BFIN Book Value Just Fell Below Book - Is the Market Pricing in a Credit Crisis That Isn't in the Numbers?

A Year That Decelerated, Then a Quarter That Reversed It

9M 2025's post closed on a genuinely rare alignment: every quarter-over-quarter credit and profitability ratio in BFI's own table moving the favorable direction at once, even as two of three segments' standalone Q3 profit had cratered underneath the consolidated number. The full year complicates that read rather than confirming it. Cost of Credit for FY2025 came in at 4.3%, up 88 basis points from FY2024's 3.4% - the worst full-year reading since the 2023 cyberattack-era peak - and NPF (gross) rose 14 basis points year-over-year to 1.39%, even though both figures improved sequentially in the fourth quarter alone (Cost of Credit eased to 3.5% in Q4, down from Q3's 4.5%; NPF fell to 1.39% from Q3's 1.55% - a fourth-quarter number that happens to equal the full-year figure exactly, since Q4 is the year's final data point). Net income grew just 1.1% year-over-year to Rp1,581,490M, the slowest full-year growth rate in this backlog's post-pandemic history, on Total Income up a healthier 6.5% to Rp6,747,819M - the gap between top-line growth and bottom-line growth is almost entirely the credit-cost story.

What the annual figures add that 9M's post couldn't yet show is where the year's credit deterioration actually landed. Segment-level profit before tax for the full year: Cars +11.6% YoY to Rp1,379,872M, Motorcycles +0.9% YoY to Rp374,661M, Others -31.4% YoY to Rp218,548M - see Three Segments, One Widening Gap below. Reconstructing Q4 alone from the FY and 9M figures shows Others fell an estimated 37.4% year-over-year in the fourth quarter by itself, extending 9M's own -48.0% Q3-alone finding into a second consecutive quarter of standalone collapse for the same segment - a trend now spanning two full quarters, not a one-off.

Layered on top: the 190-million-share buyback flagged as newly opened at 9M ran its full course to completion within the fourth quarter, and BFI's own March 2026 investor presentation discloses a third buyback program already in progress - one the audited annual report's own events-after-the-reporting-period note doesn't mention at all. See Beyond the Usual below.

The Prescription

BFI should publish the segment-level asset-quality ratio (NPF or an equivalent) this backlog has requested since 9M 2023, and this year's own numbers make the case more urgently than any prior period. Others' profit before tax has now fallen an estimated 48.0% and 37.4% year-over-year in two consecutive standalone quarters (Q3 and Q4 2025), while the segment note's provision-for-impairment line shows Others absorbing Rp197,278M for the year against Rp1,144,598M of segment income - a materially higher provision-to-income ratio than Cars' Rp729,458M against Rp4,547,920M. That's suggestive, but a reader still can't tell whether Others is genuinely underperforming on credit quality or simply carries a smaller, lumpier book (heavy equipment, property, Sharia) where a handful of large accounts move the ratio disproportionately. A segment NPF line would resolve that ambiguity in one disclosure, rather than leaving it to be inferred from a note that wasn't built to answer the question.

What BFI should stop doing: running three distinct buyback authorizations inside eighteen months without ever describing them as a single, coherent capital-return program. The 927,732,000-share overhang was cancelled via Capital Reduction in July 2025; a fresh POJK 13/2023 market-stabilization buyback (up to Rp500 billion) opened days later and bought back 190,000,000 shares by year-end; and BFI's own March 2026 presentation now discloses a further buyback running through 23 May 2026, with 70.5 million shares (~Rp54 billion) already repurchased. Each is legally distinct, and each disclosure is individually compliant - but a shareholder watching three separate treasury-share actions in year-and-a-half, two of which the company itself frames as "market stabilization," is owed a single sentence tying them together: is this capital return, price support, or opportunistic buying at a multi-year-low valuation? Right now each program reads as a standalone regulatory filing rather than part of one articulated capital-allocation stance.

Key Financial Metrics

Year ended 31 December 2025 vs. year ended 31 December 2024

FX: Rp16,782 = USD 1 (31 December 2025 Bank Indonesia mid rate, the period-end date), following the convention used throughout this backlog.

Metric	FY2025 (IDR)	FY2025 (USD)	FY2024 (IDR)	YoY
Total Income ("Net Revenue" equivalent)	Rp6,747,819M	~$402.0M	Rp6,335,070M	✅ +6.5%
Profit Before Tax ("Operating Income" equivalent)	Rp1,973,081M	~$117.6M	Rp1,926,614M	✅ +2.4%
Net Income	Rp1,581,490M	~$94.2M	Rp1,564,674M	⚠️ +1.1%
Total Cash and Cash Equivalents	Rp1,552,212M	~$92.5M	Rp1,614,126M	⚠️ -3.8%

Profit before tax remains the closest operating-income equivalent for this lender, as established throughout this backlog. Net income's 1.1% growth is the slowest full-year rate this backlog has recorded since FY2023's outright decline, even as Total Income grew 6.5% - the entire gap traces to Cost of Credit (see Key Operational Metrics below), not a revenue problem. Basic earnings per share fell to Rp103 for FY2025 from Rp104 a year earlier (-1.0%), on a weighted-average share count that rose to 15,396,017,365 (from 15,039,383,620) as the Capital Reduction and buyback activity moved through the year at different times rather than offsetting cleanly. Net cash from operating activities more than tripled to Rp1,413,431M (from Rp489,540M, per this filing's own comparative column) as collections continued to outpace new-financing cash outlays; investing outflow widened modestly to Rp143,587M (from Rp105,240M) on higher fixed-asset and intangible-asset spend. Total cash fell 3.8% year-over-year to Rp1,552,212M, continuing the gradual, multi-year decline from the 2021 post-bond-issuance peak this backlog has tracked since.

New financing bookings grew 9.3% year-over-year to Rp21,922 billion for the year, per the company's own presentation, while Total Income - the closest net-revenue equivalent this backlog tracks - grew just 6.5% over the same period - the ordinary lag of an installment lender's business model, since new bookings convert to income only over the life of each loan, as this backlog has established repeatedly. Q4 alone came in at Rp5,547 billion, up 1.2% quarter-over-quarter from Q3's Rp5,480 billion - a fourth consecutive quarter of sequential growth, though the smallest sequential gain of the four.

Balance sheet metric	31 Dec 2025 (IDR)	31 Dec 2025 (USD)	31 Dec 2024 (IDR)	YoY
Total Assets	Rp25,472,524M	~$1,517.9M	Rp25,119,820M	✅ +1.4%
Financing Receivables (net)	Rp22,394,470M	~$1,334.3M	Rp22,012,814M	✅ +1.7%
Total Liabilities	Rp14,819,233M	~$883.0M	Rp14,938,155M	✅ -0.8%
Fund Borrowings (net)	Rp10,370,062M	~$617.9M	Rp10,822,571M	✅ -4.2%
Securities Issued (bonds, net)	Rp3,225,459M	~$192.2M	Rp2,935,877M	⚠️ +9.9%
Total Equity	Rp10,653,291M	~$634.8M	Rp10,181,665M	✅ +4.6%

Debt-to-equity^» (fund borrowings plus bonds, over equity, following this backlog's convention) came in at roughly 1.28x for FY2025, down from FY2024's 1.35x but up from 9M 2025's own 1.23x - a partial reversal of the de-leveraging 9M reported, as bond issuance (securities issued grew 9.9% year-over-year) outpaced the continued paydown of fund borrowings in the year's final quarter. Including the off-balance-sheet joint-financing balance, the company's own "proforma debt" figure of Rp16,413 billion is up 9.6% year-over-year from Rp14,982 billion - still the faster-growing debt measure, driven by the Bank Jago joint-financing book (see Beyond the Usual below). The related-party PT United Tractors Tbk facility - flagged since Q1 2020 - kept amortizing on schedule, its drawn balance falling to Rp171,543M from FY2024's Rp311,544M (-44.9%), against an unchanged Rp1,250,000M limit.

Key Operational Metrics

• New financing originations: Rp21,922 billion for FY2025 (excluding Pinjam Modal channeling), up 9.3% year-over-year from FY2024's Rp20,054 billion; Q4 alone rose 1.2% quarter-over-quarter to Rp5,547 billion from Q3's Rp5,480 billion.
• Managed receivables (including off-balance-sheet joint financing, per the deck): Rp26,283 billion at year-end, up 8.9% year-over-year and 1.1% quarter-over-quarter from Q3's Rp25,992 billion.
• Non-Performing Financing (NPF) (company's own disclosed figure^», gross basis): 1.39% for FY2025, up 14 basis points year-over-year from FY2024's 1.25%, but down 16 basis points quarter-over-quarter from Q3's 1.55%. Net NPF stood at 0.22% (industry average: 2.51% gross / 0.77% net, per OJK data cited in the company's own media release). NPF coverage improved to 2.7x, up from Q3's 2.5x and flat year-over-year against FY2024's 2.7x.
• Cost of Credit (CoC): 4.3% for FY2025, up 88 basis points year-over-year from FY2024's 3.4% - the company's presentation again attributes the rise to additional provisioning and loss on repossessed assets; Q4 2025 alone improved to 3.5%, down 95 basis points from Q3's 4.5%, the sharpest single-quarter improvement in this ratio since the FY2023-to-Q4 reversal this backlog tracked two years ago.
• Net Interest Spread: 11.7% for FY2025, down 19bps year-over-year from FY2024's 11.9%; Q4 alone was 12.0%, up 36bps from Q3's 11.6% - a genuine quarterly improvement even as the full-year figure kept compressing.
• Cost to Income: 44.2% for FY2025, down 214bps year-over-year from FY2024's 46.4% - a real full-year improvement; but Q4 alone rose sharply to 48.1%, up 520bps from Q3's 42.9%, the steepest single-quarter deterioration in this ratio this backlog has tracked, on higher operating expenses (up 8.0% quarter-over-quarter) against a smaller profit base.
• Return on average assets (after tax): 6.3% for FY2025, down 21bps year-over-year from FY2024's 6.5%; Q4 alone was 6.6%, up 17bps from Q3's 6.4%.
• Return on average equity (after tax): 14.8% for FY2025, down 89bps year-over-year from FY2024's 15.7%; Q4 alone was 15.3%, up 23bps from Q3's 15.0%.
• Earnings per share: Rp103 basic for FY2025, down from Rp104 a year earlier (see Key Financial Metrics above).

The pattern is genuinely two-sided this year, more than any prior period in this backlog: every ratio worsened year-over-year on a full-year basis (CoC, NPF, Net Interest Spread, ROAA, ROAE all moved the unfavorable direction), while Cost of Credit, NPF, ROAA, ROAE, and Net Interest Spread all improved quarter-over-quarter in Q4 alone - only Cost to Income broke that pattern, worsening sharply in Q4. A full year of gradually rising credit cost closed on its best single quarter of the year for credit quality, but its worst quarter for expense discipline - two different stories depending on which ratio a reader looks at.

Three Segments, One Widening Gap

The company reports Cars, Motorcycles, and Others on the same full-year basis as every prior period in this backlog.

Cars - still the largest segment: Rp4,547,920M of income for FY2025 (67.4% of total, down marginally from FY2024's 67.8%), up 5.9% year-over-year, with profit before tax rising 11.6% YoY to Rp1,379,872M from Rp1,236,814M and margin improving to 30.3% from 28.8%. Reconstructing Q4 alone from the FY and 9M figures gives an estimated profit before tax of roughly Rp367,075M, essentially flat year-over-year (+0.2%) against an estimated Q4 2024 figure of approximately Rp366,237M - Cars' growth for the year came almost entirely from the first three quarters.

Motorcycles - Rp1,055,301M of income (15.6% of total, down from FY2024's 15.9%), up 4.9% year-over-year, with profit before tax essentially flat year-over-year at Rp374,661M (+0.9% from Rp371,199M) and margin easing slightly to 35.5% from 36.9%. Estimated Q4-alone profit before tax of roughly Rp113,051M is up an estimated 10.7% year-over-year from approximately Rp102,141M - a real fourth-quarter acceleration masked by a flat full-year figure, since 9M 2025 itself already showed Motorcycles down 2.8% year-over-year.

Others (heavy equipment/machinery, property, and Sharia financing) - Rp1,144,598M of income (17.0% of total, up from FY2024's 16.3%), up 10.5% year-over-year - but profit before tax fell 31.4% YoY to Rp218,548M from Rp318,601M, with margin compressing sharply to 19.1% from 30.6%. This is the steepest full-year segment decline in this backlog's history for any segment outside a pandemic or cyberattack-affected period. Reconstructing Q4 alone gives an estimated profit before tax of roughly Rp53,285M, down an estimated 37.4% year-over-year from approximately Rp85,098M - a second consecutive quarter (following 9M's own estimated Q3-alone decline of 48.0%) of standalone profit collapse for the same segment, not a one-quarter blip.

Nine months in, this backlog flagged Others as the segment whose Q3-alone decline was masked by a milder cumulative figure. The full year confirms that wasn't a single bad quarter: Others' estimated standalone profit fell roughly 48% in Q3 and roughly 37% in Q4 - two different quarters, the same direction, and now a full year in which Others is the only segment to post a genuine year-over-year profit decline. Cars and Motorcycles both grew (Motorcycles only barely), leaving Others as the clear outlier - the inverse of FY2023's pattern, when Motorcycles alone carried the year while Cars and Others struggled.

Beyond the Usual

The restructured-loan balance stays missing for a seventh straight filing, now spanning three full annual reports

H1 2024 removed the restructured-loan balance from the financing-receivables note, and neither 9M 2024, FY2024, Q1 2025, H1 2025, nor 9M 2025 restored it. This year's Note 5 again runs several pages of granular detail - gross financing receivables by purpose and contract type, staging by credit-risk tier, aging buckets, allowance movements broken out by individual versus collective assessment - without a single line for restructured loans. The gap has now held for seven consecutive filings, spanning five interim reports and two full annual reports, through a year in which Cost of Credit and NPF both moved meaningfully worse.

A third buyback program is underway, disclosed only in the investor presentation - not in the audited annual report's own subsequent-events note

The 190,000,000-share buyback under the market-stabilization program opened in early August 2025 ran to its 31 October 2025 close, with the company disclosing a final total of 190,000,000 shares repurchased for Rp147,314M by year-end - up sharply from the 19,751,300 shares disclosed at the nine-month mark, meaning most of the buyback's execution happened in the final two months of the program. The annual report's own events-after-the-reporting-period note, signed 5 March 2026, discloses only two subsequent events: a scheduled bond repayment on 26 January 2026, and the 14 January 2026 shareholder decision to relinquish PT FIT's peer-to-peer lending license (see below). It says nothing about a further buyback. Yet the company's own investor presentation, dated five days later on 10 March 2026, discloses a third buyback program already running through 23 May 2026, with 70.5 million shares (~Rp54 billion) repurchased as of the presentation date. Whatever the timing or authorization behind this newest program, it isn't in the one document built to disclose events between the balance-sheet date and the financial statements' issuance.

BFI is giving up the peer-to-peer lending license it once called a first for an Indonesian multifinance company

On 14 January 2026 (a subsequent event), PT FIT's shareholders approved discontinuing its business as an Information Technology-Based Joint Funding Services Provider (the regulatory category for peer-to-peer lending, LPBBTI) and applied to OJK on 20 January 2026 to have the license revoked. This is the same PinjamModal.id platform this backlog noted at H1 2020 as making BFI the first Indonesian multifinance company to own a licensed P2P platform - a five-year-old diversification effort now being unwound rather than expanded, with no explanation offered beyond the bare fact of the shareholders' decision.

Legal cases held roughly flat, but administrative sanctions nearly doubled

Ongoing legal cases edged up to 57 at year-end (from FY2024's 56), with total outstanding principal across all of them at Rp8.8 billion - 0.03% of total managed receivables, immaterial by the company's own assessment and this backlog's read of the case count relative to receivables. Separately, BFI received 15 administrative sanctions from OJK during 2025 (5 fines, 3 written reprimands, 7 written warnings) - nearly double FY2024's 8 sanctions. The underlying causes are the same routine compliance friction as last year - delayed or corrected debtor-report submissions through the SLIK credit-reporting system account for the majority of both years' sanctions - but the near-doubling in count is worth tracking into next year's filing to see whether it's a genuine compliance slippage or a regulator applying stricter enforcement across the industry.

The Bank Jago off-balance-sheet joint-financing balance more than doubled year-over-year

The net joint-financing balance with PT Bank Jago Tbk grew to Rp2,817,264M at year-end, from FY2024's Rp1,223,408M - up 130.2% year-over-year, continuing the pattern flagged since Q1 2025's ceiling increase of the facility's Rp5 trillion ceiling (through August 2027) filling up faster than the ceiling itself has needed raising again this year. This arrangement stays off BFI's own balance sheet even as it's now large enough, on its own, to move the company's "proforma debt" figure meaningfully above its on-balance-sheet debt trend (see Key Financial Metrics above).

Target Valuation Range

Market cap ~Rp10,394,569M (~$619.4M) at ~6.57x FY2025 P/E and ~0.98x P/B - the stock is now pricing in more credit-cycle pessimism than the company's own full-year numbers support - a 1.1% net income gain and a genuine fourth-quarter credit-quality recovery closed a year in which the shares fell to a level that puts BFI below its own book value for the first time outside the 2020 pandemic crash.

Using 14,849,383,620 shares outstanding net of treasury (15,039,383,620 issued and paid-up shares, less 190,000,000 shares held in treasury under the buyback completed this year - see Beyond the Usual above) and the Rp700 closing price:

Market cap buildup	FY2025
Share price (period-end)	Rp700
Shares outstanding	14,849,383,620
Market capitalization	Rp10,394,569M (~$619.4M)
Book value (total equity)	Rp10,653,291M

Peer-multiple sanity check	9M 2025	FY2025	Change
P/E	~7.11x (TTM)	~6.57x	down - a pure price effect, FY2025 net income modestly higher than 9M's TTM figure
P/B	~1.05x	~0.98x	down - first time below book value outside the 2020 pandemic crash

Market cap is down 9.5% from Q3 2025's implied ~Rp11,490,019M, on a lower share count (buyback) and a lower price. P/E uses FY2025 net income of Rp1,581,490M. The stock fell from Rp765 at September's close to Rp700 by year-end - every year-end and quarter-end since FY2020 traded above 1x book until now (Q1 2020 alone saw P/B fall as low as ~0.57x, recovering gradually through the rest of that year). Over the trailing two years (January 2024 through December 2025), the stock ranged from Rp700 (this quarter's own close, a fresh two-year low) to Rp1,380 (February 2024's two-year high) - a 96.9% swing, the widest this backlog has ever recorded for BFI, and one that ended at the low end rather than the high end. The path since September: Rp765 (Sep) → Rp805 (Oct, a brief bounce) → Rp750 (Nov) → Rp700 (Dec) - a resumed decline after Q3's own stabilization, not a reversal of it. At ~6.57x trailing earnings and ~0.98x book against a 14.8% full-year ROAE, the market is pricing BFI as though its credit cycle were deteriorating faster than the company's own Q4 ratios actually show - a genuine disconnect between price and the most recent quarter's own numbers, in the opposite direction from FY2024's own disconnect, where the stock had fallen even as every metric improved.

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