BMRI Every Lending Segment Shrank Again - Is the Head Office Trick Running Out?

A Second Straight Period Where the Segments Lost and the Headline Won

The FY2024 post closed on a discovery: the first segment-level income statement ever disclosed in this backfill showed every one of Bank Mandiri's core banking segments' profit falling in 2024, with a shrinking Head Office loss and improving consolidation eliminations doing the work of keeping the consolidated headline number positive. That post flagged the pattern as worth watching for a second year before concluding whether it was a genuine cost-allocation shift or something that would resolve itself. Mandiri's unaudited consolidated financial statements for the quarter ended March 31, 2025 - which include a segment note for the first time at the quarterly level in this backfill - answer that question sooner than expected: the same pattern shows up again, one quarter in.

Start with the headline: consolidated net income for the period was Rp14,530,150 million, up 2.89% YoY from Q1 2024's Rp14,121,449 million; net income attributable to owners (PATMI) was Rp13,197,259 million, up 3.90% YoY from Rp12,702,178 million - a real recovery from the ~13.9% standalone decline the FY2024 post calculated for Q4 2024, though nowhere close to the 20%+ pace this backfill tracked through most of 2023.

Now look at the segment note this quarter's report discloses for the first time on a quarterly (not just annual) basis. Of the five core banking segments, four fell YoY: Corporate Banking net income fell -28.98% (Rp3.56 trillion → Rp2.53 trillion), Government Institution Banking fell -32.51%, Retail Banking - the largest single profit contributor - fell -29.88% (Rp10.90 trillion → Rp7.64 trillion), and Commercial Banking fell -4.58%. Only Treasury & International Banking moved the other way, surging +280.0% (Rp0.65 trillion → Rp2.46 trillion) off a weak year-ago base - a trading/positioning-driven segment, not a lending one (see below). Combined, the four true lending segments' profit fell by Rp4.65 trillion, a -26.80% YoY decline.

The headline number absorbed all of that because the Head Office segment's reported loss narrowed by Rp4.11 trillion (from -Rp6.74 trillion to -Rp2.63 trillion) - almost exactly offsetting the lending segments' combined decline, the same structural pattern the FY2024 post first found and flagged as a comparative-basis question mark rather than a confirmed one-off. It no longer reads like a one-off. See below for what's driving the Head Office swing this quarter, which is sharper than FY2024's.

The Prescription

Mandiri's real operational task in 2025 is to make the segment note tell the same story as the consolidated number, not to keep managing the consolidated number around the segment note. Two quarters running, the same internal cost-reallocation pattern has produced a healthy-looking headline while every real lending business line's own profit fell - and this quarter it happened even as bank-only capital adequacy dropped 2.81 percentage points in three months (see Key Operational Metrics) and bank-only computed liquidity actually eased (LDR fell from a Dec-2024 high back toward 94%, see below). The operational move: publish a like-for-like segment income statement that holds the Head Office allocation methodology constant across periods, so a reader (and, more importantly, Mandiri's own management) can tell whether Retail Banking's underlying economics are actually improving or whether the bank is simply getting better at moving costs off the segments that look good and onto the ones that already look weak.

What it should stop doing: treating a narrowing Head Office loss as evidence the corporate center is running leaner, when the note's own opex lines show costs migrating onto the operating segments instead of disappearing (see below). This is the same prescription the FY2024 post made, restated because the evidence for it just got stronger, not weaker - a pattern flagged once as "worth watching" that recurs identically the very next quarter it could be checked is no longer a watch item, it's a finding.

Key Financial Metrics

Q1 2025 vs Q1 2024 (P&L, consolidated), and March 31, 2025 vs December 31, 2024 / March 31, 2024 (balance sheet, consolidated)

FX: IDR 16,560.00 = USD 1 (March 31, 2025 close, per the bank's own filed exchange-rate disclosure); IDR 15,855.00 = USD 1 (March 31, 2024 close, per the same disclosure, consistent with the Q1 2024 post); IDR 16,095.00 = USD 1 (December 31, 2024 close, per the FY2024 post).

Metric	Q1 2025 (IDR)	Q1 2025 (USD)	Q1 2024 (IDR)	YoY
Net interest, sharia & premium income, net ("Net Revenue" equivalent)	Rp25,933,257M	~$1.57B	Rp24,728,848M	✅ +4.9%
Operating Income (Income From Operation)	Rp18,113,820M	~$1.09B	Rp17,605,258M	⚠️ +2.9%
Net Income (attributable to owners)	Rp13,197,259M	~$0.80B	Rp12,702,178M	⚠️ +3.9%
EPS (basic, quarter)	Rp141.40	~$0.0085	Rp136.09	⚠️ +3.9%

Operating cash flow for Q1 2025 was Rp20,242,157M (~$1.22B), against fixed- and intangible-asset capex of Rp870,271M - a sharp reversal from Q1 2024's -Rp8,733,075M operating cash flow (on Rp807,740M capex), consistent with a bank whose bank-only computed liquidity pressure eased this quarter rather than tightened further (see below). As with any bank, this swing reflects deposit and loan movements rather than a free-cash-flow improvement. Total cash and cash equivalents at period-end is Rp196,874,532M (~$11.89B), up from Rp165,446,172M a year earlier.

Balance sheet metric	Mar 31, 2025 (IDR)	Mar 31, 2025 (USD)	Dec 31, 2024 (IDR)	Mar 31, 2024 (IDR)	YoY
Total Assets	Rp2,463,658,976M	~$148.77B	Rp2,427,223,262M	Rp2,163,785,243M	✅ +13.9%
Loans (gross, Kredit)	Rp1,625,286,579M	~$98.15B	Rp1,623,216,612M	Rp1,393,927,895M	⚠️ +16.6%
Total Deposits (customer deposits + temporary syirkah funds, consolidated)	Rp1,748,719,282M	~$105.60B	Rp1,698,896,916M	Rp1,571,891,093M	⚠️ +11.2%
Total Equity (attributable to owners)	Rp254,163,784M	~$15.35B	Rp283,796,429M	Rp240,686,777M	✅ +5.6%

Equity's -10.4% sequential drop since December is the same seasonal pattern this backfill has tracked every Q1 since Q1 2023: a large cash dividend from the prior year's profit clears the books early in the new year. This time it was Rp43,510,539 million (roughly 78% of FY2024's own net income), a materially larger payout than Q1 2024's Rp33,036,034 million dividend from FY2023's profit - equity still grew 5.6% YoY despite it, meaning retained-earnings accumulation outpaced an even bigger cash return to shareholders than a year ago.

Q1 2025 net income grew 2.89% YoY (PATMI +3.90%), a real recovery from Q4 2024's ~13.9% standalone decline - but the segment note shows the exact same offsetting pattern the FY2024 annual report first revealed: every core lending segment's profit fell, and a narrower Head Office loss covered the gap. See A Second Straight Period Where the Segments Lost and the Headline Won above.

Key Operational Metrics

Bank-only Loan-to-Deposit Ratio and CASA are computed directly from the parent-entity financial statements (see note below); bank-only CAR and consolidated CAR are the bank's own filed figures; other bank-only ratios use the consolidated presentation-deck figures where noted, since the bank's own filed Statement of Financial Ratios appendix - present in every prior quarter of this backfill - is absent from this quarter's report (see [Beyond the Usual](#beyond-the-usual))

• Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR) - bank-only, computed: 94.18% (Rp1,303,266,541M parent-entity loans ÷ Rp1,383,790,703M parent-entity customer deposits), down from a computed 98.79% at December 2024 (same methodology - close to, though not identical to, the bank's own filed 98.04% cited in the FY2024 post, a small definitional gap this quarter's missing ratio appendix makes impossible to fully reconcile) and up from Q1 2024's filed 89.66%. The direction matters more than the exact level: bank-only liquidity pressure eased this quarter rather than climbing to a new record, the first sequential LDR decline this backfill has tracked. Consolidated^»: 92.94% (computed: Rp1,625,286,579M loans ÷ Rp1,748,719,282M deposits), down from Dec 2024's computed 95.55% and up from Mar 2024's computed 88.68%.
• CASA^» ratio - bank-only, computed: 77.05% (Rp1,066,213,299M demand + saving deposits ÷ Rp1,383,790,703M total deposits), down from Dec 2024's computed 80.31% and from Q1 2024's filed 79.44% - a real sequential CASA decline, distinct from the LDR relief above - parent-entity time deposits grew +21.5% QoQ to Rp317.58 trillion while demand deposits fell -3.1% and savings deposits grew a slower +3.5%, the mix shift actually driving the CASA ratio down.
• CAR (capital adequacy)^» - bank-only (credit, operational & market risk), filed: 17.29%, down from 19.01% a year earlier and down 2.81 percentage points from Dec 2024's 20.10% - the sharpest single-quarter CAR move this backfill has tracked, though still comfortably above the bank's own disclosed minimum requirement of 9.70% (risk-profile-based) plus core-capital minimum of 6.00%. Consolidated CAR: 18.50%, down from 19.90% a year earlier.
• NIM^» - consolidated (per the presentation deck; bank-only not available this quarter, see note above): 4.80%, down from 5.07% a year earlier and from 5.27% in Q4 2024.
• NPL^» ratio - gross - consolidated: 1.17%, flat versus a year earlier and up slightly from Q4 2024's 1.12%.
• ROA^» - after tax - consolidated: 2.16%, down from 2.34% a year earlier.
• ROE^» - after tax - consolidated: 18.9%, down from 19.7% a year earlier and from Q4 2024's 19.5%.
• Cost-to-Income Ratio^» (CIR) - consolidated: 40.8%, worse than 38.2% a year earlier though better than Q4 2024's 47.9%.
• Net Open Position (NOP)^» - overall: bank-only 3.67%, up sharply from Dec 2024's 1.00% - still well inside Bank Indonesia's 20%-of-capital regulatory ceiling, but the largest quarter-over-quarter increase in currency-risk exposure this backfill has tracked (see Beyond the Usual).
• Not available this quarter: the bank's own filed bank-only Statement of Financial Ratios appendix (NIM, NPL, ROA, ROE, CIR bank-only), and no earnings call transcript was filed alongside this quarter's documents - only the published financial statements and a results presentation.

Every Core Banking Segment, Compared

Net income is Q1 2025 vs Q1 2024 (P&L, a true year-over-year flow comparison); gross loans are Mar 31, 2025 vs Dec 31, 2024 (balance sheet, the only two dates this quarter's segment note discloses)

Mandiri reports the same nine segments the FY2024 post first found disclosed: Corporate Banking, Commercial Banking, Government Institution Banking, Retail Banking, Treasury & International Banking, a Head Office/corporate-center bucket, and three subsidiary buckets (Sharia, Insurance, and other financing/remittance/securities units).

Segment	Q1 2025 Net Income	Q1 2024 Net Income	YoY	Mar-25 Gross Loans	Dec-24 Gross Loans	QoQ (loans)
Corporate Banking	Rp2,526,100M	Rp3,556,746M	⚠️ -29.0%	Rp506,829,448M	Rp515,387,333M	⚠️ -1.7%
Commercial Banking	Rp1,979,582M	Rp2,074,674M	⚠️ -4.6%	Rp296,093,785M	Rp292,862,407M	✅ +1.1%
Government Institution Banking	Rp558,167M	Rp827,072M	⚠️ -32.5%	Rp92,589,810M	Rp96,337,445M	⚠️ -3.9%
Retail Banking	Rp7,640,090M	Rp10,896,746M	⚠️ -29.9%	Rp398,797,860M	Rp397,443,310M	✅ +0.3%
Treasury & International Banking	Rp2,458,240M	Rp646,940M	✅ +280.0%	Rp8,955,637M	Rp8,748,909M	✅ +2.4%
Head Office (corporate center)	-Rp2,633,480M	-Rp6,739,020M	✅ +60.9% (loss narrowed)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Subsidiary - Sharia	Rp1,878,795M	Rp1,716,936M	✅ +9.4%	Rp283,726,329M	Rp275,170,624M	✅ +3.1%
Subsidiary - Insurance	Rp279,076M	Rp400,638M	⚠️ -30.3%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Subsidiary - other (financing, remittance, securities, venture capital)	Rp731,804M	Rp877,671M	⚠️ -16.6%	Rp48,144,192M	Rp46,933,649M	✅ +2.6%

Retail Banking's decline is now the single biggest driver of the lending-segment story, two quarters running. It fell -29.9% YoY this quarter (Rp3.26 trillion in absolute profit lost) even as its own loan book barely moved QoQ (+0.3%, the slowest of the growing segments) - a materially sharper version of the same "largest segment, weakest growth, steepest decline" mix the FY2024 post flagged. Two consecutive periods of Retail Banking's profit falling by nearly a third YoY, even as its balance sheet barely grows, is no longer explainable as one bad annual comparison.

Government Institution Banking's -32.5% decline is the sharpest of the four lending segments in percentage terms, on a loan book that also shrank -3.9% QoQ - the only core segment where both profit and loans moved the same direction, which reads as a genuine pullback in this segment specifically rather than a margin or cost-allocation story alone.

Treasury's +280% swing is a trading story, not a lending one

Treasury & International Banking's profit nearly quadrupled YoY, but its loan book (Rp8.96 trillion, under 1% of the total) barely moved. A segment whose earnings come from foreign exchange, money market, and fixed-income positioning rather than lending volume swinging this hard mostly says Q1 2024 was an unusually weak quarter for treasury income (see the FY2024 post, where this same segment's full-year profit fell -68.2%) - a low base this quarter's comparison is set against, not a sign the segment's underlying economics improved structurally.

The cost reallocation is even more pronounced this quarter

The Head Office segment's Rp4.11 trillion narrower loss mirrors, at a steeper pace, the same pattern the FY2024 post found in the full-year opex lines. Head Office's own allocated salaries and employee-benefit expense fell from Rp3.23 trillion in Q1 2024 to Rp1.50 trillion in Q1 2025 - more than halved in a single quarter-over-quarter comparison. Over the same period, every operating segment's own allocated salary expense rose sharply: Retail Banking's more than quintupled (Rp0.56 trillion → Rp2.96 trillion), Corporate Banking's roughly quadrupled (Rp0.056 trillion → Rp0.22 trillion), and Commercial and Government Institution Banking both roughly doubled. This is a sharper version of the exact same shift the FY2024 annual figures showed - not a new phenomenon, but stronger evidence the internal allocation methodology genuinely changed rather than the operating segments organically absorbing more real costs. See Beyond the Usual for what this means for reading the segment table above.

Bank Mandiri Shares Fell Sharply in February, Then Partly Recovered

The FY2024 post closed at Rp5,700 on December 30, 2024, the first calendar-year decline in this backfill. That decline continued into 2025 with a sharp twist: shares rose to Rp6,025 at end-January, then collapsed to Rp4,600 at end-February - a -23.7% one-month drop - before partially recovering to Rp5,200 by March 27, 2025, still -8.8% below the December close. The February collapse coincided with a broad Indonesian equity sell-off tied to investor concern over the government's fiscal spending plans and the newly formed Danantara state investment holding company (see Beyond the Usual for Mandiri's own ownership link to Danantara) - a market-wide move, not one isolated to Mandiri specifically. Against March 2024's Rp7,250 close, March 2025's Rp5,200 is down 28.3% YoY (no stock split has occurred since the 1:2 split that took effect April 2023, so both prices are on the same nominal, actually-quoted basis) - a peak-to-trough swing of roughly 37% across this post's two-year price window (Rp7,250 high in March 2024 to Rp4,600 low in February 2025), among the sharpest of any window this backfill has tracked.

Beyond the Usual

The segment-level cost reallocation the FY2024 annual report first flagged has now recurred at the quarterly level

The FY2024 post found that Head Office's allocated operating expense fell by more than half in 2024 while every operating segment's own allocated opex rose sharply, and flagged this as a comparative-basis quirk worth confirming over a second reporting period before drawing a firm conclusion. This quarter's segment note - the first quarterly-level segment disclosure in this backfill - shows an even steeper version of the identical pattern in a single quarter-over-quarter comparison (see above). A pattern that recurs on the very next opportunity to check it is no longer just a comparative-basis quirk to watch - it's now good evidence that Mandiri's internal cost-allocation methodology genuinely shifted costs off the Head Office segment and onto the operating segments between the two periods being compared, which means the segment-level profit declines shown above likely overstate how much the operating segments' actual underlying economics weakened.

The bank's own filed bank-only ratio disclosure - present every prior quarter in this backfill - is missing this quarter

Every quarterly and annual report this backfill has covered since Q1 2023 has included a "Statement of Financial Ratios" appendix disclosing the bank's own filed bank-only LDR, CASA, NIM, NPL, CAR, ROA, ROE, and cost ratios. This quarter's published financial statements omit that appendix entirely - the parent-entity balance sheet and profit-or-loss statements are still filed (so the balance sheet and P&L requirement for this post is still met), but the ratio summary itself is absent. This post computes bank-only LDR and CASA directly from the underlying parent-entity balance sheet lines instead, which land close to but not identical to the bank's own filed methodology in adjacent quarters (see Key Operational Metrics) - a small but real loss of precision, and a disclosure gap worth watching for whether it returns next quarter or becomes a lasting change in what Mandiri publishes.

Currency-risk exposure jumped to its highest level in this backfill

Mandiri's disclosed Net Open Position (overall) rose to 3.67% at March 2025, up sharply from December 2024's 1.00% - more than triple in one quarter, and the largest single-quarter increase this backfill has tracked (see the FY2024 post for the prior trend). The ratio remains well inside Bank Indonesia's 20%-of-capital regulatory ceiling and isn't itself an alarm, but a currency-risk exposure that triples in a quarter marked by sharp Rupiah volatility (see the share-price section above for the same quarter's broader market stress) is worth tracking into Q2 2025 to see whether it settles back down or represents a genuine shift in the bank's foreign-currency positioning.

Bank Mandiri's shares are now majority-held through Danantara, not directly by the government

The bank's results presentation discloses that the Government of Republic of Indonesia's 52.0% shareholding - unchanged in share count from a year earlier - has been transferred into Danantara, Indonesia's newly formed sovereign wealth/state-enterprise holding vehicle, with the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises retaining only the single Dwiwarna "golden share." This is a structural ownership change at the holding-company level, not a change in economic ownership or control mechanics disclosed as affecting Mandiri's own governance this quarter, but it's a genuinely new fact about who sits above the government's stake in a bank this backfill has followed since 2022.

The COVID-era restructured loan book kept shrinking, even as total restructuring rose

Bank Mandiri's loan-restructuring footnote shows the COVID-19-specific restructuring balance falling to Rp12.83 trillion at March 2025, down 9.7% from Rp14.20 trillion at December 2024, continuing the steady wind-down the FY2024 post tracked from a June 2021 peak of Rp96.49 trillion. But total loan restructuring across all schemes actually rose this quarter, from Rp89.20 trillion to Rp95.20 trillion (+6.7%) - the first quarter-over-quarter increase in total restructuring this backfill has seen, driven entirely by non-COVID restructuring schemes growing faster than the COVID-era book shrinks.

Related-party lending stayed near a fifth of the bank-only loan book

Bank Mandiri's bank-only loan book classifies 20.34% of parent-entity gross loans (Rp265.14 trillion of Rp1,303.27 trillion) as extended to related parties at March 2025, essentially flat versus December 2024's 20.76% flagged in the FY2024 post. As that post explained, Indonesian accounting standards treat other state-owned enterprises as related parties for a majority state-owned bank like Mandiri, so this reflects the bank's structural role as a lender to the broader state-owned enterprise ecosystem rather than a governance concern in the way related-party lending would read at a privately controlled bank - but a related-party share this close to a fifth of the entire loan book remains a genuinely notable structural fact about this bank's lending mix.

Coverage at a Glance

Metric	Q1 2025	Q1 2024	YoY	Why it matters
Net income (attributable to owners)	Rp13.20T	Rp12.70T	+3.9%	A real recovery from Q4 2024's ~13.9% standalone decline
Combined core-segment net income (4 lending segments)	Rp12.70T	Rp17.36T	-26.8%	Every core lending segment's profit fell; only Treasury and Head Office/eliminations kept the total positive
Bank-only CAR	17.29%	19.01%	-1.72pp	Down 2.81pp from Dec 2024 alone - the sharpest quarterly CAR move in this backfill
Bank-only computed LDR	94.18%	89.66% (filed)	+4.52pp	But down from a computed 98.79% in Dec 2024 - the first sequential LDR relief this backfill has tracked
Share price (Mar 27, 2025 close)	Rp5,200	Rp7,250	-28.3%	Sharpest YoY price decline in this backfill, driven by a February market-wide sell-off

Target Valuation Range

Market cap Rp485.33 trillion (~$29.31B), ~1.9x P/B, ~8.6x P/E. Bottom line: Mandiri looks modestly cheap on trailing multiples after February's sell-off, but the multiple compression is arguably justified rather than a clean opportunity - it's tracking a genuine deterioration in bank-only capital adequacy and segment-level lending profitability, not just a market overreaction.

Using trailing-twelve-month net income attributable to owners of approximately Rp56,277,823M (FY2024's Rp55,782,742M less Q1 2024's Rp12,702,178M plus Q1 2025's Rp13,197,259M), implied TTM EPS of approximately Rp603.0, and the post-split share count of 93,333,333,332:

Market cap → book value	Q1 2025
Share price (period-end)	Rp5,200
Shares outstanding	93,333,333,332
Market capitalization	Rp485.33 trillion (~$29.31B)
Total equity (book value)	Rp254,163,784M
Book value per share	Rp2,723.18

Peer-multiple sanity check	Q4 2024	Q1 2025	Change
P/B	1.9x	1.9x	flat
P/E	9.5x	8.6x	down

P/E: ~8.6x, using TTM EPS of ~Rp603.0 against the Rp5,200 close on March 27, 2025. P/B: ~1.9x, using book value per share of approximately Rp2,723.18 (Rp254,163,784M total equity attributable to owners ÷ 93,333,333,332 shares). Market capitalization: approximately Rp485.33 trillion (~$29.31B). That's cheaper than the FY2024 post's ~9.5x P/E and ~1.9x P/B on essentially the same book multiple - the earnings multiple compressed further while the book multiple held roughly flat, consistent with a market pricing in the segment-level lending weakness and the sharp CAR decline this post found, rather than treating February's sell-off as a pure overreaction to fix in March. A real DCF remains the natural next step, but the two open questions from the FY2024 post are still open here: whether the segment-level declines are substantially a cost-allocation artifact (this quarter's evidence makes that more, not less, likely - see Beyond the Usual), and whether the funding picture stabilizes - on that count, this quarter is genuinely better news, with bank-only computed LDR easing rather than climbing to a new record.

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