The Ratio Improved. Did the Risk?
The last two posts on this company tracked the same worrying thread for six months running: finance lease», the segment this company has spent two years building into the majority of its book, had receivables overdue more than 90 days climbing for two consecutive quarters - 0.74% at the end of 2015, up to 1.10% in June, up again to 1.33% in September. This quarter's filing shows that ratio at 0.61% - not just an improvement, but the lowest year-end reading in this entire backlog. Consumer financing's own overdue ratio tells the same story, dropping to 0.90% from September's 1.54%. Read at face value, the credit-quality concern this blog has now raised twice just evaporated.
It didn't evaporate on its own. Buried under "Asset Quality" in the company's own results presentation is a single line: "Write-off policy for 4W and 2W changed to 210 days starting Dec-2016" - down from 270 days previously. Loans that used to sit on the books as overdue-but-not-yet-written-off for an extra two months are now written off two months sooner, which mechanically shrinks the numerator of every overdue ratio the moment the policy takes effect. The finance lease segment's own write-offs jumped 81.8% year-over-year (Rp105,722 million from Rp58,133 million) in the same period its overdue ratio supposedly improved - a write-off increase of that size isn't what a segment getting safer usually looks like. None of this means the improvement is fake; movement in both segments' gross books (finance lease +35.6%, consumer financing -15.1%) also affects the ratio's denominator, and total assets resumed growing after two flat quarters (+6.8% in the fourth quarter alone, after -0.8% and -0.03% the two quarters before it). But a reader comparing this year-end ratio against last year-end's on a like-for-like basis is comparing two different write-off clocks, not just two different years of underwriting.
The Prescription
Publish a pro forma comparison the day a write-off policy changes, not a footnote buried three sections into the presentation. If the 210-day policy had applied throughout 2016, the company - not this blog - is the only party with the data to show what the September 1.33% finance lease overdue ratio would have looked like on the new clock, and whether the "improvement" investors are being shown is a real reversal in underwriting quality or an accounting reset dressed as one. Disclosing the change at all, in a single presentation bullet, is honest; disclosing it without the comparison that would let a reader judge its size is not enough for a metric this company has spent years building its credibility around (see the NPL» trend across the last three posts in this backlog).
What it should stop doing: nothing new this quarter, and that's worth stating plainly rather than repeating last quarter's buyback warning - share buybacks that ran through nine straight months and consumed Rp248,116 million stopped completely in the fourth quarter (see Beyond the Usual), so the capital-allocation concern flagged twice in this backlog didn't need a third repetition. The company's next test is whether it treats that pause as a new normal or resumes the same pace once the MESOP-offset justification is even further in the rearview mirror.
Key Financial Metrics
Fiscal year 2016 vs. fiscal year 2015
FX: Rp13,436 = USD 1 (December 31, 2016, per the company's own financial statements). Both periods are converted at this same rate for comparability; it is not a historical rate for the 2015 column.
| Metric | FY2016 (IDR) | FY2016 (USD) | FY2015 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Income ("Net Revenue" equivalent) | Rp3,227,109M | ~$240.2M | Rp2,830,617M | ✅ +14.0% |
| Profit Before Income Tax ("Operating Income" equivalent) | Rp1,024,963M | ~$76.3M | Rp835,494M | ✅ +22.7% |
| Net Income | Rp798,365M | ~$59.4M | Rp650,288M | ✅ +22.8% |
| Total Cash and Cash Equivalents | Rp165,388M | ~$12.3M | Rp777,233M | ⚠️ -78.7%, spent on buybacks/bond redemptions/dividends |
Profit before tax remains the closest real operating-income equivalent. This is the first full fiscal year in this backlog, which makes the year-over-year comparison a genuine trailing-twelve-month read rather than the annualized nine-month estimates used in the last two posts.
| Balance sheet metric | Dec 2016 (IDR) | Dec 2016 (USD) | Dec 2015 (IDR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp12,476,256M | ~$928.7M | Rp11,770,414M | ✅ +6.0%, growth resumed after two flat quarters |
| Net Investments in Finance Lease | Rp7,121,175M | ~$530.1M | Rp5,209,847M | ✅ +36.7% |
| Consumer Financing Receivables (net) | Rp4,462,184M | ~$332.2M | Rp4,688,156M | ⚠️ -4.8%, though up 5.0% in Q4 alone |
| Total Liabilities | Rp8,221,572M | ~$611.9M | Rp7,751,311M | ⚠️ +6.1% |
| Fund Borrowings (net) | Rp4,690,939M | ~$349.2M | Rp5,636,699M | ✅ -16.8% |
| Securities Issued (bonds + MTNs, net) | Rp2,965,295M | ~$220.7M | Rp1,681,116M | ⚠️ +76.4%, two new Rp1 trillion bond tranches issued |
| Total Equity | Rp4,254,684M | ~$316.7M | Rp4,019,103M | ✅ +5.9% |
A full fiscal year finally puts this backlog on genuinely comparable footing - no seasonality adjustment or cumulative-period caveat is needed the way it was for the nine-month interim posts. This business doesn't carry meaningful calendar-driven seasonality the way a retailer or harvest-cycle-linked bank would - vehicle and equipment financing demand tracks Indonesia's broader economic cycle more than any pattern within the year.
Key Operational Metrics
- Net investment mix: finance lease is 61.5% of the combined finance lease + consumer financing net book, up from 60.6% in September and 52.6% at year-end 2015 - a smaller quarterly gain (+0.9 percentage points) than the +1.9-point jump from June to September, suggesting the mix shift is decelerating even as it continues.
- Receivables overdue more than 90 days (calculated from the filed statement's own overdue-day disclosure, the same convention used the last two quarters): finance lease 0.61% of gross investment (Rp53,826M of Rp8,809,005M), down sharply from 1.33% in September, 1.10% in June, and 0.74% at year-end 2015 - see above for why this reversal needs a caveat. Consumer financing sits at 0.90% (Rp64,683M of Rp7,202,876M), also down from September's 1.54% and below year-end 2015's 1.36%.
- Write-offs: finance lease wrote off Rp105,722M during 2016, up 81.8% from Rp58,133M in 2015. Consumer financing wrote off Rp164,255M, up a much smaller 6.5% from Rp154,215M - the shortened write-off window landed far harder on the finance lease book, the same segment whose overdue ratio improved the most.
- Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DER)»: ~1.80x on a gross basis (fund borrowings plus securities issued, both net of unamortized costs, against equity), up from ~1.66x in September as bond issuance in the fourth quarter outpaced the continued paydown of bank borrowings - reversing three straight quarters of deleveraging on this measure. The company's own disclosed "gearing ratio" (a narrower measure using the same borrowings-over-equity logic) was 1.8x at both year-ends, essentially flat, comfortably inside the regulatory maximum of 10x.
- Branch network: 305 outlets (209 branches, 96 kiosks) as of December 2016, up 14.2% from 267 outlets a year earlier - 38 new outlets opened during the year.
- Headcount: 8,941 employees, up 12.8% from 7,924 a year earlier. The composition shifted more than the headline number suggests: permanent staff grew 11.2% and contract staff fell 32.1%, while a category the company labels "Mitra BFI" (BFI Partners) grew 138.5% to 2,080 people - a meaningfully different labor mix behind similar total growth to last quarter's pace.
- Geographic mix: 49.9% of full-year revenue came from Java, with Sumatera (18.7%) and Sulawesi (18.2%) next, and Kalimantan at 12.2% - essentially unchanged from the split reported all year.
- Earnings per share: Rp524 basic and diluted, up 25.7% from Rp417 - growing faster than net income itself (+22.8%) because the net share count outstanding didn't grow in step with profit.
- Not available this quarter: no transcript has been located for this earnings call, so management's own framing of these results comes only from the presentation deck cited throughout this post.
Two Segments, One Balance Sheet
No change to the segment structure this year - finance lease and consumer financing, plus the residual "others" category for unallocated finance income and corporate items.
Finance lease - income statement revenue of Rp1,332,174M for the year, up 50.5% year-over-year, now 61.4% of segment assets (Rp7,148,427M, up 35.4% YoY) versus 52.9% a year earlier. This remains the segment carrying the business's growth, and the one whose credit-quality reversal this quarter needs the write-off-policy caveat above.
Consumer financing - income statement revenue of Rp1,068,610M, down 13.8% year-over-year, now 38.6% of segment assets (Rp4,496,606M, down 4.5% YoY). Its own overdue ratio improved by more in percentage-point terms than finance lease's did (0.46 points versus 0.20 points off their respective September readings), despite carrying a shrinking book.
Comparing the two: finance lease keeps taking share of both income and the balance sheet - its revenue grew almost four times faster than consumer financing shrank, continuing the pattern first identified in this backlog's opening post. The credit-quality story that had inverted over the two prior quarters - finance lease's overdue ratio rising faster than consumer financing's - reversed again this quarter, with both segments improving simultaneously under the same new write-off policy. That simultaneity is itself informative: a policy change that shortens the write-off window for "4W and 2W" products, as the company's own disclosure specifies, would be expected to hit both segments' ratios in the same direction at the same time, which is exactly what happened.
Beyond the Usual
A shortened write-off window did more of the work in the NPL improvement than the headline suggests
The company's own FY16 results presentation discloses, in a single bullet under "Asset Quality," that the write-off policy for "4W and 2W" products changed from 270 days to 210 days overdue starting December 2016 - the same period in which finance lease's overdue-90-days ratio dropped from 1.33% (September) to 0.61% and consumer financing's dropped from 1.54% to 0.90%. Finance lease write-offs rose 81.8% year-over-year (Rp105,722M from Rp58,133M) in the same period, a far larger jump than consumer financing's 6.5% increase (Rp164,255M from Rp154,215M) - consistent with a shortened write-off window landing hardest on the segment with the faster-growing, more aggressively-tenored book. The disclosure itself is genuine and not hidden, but a reader comparing this year-end ratio against prior year-ends without knowing the write-off clock changed would draw a stronger conclusion about underwriting quality than the data alone supports.
Share buybacks that ran nine straight months stopped completely in the fourth quarter
Note 17 to the financial statements discloses that the Company repurchased 98,700,400 shares for Rp248,116 million "as of 31 December 2016" - the identical share count and Rupiah amount already reported as the nine-month cumulative total as of September 30, 2016. No further shares were repurchased in the fourth quarter. This is a clean, verifiable answer to the capital-allocation question this blog raised across the last two quarters: buyback spending that had continued well past the point the MESOP» program had anything left to offset simply stopped, rather than continuing at pace.
The cross-currency swaps that flipped to a liability in September flipped back to an asset by year-end
The company's cross-currency swaps - used to fully hedge its remaining US-Dollar bank borrowings - showed a net derivative liability of Rp55,764M as of September 30, 2016, the first time in this backlog the position had moved to the liability side. As of December 31, 2016, the same book of swaps (gross assets of Rp2,407,755M against gross liabilities of Rp2,366,454M across four counterparty banks) shows a net derivative asset of Rp41,301M again - back in line with every year-end reading in this backlog before September's brief flip. As before, the swing reflects Rupiah-Dollar movements rather than any change in the company's actual currency exposure, which remains fully hedged.
A related-party working-capital loan that was being repaid ahead of schedule got redrawn instead
The Rp300,000M working-capital loan from PT United Tractors Tbk, earmarked for financing the company's own customers' heavy-equipment purchases, carried an outstanding balance of Rp136,235M as of September 30, 2016 - more than half repaid on a 12-installment quarterly schedule. As of December 31, 2016, the outstanding balance is Rp217,529M - higher than the September figure, meaning the company drew down against the facility again in the fourth quarter rather than continuing to amortize it down. The facility remains well within its Rp300,000M ceiling and is secured by the company's own finance lease and consumer financing receivables, but the repayment pattern flagged as unusually fast last quarter didn't continue in a straight line.
A shortened bond-issuance shelf drew heavily in its first two quarters of life
The Rp5 trillion "PUB III" bond shelf that went effective in October 2016 wasn't the only shelf drawn on this year: total bonds outstanding grew from a nominal Rp1,430,000M at year-end 2015 to Rp2,875,000M at year-end 2016, via two separate Rp1 trillion tranches - one issued in February 2016 under the company's earlier "PUB II" shelf (370-day/2-year/3-year tenors at 9.75%/10.25%/10.75%), and one issued in October 2016 as the first tranche under the new PUB III shelf (370-day/3-year/5-year tenors at 8.10%/8.80%/9.10%). Total securities issued (bonds plus MTNs) grew 76.4% year-over-year to Rp2,965,295M - still well short of the Rp5 trillion PUB III ceiling on its own, but the combined draw pushed the gross debt-to-equity ratio back up to ~1.80x after three straight quarters of decline (see Key Operational Metrics above).
The full-year prior-year tax adjustment turned out to be a normal-sized number after all
Last quarter's filing showed a nine-month "adjustment respect of prior year" tax reconciliation item of Rp22,435M, more than 200 times the year-earlier nine-month figure and flagged here as worth watching given a fiscal-2011 tax dispute that had simultaneously dropped out of disclosure. The full-year figure is Rp23,267M for 2016 against Rp22,261M for 2015 - essentially flat year-over-year once the fourth quarter of each year is included, since a comparable-sized prior-year adjustment turns out to have existed in full-year 2015 too, just outside the nine-month window used in the earlier comparison. The fiscal-2011 dispute itself still isn't mentioned in this filing.
The interim dividend for a still-open fiscal year grew alongside profit
The company declared an interim cash dividend of Rp150 per share (Rp224,465M) from fiscal-2016 profits, paid 16 December 2016 - up from the Rp138-per-share (Rp216,103M) interim declared from fiscal-2015 profits at the same point the prior year. Total cash dividends paid during 2016 were Rp331,058M, combining this interim tranche with the final Rp106,840M tranche of the fiscal-2015 dividend paid in May 2016; the final tranche of fiscal-2016's own dividend (and its resulting full-year payout ratio) awaits the 2017 shareholders' meeting.
Target Valuation Range
Market cap ~Rp5,237,534M (~$389.8M) at ~6.7x full-year P/E and ~1.2x P/B - fairly valued, tilting cheap, for a lender growing net income above 20% a year, with a credit-quality signal that's genuinely ambiguous rather than clearly deteriorating - not expensive even after accounting for the write-off-policy caveat above.
Shares closed at approximately Rp3,500 on December 30, 2016 - up from Rp3,300 three months earlier (converted from a market-data pull that reflects the company's later 10-for-1 stock split in June 2017, since price data fetched today for this period is retroactively split-adjusted). Against this quarter's own numbers, using 1,496,438,362 shares outstanding net of treasury stock:
| Market cap buildup | Q4 2016 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp3,500 |
| Shares outstanding | 1,496,438,362 |
| Market capitalization | Rp5,237,534M (~$389.8M) |
| Book value (total equity) | Rp4,254,684M |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | Q3 2016 | Q4 2016 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | ~6.9x | ~6.7x (full-year basic EPS Rp524) | roughly flat |
| P/B | ~1.2x | ~1.2x | flat |
This sits close to September's ~6.9x P/E and ~1.2x P/B despite the share price rising further - full-year EPS growing faster than the annualized nine-month estimate it's now being compared against roughly offsets the price move. A full multi-year DCF still isn't included here: four data points across roughly 15 months is more than this backlog had before, but a real multi-year lending-growth and cost-of-funds model needs several full fiscal years to anchor a terminal growth assumption with any confidence, and this is only the first of those. The peer-multiple read above remains the honest valuation lens for now.
Within the trailing two years, shares moved from a low of roughly Rp2,470 (May 2016) to this quarter's Rp3,500 close - a rise of about 42% low-to-high, continuing the steady re-rating described in the first post in this backlog rather than marking a new, separate story. The final three months alone added another 6.1% (Rp3,300 to Rp3,500).
PT BFI Finance Indonesia Tbk's audited financial statements as of and for the year ended 31 December 2016 (with comparative figures for 31 December 2015, as reclassified), authorized for issuance 17 February 2017, together with the company's FY16 results presentation dated February 2017.