FiberStar's Own Books Turned Red While the Company Kept Borrowing
Over these 12 quarters: share price Rp4,700 to Rp9,700 (+106%); operating income 190 to 262 Rp billion; operating income margin 52.8% to 56.4%. One graph in actual numbers: bars are the quarter's operating income, over them the share price at quarter-end (left axis) and the operating income margin (right axis); each line is fitted to its own range, so read the timing, not the heights. Prices are adjusted for splits.
MAP, the Company's own consolidated fiber-optic subsidiary (FiberStar), swung from a Rp92.4 billion pre-tax profit a year ago to an Rp82.9 billion pre-tax loss for the first nine months of 2026 - a fact buried in the filing's own tax reconciliation note, not stated anywhere else in it - while the Company borrowed another Rp2 trillion and, within days, moved almost all of it into a brand-new private fund.
PT Indoritel Makmur Internasional Tbk's nine-month 2026 net income attributable to owners fell 22.2% YoY to Rp652.9 billion, continuing the decline the H1 2026 post flagged. The headline explanation so far has been the associates: their combined profit share fell 12.5% as Fast Food Indonesia's loss kept widening. What the headline "Profit from Operations" line doesn't show is that the Company's own consolidated business lost money before tax this year, after making money a year ago. See FiberStar and Beyond the Usual.
FiberStar's Own Pre-Tax Result Flipped From a Profit to a Loss
Subtracting the Company's own standalone pre-tax profit (Rp740.7 billion, per the filing's tax reconciliation) from the Group's consolidated pre-tax profit (Rp657.8 billion) leaves a negative Rp82.9 billion - the pre-tax result of MAP and its dormant Singapore unit, the Company's only consolidated subsidiaries, which together run FiberStar. A year ago the same arithmetic (Rp896.5 billion consolidated less Rp804.1 billion standalone) showed a Rp92.4 billion subsidiary-level profit. That's a roughly Rp175.3 billion swing inside the one business the Company actually operates day to day, not an associate it merely has a stake in. FiberStar's own revenue still grew 9.3% this period, so the swing isn't a revenue problem - see FiberStar for the cost side of that story.
The Company Borrowed Rp2 Trillion and Put Nearly All of It Into a New Fund
The Rp2 trillion unsecured credit facility the H1 2026 post flagged as signed "three weeks after period-end" was fully drawn by September 30, 2026, and four days after signing it, the Company subscribed Rp2 trillion into a brand-new private fund vehicle, Magnus Fund VCC. The filing states what the loan costs (Cost of Fund plus 0.75%, unsecured, maturing in 12 months) and what the fund invests in (debt securities and obligations described as "non-speculative"), but nothing in it explains why the Company borrowed unsecured, short-tenor debt to fund a long-dated, discretionary-redemption private investment. See Beyond the Usual for the full terms of both.
The Three Associates Pulled in Different Directions
Indomaret had its strongest quarter of the year, Sari Roti rebounded from a near-wipeout, and Fast Food Indonesia's loss widened for a second straight quarter - yet the combined result was still the YoY decline already noted above. Indomaret contributed roughly Rp745.1 billion in Q3 alone (nine-month profit of Rp1,688.6 billion less H1's Rp943.5 billion), well above its first-half quarterly pace. Sari Roti added about Rp51.3 billion in Q3, a sharp recovery from H1's near-zero Rp4.0 billion. Fast Food Indonesia instead lost a further Rp102.4 billion in Q3, on top of H1's Rp110.0 billion loss, pushing the nine-month loss to Rp212.5 billion - already more than half of FY2025's full-year Rp366.0 billion loss, with one quarter still to report. See The Four Holdings, One by One.
The Prescription
FiberStar's own business turned pre-tax-negative this quarter - the first time this post's own analysis has been able to isolate that result from the associates - and in the same quarter the Company borrowed unsecured debt to fund an unrelated private investment instead. That ordering of priorities matters more this quarter than the associates' mixed results do.
The one business the Company actually runs needs the capital and management attention first. FiberStar's depreciation charge is growing far faster than its revenue - selling expenses rose 25.8% to Rp1,058.8 billion against 9.3% revenue growth, with depreciation of network equipment alone up 23.8% - and that gap, not the associates, is the more fixable problem behind this quarter's pre-tax swing to a loss. Borrowing another Rp2 trillion unsecured and parking nearly all of it in a new, illiquid private fund (see Beyond the Usual) does nothing to close that gap; it's capital that could instead have gone toward FiberStar's own buildout or toward paying down existing bank debt.
What it should stop doing: treating unsecured, 12-month floating-rate borrowing as a source of funds for a fund investment the Company can't redeem on its own schedule. The Atrium Stable Fund VCC - the vehicle the Magnus Fund subscription sits alongside - can only be redeemed early "subject to the sole and absolute discretion" of the fund itself, not the Company. Borrowing short-tenor debt to fund a long-dated, discretionary-redemption asset is a maturity and liquidity mismatch the filing never explains, and it's happening in the same year FiberStar's own operating business needs the cash more.
Key Financial Metrics
Rp billion; margin is operating income as a percent of net revenue, per quarter. Values are standalone quarters; 9 derived from annual, half-year or nine-month figures (Q4 2023, Q2 2024, Q3 2024, Q4 2024, Q2 2025, Q3 2025, Q4 2025, Q2 2026, Q3 2026).
9M 2026 (nine months ended September 30, 2026) vs. 9M 2025, consolidated, cumulative
FX: IDR 17,884.80 = USD 1 (September 30, 2026) and IDR 16,683 = USD 1 (September 30, 2025), both from independently sourced spot data for the respective period-end dates.
| Metric | 9M 2026 (IDR) | 9M 2026 (USD) | 9M 2025 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (FiberStar, consolidated) | Rp1,335.373B | ~$74.66M | Rp1,221.934B | +9.28% |
| Share of profit of associates» | Rp617.044B | ~$34.50M | Rp705.061B | -12.48% |
| Operating Income» | Rp711.324B | ~$39.77M | Rp990.654B | -28.20% |
| Net Income» (total, incl. NCI) | Rp629.827B | ~$35.22M | Rp858.976B | -26.68% |
| Net income attributable to owners | Rp652.862B | ~$36.50M | Rp838.664B | -22.15% |
| EPS (basic, cumulative) | Rp46.03 | ~$0.00257 | Rp59.13 | -22.15% |
| Operating cash flow | Rp464.059B | ~$25.95M | Rp328.138B | +41.42% |
| Free Cash Flow» (op. cash flow - capex) | -Rp687.686B | ~-$38.45M | -Rp647.805B | Burn widened 6.16% |
"Adjusted EBITDA" still isn't a metric this Company reports, and it still doesn't fit a pure holding company's accounts: Operating Income above embeds Rp617.0 billion of non-cash equity-method associate profit unrelated to FiberStar's own cost structure, so an EBITDA add-back would double-count it.
| Balance sheet | Sep 30, 2026 (IDR) | Sep 30, 2026 (USD) | Dec 31, 2025 (IDR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp26,717.969B | ~$1.494B | Rp23,700.330B | +12.73% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp10,583.266B | ~$591.7M | Rp8,211.386B | +28.89% |
| Total Equity | Rp16,134.703B | ~$902.1M | Rp15,488.944B | +4.17% |
| Cash and cash equivalents | Rp702.117B | ~$39.26M | Rp744.590B | -5.70% |
Operating cash flow kept improving on the trend the H1 2026 post first flagged: Rp464.1 billion for the nine months, up 41.4% YoY, as cash receipts from customers (Rp1,341.8 billion, +20.5%) grew more than twice as fast as revenue itself (+9.3%). None of that improvement reached free cash flow, though - capex (Rp1,151.7 billion for the nine months, up from Rp975.9 billion) kept outrunning operating cash flow, so the cash burn widened again, to -Rp687.7 billion from -Rp647.8 billion. Financing activities flipped from a small net outflow a year ago (-Rp18.4 billion) to a Rp2,172.3 billion net inflow this year - almost entirely the new SMBC facility (see Beyond the Usual).
Where Q3 2026's Revenue Went
Net revenue, and how much of it was left as operating profit and net income, in one view. Figures are the same standalone-quarter figures as the metrics table.
Rp billion, Q3 2026. Operating costs are net revenue less operating income; other items & tax are operating income less net income. Standalone quarter; all three figures derived from an annual, half-year or nine-month row.
The Four Holdings, One by One
The Company reports four material holdings, not operating segments: three equity-method associates whose individual P&Ls never touch its own income statement beyond a single "share of profit" line, and one consolidated subsidiary group - PT Mega Akses Persada ("MAP") and a small investment-holding shell, PT Indoritel Persada Nusantara ("IPN") - whose full financials do. MAP operates the FiberStar business.
Indomarco Prismatama (Indomaret) — 40% stake
Indomaret's own nine-month 2026 net sales came to Rp96,545.4 billion, with profit attributable to owners of Rp1,688.6 billion - about 57.3% of its FY2025 full-year profit (Rp2,946.0 billion), well ahead of H1 2026's 32.0% pace. That means Q3 alone contributed roughly Rp745.1 billion - well above the roughly Rp471.8 billion-a-quarter pace the first half averaged (Q1 2026 was Rp489.0 billion per the Q1 2026 post), and the strongest single quarter for this associate so far this year. The Company's 40% share of the nine-month profit, Rp674.5 billion, remains by far the largest contributor to the combined associate-profit line, and Indomaret's carrying value (Rp10,324.0 billion) now accounts for roughly 73.7% of the Company's total investment-in-associates-and-joint-ventures balance (Rp14,003.7 billion) - functionally, this is still an Indomaret holding company with three smaller positions attached.
Nippon Indosari Corpindo (Sari Roti) — 25.77% stake
Sari Roti's nine-month 2026 net sales were Rp2,739.3 billion against profit attributable to owners of Rp55.3 billion - a sharp recovery from H1 2026's near-wipeout of just Rp4.0 billion, meaning Q3 alone contributed about Rp51.3 billion. The Company's 25.77% share came to Rp14.2 billion for the nine months. Nothing in the filing breaks down cost or margin at this associate's equity-method level, so the specific driver of either the collapse or the rebound isn't verifiable from what's disclosed, but the swing itself - from a near-zero half to a meaningfully profitable quarter - argues for treating any single period's associate result as noisy rather than a confirmed trend, the same caution the H1 2026 post already raised about this associate.
Fast Food Indonesia (KFC) — 37.51% stake
Fast Food Indonesia's loss attributable to owners widened to Rp212.5 billion for the nine months, from Rp110.0 billion at H1 2026 - meaning Q3 alone added roughly Rp102.4 billion of further loss, continuing the deterioration the H1 2026 post flagged after Q1's brief return to profit. Net sales for the nine months were Rp4,132.2 billion, tracking toward a figure below FY2025's full-year Rp4,881.5 billion. The nine-month loss is already about 58% of FY2025's full-year loss (Rp366.0 billion), with one quarter still to report.
FiberStar — 71.97% consolidated (via MAP)
FiberStar is the only holding whose numbers show up in full on the Company's own income statement. Total revenue grew 9.3% YoY to Rp1,335.4 billion for the nine months, with the same split the H1 2026 post first disclosed: Corporate revenue grew 19.2% YoY to Rp825.3 billion, while Retail revenue fell 7.6% YoY to Rp428.5 billion - the identical pace of decline as H1 alone, so Retail isn't accelerating its slide, just continuing it - and "Others" grew 24.0% to Rp81.6 billion. Customer concentration kept de-concentrating: PT Cyberindo Aditama represented 45.2% of total revenue for the nine months, down from 50.4% a year ago and essentially flat against H1's 45.4%. Revenue growth alone doesn't explain this quarter's numbers, though: selling expenses (which are almost entirely FiberStar's own cost base) rose 25.8% to Rp1,058.8 billion, with depreciation of network equipment up 23.8% to Rp608.0 billion - a cost base growing nearly three times faster than revenue. That gap is the proximate driver of the subsidiary-level swing to a pre-tax loss detailed in Beyond the Usual, though the filing itself draws no such connection explicitly; this is this post's own reading of the cost lines, not a stated management explanation.
Beyond the Usual
A Rp2 trillion loan funded a Rp2 trillion placement into a new private fund, four days apart
The Rp2,000,000 million SMBC credit facility the H1 2026 post flagged as signed on July 23, 2026 (unsecured, Cost of Fund plus 0.75% margin, floating rate, 12-month tenor, with Interest Service Coverage Ratio above 100% and a Leverage Ratio at or below 300% as covenants) was fully drawn as of September 30, 2026. Four days after signing it, on July 27, 2026, the Company subscribed 193,704 non-voting participating shares of a new fund vehicle, Magnus Fund VCC, for a total consideration of Rp2,000,000 million - which the filing states is "primarily investing in debt securities and obligations that are non-speculative in nature." The Company already held a similar vehicle, Atrium Stable Fund VCC, whose terms the filing also discloses: a 10-year Charter Life, with early redemption "allowed and subject to the sole and absolute discretion of the Atrium Stable Fund VCC" - meaning the Company itself cannot force an early withdrawal. Combined, the Company's long-term investment balance in these fund vehicles grew from Rp2,850.0 billion to Rp5,100.0 billion this period, generating Rp267.3 billion of distributions for the nine months (recorded as Finance Income). Nothing in the filing explains why unsecured, 12-month borrowing was used to fund a long-dated, discretionary-redemption investment, or what spread the Company expects to earn net of its own borrowing cost.
An unexplained Rp28.7 billion penalty expense appeared this period
The "Other income - net" footnote discloses a Rp28,704 million "Penalty expenses" line for the nine months, up from a negligible Rp24 million a year earlier - a jump of more than a thousand-fold in absolute terms, and large enough on its own (about 4% of this period's operating income) to be worth noting. Nothing elsewhere in the filing - no litigation note, no regulatory disclosure, no further breakdown within the footnote itself - identifies what the penalty relates to. The accounting-policy note on taxation does describe tax underpayment interest/penalties as a general category that flows through "Income Tax Expense," but this particular line sits under "Other income - net," not the tax expense line, so it isn't that policy being applied; what it actually is remains undisclosed.
MAP's approved tax refund was mostly offset, not paid in cash
On May 18, 2026, MAP received a tax overpayment decree (SKPLB) for its full 2024 corporate income tax claim of Rp35,630 million. The cash actually received on September 9, 2026 was only Rp1,398 million - the filing states the remainder was deducted against underpayments of income tax articles 23, 4(2), 26 and 21, plus 2021 VAT, which MAP agreed to. A tax authority approving a refund in full while paying out only about 4% of it in cash, with the rest absorbed into older underpayments across five different tax types, is a genuinely interesting piece of footnote color on how Indonesian tax administration actually nets out across periods - not a criticism of the Company, which simply accepted the offset.
A satellite ISP's receivable balance reversed sharply after growing through the first half
PT Starlink Services Indonesia's trade receivable balance, which the H1 2026 post flagged as having grown 70.9% to Rp12.340 billion by June 30, 2026, fell to just Rp3.701 billion by September 30, 2026 - a 70.0% decline from that June peak, and 48.8% below the Rp7.221 billion balance at the start of the year. The relationship between the two competing broadband providers (Starlink is a wholesale customer of FiberStar's network) continues, but the receivable swing shows it isn't the steadily deepening dependency the H1 2026 post's framing might have suggested; it moves in both directions quarter to quarter.
No dividend this year, after a cash payout the year before
The Company's Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on June 24, 2026 approved only a Rp1.0 billion appropriation to general reserves from retained earnings, with no dividend distribution for the year. The equivalent meeting a year earlier, on June 25, 2025, had approved a Rp70.9 billion cash dividend - Rp5 per share, paid July 29, 2025. The filing doesn't say why the practice changed, and this isn't connected here to the new SMBC loan or the Magnus Fund placement disclosed above; it's simply where the Company's cash did, and didn't, go this year.
Target Valuation Range
Still near the H1 2026 post's own highest-in-this-backlog reading, even as this period's profit fell across the board. The market is paying roughly Rp137.6 trillion for a company whose own filed net asset value is Rp16.1 trillion - an 8.53x price-to-book», down slightly from H1 2026's 8.74x but still above Q1 2026's 8.30x. Backing Indomaret out from the Company's own numbers, the market is paying roughly Rp329.4 trillion for 100% of it - about 111.8x Indomaret's own FY2025 profit, essentially flat against H1 2026's ~113.0x and still well above Q1 2026's ~105.7x.
A multi-year projection still doesn't fit this Company, for the same reason the FY2019-2021 and Q1 2026 posts didn't attempt one: DNET's fair value depends almost entirely on Indomaret, which isn't separately listed and discloses only a summarized balance sheet and P&L as an equity-method associate. What follows is the same sum-of-the-parts and reverse-valuation approach as the Q1 2026 and H1 2026 posts, updated for this period's own numbers.
| Market cap → enterprise value | Sep 30, 2026 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp9,700 |
| Shares outstanding | 14,184,000,000 |
| Market capitalization | Rp137,584.8B (~$7.693B) |
| Total liabilities | Rp10,583.3B |
| Less: cash and equivalents | Rp702.1B |
| Enterprise value | Rp147,465.9B (~$8.245B) |
| Book-value sum-of-the-parts | Sep 30, 2026 |
|---|---|
| Investment in Indomarco Prismatama (Indomaret), carrying value | Rp10,324.0B |
| Investment in Nippon Indosari (Sari Roti), carrying value | Rp2,182.9B |
| Investment in Fast Food Indonesia (KFC), carrying value | Rp1,462.4B |
| Investment in joint ventures, carrying value | Rp34.7B |
| Non-associate net assets (FiberStar + cash + other, net of all liabilities) | Rp2,131.0B |
| Total book equity (= filed Total Equity) | Rp16,134.7B |
| Market capitalization | Rp137,584.8B |
| Implied price-to-book» | ~8.53x |
That 8.53x P/B sits just below H1 2026's 8.74x peak, even though this period's net income fell 22% YoY and the share price itself was essentially flat (Rp9,800 to Rp9,700, -1.0%) - the small decline in the ratio comes almost entirely from retained-earnings growth increasing the book-value denominator, not from the market paying less. Backing out the implied value of Indomaret the same way the Q1 2026 and H1 2026 posts did - market cap, less the book value of everything except Indomaret:
| Reverse valuation: what the market is paying for Indomaret | Value |
|---|---|
| Market capitalization | Rp137,584.8B |
| Less: Sari Roti, Fast Food Indonesia, JVs, non-associate net assets (book) | Rp5,811.0B |
| What the market is paying for the Company's 40% Indomaret stake | Rp131,773.8B |
| What the market is paying for 100% of Indomaret | Rp329,434.5B |
| Indomaret FY2025 profit (attributable to owners) | Rp2,946.0B |
| Implied P/E on Indomaret's FY2025 profit | ~111.8x |
This uses Indomaret's FY2025 full-year profit as the denominator, the same basis the Q1 2026 and H1 2026 posts used, rather than a trailing-twelve-month figure - Indomaret's own 9M 2025 profit isn't disclosed in this filing (only the current-period and prior-FY-end comparatives are shown), so a TTM figure isn't independently verifiable from what's downloaded. On this consistent basis, the implied multiple sits at ~111.8x, essentially unchanged from H1 2026's ~113.0x and still well above Q1 2026's ~105.7x - the market's premium for Indomaret didn't meaningfully compress even as the Company's own consolidated subsidiary swung to a loss and two of three associates showed real weakness this year.
As with the Q1 2026 and H1 2026 posts, these aren't a projection of Indomaret's future - they're a sensitivity read on the one number this valuation actually turns on: what multiple the market keeps paying for a business it can't directly buy. This period's own fundamentals (consolidated net income down 22%, the subsidiary swinging to a loss, Fast Food Indonesia's loss widening further) offer no particular support for the multiple staying this high, though nothing in the filing itself forces a reversion either. A reader with a strong independent view on Indomaret's true worth still has more information to work with than DNET's own filings provide; DNET's own price action this period simply isn't explained by DNET's own filed numbers.
PT Indoritel Makmur Internasional Tbk's consolidated financial statements for the period ended September 30, 2026 (with September 30, 2025 comparatives), authorized for issuance by the Company's Board of Directors on October 30, 2026.