Q1 2021 · IDX · May 11, 2021

AMRT Why Did Profit Jump 42% in the Quarter Revenue Fell?

Alfamart's Q1 2021 unaudited interim consolidated financial statements show net revenue slipping 0.49% to Rp19.24 trillion - the first year-over-year revenue decline this site has recorded for the company - while net income to owners jumped 42.5% to Rp499.4 billion on a fully repaired overhead-discipline pattern and lower finance costs. Jabodetabek posted a fifth consecutive quarter of standalone margin erosion even as Outside Java's margin gain accelerated further, free cash flow fell 60.2% on a sharp inventory build, and the Company's last outstanding bond disappeared from the balance sheet nine days after quarter-end with no refinancing.

A Revenue Decline This Site Has Never Reported for This Company, Buried Under a Profit Surge

The last post on this company closed FY2020 with Note 37 finally naming Covid-19 only to downplay it, Jabodetabek's fourth straight quarter of standalone margin erosion, an overhead-discipline break that had only partially repaired itself, and a subsequent-events note disclosing that the Company had signed a term sheet to hand control of its delivery subsidiary, PT Sumber Wahana Sejahtera ("SWS"), to a third party. This is PT Sumber Alfaria Trijaya Tbk's unaudited interim consolidated financial statements for the three months ended March 31, 2021, board-authorized for issue on May 28, 2021, and the headline is one this site hasn't had to report before for this company: net revenue fell 0.49% to Rp19,239,177 million, from Rp19,334,788 million a year earlier - the first year-over-year revenue decline in this backlog's entire coverage of Alfamart. And yet net income attributable to owners rose 42.5% to Rp499,388 million, from Rp350,403 million, and operating income grew 36.4%. A retailer growing profit by more than a third while its top line shrinks is not, on its own, either good or bad news - it depends entirely on whether the profit growth is durable operating leverage or a one-quarter accounting favor, and this filing's own numbers point to both at once.

The gap is mostly finance cost and overhead, not gross margin engineering: finance cost fell 29.0% (Rp70,800 million from Rp99,756 million) as the balance sheet's remaining debt kept shrinking, and unallocated corporate overhead - the line this site flagged breaking its cost-discipline pattern across Q3 and Q4 2020 - actually fell 1.1% year-over-year this quarter even as combined segment income grew 19.5% (see Segments Compared). That's a genuine repair, not just a partial one. But the revenue decline itself sits alongside Jabodetabek's fifth consecutive quarter of standalone margin erosion (see Segment Performance) and a 60.2% year-over-year drop in free cash flow on a sharp one-quarter inventory build (see Key Financial Metrics) - two threads a reader shouldn't lose under the headline profit number.

On the SWS handover flagged as a subsequent event last quarter: this filing's corporate-structure note confirms the Company and its co-owner SIL still held 99.96%/0.04% of SWS as of March 31, 2021 - unchanged - and repeats the same March 25, 2021 term-sheet language without any update on price, timing, or whether the deal has advanced. Two months after the term sheet was signed, it's still just a term sheet.

The Prescription

Alfamart's overhead-discipline problem, which this site tracked breaking across two consecutive quarters, is now genuinely fixed - unallocated operating expenses fell year-over-year for the first time since the break started, even as the segments it supports grew combined income by nearly a fifth (see Segments Compared). Management should keep disclosing this line with the same granularity it has, quarter to quarter, rather than letting the discipline lapse again the way it did in mid-2020. What it should stop doing: treating "profit still grew" as sufficient explanation for a quarter in which consolidated revenue actually declined for the first time in this site's coverage. The filing doesn't say why net revenue fell - whether it's Jabodetabek's continuing erosion (down 9.7% in revenue alone this quarter, see Segment Performance), a genuine industry slowdown, or something specific to pricing or promotional activity - and a reader is left to infer it from the segment note rather than from anything management actually said. A company that just posted its first revenue decline on record in this backlog owes its shareholders a stated reason, not a profit number loud enough to distract from the question.

Key Financial Metrics

Q1 2021 vs. Q1 2020 (P&L and cash flow), March 2021 vs. December 2020 (balance sheet) - consolidated, unaudited

FX: IDR 14,572 = USD 1 (Bank Indonesia's period-end exchange rate as of March 31, 2021, per the filing's own foreign-currency policy note) - a 3.3% Rupiah depreciation from the Rp14,105 used at December 31, 2020.

Metric Q1 2021 (IDR) Q1 2021 (USD) Q1 2020 (IDR) YoY
Net Revenue Rp19,239,177M ~$1,320.6M Rp19,334,788M ⚠️ -0.49%
Gross Profit Rp4,201,736M ~$288.4M Rp3,931,893M ✅ +6.86%
Income from Operations ("Operating Income") Rp673,019M ~$46.2M Rp493,438M ✅ +36.39%
Finance Cost Rp70,800M ~$4.9M Rp99,756M ✅ -29.03%
Income Before Final Tax and Corporate Income Tax Rp622,100M ~$42.7M Rp427,838M ✅ +45.41%
Income for the Period (total) Rp506,951M ~$34.8M Rp356,236M ✅ +42.31%
Net Income (attributable to owners) Rp499,388M ~$34.3M Rp350,403M ✅ +42.53%
EPS Rp12.03 ~$0.0008 Rp8.44 ✅ +42.53%
EBITDA» (Operating Income + D&A) Rp1,433,439M ~$98.4M Rp1,186,970M ✅ +20.76%
Balance sheet metric Mar 2021 (IDR) Mar 2021 (USD) Dec 2020 (IDR) Change
Total Assets Rp28,928,362M ~$1,985.4M Rp25,970,743M ✅ +11.39%
Total Liabilities Rp20,783,096M ~$1,426.4M Rp18,334,415M ⚠️ +13.36%
Total Equity (attributable to owners) Rp7,923,479M ~$543.8M Rp7,422,104M ✅ +6.76%
Total Cash (incl. time deposits) Rp3,859,013M ~$264.9M Rp3,877,560M ⚠️ -0.48%

"Adjusted EBITDA»" is still not a metric Alfamart reports; the EBITDA line above is Income from Operations plus depreciation and amortization (Rp760,420M for Q1 2021, per the segment note, versus Rp693,532M in Q1 2020), matching the convention used in every prior post here.

Free cash flow» (operating cash flow minus capex, both from the filed cash flow statement) fell 60.2% to +Rp530,894M for Q1 2021, from +Rp1,334,765M in Q1 2020 - not on higher capex (which actually fell 4.0% to Rp363,277M from Rp378,310M), but on a 47.8% drop in net cash from operations (Rp894,171M from Rp1,713,075M). The cash flow statement's own components point to the cause: inventories jumped 26.0% in a single quarter (Rp7,640,169M at December 2020 to Rp9,627,693M at March 2021), and income tax payments more than doubled (Rp269,256M paid versus Rp127,859M a year earlier, tracking this quarter's much higher pre-tax profit). Cash receipts from customers were essentially flat (Rp18,749,970M versus Rp18,845,106M), so the swing runs entirely through working capital and tax timing rather than a weaker top line converting to cash. This is a genuine profit-quality flag worth watching next quarter: a 42.5% net income gain that didn't convert into proportionate cash generation.

Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DER)» (interest-bearing debt, including finance leases, consumer financing, and borrowings, over equity attributable to owners, excluding the right-of-use lease liability recognized under PSAK 73 to stay on the same basis as prior posts): 0.48x at March 2021, up from 0.41x at December 2020 - the first uptick in gross leverage since the multi-quarter deleveraging trend this site tracked through Q2, Q3, and Q4 2020, on total interest-bearing debt of approximately Rp3,800,682 million (up 24.6% from Rp3,050,003 million at December 2020) - almost entirely short-term bank borrowing built up ahead of the last outstanding bond's maturity (see Beyond the Usual). Net gearing narrowed to roughly -0.01x (still a net cash position, but a much thinner one) at March 2021, from -0.11x at December 2020 - the balance sheet is still net-cash, just barely, as the same short-term borrowing that pushed gross debt up also pushed total cash to within Rp58,331 million of covering it entirely. This uptick is likely temporary rather than a reversal of the deleveraging trend: the bond that's still on this quarter's balance sheet was retired in full nine days after quarter-end (see Beyond the Usual), which should reverse most of this quarter's gross-leverage increase once it shows up in the next filing.

Key Operational Metrics

  • Permanent employees: 73,190 as of March 2021, up 7.13% from 68,320 at December 2020 in a single quarter - and up 18.4% from 61,828 a year earlier at Q1 2020. Headcount growth continues to run well ahead of any disclosed store-count growth, a pattern this site has flagged since Q3 2020, though a like-for-like comparison against the store network isn't possible this quarter (below).
  • Mini-market network, market share, industry backdrop: not available this quarter - all three came from the corporate presentation deck in every prior post, and no deck was published for this off-cycle quarter, the same gap Q1 2019 and Q1 2020 both had.
  • Seasonality note: Ramadan fell in April-May 2021, entirely in Q2, so this quarter's year-over-year comparison against Q1 2020 (also Ramadan-free) is seasonally clean - the revenue decline and margin shifts reported here aren't a calendar artifact.

Segment Performance

Alfamart reports the same three geographic segments as every prior post - Jabodetabek (greater Jakarta), Java excluding Jabodetabek, and Outside Java. Figures below use each segment's external revenue (excluding the minor inter-segment elimination Jabodetabek reports), for the three months ended March 31.

Segment Revenue (Q1 2021) Revenue (Q1 2020) YoY Segment Income (Q1 2021) Segment Income (Q1 2020) YoY Margin (2021 vs 2020)
Jabodetabek Rp6,218,341M Rp6,888,329M ⚠️ -9.73% Rp184,453M Rp233,909M ⚠️ -21.13% ⚠️ 2.97% vs 3.40%
Java (excl. Jabodetabek) Rp6,823,329M Rp6,879,478M ⚠️ -0.82% Rp462,902M Rp408,588M ✅ +13.29% ✅ 6.78% vs 5.94%
Outside Java Rp6,197,507M Rp5,566,981M ✅ +11.33% Rp428,214M Rp257,840M ✅ +66.08% ✅ 6.91% vs 4.63%

Jabodetabek is now five consecutive quarters into a standalone margin erosion streak that this site first flagged at Q1 2020 and has tracked through every quarter since - Q2, Q3, and the implied Q4 2020 standalone figure. This quarter is also the region's sharpest revenue decline of the streak (-9.73%, versus low-single-digit or flat readings in the prior three quarters), and the only one of the three segments losing revenue outright rather than just growing more slowly. The capital region is still just under a third of consolidated segment revenue, and it is now the entire drag holding back what would otherwise be a much stronger consolidated revenue picture - Java excluding Jabodetabek and Outside Java combined actually grew segment revenue, just not enough to offset Jabodetabek's decline.

Outside Java kept accelerating. Segment income grew 66.1% year-over-year, the fastest growth this site has recorded for the segment (ahead of Q4 2020 standalone's 46.8%), and margin expanded 228 basis points to 6.91% - now the highest margin of the three segments, a distinction Java excluding Jabodetabek held as recently as FY2019.

Java excluding Jabodetabek posted essentially flat revenue (-0.82%) but grew segment income 13.3% and margin 84 basis points to 6.78%, continuing the recovery that began after Q3 2020.

Segments Compared

Combined segment income grew 19.46% year-over-year (Rp900,337M to Rp1,075,569M), well ahead of consolidated revenue's decline and consistent with the operating-leverage story in Key Financial Metrics. Unallocated corporate overhead actually fell 1.07% (Rp406,899M to Rp402,550M) - the first year-over-year decline this site has recorded for this line since the discipline pattern first broke in Q3 2020. Overhead's share of combined segment income dropped to 37.44%, from 45.20% a year earlier - a much cleaner improvement than Q4 2020 standalone's partial repair (which was still worse than its own year-ago comparison), confirming the pattern this site flagged as a two-quarter problem has now genuinely reversed rather than just moderated. The filing still doesn't itemize what's inside "unallocated operating expenses" by driver.

Beyond the Usual

Free cash flow fell 60% in the same quarter net income rose 43%

Net income attributable to owners grew 42.5% year-over-year this quarter, but free cash flow» moved in the opposite direction, falling 60.2% to +Rp530,894 million from +Rp1,334,765 million (see Key Financial Metrics). The gap traces to a 26.0% single-quarter jump in inventories (Rp7,640,169 million to Rp9,627,693 million) and income tax payments that more than doubled on the higher pre-tax profit, both of which pulled operating cash flow down 47.8% even as capex actually fell. Neither cause is a red flag by itself - a genuine inventory build ahead of demand, or simply paying more tax on more profit, are both normal - but a reader relying on the net income headline alone would miss that this quarter's profit growth didn't convert into cash at anywhere near the same rate, which is exactly the kind of divergence worth checking again next quarter.

The Company's insurtech vehicle has quietly built a four-company fintech stake, not a one-off

This site's FY2019 post first flagged capital injections into an unnamed subsidiary that turned out, per FY2020's filing, to be PT Sumber Trijaya Lestari ("STL"). This quarter's investments note resolves what that vehicle has actually been buying, and it's broader than previously visible in this site's coverage: alongside PT Kita Indonesia Plus ("KIP", 14.28% stake, an online insurance marketplace, purchased for Rp14,000 million in July 2019) and Tada Network Pte. Ltd. ("TADA", 2.60% stake, a customer-retention platform, purchased for US$1,000,000 in June 2020), the Group also holds convertible-bond investments in Buku Pte. Ltd. ("BUKU", US$500,000, no maturity date, interest-free unless converted, entered October 2020) and Digital Payments Holding Pte. Ltd. ("OY", US$1,500,000, maturing October 27, 2022, interest-free unless converted or in default, entered December 2020). None of these four is disclosed anywhere in Alfamart's corporate presentation decks, and none received a fresh capital injection this quarter - but taken together they show a deliberate, multi-year fintech and insurtech venture portfolio being built through a single subsidiary, not the isolated stakes this site's earlier posts described one at a time.

The last outstanding bond disappeared from the balance sheet nine days after quarter-end, unrefinanced

The Rp1,000,000 million "Obligasi Berkelanjutan II Sumber Alfaria Trijaya Tahap II Tahun 2018," classified as a current liability at Rp999,941 million on this quarter's balance sheet and flagged across Q2, Q3, and Q4 2020 as unrefinanced with no disclosed repayment plan, was paid in full on April 9, 2021 - three days ahead of its April 12 maturity - per this filing's bonds-payable note. No new bond was issued to replace it, continuing the pattern the two 2020-maturity bonds already set: Alfamart has now retired every bond series this site has tracked across its entire coverage without issuing a replacement. The Company enters its next quarter with no outstanding bonds at all for the first time in this backlog's history, funded instead by the short-term bank borrowing build-up visible in this quarter's own balance sheet (see Key Financial Metrics).

The delivery-subsidiary handover flagged last quarter is still just a term sheet, two months on

FY2020's filing disclosed as a subsequent event that the Company had signed a term sheet with PT Galaxy Mitra Global ("GMG") on March 25, 2021, under which GMG would take over control of PT Sumber Wahana Sejahtera ("SWS"), the Company's 99.96%-owned delivery and freight-forwarding subsidiary. This filing's own corporate-structure note repeats the same term-sheet language, with no update on price, closing timeline, or deal status - and confirms the Company and its co-owner SIL still held the identical 99.96%/0.04% stake in SWS as of March 31, 2021. Notably, SWS also increased its paid-up share capital again on March 31, 2021 itself - the same day this reporting period ends - with the Company and SIL both participating pro-rata to keep their ownership unchanged, an odd moment for a capital injection into a subsidiary whose control is supposedly about to change hands. Whether this signals the handover has stalled, or is simply normal operating capital ahead of a deal that takes longer to close than a term sheet implies, isn't something this filing addresses either way.

Coverage Table

Metric Q1 2021 Q1 2020 YoY Why it matters
Net Revenue Rp19,239,177M Rp19,334,788M ⚠️ -0.49% First revenue decline this site has recorded for this company
Net Income (to owners) Rp499,388M Rp350,403M ✅ +42.5% Margin and finance-cost relief, not top-line growth, are doing the work
Free cash flow +Rp530,894M +Rp1,334,765M ⚠️ -60.2% A profit quarter that didn't convert to cash at the same rate
Jabodetabek margin 2.97% 3.40% ⚠️ fifth straight erosion The capital region is now the sole drag on consolidated revenue
Outstanding bonds Rp0 (repaid Apr 9, 2021) Rp999,941M (this quarter's balance) ✅ resolved Every bond this site has tracked for the company is now retired

Target Valuation Range

Enterprise value ~Rp37.31 trillion (~$2.57B), implying 7.73x EV/EBITDA and a trailing P/E of ~30.9x - modestly more expensive than three months ago on two of three multiples this site tracks. But the move is smaller than the share price's own 12.5% gain would suggest, because trailing earnings also grew. This is not an obviously overvalued or undervalued setup - it's a business whose profit quality this quarter (see the free-cash-flow divergence above) deserves more scrutiny than its multiples do.

Alfamart's shares closed at Rp900 on March 31, 2021 (the last trading day of the quarter) - up 12.5% from Rp800 at December 2020.

Market cap → enterprise value Q1 2021
Share price (period-end) Rp900
Shares outstanding 41,524,501,700
Market capitalization Rp37.37 trillion (~$2.57B)
Plus: interest-bearing debt Rp3.80 trillion
Less: cash and equivalents Rp3.86 trillion
Enterprise value Rp37.31 trillion (~$2.57B)
Peer-multiple sanity check FY2020 Q1 2021 Change
Trailing P/E ~31.3x ~30.9x ➖ roughly flat
EV/EBITDA ~7.07x ~7.73x ⚠️ up
P/B ~4.48x ~4.72x ⚠️ up

Trailing P/E (using trailing-twelve-month net income to owners of Rp1,210,461 million: FY2020's Rp1,061,476 million, less the already-reported Q1 2020 figure, plus this quarter's Rp499,388 million) barely moved - the share price rose 12.5% but trailing earnings grew at a similar pace. EV/EBITDA (against trailing-twelve-month EBITDA of Rp4,829,445 million) rose on the higher EV outpacing EBITDA growth. P/B (book value of approximately Rp7,923,479 million equity attributable to owners ÷ 41.52 billion shares) rose tracking the share price gain.

No listed domestic peer still exists for a direct minimarket-format comparison - Indomaret remains privately held under the Salim Group. A full DCF still isn't included here: this quarter's headline profit growth and its free-cash-flow divergence point in different directions, and one more quarter is needed to see which one describes the business going forward. The share price moved within a Rp665-Rp1,025 range across the trailing two years to this quarter-end (a 35.1% peak-to-trough swing, the same range flagged at FY2020), with March's Rp900 close sitting a little below the range's midpoint.


PT Sumber Alfaria Trijaya Tbk's unaudited interim consolidated financial statements as of March 31, 2021 and for the three months then ended.