One Quarter Undid What Four Quarters Built
FY2024's post closed on a genuinely encouraging streak: Cost of Credit, NPF, Net Interest Spread, Cost to Income, ROAA, and ROAE all improving sequentially every quarter from Q2 2024 onward. Q1 2025 breaks that streak in the one direction this backlog hadn't yet had to write about - Cost of Credit jumped to 4.4% for the quarter, up 157 basis points from Q4 2024's 2.8% and now sitting above even Q1 2024's own 3.7%, per the company's own disclosed ratio. NPF ticked up to 1.30%, from Q4's 1.25% and Q1 2024's 1.24% - a small move in absolute terms, but the first sequential worsening in five straight quarters. The company's own presentation attributes the Cost of Credit jump to "additional provision for impairment losses for financing and sharia receivables, and loss on repossessed assets," the same category of driver named at prior turning points in this backlog, without further specifics on which segment or vintage is behind it.
What makes this quarter genuinely confusing rather than simply bad is that net income still rose 12.2% year-over-year to Rp405,492M, and profit before tax rose 12.4% to Rp499,355M, both comfortably ahead of Q1 2024's own weak comparison base. Total Income grew 6.8% year-over-year to Rp1,656,215M, while operating expenses fell - Cost to Income improved 528 basis points year-over-year to 42.7%, continuing the efficiency gains this backlog has tracked since 2024's trough. So the quarter reads as two separate stories moving in opposite directions at once: the profit-and-loss line looks like the credit cycle kept healing, while the credit-quality ratios say it just relapsed. Quarter-over-quarter, the two stories agree with each other for once - net income fell 9.8% from Q4's Rp449,766M, tracking the same direction as the worsening ratios - which makes the year-over-year comparison the one doing the disagreeing, purely because Q1 2024 was still a weak quarter in its own right.
The segment breakdown offers the first genuinely positive read on asset quality in over a year: all three of BFI's segments - Cars, Motorcycles, and Others - posted year-over-year profit-before-tax growth this quarter, the first time this backlog has recorded that since Others reversed into a full-year decline at FY2024. See All Three Segments, Finally Moving Together below for how unevenly that growth is actually distributed.
The Prescription
A quarter where every headline profit number improved while the two ratios that actually describe loan-book health both reversed is exactly the kind of divergence a segment-level Cost of Credit and NPF breakdown would resolve - the request this backlog has made every quarter since 9M 2023 is more urgent now than at any point since then. Without it, a reader can't tell whether this quarter's CoC jump is a single large repossession-related write-off concentrated in one segment (plausible, given how sharply the ratio moved in one quarter) or a broader deterioration spreading gradually across the book - and the company's own one-line attribution in the presentation doesn't distinguish between those two very different stories.
What the company should stop doing: treating a change of remedy for the treasury-share overhang as something that doesn't need explaining in its own right. Shareholders approved a specific mechanism in 2022 - selling the 927,732,000 remaining treasury shares to Trinugraha Capital or third parties - and three full years of this backlog have tracked that mechanism sitting at zero execution (see Beyond the Usual below). Putting cancellation on an AGM agenda instead, with the original transfer deadline six months away, is a real change in direction for a governance commitment shareholders explicitly voted on - and it deserves its own explanation to those shareholders, not a single bullet point in an investor deck.
Key Financial Metrics
Three months ended 31 March 2025 vs. three months ended 31 March 2024
FX: Rp16,652 = USD 1 (31 March 2025 close, the period-end date), following the convention used throughout this backlog. Both periods below are converted at this same rate for comparability - it is not a historical rate for the Q1 2024 column.
| Metric | Q1 2025 (IDR) | Q1 2025 (USD) | Q1 2024 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Income ("Net Revenue" equivalent) | Rp1,656,215M | ~$99.5M | Rp1,551,397M | ✅ +6.8% |
| Profit Before Tax ("Operating Income" equivalent) | Rp499,355M | ~$30.0M | Rp444,307M | ✅ +12.4% |
| Net Income | Rp405,492M | ~$24.3M | Rp361,440M | ✅ +12.2% |
| Total Cash and Cash Equivalents | Rp1,276,978M | ~$76.7M | Rp1,327,667M | ⚠️ -3.8% |
Profit before tax remains the closest operating-income equivalent for this lender, as established throughout this backlog. Basic earnings per share rose to Rp27 for Q1 2025 from Rp24 a year earlier (+12.5%), on an unchanged weighted-average share count. Operating cash outflow grew to Rp379,484M (from Rp345,558M a year earlier) as new-financing disbursements (Rp6,198,808M) outpaced financing-transaction collections (Rp6,227,460M) by a wider margin than a year ago, even with joint-financing cash receipts nearly quintupling to Rp720,939M. Total cash fell 3.8% year-over-year to Rp1,276,978M, continuing the multi-year decline from the post-bond-issuance peak this backlog has tracked since 2021.
New bookings grew 23.6% year-over-year to Rp5,912 billion, while Total Income grew 6.8% over the same period. That gap is wider than FY2024's own 5.1%-bookings-versus-flat-revenue divergence, but it's the ordinary lag of an installment lender's business model rather than a misdirection - new bookings convert to interest income over the life of each loan, not immediately, and Q1 2024's own bookings were unusually weak (the easy comparison this backlog flagged when covering that quarter). Quarter-over-quarter, bookings grew just 1.3% (from Q4's Rp5,835 billion), a real deceleration from Q4's own 13.7% quarter-over-quarter jump - the growth streak continued, but at a much slower pace.
| Balance sheet metric | 31 Mar 2025 (IDR) | 31 Mar 2025 (USD) | 31 Dec 2024 (IDR) | QoQ ∆ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp25,687,033M | ~$1,542.4M | Rp25,119,820M | ✅ +2.3% |
| Financing Receivables (net) | Rp22,712,164M | ~$1,363.7M | Rp22,012,814M | ✅ +3.2% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp15,019,454M | ~$902.0M | Rp14,938,155M | ⚠️ +0.5% |
| Fund Borrowings (net) | Rp11,169,445M | ~$670.7M | Rp10,822,571M | ⚠️ +3.2% |
| Securities Issued (bonds, net) | Rp2,710,126M | ~$162.8M | Rp2,935,877M | ✅ -7.7% |
| Total Equity | Rp10,667,579M | ~$640.7M | Rp10,181,665M | ✅ +4.8% |
Debt-to-equity» (fund borrowings plus bonds, over equity, following this backlog's convention) improved to roughly 1.30x, from FY2024's 1.35x and Q1 2024's 1.36x - a genuine continuation of the de-leveraging this backlog first flagged reversing at 9M 2024, not just a one-quarter blip this time. Bonds outstanding fell 7.7% quarter-over-quarter as repayments (Rp227,000M) outpaced new issuance, continuing the multi-quarter shrinkage of BFI's bond book as a share of total funding. The related-party PT United Tractors Tbk facility - flagged since Q1 2020 - kept amortizing on schedule, its drawn balance falling to Rp269,166M from FY2024's Rp311,544M (-13.6%), against an unchanged Rp1,250,000M limit.
Key Operational Metrics
- New financing originations: Rp5,912 billion for Q1 2025 (excluding Pinjam Modal channeling), up 23.6% year-over-year from Q1 2024's Rp4,783 billion, on an easy comparison against last year's own weak quarter; up 1.3% quarter-over-quarter from Q4's Rp5,835 billion, a sharp deceleration from Q4's own 13.7% quarter-over-quarter jump.
- Managed receivables (including off-balance-sheet joint financing, per the deck): Rp25,406 billion at quarter-end, up 12.8% year-over-year and 5.3% quarter-over-quarter from Q4's Rp24,133 billion.
- Non-Performing Financing (NPF) (company's own disclosed figure», gross basis): 1.30% for Q1 2025, up 6 basis points year-over-year from Q1 2024's 1.24%, and up 5 basis points quarter-over-quarter from Q4's 1.25% - the first sequential worsening since Q1 2024's own trough. NPF coverage fell to 2.8x, down from Q1 2024's 2.9x but up from Q4's 2.7x.
- Cost of Credit (CoC): 4.4% for Q1 2025, up 157 basis points quarter-over-quarter from Q4's 2.8%, and up 74 basis points year-over-year from Q1 2024's 3.7% - reversing the improvement this backlog tracked across all of 2024, with the company's presentation attributing the jump to additional provisioning and loss on repossessed assets, without segment-level detail.
- Net Interest Spread: 11.8% for Q1 2025, down 29bps from Q1 2024's 12.1% and down 10bps from Q4's 11.9% - a continuation of the multi-year compression this backlog has tracked, not a new development.
- Cost to Income: 42.7% for Q1 2025, down 528bps from Q1 2024's 48.0% and down 208bps from Q4's 44.8% - the fifth straight quarterly improvement in this ratio.
- Return on average assets (after tax): 6.5% for Q1 2025, up 42bps from Q1 2024's 6.1%, but down 92bps from Q4's 7.4%.
- Return on average equity (after tax): 15.5% for Q1 2025, up 61bps from Q1 2024's 14.9%, but down 192bps from Q4's 17.4%.
- Earnings per share: Rp27 basic for Q1 2025, up from Rp24 a year earlier (see Key Financial Metrics above).
The pattern here is genuinely new for this backlog: every profitability ratio (Cost to Income, ROAA, ROAE) improved year-over-year, while both asset-quality ratios (NPF, Cost of Credit) worsened year-over-year - the opposite mix from FY2024, where profitability metrics had lagged while credit metrics led the recovery. Quarter-over-quarter, everything moved together in the same, weaker direction, which is the more conventional read: Q1 is typically BFI's seasonally softer quarter after Q4's collection push, a pattern worth keeping in mind before treating this quarter's ratio reversal as a new structural trend rather than a normal seasonal step-down that happens to look sharper this year.
All Three Segments, Finally Moving Together
The company reports Cars, Motorcycles, and Others on the same basis as every prior period in this backlog.
Cars - still the largest segment: Rp1,130,083M of income for Q1 2025 (68.2% of total, up from Q1 2024's 67.8%), up 7.4% year-over-year, with profit before tax rising 11.4% YoY to Rp325,149M from Rp291,792M and margin improving to 28.8% from 27.7%.
Motorcycles - Rp250,909M of income (15.2% of total, down from Q1 2024's 16.4%), down 1.4% YoY as the book keeps shrinking - but profit before tax rose 24.5% YoY to Rp96,367M from Rp77,389M, with margin jumping to 38.4% from 30.4%, the segment's most profitable quarter (by margin) in this backlog.
Others (heavy equipment/machinery, property, and sharia financing) - Rp275,223M of income (16.6% of total, up from Q1 2024's 15.8%), up 12.5% YoY - but profit before tax rose just 3.6% YoY to Rp77,839M from Rp75,126M, with margin actually compressing to 28.3% from 30.7% even as both income and profit grew. This is the segment to watch: it swung to a 19.8% year-over-year profit decline in Q4 2024 alone, and while Q1 2025 turned that back to growth, the margin compression happening at the same time suggests the segment's underlying cost or provisioning pressure from Q4 hasn't fully cleared, even as the headline profit number recovered.
All three segments posting year-over-year profit growth in the same quarter is a genuine first for this backlog - FY2024 closed with only Motorcycles managing that for the full year. But the growth isn't evenly distributed: Motorcycles' 24.5% growth and Cars' 11.4% are doing the real work, while Others' 3.6% is barely ahead of its own revenue growth, meaning almost none of that segment's extra income actually reached the bottom line this quarter.
Beyond the Usual
The restructured-loan balance stays missing for a fourth straight filing
H1 2024 removed the restructured-loan balance from the financing-receivables note, 9M 2024 didn't restore it, and neither did the FY2024 annual report - the filing with the most room and scrutiny of any in BFI's reporting calendar. This quarter's Note 5 - covering gross financing receivables, unearned income, staging by credit-risk tier, and aging buckets across several pages - still carries no line for restructured loans at all. The gap has now held for four consecutive filings, spanning three interim reports and a full annual report.
A different remedy is now on the table for the treasury-share overhang, six months before the original deadline
The 927,732,000 treasury shares - equivalent to 5.81% of total outstanding shares - remained entirely unmoved through Q1 2025: the quarterly report confirms the same 927,732,000-share balance at both 31 March 2025 and 31 December 2024. The transfer deadline set under the 29 June 2022 EGMS resolution is still 5 November 2025, now roughly six months away. But this quarter's investor presentation lists a different item under its "Other" highlights: "Cancellation of treasury shares," alongside the note that new directors were appointed to the Board and that BFI's Annual and Extraordinary General Meeting is scheduled for 8 May 2025. Cancelling the shares outright is not the mechanism shareholders actually approved in 2022 - that mechanism was a sale, either to the controlling shareholder Trinugraha Capital or to third parties - and neither the quarterly financial statements nor the presentation explain what happens to the 2022 mandate if cancellation is what the 8 May meeting actually approves.
The Bank Jago joint-financing facility ceiling was raised to Rp5 trillion in January 2025, and the balance grew with it
BFI's off-balance-sheet joint-financing arrangement with PT Bank Jago Tbk - tracked in this backlog since the relationship's earlier expansions - was amended again on 17 January 2025, raising the facility ceiling to Rp5,000,000M from the Rp2,000,000M set in August 2024, while listing an effective-until date of 5 August 2025 rather than the August 2024 amendment's 2027 date. The joint-financing balance grew alongside the bigger ceiling, up 38.9% quarter-over-quarter to Rp1,701,717M (net Rp1,698,816M) from Rp1,223,408M at year-end. The facilities remain structured without recourse to BFI if a customer defaults, so this growth adds funding capacity and receivables volume without adding credit exposure to BFI's own book.
The direct Bank Jago related-party borrowing kept shrinking
Separate from the joint-financing facility above, BFI's own direct fund-borrowing balance from Bank Jago as a related party fell to Rp135,730M at quarter-end from FY2024's Rp169,094M - a 19.7% quarter-over-quarter decline, continuing the drawdown this backlog first flagged at FY2024. The two Bank Jago relationships keep moving in opposite directions: BFI is winding down its own direct borrowing from the bank while the joint-financing arrangement the two run together for consumers keeps expanding.
Target Valuation Range
Market cap ~Rp12,257,098M (~$736.1M) at ~7.62x TTM P/E and ~1.15x P/B - fairly valued to undervalued against a genuinely improving profit line, but the stock's continued decline reflects real uncertainty about which of this quarter's two contradictory signals - rising profit or reversing credit quality - actually describes where BFI is headed next.
Using 15,039,383,620 shares outstanding net of treasury (unchanged again this quarter - see Beyond the Usual above) and the Rp815 closing price:
| Market cap buildup | Q1 2025 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp815 |
| Shares outstanding | 15,039,383,620 |
| Market capitalization | Rp12,257,098M (~$736.1M) |
| Book value (total equity) | Rp10,667,579M |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | FY2024 | Q1 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E (TTM) | ~9.08x | ~7.62x | down - despite TTM earnings rising 2.8%, a pure price effect |
| P/B | ~1.40x | ~1.15x | down |
Market cap is down 13.8% from FY2024's ~Rp14,212,218M, a fourth straight quarterly decline in market cap even as trailing earnings have now turned upward. TTM P/E uses TTM net income of Rp1,608,726M (FY2024's Rp1,564,674M less Q1 2024's Rp361,440M plus this quarter's Rp405,492M) - unlike the FY2024-versus-9M2024 comparison, the compression is happening while TTM earnings are actually rising, not falling. Over the trailing two years (March 2023 through March 2025), the stock ranged from Rp815 (this quarter's own closing price, a new two-year low) to Rp1,430 (June 2023's two-year high) - a 75.5% swing, wider than FY2024's own 59.8%-reading window purely because the low itself dropped further this quarter; the actual price path has been a steady multi-quarter decline from Rp1,340 a year ago (Q1 2024's close) down through Rp945 (year-end 2024) to Rp815 now, a cumulative 39.2% drop over four quarters that has tracked almost none of the profit recovery this post's own numbers describe. At ~7.62x trailing earnings and ~1.15x book against a 15.5% quarterly ROAE, the market is pricing in considerably more caution about BFI's credit cycle than this quarter's own profit-and-loss line argues for - caution this quarter's own ratio reversal at least partially justifies, even if the bottom line hasn't caught up to it yet.
PT BFI Finance Indonesia Tbk's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the three-month period ended 31 March 2025 (with comparative figures for 31 March 2024), together with the company's Q1 2025 investor presentation dated 28 April 2025.