BMRI Where Did Rp108 Trillion in Deposits Go in Three Months?

The December Deposit Tide Goes Out

Bank Mandiri's FY2022 post flagged that most of that year's profit surge was a shrinking loan-loss provisioning line, not a genuinely bigger lending business. This is Mandiri's Q1 2023 published financial statement (period ended March 31, 2023) - and the mechanics behind the profit growth have shifted, even though the headline still looks similar: consolidated net income rose 25.2% YoY to Rp12.6 trillion, again outrunning net interest and premium income's more modest 11.4% growth.

But this time provisioning isn't doing the heavy lifting - impairment losses on financial assets fell only 5.7% YoY (Rp3.66 trillion vs Rp3.88 trillion), nowhere near the scale of relief that drove FY2022. What actually widened the gap between profit and revenue growth this quarter was fee and other income: commission/fee income rose 19.9% YoY and other operating income rose 37.3% YoY (both consolidated), while trading and asset-sale gains actually fell (asset-sale gains down 52.1%, fair-value gains down 43.2%). A genuinely more diversified income mix is a better story than another year of provisioning release - but it's still profit growing more than twice as fast as revenue, and a reader should know which lever moved this time.

The more interesting story this quarter sits on the other side of the balance sheet. Bank-only deposits (Giro + Tabungan + Deposito) fell from Rp1,193.2 trillion at December 31, 2022 to Rp1,084.8 trillion at March 31, 2023 - a Rp108.4 trillion decline in one quarter. Loans barely moved over the same period (Rp932.6 trillion → Rp927.2 trillion, -0.6%). The result: the Loan-to-Deposit Ratio^» (LDR) jumped from 77.61% to 84.90% individual/bank-only - a 7.3-point move in a single quarter that has nothing to do with Mandiri suddenly lending more aggressively. It's a seasonal pattern common to Indonesian banks with heavy government and state-owned-enterprise relationships: large institutional and corporate current-account balances get parked at year-end (when Giro peaked at Rp497.99 trillion bank-only on December 31), then flow back out in the new year as those same depositors resume normal operating cash use. The operating cash flow statement confirms it - Rp90.1 trillion of net cash was used in operating activities this quarter (consolidated), almost entirely the mirror image of the deposit outflow above, not a sign of the bank's underlying earnings deteriorating.

The Prescription

Mandiri's FY2022 post argued the bank's real edge is balance-sheet scale funding a corporate and state-linked book most Indonesian competitors can't touch - this quarter reinforces exactly why that edge needs to be converted into stickier deposits, not just bigger ones. The operational move worth doubling down on: push the government and BUMN relationships already banking with Mandiri into actual transaction-banking mandates - payroll, treasury management, supply-chain financing - so that Giro balances become operational float tied to a service Mandiri provides, not a passive year-end placement that a treasurer parks for a balance-sheet snapshot and pulls back out in January. The Rp108 trillion swing this quarter is the clearest evidence yet that a meaningful slice of Mandiri's low-cost funding is placement-driven rather than relationship-driven, and that's a fixable problem with the right transaction-banking product mix, not a structural one.

What it should stop doing: treating the December 31 CASA^»/LDR snapshot as if it reflects steady-state funding health. A ratio that swings 7+ points from one quarter-end to the next because of institutional placement timing isn't a stable metric a reader (or the bank's own risk management) should anchor to without the quarterly volatility disclosed alongside it - and a bank that benefits from a flattering year-end number has an incentive to under-explain just how much of it reverses every Q1.

Key Financial Metrics

Q1 2023 vs Q1 2022 (P&L, consolidated), and March 31, 2023 vs December 31, 2022 (balance sheet, consolidated)

FX: IDR 15,020 = USD 1 (March 31, 2023 close); IDR 14,351 = USD 1 (March 31, 2022 close).

Metric	Q1 2023 (IDR)	Q1 2023 (USD)	Q1 2022 (IDR)	YoY
Net interest, syariah & premium income, net ("Net Revenue" equivalent)	Rp23,473,048M	~$1.56B	Rp21,066,032M	✅ +11.4%
Non-interest operating expense, net	Rp6,231,929M	~$0.41B	Rp7,369,724M	✅ -15.4%
Operating Income	Rp17,241,119M	~$1.15B	Rp13,696,308M	✅ +25.9%
Net Income (attributable to owners)	Rp12,560,171M	~$0.84B	Rp10,031,527M	✅ +25.2%
EPS (quarterly, not annualized)	Rp269.15	~$0.018	Rp215.12	✅ +25.1%

Balance sheet metric	Mar 31, 2023 (IDR)	Mar 31, 2023 (USD)	Dec 31, 2022 (IDR)	QoQ
Total Assets	Rp1,908,171,161M	~$127.0B	Rp1,992,544,687M	⚠️ -4.2%
Loans (Kredit)	Rp1,172,883,517M	~$78.1B	Rp1,172,599,882M	➖ +0.02%
Total Deposits (Giro + Tabungan + Deposito)	Rp1,391,149,243M	~$92.6B	Rp1,490,844,592M	⚠️ -6.7%
Total Liabilities	Rp1,690,411,907M	~$112.5B	Rp1,762,865,901M	➖ -4.1%
Total Equity (attributable to owners)	Rp217,759,254M	~$14.5B	Rp229,678,786M	⚠️ -5.2%

Operating cash flow this quarter was negative Rp90.1 trillion (~-$6.00B; against Rp0.37 trillion of fixed- and intangible-asset capex) - a large swing from FY2022's positive full-year operating cash flow, but almost entirely the deposit-outflow mechanics explained above (the comparable Q1 2022 figure was also negative, at -Rp24.8 trillion/~-$1.73B, just smaller). Total cash at quarter-end is Rp184,855,201M (~$12.3B), down from Rp274,889,544M at the start of the period - consistent with the same outflow, not a cash-generation problem. Total equity fell 5.2% quarter-over-quarter mainly because the Rp24.70 trillion FY2022 dividend was accrued against retained earnings as of March 31 (see Beyond the Usual below) even though it wasn't paid out in cash until April 12, 2023 - after this reporting period closed.

A Loan-to-Deposit Ratio that jumps 7 points and an operating cash flow that goes deeply negative in the same quarter look alarming read in isolation - here, both are the same seasonal deposit story told twice.

Key Operational Metrics

All ratios are individual (bank-only), per the bank's own regulatory disclosure convention

• Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR): 84.90%, up sharply from 77.61% at December 31, 2022 (and up from 83.66% a year earlier) - driven by the deposit outflow discussed above, not loan growth.
• CASA ratio (consolidated): 74.16%, actually up from 73.42% at December 31, 2022, even though CASA balances fell in absolute terms (Giro -10.8%, Tabungan -0.7% over the quarter) - because higher-cost time deposits (Deposito, -9.3%) fell in roughly similar proportion, so the deposit base that remains is relatively cheaper, not because the outflow spared low-cost deposits.
• NIM^»: 5.11%, up from 5.01% a year earlier.
• NPL^» ratio - gross: 1.70%, down from 1.88% at December 31, 2022 and from 2.74% a year earlier - continuing the improvement flagged in the FY2022 post.
• NPL ratio - net: 0.26%, flat versus December 31, 2022, down from 0.35% a year earlier.
• KPMM (capital adequacy)^»: 19.52% individual, essentially flat from 19.46% at December 31, 2022 - comfortably above the regulatory minimum, still built entirely from CET1 and Tier 2 with no Additional Tier 1 instruments.
• ROA: 3.59% (annualized), up from 3.34% a year earlier.
• ROE: 24.56% (annualized, OJK regulatory formula), up from 22.15% a year earlier - note this is a single quarter annualized, not a full-year average like the 22.62% shown in the FY2022 post, so the levels aren't directly comparable without that caveat.
• BOPO^»: 54.83%, improved from 56.37% a year earlier.
• Cost-to-Income Ratio^» (CIR): 33.46%, improved from 36.44% a year earlier - a cleaner efficiency read than BOPO since it excludes loan-loss provisioning, and it improved by almost as much, which is the real evidence behind this quarter's income-mix story above.
• Not available in this filing: a segment-level breakdown of loans or profitability (Mandiri still reports as a single consolidated banking entity), and no earnings call transcript or analyst presentation was issued alongside this quarter's published financial statement.

Beyond the Usual

Restructured Covid-era loans keep shrinking, now roughly one in ten rupiah lent

The bank's own asset-quality schedule shows Rp93.02 trillion of loans still classified as restructured (bank-only, individual), against a bank-only loan book of Rp927.19 trillion - 10.03% of it, down from 10.9% at December 31, 2022 (per the FY2022 post) and down sharply from Rp134.71 trillion a year earlier (a 31.0% YoY decline in absolute terms). Of this quarter's restructured pool, only Rp12.56 trillion (13.5%) sits in a substandard-or-worse quality bucket - the rest is still classified current or special-mention, consistent with a year ago. The trend keeps improving, but a tenth of the loan book still carries a Covid-era restructuring flag, and that's still worth tracking every quarter until it normalizes toward pre-pandemic levels.

The FY2022 dividend was accrued against equity before it was actually paid

Mandiri's equity fell 5.2% quarter-over-quarter largely because Rp24.70 trillion of FY2022 dividends was reserved against retained earnings as of March 31, 2023, per the bank's own footnote - even though the cash didn't leave until it was paid out on April 12, 2023, twelve days after this reporting period closed. That's a 60.0% payout ratio against FY2022's Rp41.17 trillion net income, identical to the 60.0% payout ratio on FY2021's dividend - a consistent capital-return policy, not a one-off, and the reason book value per share dipped from roughly Rp4,922 at year-end to about Rp4,666 this quarter despite a profitable quarter in between.

Related-party lending grew but is still a rounding error

Loans to related parties (affiliated entities, not counting the government as a whole) rose to roughly Rp4.76 trillion bank-only, up from about Rp3.9 trillion at December 31, 2022 - a real increase in percentage terms, but still just 0.51% of the bank-only loan book, up from 0.42%. For a majority state-owned bank, this remains a genuinely small, clean number worth checking each quarter rather than assuming it stays static.

Off-balance-sheet commitments ticked up to roughly 18% of consolidated assets

Undrawn credit facilities (committed + uncommitted), outstanding irrevocable letters of credit, and guarantees given together total approximately Rp351.93 trillion (consolidated) - about 18.44% of total consolidated assets, up modestly from 17.50% at December 31, 2022 (a figure that independently reproduces the 17.5% calculated in the FY2022 post, confirming the methodology). The increase came entirely from growth in undrawn credit facilities; outstanding guarantees and letters of credit both actually fell over the quarter. None of this sits on the balance sheet as debt, and the overall scale is standard disclosure for a bank this size, but it's worth re-checking each quarter since it's real contingent exposure the balance sheet's liability side doesn't show.

The cash flow statement's derivative and securities-trading lines swung sharply, in both directions

Cash received from selling government bonds fell from Rp108.98 trillion a year earlier to Rp42.41 trillion this quarter, while cash spent buying them fell similarly (from Rp124.52 trillion to Rp45.90 trillion) - both sides of the bond-trading book scaled down by roughly 60% YoY, a much quieter quarter for balance-sheet securities turnover than a year ago. Worth knowing before reading too much into any single securities-related income line moving quarter to quarter.

Target Valuation Range

Market cap Rp481.8 trillion (~$32.1B), ~2.2x P/B, ~11.0x P/E. Bottom line: Mandiri still looks fairly to attractively valued against its own profitability - a trailing P/E of roughly 11.0x and P/B of roughly 2.2x for a bank running a 24.6% annualized ROE this quarter is little changed from the FY2022 read, and still sits well below what a bank this profitable would command if the market fully trusted the earnings quality and the state-ownership structure behind it.

Bank Mandiri's shares closed at approximately Rp10,325 on March 31, 2023, the last trading day of the quarter (public market price on the Indonesia Stock Exchange; converted from the split-adjusted price data available today to account for the company's later 1:2 stock split, which took effect in April 2023 - after this quarter's period-end, so the nominal, pre-split price is the correct basis here). That's a modest +4.0% move from the Rp9,925 close on December 30, 2022, and still below the Rp10,550 interim peak reached in October 2022 - an unremarkable move for the quarter itself, layered on the much larger two-year recovery already covered in the FY2022 post.

Using trailing-twelve-month figures (FY2022 net income of Rp41.17 trillion, less Q1 2022's Rp10.03 trillion, plus this quarter's Rp12.56 trillion, for TTM net income of Rp43.70 trillion) and 46,666,666,666 shares outstanding:

Market cap → book value	Q1 2023
Share price (period-end)	Rp10,325
Shares outstanding	46,666,666,666
Market capitalization	Rp481.8 trillion (~$32.1B)
Total equity (book value)	Rp217,759,254M
Book value per share	Rp4,666

Peer-multiple sanity check	Q4 2022	Q1 2023	Change
P/B	2.0x	2.2x	up
P/E	11.2x	11.0x	down

P/E (TTM): ~11.0x, using TTM EPS of approximately Rp936. P/B: ~2.2x, using book value per share of approximately Rp4,666 (Rp217,759,254M total equity attributable to owners ÷ 46,666,666,666 shares). Market capitalization: approximately Rp481.8 trillion (~$32.1B). Both multiples are barely changed from the FY2022 post's ~11.2x P/E and ~2.0x P/B (the small P/B increase mostly reflects the equity dip discussed above, not price appreciation), and remain well below BBCA's own historical multiples on a similar ROE profile (~18x P/E, ~3.3x P/B in its earliest backfilled quarters - see BCA's Q1 2016 post, directional context rather than a same-period read). A full DCF still isn't included - only two quarters of Mandiri's own trailing data exist in this backfill so far, not enough to responsibly model a multi-year loan growth, margin, and cost-of-equity trajectory. The peer-multiple read remains the honest valuation lens until more of the loan-growth and NIM trend across quarters is on record.

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