The Segment That Was Never the Problem Becomes the Only One Left
H1 2024's post closed on a Cost of Credit that had climbed for three straight quarters, new bookings that had just reversed after three quarters of growth, and net profit that had fallen sequentially for four quarters running. Nine months in, most of that has turned: Cost of Credit for the nine months eased to 3.7%, down from 4.5% a year earlier, and fell further still to 3.0% in the third quarter alone - down from Q2's 4.4%, the sharpest single-quarter improvement this backlog has tracked. New bookings, which fell 10.0% quarter-over-quarter in Q2, jumped 19.1% quarter-over-quarter to Rp5,130 billion in Q3 - the highest quarterly figure since the cyberattack-linked downturn of 2023, per the company's own framing. And net profit for Q3 alone rose 32.3% quarter-over-quarter, to Rp429,112M from Q2's Rp324,356M - the first sequential increase after four consecutive quarterly declines this backlog has tracked since Q4 2023.
None of that yet closes the nine-month gap: net income for the period is still down 5.2% year-over-year, to Rp1,114,908M from Rp1,176,201M - a much smaller decline than H1's own 19.2%, but still a decline. What's genuinely new is where the weakness now sits. Every one of BFI's three segments posted a year-over-year profit-before-tax decline in both Q1 and H1 2024. That's no longer true: Motorcycles' profit before tax rose 46.0% year-over-year to Rp269,058M, and Others rose 4.2% to Rp233,503M - only Cars, the segment that was carrying the smallest percentage decline as recently as Q1 2023, is still down, falling 16.5% to Rp870,577M. The segment mix hasn't just reshuffled order (as it did between Q1 and H1) - it's flipped from three decliners to one. See Three Segments, One Recovery below.
The Prescription
A quarter where bookings, Cost of Credit, and profit all moved the right direction at once is the first real evidence this backlog has seen that the credit cycle itself, not just management's booking discipline, has turned - and BFI should lean into it by publishing the segment-level Cost of Credit or NPF breakdown this backlog has asked for since 9M 2023: with Cars now the only segment losing money year-over-year while Motorcycles and Others both grew, a reader still can't tell from the disclosed numbers whether Cars' credit book specifically deteriorated or whether its decline is a volume/mix effect unrelated to asset quality.
What the company should stop doing: treating the restructured-loan balance as immaterial enough to omit indefinitely. H1 2024's filing removed the balance entirely from the financing-receivables note after eight straight filings without the cure rate or second-restructuring share; this filing doesn't restore it either (see Beyond the Usual below). A pool that was worth roughly 0.13% of managed receivables as recently as Q1 2024 costs the company nothing to keep disclosing, and going quiet on it for a second straight filing - in the same quarter the company is otherwise disclosing more, not less, about its credit recovery - reads as an inconsistent standard for what counts as worth telling a reader.
Key Financial Metrics
Nine months ended 30 September 2024 vs. nine months ended 30 September 2023
FX: Rp15,171 = USD 1 (30 September 2024 close, the period-end date). Both periods below are converted at this same rate for comparability, following the convention used throughout this backlog - it is not a historical rate for the 9M 2023 column.
| Metric | 9M 2024 (IDR) | 9M 2024 (USD) | 9M 2023 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Income ("Net Revenue" equivalent) | Rp4,708,513M | ~$310.4M | Rp4,767,691M | ⚠️ -1.2% |
| Profit Before Tax ("Operating Income" equivalent) | Rp1,373,138M | ~$90.5M | Rp1,450,773M | ⚠️ -5.4% |
| Net Income | Rp1,114,908M | ~$73.5M | Rp1,176,201M | ⚠️ -5.2% |
| Total Cash and Cash Equivalents | Rp1,499,940M | ~$98.9M | Rp2,056,836M | ⚠️ -27.1% |
Profit before tax remains the closest operating-income equivalent for this lender, as established throughout this backlog. Total income fell just 1.2% year-over-year - a smaller decline than H1's own 2.8% drop against its comparable period - while operating expenses (including impairment provisions) grew 6.6% year-over-year, still outpacing revenue but by less than in H1. Combined operating and investing cash flow swung from an outflow of Rp465,812M in 9M 2023 to a net inflow this period - a larger swing than H1's own turn positive, driven by financing-transaction cash receipts outpacing new originations by a wider margin than in H1, consistent with the slower net growth in the financing book even as gross bookings themselves recovered in Q3. Total cash fell 27.1% year-over-year to Rp1,499,940M, continuing the decline from 9M 2023's elevated post-bond-issuance level.
Basic earnings per share fell to Rp74 for 9M 2024 from Rp78 a year earlier (-5.1%), on an unchanged weighted-average share count of 15,039,383,620 shares - closely tracking the net-income decline, since neither period carries a one-off item large enough to separate the two.
| Balance sheet metric | 30 Sep 2024 (IDR) | 30 Sep 2024 (USD) | 30 Sep 2023 (IDR) | YoY ∆ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp24,109,096M | ~$1,588.9M | Rp24,165,826M | ✅ -0.2% |
| Financing Receivables (net) | Rp21,130,125M | ~$1,392.8M | Rp20,452,430M | ⚠️ +3.3% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp13,860,038M | ~$913.6M | Rp14,753,585M | ✅ -6.1% |
| Fund Borrowings (net) | Rp9,898,186M | ~$652.5M | Rp9,005,820M | ⚠️ +9.9% |
| Securities Issued (bonds, net) | Rp2,934,563M | ~$193.4M | Rp4,718,307M | ✅ -37.8% |
| Total Equity | Rp10,249,058M | ~$675.7M | Rp9,412,241M | ✅ +8.9% |
Debt-to-equity» (OJK Gearing Ratio) fell further to roughly 1.25x, from H1 2024's 1.41x - a genuine continuation of the de-lever that had briefly reversed between Q1 and H1. Securities issued fell 37.8% year-over-year as Rp2,387,000M of bonds were repaid against just Rp600,000M of new issuance (the first tranche of the Shelf VI program - see Beyond the Usual below), while fund borrowings grew 9.9% to partly fill the gap - the same funding-mix shift toward bank borrowings flagged in H1, now a full three quarters running rather than a one-off bridge. The related-party PT United Tractors Tbk facility - flagged since Q1 2020 - kept amortizing on schedule, its drawn balance falling to Rp335,936M from FY2023's Rp432,257M (-22.3%), still against an unchanged Rp1,250,000M limit and a 27 September 2027 maturity.
Key Operational Metrics
- New financing originations: Rp5,130 billion for Q3 2024 (excluding Pinjam Modal channeling), up 19.1% quarter-over-quarter from Q2's Rp4,306 billion - the sharpest single-quarter recovery in this backlog's booking history and, per the company's own framing, the highest quarterly figure since the 2023 cyberattack-linked downturn. For the nine months, new bookings totaled Rp14,219 billion, down just 1.6% year-over-year from 9M 2023's Rp14,455 billion - a far smaller gap than H1's own 11.8% year-over-year shortfall, meaning Q3's surge did most of the work closing it.
- Managed receivables (including off-balance-sheet joint financing, per the deck): Rp23,003 billion, up 5.0% year-over-year and 2.5% quarter-over-quarter.
- Non-Performing Financing (NPF) (company's own disclosed figure», gross basis): 1.42% at Q3 2024, down 4 basis points quarter-over-quarter from Q2's 1.47% and down 59 basis points year-over-year from Q3 2023's 2.02% - the first year-over-year improvement this backlog has tracked since the credit cycle began deteriorating in 2023. NPF coverage held stable at 2.6x quarter-over-quarter, up from Q3 2023's 2.2x.
- Cost of Credit (CoC): 3.0% for Q3 2024 alone, down 136 basis points quarter-over-quarter from Q2's 4.4% - reversing three straight quarterly increases this backlog tracked through H1; 3.7% for the nine months overall, down 79 basis points from 9M 2023's 4.5%, the company's own presentation attributing the improvement mainly to lower delinquency in the NDF motorcycle book.
- Net Interest Spread: 11.9% for 9M 2024, down 84bps from 9M 2023's 12.7%; 11.8% for Q3 2024 alone, down a further 9bps from Q2's 11.9% - the spread compression itself hasn't reversed even as credit quality has.
- Cost to Income: 46.9% for 9M 2024, up sharply from 43.0% a year earlier (+393bps); 45.2% for Q3 2024 alone, a 258bps improvement from Q2's 47.7%.
- Return on average assets (after tax): 6.2% for 9M 2024, down from 6.5% a year earlier (-24bps); 7.2% for Q3 alone, up sharply from Q2's 5.4%.
- Return on average equity (after tax): 15.1% for 9M 2024, down from 17.1% a year earlier (-195bps); 17.1% for Q3 alone, up from Q2's 13.4%.
- Earnings per share: Rp74 basic for 9M 2024, down from Rp78 a year earlier (see Key Financial Metrics above).
The pattern across every ratio above is the same: the nine-month cumulative figure still reads worse year-over-year, because it's carrying H1's own deterioration, but the third-quarter-alone figure improved on every metric this backlog tracks - NIS, Cost to Income, ROAA, and ROAE all reversed their sequential declines in Q3, the same quarter Cost of Credit and NPF both improved. Indonesia's own industry NPF benchmark stood at 2.66% in August 2024, per the company's disclosure - BFI's 1.42% continues to compare favorably to the sector, and the gap has widened rather than narrowed since H1's 2.77% industry benchmark.
Three Segments, One Recovery - and One Holdout
The company reports Cars, Motorcycles, and Others on the same nine-month basis as every prior period in this backlog.
Cars - still the largest segment: Rp3,188,028M of income for 9M 2024 (67.7% of total, up slightly from 9M 2023's 65.8%), up 1.7% year-over-year on continued volume - but profit before tax fell 16.5% YoY to Rp870,577M from Rp1,042,348M. Cars was H1's deepest percentage decliner at -25.5%; the nine-month figure of -16.5% shows Q3 alone was less severe than H1, but Cars remains the only segment still posting a year-over-year profit decline at all.
Motorcycles - Rp756,965M of income (16.1% of total, down from 9M 2023's 20.0%), down 20.4% YoY on a shrinking book - but profit before tax rose 46.0% YoY to Rp269,058M from Rp184,278M, a segment that had the mildest decline of the three at H1 now posting outright growth. This is the segment flagged in 9M 2023 as having nearly vanished profit for a single quarter (roughly Rp11 billion in Q3 2023 alone) - a year later, its nine-month profit before tax has grown faster than any other segment.
Others (heavy equipment/machinery, property, and sharia financing) - Rp763,520M of income (16.2% of total, up from 9M 2023's 14.3%), up 12.1% YoY on continued growth, with profit before tax up 4.2% YoY to Rp233,503M from Rp224,147M - a genuine turn after H1's 6.4% year-over-year decline.
Cars is now the only one of BFI's three segments posting a year-over-year profit decline - a sharp change from both Q1 and H1 2024, when all three segments fell together. Motorcycles' 46.0% profit growth is the standout, and it lines up with the operational story above: Motorcycles was both the earliest and hardest-hit segment through 2023's credit deterioration, and it's now recovering the fastest. Cars' continued decline, on a book that's still growing its top line, is worth watching precisely because it's now the outlier rather than the pattern - see The Prescription above for why a segment-level credit-quality breakdown would help a reader tell whether this is a Cars-specific asset-quality problem or simply volume/mix.
Beyond the Usual
The restructured-loan balance stays missing for a second straight filing
H1 2024's filing removed the restructured-loan balance from the financing-receivables note entirely, after the cure rate and second-restructuring share had already gone undisclosed for eight consecutive filings. This filing's Note 5 - covering gross financing receivables, unearned income, staging by credit-risk tier, and aging buckets in detail - still carries no line for restructured loans at all, the same total absence flagged last quarter. The gap has now held for two consecutive interim filings, in a quarter where the company is otherwise disclosing more about credit-quality improvement than in any recent period (see Key Operational Metrics above) - making the continued silence specifically on this one line harder to read as incidental.
The Bank Jago facility was renewed for three more years, but BFI cut its own funded share to 1%
The current joint-financing agreement, flagged since H1 2023 as growing steadily, was due to expire 5 August 2024 with no renewal terms disclosed as of H1's own filing. This filing resolves that: on 1 August 2024, BFI signed an Amendment and Restatement of the Joint Financing Facility Agreement with PT Bank Jago Tbk, extending the facility from 5 August 2024 to 5 August 2027. But the amendment also changed the funding split - BFI's own financed portion of each consumer loan under the facility fell from roughly 10% to just 1%, with joint-financing bank partners now funding 99%. The facility's gross balance grew to Rp948,625M as of 30 September 2024, up 52.0% quarter-over-quarter from H1's Rp623,022M net and up 91.7% from FY2023's Rp493,824M net - a much larger number on BFI's books, even as the amended split means BFI's own capital at risk within it is now a smaller fraction of that larger total than before.
The Rp6 trillion bond shelf's first tranche was actually issued, confirming H1's funding-mix shift was a bridge
H1 2024's filing disclosed a newly approved Rp6,000,000 million Shelf Registration Bonds Phase VI program, with a first tranche of roughly Rp600,000M targeted for September 2024. That issuance has now actually happened: Rp600 billion was issued in September 2024, rated AA-(idn) by Fitch Ratings, split across three tenors (1-year at 6.6%, 2-year at 6.8%, 3-year at 6.9%). This confirms H1's own read - that the shift toward bank borrowings while bond issuance shrank was a temporary bridge rather than a change in funding strategy - though the new tranche (Rp600 billion) is still far smaller than the Rp2,387,000M of bonds repaid this same period, so bonds as a share of total funding continue to shrink for now (see Key Financial Metrics above).
The treasury mandate's ninth straight quarter at zero execution continues: the 927,732,000-share tranche authorized for sale to Trinugraha Capital or any other party in the 29 June 2022 EGMS remains entirely unexecuted as of 30 September 2024, against the 5 November 2025 transfer deadline - now roughly 13 months away, with three-quarters of the original ~40-month window elapsed and the disposal still at 0%.
Target Valuation Range
Market cap ~Rp15,640,959M (~$1,031.0M) at ~9.88x TTM P/E and ~1.53x P/B - fairly valued - the credit cycle genuinely appears to be turning, but the market has already started pricing that in, so this isn't the discount Q1's crash or H1's continued deterioration once offered.
Using 15,039,383,620 shares outstanding net of treasury (unchanged again this quarter - see Beyond the Usual above) and the Rp1,040 closing price:
| Market cap buildup | 9M 2024 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp1,040 |
| Shares outstanding | 15,039,383,620 |
| Market capitalization | Rp15,640,959M (~$1,031.0M) |
| Book value (total equity) | Rp10,249,058M |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | H1 2024 | 9M 2024 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E (TTM) | ~9.60x | ~9.88x | up slightly - market cap's 10.1% gain outpaced TTM earnings' 6.8% rise |
| P/B | ~1.47x | ~1.53x | up slightly |
Market cap is up 10.1% from H1 2024's ~Rp14,212,218M. TTM P/E uses TTM net income of Rp1,582,506M (FY2023's Rp1,643,799M less 9M 2023's Rp1,176,201M plus this period's Rp1,114,908M). Over the trailing two years (October 2022 through September 2024), the stock ranged from Rp895 (July 2024's low, early in this quarter) to Rp1,430 (June 2023's two-year high) - a roughly 59.8% swing, well above this backlog's usual >30-40% threshold, though most of that range sits behind this quarter rather than within it: the price itself moved from H1's Rp945 close to this quarter's Rp1,040, a comparatively modest 10.1% quarter-over-quarter recovery partway back up from July's low. At ~9.88x trailing earnings and ~1.53x book against a 15.1% nine-month ROAE, the stock is pricing in a credit-cycle recovery that this quarter's numbers do support - CoC, NPF, bookings, and quarter-over-quarter profit all moved the right direction together for the first time in this backlog - but a reader shouldn't mistake the current multiple for a discount; it's already caught up to the improvement, not still waiting to price it.
PT BFI Finance Indonesia Tbk's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the nine-month period ended 30 September 2024 (with comparative figures for 30 September 2023), together with the company's 9M 2024 investor presentation dated 29 October 2024.