The Business Kept Improving While the Stock Fell Almost in Half
Uber's Q1 2022 10-Q showed a record GAAP loss driven by a $5.6 billion combined markdown across four equity stakes, while the actual business had its best operating quarter yet. This quarter continues both halves of that story, but the gap between them widened further. Operationally, this is the strongest quarter yet: Adjusted EBITDA» more than doubled sequentially (2.2x) to $364 million, from Q1's $168 million and up from a $(509) million loss a year ago. Delivery Adjusted EBITDA was positive for a third straight quarter, at $99 million - the first positive quarter came in Q4 2021 ($25 million), followed by $30 million in Q1 2022 (see the Q1 2022 post), and it wasn't a one-off. First-half free cash flow turned positive for the first time in Uber's public company history, at $335 million, versus $(1,080) million in the first half of 2021 (the second half of 2021 had already been positive, at $337 million).
None of that stopped the stock from falling 43% during the quarter, from $35.68 to $20.46 - a far larger move than the underlying operating results would suggest on their own, and part of a broader 2022 collapse in growth and technology stock valuations as interest rates rose and recession fears built. Meanwhile the GAAP net loss widened again, to $(2,601) million from a $1,144 million profit a year earlier (the Q2 2021 post's Didi-driven headline profit), on a further $1.7 billion combined unrealized markdown across the Aurora, Grab, and Zomato stakes - continuing the same mechanism flagged every quarter since Q2 2021.
The Prescription
Uber should keep pointing to the numbers that actually describe the business: first-half free cash flow positive for the first time ever, Adjusted EBITDA more than doubling sequentially, and Delivery now three-for-three on profitable quarters since Q4 2021. This is the clearest evidence yet that the years-long path to sustainable unit economics (since the pandemic-era losses of 2020) has actually arrived as a repeatable pattern, not a single good quarter.
What it should stop doing is letting its own stock price reaction dictate the narrative when the two things - operating performance and market valuation - have now diverged for two consecutive quarters in opposite directions (this quarter's stock fell 43% while free cash flow turned positive; last quarter's stock fell 15% while Adjusted EBITDA was positive for a third straight quarter). Uber can't control the market's 2022 repricing of growth stocks broadly, but it can keep making the case, quarter after quarter with cash-flow evidence rather than adjusted metrics alone, that its business model actually works - which is exactly what this quarter's free-cash-flow milestone does, and what the company should lead with rather than let get lost under a falling stock price and another equity-stake write-down.
Key Financial Metrics
Q2 2022 vs. Q2 2021 - consolidated, reported in USD
| Metric | Q2 2022 | Q2 2021 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $8,073M | $3,929M | +105% |
| Adjusted EBITDA» | $364M | $(509)M | swung to profit, fourth straight quarter |
| Loss from Operations | $(713)M | $(1,188)M | loss narrowed 40% |
| Net Income (Loss) attributable to Uber | $(2,601)M | $1,144M | swung to a loss on a $1.7B unrealized markdown across Aurora, Grab, and Zomato stakes |
| Free Cash Flow (six months) | $335M | $(1,080)M | first positive first half in company history (second half of 2021 was $337M) |
Balance sheet: Dec 2021 vs. Jun 2022
| Balance sheet metric | Jun 2022 | Dec 2021 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and Cash Equivalents | $4,397M | $4,295M | +2% |
| Total Assets | $31,014M | $38,774M | -20% |
| Total Liabilities | $23,451M | $23,425M | roughly flat |
| Long-term Debt, net of current | $9,271M | $9,276M | roughly flat |
| Goodwill | $8,359M | $8,420M | roughly flat |
Total assets have now fallen 20% since year-end 2021, driven almost entirely by the equity-stake markdowns: the Investments balance-sheet line fell further to $4,572 million from $6,247 million at Q1 2022's close (and $11,806 million at year-end 2021) - a decline of more than 60% across two quarters. Cash actually improved slightly to $4.40 billion, and liabilities/debt/goodwill all stayed roughly flat, confirming the balance-sheet erosion this year has been entirely on the equity-holdings side, not from operating cash burn or new borrowing.
Uber's stock fell 43% this quarter while its first-half operating cash flow turned positive for the first time ever (the second half of 2021 was already positive, at $507 million) - a wide divergence between market pricing and operating substance. Adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow, not GAAP net income (still dominated by unrelated equity-stake markdowns) or the stock price (caught in the broader 2022 growth-stock selloff), are the numbers that actually describe how Uber's business performed this quarter, and both improved materially.
Segment Results
Segment Adjusted EBITDA, Q2 2022 vs. Q2 2021
| Segment | Adj. EBITDA Q2 2022 | Adj. EBITDA Q2 2021 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobility | $771M | $179M | +331% |
| Delivery | $99M | $(161)M | third straight positive quarter |
| Freight | not separately broken out in this quarter's MD&A highlights table | — | — |
Mobility more than quadrupled Adjusted EBITDA year-over-year to $771 million, as pandemic-recovery demand kept building on top of the margin discipline flagged since Q3 2021. Delivery's third consecutive positive quarter ($99 million, up from $30 million in Q1 2022 and $25 million in Q4 2021) confirms the segment's move to profitability wasn't a one-off - a genuine structural shift after years of narrowing losses since Q2 2020.
Beyond the Usual
A Further $1.7 Billion Combined Markdown on Aurora, Grab, and Zomato - Partly Offset by a Didi Gain
Uber recognized a further $1.7 billion combined unrealized loss on its public equity stakes this quarter: $1.1 billion on Aurora, $520 million on Grab, and $245 million on Zomato, partially offset by a $259 million unrealized gain on Didi. This is the fifth consecutive quarter this mechanism has moved Uber's headline GAAP result independent of its own operations - Didi gain in Q2 2021, Didi loss in Q3 2021, a net gain for FY2021, a combined $5.6 billion loss across all four stakes in Q1 2022, and now a further $1.7 billion loss this quarter. Across the first half of 2022 alone, these four minority stakes have cost Uber a combined $7.3 billion of unrealized value on paper - larger than Uber's entire market capitalization decline would suggest if read in isolation, since the stock itself fell for reasons beyond just these markdowns.
Legal and Regulatory Accrued Liabilities Held Flat at $2.2 Billion
Uber's aggregate recorded liability for legal, regulatory, and non-income tax matters was $2.2 billion as of both December 31, 2021 and June 30, 2022 - back at the year-end level after Q1 2022's dip to $2.1 billion (see the Q1 2022 post). The reserve appears to have stabilized rather than continuing to grow, worth watching for whether that holds.
Stock Price Since Last Quarter
Uber's stock fell sharply and continuously through the second quarter of 2022: from a March 31, 2022 close of $35.68, down to $31.48 in April, $23.20 in May, and $20.46 at the June 30, 2022 close - a decline of 43% for the quarter, and down roughly 51% from the December 31, 2021 close of $41.93 just six months earlier. This tracks the broader 2022 selloff in growth and technology stocks as the Federal Reserve began raising interest rates and recession concerns built - the same macro backdrop that hit Uber's own Aurora, Grab, and Zomato equity stakes this quarter (see Beyond the Usual above). The magnitude of the stock's decline is notably larger than the deterioration in Uber's own reported operating results, which improved on essentially every key metric (Adjusted EBITDA, Delivery profitability, free cash flow) during the same period - a genuine divergence between the market's pricing of Uber and the company's own operating trajectory.
Target Valuation Range
Undervalued. Uber traded at an EV/Revenue multiple of roughly 2.3x against TTM revenue as of this quarter's close - a dramatic compression from Q1 2022's ~4.2x and FY2021's ~5.8x, driven almost entirely by the stock's 43% quarterly decline rather than any deterioration in the underlying business, which actually improved this quarter on every operating metric.
With approximately 1,979,918,174 shares outstanding as of August 2, 2022 (per the 10-Q's cover page) and a June 30, 2022 close of $20.46, Uber's market capitalization was approximately $40.5 billion. Against total liabilities of $23.45 billion and cash and cash equivalents of $4.40 billion, enterprise value was roughly $59.6 billion - down sharply from the ~$88.9 billion calculated in the Q1 2022 post, almost entirely on the stock's collapse rather than a change in the balance sheet, which stayed roughly flat on the liabilities/debt side this quarter.
| Jun 2022 | Mar 2022 | |
|---|---|---|
| TTM Revenue | $25.6B | $21.4B |
| Enterprise Value | $59.6B | $88.9B |
| EV/Revenue | 2.3x | 4.2x |
Enterprise value here does not add non-controlling interests ($0.90 billion at June 30, 2022, redeemable and non-redeemable together), although revenue is consolidated; adding them would put EV/Revenue at about 2.4x instead of 2.3x (2.37x instead of 2.33x on unrounded figures).
Uber Technologies, Inc.'s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2022, filed with the SEC in August 2022.