FY25's 906 crore, confirming the QIP-driven dilution (see Beyond the Usual) was already complete by the start of this quarter.

Market cap → enterprise value	Q4 FY25
Share price (period-end)	Rs. 201.70
Shares outstanding	~907 crore
Market capitalization	Rs. 1,82,942 crore ($21.40B)
Add: total lease liabilities	Rs. 2,045 crore
Less: cash and equivalents	Rs. 666 crore
Less: investments (current + non-current)	Rs. 13,192 crore
Enterprise value	Rs. 1,71,129 crore

Market cap is down from Q3 FY25's roughly Rs. 2,51,889 crore - a 27.4% quarterly decline, tracking the share-price move almost exactly since share count barely moved.

Peer-multiple sanity check	Q3 FY25	Q4 FY25
Revenue (annualized)	Rs. 21,620 crore	Rs. 23,332 crore
Revenue (TTM)	Rs. 17,972 crore	Rs. 20,243 crore (FY25 actual)
P/S (annualized quarter revenue)	11.65x	7.84x
P/S (TTM revenue)	14.0x	9.04x
EV/Revenue (TTM)	-	8.46x

Both P/S multiples compressed by roughly a third in a single quarter. With a full balance sheet available again this quarter, an enterprise-value estimate is possible for the first time in two quarters (see table above).

There's still no comparably-sized listed pure-play Indian food-delivery-plus-quick-commerce peer to build a direct multiple against, though Swiggy's November 2024 IPO means one now exists on paper - a real side-by-side comparison isn't attempted here since Swiggy's own FY25 results haven't been sourced for this series yet, but it's a natural next comparison post once they are.

A real discounted-cash-flow model remains out of reach this quarter, and for a new reason: FY25's own free cash flow was negative on a full-year basis (see Beyond the Usual), so there isn't yet a positive base year to project forward from, let alone the multi-year track record a credible DCF would need. The peer-multiple read above - a sharply compressed but still elevated valuation relative to a business whose most recent quarter and full-year cash generation both moved in the wrong direction - is the only valuation method this quarter's numbers actually support.

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