The Recovery Held, But Not Everywhere
9M 2024's post closed on the first genuinely encouraging quarter this backlog had tracked in over a year: Cost of Credit easing, bookings jumping, and net profit rising sequentially for the first time after four straight quarterly declines. The full year confirms that wasn't a one-quarter blip. Cost of Credit for Q4 alone fell to 2.8%, down from Q3's 3.0% and a full 160 basis points below Q2's 4.4%; NPF improved to 1.25% from Q3's 1.42%; and net income rose 4.8% quarter-over-quarter to roughly Rp449,766M - a second consecutive sequential increase, on top of Q3's own 32.3% jump. New bookings reached Rp5,835 billion in Q4 alone, up 13.7% quarter-over-quarter and, per the company's own framing, the highest quarterly figure since the 2023 cyberattack-linked downturn began.
Every ratio this backlog tracks moved the same direction in Q4: Net Interest Spread, Cost to Income, ROAA, and ROAE all improved sequentially, the same pattern Q3 first established. The full-year totals still read worse than 2023's - net income fell 4.8% year-over-year to Rp1,564,674M, because the year is still carrying H1's own deterioration - but every quarter from Q2 onward moved in one direction, and Q4 didn't break that streak.
What the full-year segment disclosure adds that the nine-month figures couldn't yet show is where the recovery stopped working. At 9M, only Cars was still posting a year-over-year profit decline; Motorcycles and Others had both turned positive. Isolating Q4 alone against the nine-month figures already published, Others' profit before tax fell 19.8% year-over-year in the fourth quarter - enough to drag the segment's full-year profit into an outright 3.5% year-over-year decline, reversing the +4.2% gain this backlog reported at 9M. Cars' own decline, meanwhile, kept moderating - down just 4.9% year-over-year in Q4 alone, versus the 16.5% cumulative decline through September - and Motorcycles is now the only one of BFI's three segments to finish the year with genuine year-over-year profit growth. See Three Segments, One Reversal below.
BFI's board also disclosed a leadership transition inside this filing's events-after-the-reporting-period note: President Director Francis Lay Sioe Ho resigned effective 27 December 2024, with Sutadi - a long-tenured internal executive who had already been serving as Business & Asset Management Director - appointed as his successor, approved by OJK's fit-and-proper process on 17 February 2025. Francis Lay moves to President Commissioner rather than leaving the company outright. The transition is disclosed cleanly, with named dates, an internal successor, and completed regulatory approval - a materially different disclosure standard than the restructured-loan gap covered below.
The Prescription
A full year where every single quarterly metric improved sequentially from Q2 onward is the clearest evidence yet that BFI's credit cycle has genuinely turned, not just that management tightened booking discipline for one good quarter - and the company should now do what nine months of improving numbers have earned it: publish the segment-level Cost of Credit or NPF breakdown this backlog has requested since 9M 2023. Without it, a reader can't tell whether Others' quiet reversal in Q4 - a segment that looked like it had turned the corner as recently as September - reflects a genuine asset-quality wobble or simply volume/mix noise in a smaller, more heavy-equipment-and-property-weighted book. The same question that used to apply only to Cars now applies to a second segment.
What the company should stop doing: treating the restructured-loan balance as immaterial enough to omit from the one filing built specifically to carry more disclosure, not less. H1 2024 removed the balance entirely from the financing-receivables note; 9M 2024 didn't restore it; this annual report - with more room, more footnotes, and more scrutiny than any interim filing this backlog has seen - doesn't either (see Beyond the Usual below). A pool that was worth a fraction of a percent of managed receivables as recently as early 2024 costs the company nothing to keep disclosing, and an annual report is precisely the document where a reader would expect a gap like this to get resolved, not carried forward silently for a third straight period.
Key Financial Metrics
Year ended 31 December 2024 vs. year ended 31 December 2023
FX: Rp16,085.60 = USD 1 (31 December 2024 close, the period-end date). Both periods below are converted at this same rate for comparability, following the convention used throughout this backlog - it is not a historical rate for the FY2023 column.
| Metric | FY2024 (IDR) | FY2024 (USD) | FY2023 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Income ("Net Revenue" equivalent) | Rp6,335,070M | ~$393.8M | Rp6,353,113M | ⚠️ -0.3% |
| Profit Before Tax ("Operating Income" equivalent) | Rp1,926,614M | ~$119.8M | Rp2,025,252M | ⚠️ -4.9% |
| Net Income | Rp1,564,674M | ~$97.3M | Rp1,643,799M | ⚠️ -4.8% |
| Total Cash and Cash Equivalents | Rp1,614,126M | ~$100.3M | Rp1,739,659M | ⚠️ -7.2% |
Profit before tax remains the closest operating-income equivalent for this lender, as established throughout this backlog. Total income fell just 0.3% year-over-year - continuing the marginal, near-flat pattern seen at both H1 and 9M - while total expenses grew 1.9% year-over-year, still outpacing revenue but by less than in any prior period this year. Net cash from operating activities more than tripled to Rp489,540M this year (from Rp301,895M, as reclassified), as financing-transaction cash receipts grew faster than new originations. Total cash fell 7.2% year-over-year to Rp1,614,126M, continuing the multi-year decline from the post-bond-issuance peak.
Basic earnings per share fell to Rp104 for FY2024 from Rp109 a year earlier (-4.6%), on an unchanged weighted-average share count of 15,039,383,620 shares - tracking the net-income decline closely, since neither year carries a one-off item large enough to separate the two.
New bookings grew 5.1% year-over-year to Rp20,054 billion, while Total Income - the closest net-revenue equivalent this backlog tracks - fell 0.3% over the same period. That gap between the gross growth figure BFI's own presentation leads with and the net number sitting a few lines below it isn't hidden - both appear in the same one-page deck - but it is real: a year where the headline "growth" metric rose while the actual revenue line fell is exactly the kind of divergence worth naming plainly, regardless of how transparently the weaker number is disclosed alongside it.
| Balance sheet metric | 31 Dec 2024 (IDR) | 31 Dec 2024 (USD) | 31 Dec 2023 (IDR) | YoY ∆ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp25,119,820M | ~$1,561.6M | Rp23,991,435M | ⚠️ +4.7% |
| Financing Receivables (net) | Rp22,012,814M | ~$1,368.5M | Rp20,706,393M | ⚠️ +6.3% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp14,938,155M | ~$928.7M | Rp14,491,639M | ⚠️ +3.1% |
| Fund Borrowings (net) | Rp10,822,571M | ~$672.8M | Rp8,665,860M | ⚠️ +24.9% |
| Securities Issued (bonds, net) | Rp2,935,877M | ~$182.5M | Rp4,720,775M | ✅ -37.8% |
| Total Equity | Rp10,181,665M | ~$633.0M | Rp9,499,796M | ✅ +7.2% |
Debt-to-equity» (fund borrowings plus bonds, over equity, following this backlog's convention) improved year-over-year to roughly 1.35x, from FY2023's 1.41x - but that's a step back up from 9M 2024's own 1.25x, not a continuation of that quarter's de-lever. Fund borrowings jumped 24.9% year-over-year - well above 9M's own +9.9% YoY pace - as BFI drew more bank funding in Q4 specifically to finance the booking recovery, while the interim cash dividend of Rp421,103M paid in December simultaneously shrank the equity base. The company's own disclosed "Gearing Ratio" (a narrower OJK-defined solvency measure) held flat at 1.4x for both years, comfortably inside the regulatory ceiling of 10x. Securities issued fell 37.8% year-over-year as Rp2,387,000M of bonds were repaid against just Rp600,000M of new issuance under the Shelf VI program's first tranche - the same tranche confirmed actually issued as of September - meaning no further tranches of the Rp6 trillion shelf were drawn in Q4, and bonds kept shrinking as a share of total funding. The related-party PT United Tractors Tbk facility - flagged since Q1 2020 - kept amortizing on schedule, its drawn balance falling to Rp311,544M from FY2023's Rp432,257M (-27.9%), against an unchanged Rp1,250,000M limit.
Key Operational Metrics
- New financing originations: Rp20,054 billion for FY2024 (excluding Pinjam Modal channeling), up 5.1% year-over-year from FY2023's Rp19,081 billion. Q4 alone came in at Rp5,835 billion, up 13.7% quarter-over-quarter from Q3's Rp5,130 billion - a second straight sequential acceleration and, per the company's own framing, the highest quarterly booking figure since the 2023 cyberattack-linked downturn (still below the pre-cyberattack 2022 peaks, but the strongest recovery-era quarter to date).
- Managed receivables (including off-balance-sheet joint financing, per the deck): Rp24,133 billion at year-end, up 9.6% year-over-year and 4.9% quarter-over-quarter from Q3's Rp23,003 billion.
- Non-Performing Financing (NPF) (company's own disclosed figure», gross basis): 1.25% for FY2024, down 11 basis points year-over-year from FY2023's 1.36%, and down a further 17 basis points quarter-over-quarter from Q3's 1.42% - a fourth straight quarterly improvement in this metric. NPF coverage improved to 2.7x for the year, up from FY2023's 2.6x.
- Cost of Credit (CoC): 2.8% for Q4 2024 alone, down 17 basis points quarter-over-quarter from Q3's 3.0% - a third straight quarterly improvement, extending the reversal this backlog first flagged in Q3; 3.4% for the full year, down from FY2023's 3.6%, with the company's presentation attributing the improvement to easing delinquency in the NDF motorcycle book, the same driver named at 9M.
- Net Interest Spread: 11.9% for FY2024, down 74bps from FY2023's 12.6% - the year-over-year compression hasn't reversed even as credit quality has; 11.9% for Q4 alone, up marginally from Q3's 11.8%.
- Cost to Income: 46.4% for FY2024, up 153bps from FY2023's 44.8%; 44.8% for Q4 alone, a 39bps improvement from Q3's 45.2% - the fourth straight quarterly improvement in this ratio.
- Return on average assets (after tax): 6.5% for FY2024, down 28bps from FY2023's 6.8%; 7.4% for Q4 alone, up 25bps from Q3's 7.2%.
- Return on average equity (after tax): 15.7% for FY2024, down 198bps from FY2023's 17.7%; 17.4% for Q4 alone, up 37bps from Q3's 17.1%.
- Earnings per share: Rp104 basic for FY2024, down from Rp109 a year earlier (see Key Financial Metrics above).
The pattern this backlog first flagged at 9M holds through the full year: the annual cumulative figure still reads worse year-over-year, because it's carrying H1's own deterioration, but every quarterly figure this backlog tracks - NIS, Cost to Income, CoC, NPF, ROAA, and ROAE - improved sequentially in Q4, the fourth consecutive quarter to do so since Q1's trough. Indonesia's own industry NPF benchmark stood at 2.70% for full-year 2024, per the company's disclosure - BFI's 1.25% continues to compare favorably, and the gap has widened further from 9M's own comparison against a 2.66% industry figure.
Three Segments, One Reversal
The company reports Cars, Motorcycles, and Others on the same full-year basis as every prior period in this backlog.
Cars - still the largest segment: Rp4,293,541M of income for FY2024 (67.8% of total, up from FY2023's 66.2%), up 2.1% year-over-year on continued volume - but profit before tax fell 13.4% YoY to Rp1,236,814M from Rp1,427,621M, with margin compressing to 28.8% from 33.9%. Isolating Q4 alone against the nine-month figures already published, Cars' profit before tax fell just 4.9% year-over-year in the fourth quarter - a real moderation from the 16.5% cumulative decline through September, and the segment's mildest quarterly decline in over a year.
Motorcycles - Rp1,005,433M of income (15.9% of total, down from FY2023's 19.2%), down 17.6% YoY on a continued-shrinking book - but profit before tax rose 38.8% YoY to Rp371,199M from Rp267,409M, with margin nearly doubling to 36.9% from 21.9%. Motorcycles is now the only one of BFI's three segments to finish 2024 with genuine year-over-year profit growth. Isolating Q4 alone, profit before tax rose 22.9% year-over-year - a deceleration from the nine-month figure's 46.0% growth rate, but still comfortably positive.
Others (heavy equipment/machinery, property, and sharia financing) - Rp1,036,096M of income (16.3% of total, up from FY2023's 14.6%), up 11.8% YoY on continued growth, but profit before tax fell 3.5% YoY to Rp318,601M from Rp330,222M - a reversal of the +4.2% year-over-year gain this backlog reported for the same segment at 9M. Isolating Q4 alone, Others' profit before tax fell 19.8% year-over-year - the sharpest single-quarter decline of any segment this period, and enough on its own to drag a nine-month gain into a full-year loss.
Nine months in, this backlog described Cars as the sole holdout in an otherwise-recovering business. The full year complicates that picture rather than confirming it: Cars' decline kept shrinking (from 25.5% at H1, to 16.5% at 9M, to just 4.9% in Q4 alone), while Others - a segment with no credit-cycle narrative attached to it in any prior post - swung from growing to declining inside a single quarter. Whether that's a one-quarter volume blip in a segment that includes lumpier heavy-equipment and property financing, or the start of a genuine deterioration nobody has been watching because the segment wasn't previously flagged, is exactly the question The Prescription above argues a segment-level credit-quality breakdown would answer - and it now applies to two segments, not one.
Beyond the Usual
The restructured-loan balance stays missing for a third straight filing, now in the document built to carry the most disclosure
H1 2024 removed the restructured-loan balance from the financing-receivables note entirely, and 9M 2024 didn't restore it. This annual report's Note 5 - covering gross financing receivables, unearned income, staging by credit-risk tier, and aging buckets in granular detail across several full pages - still carries no line for restructured loans at all. An annual report is, by design, the filing with the most room, the most footnote detail, and the most scrutiny of any document in BFI's reporting calendar; it was the single most natural point in the year to restore the disclosure or explain its absence. Neither happened. The gap has now held for three consecutive filings, spanning two interim reports and a full annual report, in a year the company otherwise closed with credit metrics improving on every measure this backlog tracks.
The treasury-share mandate closed a second full year at zero execution, with the transfer deadline now under ten months away
The 927,732,000 treasury shares - equivalent to 5.81% of total outstanding shares - remained entirely unmoved through all of 2024: the annual report states plainly that "the Company did not perform any MESOP in 2024." Under the applicable regulation, the remaining treasury shares must be transferred by 5 November 2025 - a deadline now less than ten months away as of this filing, with the entire twelve months of 2024 having passed without a single share moved. This is the same 29 June 2022 EGMS-authorized obligation this backlog has tracked every quarter since; the clock is now audibly running down rather than sitting comfortably in the distance.
The company disclosed 56 ongoing legal cases and 8 OJK administrative sanctions during 2024 - both immaterial, but visible for the first time in this backlog
The annual report's governance section discloses 56 ongoing legal cases as of year-end (46 in local district courts, 10 before the Consumer Dispute Settlement Agency), with total outstanding principal across all of them at Rp9.1 billion - just 0.04% of total managed receivables, and the company's own assessment (echoed by this backlog's read of the case count relative to receivables) is that none carries a material impact on business continuity. Separately, BFI received 8 administrative sanctions from OJK during 2024 - 2 written warnings and 6 fines - covering delayed debtor-report submissions and corrections through the SLIK credit-reporting system, a delayed customer-complaint response, a delayed advertising-materials submission, and a delayed 2024 AML-CFT-CPF data update. None of this is disclosed in any interim filing this backlog has covered; both line items are exactly the kind of routine compliance friction an annual report's fuller governance section surfaces that a quarterly deck never would.
A related-party funding line with Bank Jago - distinct from the joint-financing facility - shrank 43% year-over-year
Separate from the joint-financing facility already tracked with PT Bank Jago Tbk, BFI itself borrows directly from Bank Jago as a related party under the same ultimate beneficial owner. That fund-borrowing balance fell to Rp169,094M at year-end from Rp296,893M a year earlier - a 43.0% year-over-year decline - even as BFI's current-account and time-deposit balances held with Bank Jago both grew over the same period. The two Bank Jago relationships are moving in opposite directions: BFI is drawing down its own borrowing from the bank while the joint-financing facility the two run together for consumers keeps growing.
The treasury mandate above is the ninth consecutive quarter-end this backlog has tracked at zero execution.
Target Valuation Range
Market cap ~Rp14,212,218M (~$883.5M) at ~9.08x FY2024 P/E and ~1.40x P/B - undervalued relative to the operating trend - the stock fell 9.1% quarter-over-quarter even as every credit and profitability metric this backlog tracks improved sequentially, a genuine disconnect between price and fundamentals rather than the market catching up that this backlog flagged at 9M.
Using 15,039,383,620 shares outstanding net of treasury (unchanged again this year - see Beyond the Usual above) and the Rp945 closing price:
| Market cap buildup | FY2024 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp945 |
| Shares outstanding | 15,039,383,620 |
| Market capitalization | Rp14,212,218M (~$883.5M) |
| Book value (total equity) | Rp10,181,665M |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | 9M 2024 | FY2024 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | ~9.88x (TTM) | ~9.08x | down - despite every credit/profitability metric improving sequentially |
| P/B | ~1.53x | ~1.40x | down |
Market cap is down 9.1% from 9M 2024's ~Rp15,640,959M, coincidentally landing at the identical market cap H1 2024 recorded at the same Rp945 closing price. P/E uses FY2024 net income of Rp1,564,674M. This is the opposite of what happened between H1 and 9M, when the market cap's own rally had outpaced earnings growth. Over the trailing two years (January 2023 through December 2024), the stock ranged from Rp895 (July 2024's low) to Rp1,430 (June 2023's two-year high) - a roughly 59.8% swing, unchanged from 9M's own reading of this same window since no new extreme was set in Q4. The price itself moved from Q3's Rp1,040 close down to Rp990 in October, Rp930 in November, and back up to Rp945 by year-end - a net 9.1% quarter-over-quarter decline that sits almost entirely within Q4 itself, not carried over from earlier in the year. At ~9.08x trailing earnings and ~1.40x book against a 15.7% full-year ROAE, the stock is now pricing in less optimism about the credit-cycle recovery than it was three months ago - even though Q4's own numbers gave that optimism more support, not less.
PT BFI Finance Indonesia Tbk's audited consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024 (with comparative figures for 31 December 2023), together with the company's FY2024 investor presentation dated 25 February 2025.