The Decline Continued, But the Cost Story Changed Shape
The Q2 2025 post closed on an open question: whether Mandiri's ~18.7% single-quarter profit collapse - driven by a bank-only salary expense up 9.9% YoY and a promotion expense up more than 6x - was a one-off spike or the start of a genuine trend, with no segment note available to say which. Bank Mandiri's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 answer half of that question and complicate the other half. Nine-month consolidated net income attributable to owners fell to Rp37,730,142 million, down 10.2% YoY from 9M 2024's Rp42,017,354 million. Because H1 2025 alone was already down 7.89% YoY (per the Q2 2025 post), isolating Q3 2025 standalone (9M minus H1) puts the quarter's net income at roughly Rp13.28 trillion against Q3 2024's roughly Rp15.47 trillion - a decline of approximately 14.2% YoY. That's a second consecutive quarterly profit decline, but a milder one than Q2's ~18.7% collapse - the freefall didn't accelerate, it decelerated slightly.
What changed is why. Isolating Q3 standalone bank-only (Individual) cost lines tells a very different story than H1's did: promotion expense actually fell roughly 19.7% YoY in the quarter (Rp428,992 million vs Q3 2024's Rp534,535 million) - a sharp reversal from H1's more-than-6x surge, meaning that spending spree was front-loaded into the first half and didn't repeat. But bank-only salary and labor expense accelerated further, up roughly 36.9% YoY standalone (Rp4,888,394 million vs Q3 2024's Rp3,570,022 million) - nearly four times H1's already-elevated 9.9% pace - and impairment charges on financial assets jumped roughly 43.8% YoY standalone (Rp1,649,754 million vs Q3 2024's Rp1,147,528 million), reversing H1's YoY decline in provisioning. Net revenue growth also decelerated sharply: consolidated net interest, sharia and insurance income grew just 1.52% YoY in Q3 standalone (Rp26,114,219 million vs Q3 2024's Rp25,722,546 million), down from H1's 4.5% pace. A bank whose promotion binge ended but whose personnel costs and credit costs both accelerated in the same quarter that revenue growth nearly stalled is not a story that "normalized" - it's a story that changed which lever is doing the damage.
The Prescription
Mandiri's real task now is to show it can grow net interest income faster than 1.5% YoY while personnel costs are running at nearly 37% YoY - because the arithmetic in this quarter's numbers doesn't support both continuing. The operational move: publish a segment-level income statement now, after two straight quarters without one, so a reader (and the bank's own board) can see whether the salary surge and the credit-cost jump are concentrated in one lending segment - suggesting a specific operational problem - or spread evenly across the book, which would suggest a genuine, structural cost-base reset rather than a one-segment issue. Without it, as Beyond the Usual below discusses, this quarter's numbers can only describe the decline, not diagnose it.
What it should stop doing: funding deposit growth almost entirely through expensive time deposits while its cheap-funding base erodes. Bank-only CASA» fell from 80.31% at December 2024 to 73.13% at September 2025 (see Beyond the Usual) - a nearly 7-point swing in nine months that directly explains why net interest margin kept compressing even as the loan book grew. A bank that just posted a 43.8% YoY jump in impairment charges cannot also afford to keep raising its own cost of funds by chasing rate-sensitive deposits; the two pressures compound each other.
Key Financial Metrics
9M 2025 vs 9M 2024 (P&L, consolidated), and September 30, 2025 vs December 31, 2024 (balance sheet, consolidated)
FX: IDR 16,665.00 = USD 1 (September 30, 2025 close, per the bank's own filed exchange-rate disclosure); IDR 15,140.00 = USD 1 (September 30, 2024 close, per the same disclosure); IDR 16,095.00 = USD 1 (December 31, 2024 close, consistent with the FY2024 post).
| Metric | 9M 2025 (IDR) | 9M 2025 (USD) | 9M 2024 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net interest, sharia & insurance income ("Net Revenue" equivalent) | Rp78,558,875M | ~$4.71B | Rp75,905,087M | ✅ +3.5% |
| Operating Income (Profit from Operations) | Rp51,433,729M | ~$3.09B | Rp57,325,982M | ⚠️ -10.3% |
| Net Income (attributable to owners) | Rp37,730,142M | ~$2.26B | Rp42,017,354M | ⚠️ -10.2% |
| EPS (basic, 9-month) | Rp404.25 | ~$0.024 | Rp450.19 | ⚠️ -10.2% |
Operating cash flow for 9M 2025 was Rp110,035,007M (~$6.60B), against fixed- and intangible-asset capex of Rp4,195,993M - continuing H1's reversal from 9M 2024's negative operating cash flow, on deposits still outgrowing loans cumulatively even as this quarter's balance sheet shows that gap narrowing (see Beyond the Usual). As with any bank, this reflects deposit and loan-book movements, not a free-cash-flow figure. Total cash and cash equivalents at period-end is Rp239,878,795M (~$14.39B), up from Rp209,018,936M a year earlier.
| Balance sheet metric | Sep 30, 2025 (IDR) | Sep 30, 2025 (USD) | Dec 31, 2024 (IDR) | YoY (infographic) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp2,563,360,149M | ~$153.82B | Rp2,427,223,262M | ✅ +10.3% |
| Loans (gross, Kredit) | Rp1,720,252,673M | ~$103.20B | Rp1,623,216,612M | ⚠️ +11.0% |
| Total Deposits (Giro + Tabungan + Deposito, incl. sharia) | Rp1,884,189,346M | ~$113.06B | Rp1,698,896,916M | ⚠️ +13.0% |
| Total Equity (attributable to owners) | Rp281,631,008M | ~$16.90B | Rp283,796,429M | n/a (see below) |
The bank's face financial statements this quarter compare only against December 31, 2024 - unlike prior quarters, there is no September 30, 2024 balance-sheet column on the statement itself, so the YoY growth rates for assets, loans and deposits above are the bank's own infographic figures, not independently recomputed from a disclosed comparative column. Equity is essentially flat since December (-0.76%) but has recovered 5.6% sequentially from June 2025's post-dividend low of Rp266,828,687M (see the Q2 2025 post) as retained earnings continue accumulating after the full-year dividend, Rp43,510,539 million, paid entirely in Q1 and unchanged since (confirmed again this quarter's cash-flow statement shows no further dividend payment in Q2 or Q3).
9M 2025 net income fell 10.2% YoY - and because H1 alone was down 7.89%, that means Q3 2025 standalone profit fell roughly 14.2% YoY, a second straight quarterly decline but milder than Q2's ~18.7% collapse, on a revenue line that grew just 1.5% YoY standalone. See The Decline Continued, But the Cost Story Changed Shape above.
Key Operational Metrics
All ratios below are bank-only (Individual), as filed in the bank's own Statement of Financial Ratios and capital-calculation appendices. No results presentation or transcript was filed this quarter, so consolidated-basis NIM/NPL/ROA/ROE/CIR aren't available - the same gap as Q2 2025.
- Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)» - bank-only, filed: 92.55%, down from 93.15% a year earlier, but up sharply from Q2 2025's 90.22% (Q2 2025 post) - the deposit-loan tension this backfill has tracked since Q1 2023 reasserted itself this quarter after two quarters of relief.
- CAR (capital adequacy)» - bank-only (Individual): 19.04%, down from 20.08% a year earlier but up 0.69 percentage points from Q2 2025's 18.35% - a third straight quarter of sequential recovery from Q1 2025's 17.29% crash. Consolidated CAR: 20.07%, up from Q2 2025's 19.45%.
- ROA» - after tax - bank-only: 2.93%, down from 3.71% a year earlier.
- ROE» - after tax - bank-only: 21.24%, down from 25.21% a year earlier.
- NIM» - bank-only: 4.59%, down from 4.91% a year earlier - essentially the same YoY gap as Q2 2025's 4.61%/4.92%.
- NPL» ratio - gross - bank-only: 1.03%, up from 0.97% a year earlier, though down sequentially from Q2 2025's 1.08%. Net NPL: 0.40%, up from 0.33%.
- Cost-to-Income Ratio» (CIR) - bank-only: 43.05%, still far worse than 32.12% a year earlier and essentially unchanged from Q2 2025's 43.40% - the cost-efficiency deterioration this backfill first flagged last quarter hasn't reversed, but it hasn't worsened further either at the cumulative level.
- BOPO» - bank-only: 63.48%, up from 54.68% a year earlier - a wider efficiency ratio confirming the same cost pressure CIR shows, now disclosed in this quarter's filed ratio appendix.
- Net Open Position (NOP)» - overall: bank-only 1.16%, up from 0.93% a year earlier but down further from Q2 2025's 1.44% - continuing the unwind from Q1 2025's 3.67% spike (see the Q2 2025 post).
- Not available this quarter: a segment-level income statement (present in Q1 2025 and FY2024, absent for a second straight quarter now - see Beyond the Usual); a results presentation or earnings call transcript; consolidated-basis NIM/NPL/ROA/ROE/CIR; a September 30, 2024 balance-sheet comparative column on the face statements.
Beyond the Usual
The segment note stayed missing for a second straight quarter, right as the cost story got more complicated
The Q2 2025 post flagged the absence of Mandiri's segment-level income statement - present in Q1 2025 and FY2024, missing that quarter - as a real disclosure gap given the sharp Q2 profit swing. This quarter's filing is again the abridged OJK-format regulatory publication rather than the fuller interim statements that carried the segment note, so the gap is now two quarters running, and it matters more this time, not less: Q3's cost story isn't a repeat of Q2's (promotion spend reversed; salary costs and impairment charges took over as the drivers instead - see above), so there is still no way to tell whether this new cost mix is concentrated in one lending segment or spread across the book, and whether the Head Office cost-reallocation pattern this backfill documented through FY2024 and Q1 2025 continued, reversed, or simply stopped being disclosed at this cadence.
Bank-only CASA gave back most of its Q4 2024 recovery in nine months
The FY2024 post found bank-only CASA» recovering to 80.31% at December 2024 from 79.40% a year earlier, reversing a decline this backfill tracked since Q3 2024. That recovery didn't last: bank-only CASA fell to 73.13% at September 2025 - a 7.18-percentage-point drop in nine months - driven almost entirely by a shift in deposit mix rather than an outright funding shortfall. Bank-only time deposits (Deposito) grew from Rp261,314,782 million at December 2024 to Rp399,651,947 million at September 2025, a 52.9% increase, while current accounts (Giro) grew just 2.5% and savings accounts (Tabungan) grew 1.6% over the same nine months. Mandiri funded almost all of its deposit growth this year through its most expensive funding source, which lines up directly with the NIM compression (4.59% vs 4.91% YoY) and the LDR climbing back to 92.55% - a funding-cost story sitting right underneath the headline profit decline.
An accounting standard change quietly shrank the "insurance income" component of net revenue
Bank Mandiri's insurance subsidiary adopted PSAK 117 ("Insurance Contracts") and PSAK 109 ("Financial Instruments") from January 1, 2025, per this quarter's filed notes. The consolidated "net insurance income" line - a small component of the broader Net Interest, Sharia & Insurance Income figure used above - fell from Rp1,301,976 million in 9M 2024 to just Rp300,260 million in 9M 2025, a decline large enough (roughly Rp1.0 trillion) to be a genuine drag on reported net revenue growth, separate from the interest-and-sharia income that actually grew. This is a comparative-basis effect from the new standard, not a sign the insurance business itself shrank by that magnitude - but it means the 1.52% YoY Q3-standalone net revenue growth cited above understates underlying interest-income momentum slightly.
Mandiri's government stake now runs 52% through Danantara's asset-management arm specifically
The bank's shareholder disclosure this quarter breaks out, for the first time in this backfill, exactly how the state's holding is now structured: PT Danantara Asset Management (Persero) holds 52.00%, and the Indonesia Investment Authority holds a further 8.00%, both classified as non-public shareholders holding outside the capital market, alongside the government's single Dwiwarna (golden) share. The Q1 2025 post had already noted the shift from a direct Ministry of SOE holding to the Danantara sovereign vehicle; this quarter's filing is the first to specify the split between Danantara's dedicated asset-management subsidiary and the sovereign wealth fund proper.
The bank's swap book kept growing faster than every other FX instrument
Bank-only swap notional reached Rp210,532,680 million as of September 30, 2025, up from Rp186,373,000 million at June 30, 2025 (per the Q2 2025 post) - still by a wide margin the largest single derivative-instrument category, ahead of the forward book (Rp83,379,498 million notional) and spot transactions (Rp20,791,228 million notional). As before, this is gross notional exposure, not net risk, and sits alongside the still-modest 1.16% Net Open Position figure - but the swap book's continued growth relative to the bank's other FX instruments is worth tracking given the Rupiah itself depreciated further this quarter (see below).
Bank Mandiri Shares Fell Further as the Rupiah Weakened Again
The Q2 2025 post closed at Rp4,880 on June 30, 2025, itself a -6.2% quarterly move. That drift continued: shares fell to Rp4,510 at end-July, partly recovered to Rp4,730 at end-August, then closed the quarter at Rp4,400 on September 30, 2025 - a -9.8% net move for the quarter, and -36.5% below September 2024's Rp6,925 close (itself the high point of this two-year window). Over the full two years back to October 2023 (Rp5,675), the stock is now down modestly on an absolute basis despite that window including a run to Rp7,250 in March 2024 - a peak-to-trough decline of roughly 39% from that high, easily clearing this playbook's threshold for a dedicated price section. The currency backdrop moved the same direction: the Rupiah itself weakened from Rp16,235/USD at June 30, 2025 to Rp16,665/USD at September 30, 2025 (a further -2.6% depreciation), consistent with the swap-book growth noted above and the currency-risk context this backfill has tracked since Q1 2025's NOP spike.
Coverage at a Glance
| Metric | 9M 2025 | 9M 2024 | YoY | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net income (attributable to owners) | Rp37.73T | Rp42.02T | -10.2% | Second straight YoY decline this backfill has tracked, cumulative |
| Implied Q3 2025 standalone net income | ~Rp13.28T | ~Rp15.47T | ~-14.2% | Milder than Q2's ~-18.7%, but still a second straight quarterly decline |
| Bank-only salary/labor expense (Q3 standalone, implied) | ~Rp4.89T | ~Rp3.57T | ~+36.9% | Accelerated sharply from H1's +9.9% pace - now the dominant cost driver |
| Bank-only promotion expense (Q3 standalone, implied) | ~Rp0.43T | ~Rp0.53T | ~-19.7% | Reversed after H1's 6x surge - the H1 spending spree didn't repeat |
| Bank-only impairment charges (Q3 standalone, implied) | ~Rp1.65T | ~Rp1.15T | ~+43.8% | New this quarter - credit costs are now rising, unlike H1's decline |
| Bank-only CASA | 73.13% | n/a (Dec-24: 80.31%) | -7.18pp (vs Dec-24) | Funding shifted sharply toward expensive time deposits |
| Bank-only CAR | 19.04% | 20.08% | -1.04pp | But up 0.69pp from Q2 2025's 18.35% - a third straight quarter of recovery |
| Share price (Sep 30, 2025 close) | Rp4,400 | Rp6,925 | -36.5% | Continued the de-rating that began after February's sell-off |
Target Valuation Range
Market cap Rp410.67 trillion (~$24.64B), ~1.46x P/B, ~8.0x P/E. Bottom line: Mandiri looks cheaper still on trailing multiples than either prior 2025 quarter, but the discount keeps tracking a real, ongoing earnings deceleration and a genuine funding-cost problem (CASA erosion) rather than a market overreaction - this remains a "wait for the cost story to resolve" setup, not a value opportunity yet.
Using trailing-twelve-month net income attributable to owners of approximately Rp51,495,530M (FY2024's Rp55,782,742M less 9M 2024's Rp42,017,354M plus 9M 2025's Rp37,730,142M), implied TTM EPS of approximately Rp551.74, and the post-split share count of 93,333,333,332:
| Market cap → book value | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp4,400 |
| Shares outstanding | 93,333,333,332 |
| Market capitalization | Rp410.67 trillion (~$24.64B) |
| Total equity (book value) | Rp281,631,008M |
| Book value per share | Rp3,017.47 |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | Q2 2025 | Q3 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/B | 1.7x | 1.46x | down |
| P/E | 8.5x | 8.0x | down |
P/E: ~8.0x, using TTM EPS of ~Rp551.74 against the Rp4,400 close on September 30, 2025. P/B: ~1.46x, using book value per share of approximately Rp3,017.47 (Rp281,631,008M total equity attributable to owners ÷ 93,333,333,332 shares). Market capitalization: approximately Rp410.67 trillion (~$24.64B). That's cheaper on both counts than the Q2 2025 post's ~8.5x P/E and ~1.7x P/B - TTM earnings kept falling roughly in step with the share price, so P/E compressed only modestly, while P/B fell further as the still-recovering book value per share (up from June's dividend low) was outrun by the sharper price decline. The two open questions from the Q2 2025 post are still open: whether the cost surge is a cost-allocation artifact concentrated in specific segments still can't be checked (no segment note for a second straight quarter - see Beyond the Usual); and the funding picture, which looked like a genuine stabilization in Q2, reversed this quarter as CASA fell sharply and LDR climbed back to 92.55%.
PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the period ended September 30, 2025 (with comparatives for December 31, 2024 and the period ended September 30, 2024), via Bank Mandiri's investor relations page.