Strong Numbers, a Bigger Balance Sheet
Over these 12 quarters: share price $61.57 to $68.51 (+11%); operating income 0.65 to 1.45 US$ billion; operating income margin 6.6% to 9.8%. One graph in actual numbers: bars are the quarter's operating income, over them the share price at quarter-end (left axis) and the operating income margin (right axis); each line is fitted to its own range, so read the timing, not the heights. Prices are adjusted for splits.
Uber's Q3 2026 hit the numbers it guided to in August - $59.8 billion of Gross Bookings and $0.88 of Non-GAAP EPS (earnings per share adjusted for items management excludes as non-recurring), the top of its own guided range - but the bigger move this quarter happened on the balance sheet, not the income statement.
Gross Bookings» grew 20% year-over-year (also 20% on a constant-currency basis) to $59,819 million, landing within the $58.25-$60.25 billion range Uber gave on its Q2 2026 call. GAAP income from operations rose 30% to $1,447 million, a fourteenth consecutive quarter of positive GAAP income from operations, a streak running since Q2 2023. Underneath those numbers, Uber borrowed roughly $5.2 billion through a new Euro bond, fully repaid the short-term loan it drew in June, closed three acquisitions (Getir's Turkish delivery business, a controlling stake in Careem Technologies, and the chauffeur service Blacklane), and formally launched a EUR41.50-per-share takeover offer for Delivery Hero - all while leaving billions more in credit facilities sitting undrawn. Revenue growth looks softer than Gross Bookings only because of an accounting change, not weaker demand.
Mobility's Revenue "Decline" Is an Accounting Change, Not Weaker Demand
Mobility revenue fell 2% to $7,520 million even though Mobility Gross Bookings rose 18% (17% constant-currency) - because Uber stopped being the principal for Mobility rides in certain UK markets. Effective January 2, 2026, following a UK regulatory and tax change, Uber reclassified certain UK Mobility operations so that it is no longer responsible for the underlying transportation service; as a result, payments to drivers in those markets are now recorded as a reduction of revenue instead of a cost of revenue. The 10-Q quantifies the effect directly: this single change cut revenue by $1.1 billion this quarter alone (and by $3.2 billion over the first nine months of 2026), which is why consolidated revenue grew only 10% even as Gross Bookings - the volume metric unaffected by how a transaction is booked - grew twice as fast. This is the same mechanism the Q1 2026 post first flagged as a $1.0 billion headwind; it has since nearly tripled in cumulative nine-month impact as the reclassification's first full year plays out. Cost of revenue tells the mirror-image story: it rose only 3% to $8,349 million despite the Gross Bookings growth, because the same UK change cut Driver payments and incentives recorded there by $1.1 billion.
A Bond Sale, a Loan Payoff, and Two Credit Lines Still Sitting Unused
Uber's long-term debt jumped 49% since year-end, to $15,664 million, almost entirely from a single Euro-denominated bond sale that funded a loan payoff and left Uber holding billions more in untouched borrowing capacity. On September 15, 2026, Uber issued EUR4.5 billion of Euro Senior Notes across five tranches maturing between 2029 and 2046, for roughly $5.2 billion of net proceeds, stated in the filing as being for "general corporate purposes." That same month, Uber fully repaid the $2.0 billion term loan it had drawn in June 2026 (recognizing an immaterial loss on the early payoff), which is why the balance sheet's short-term debt line - present for the first time last quarter - disappeared again this quarter. Separately, and on top of the new bonds, Uber lined up financing specifically earmarked for Delivery Hero: a EUR14.2 billion bridge credit agreement signed July 16, 2026, the same day it entered a formal business combination agreement to launch a voluntary takeover offer for the remaining shares of Delivery Hero at EUR41.50 per share (implying $14.8 billion for 100% of the company). On August 6, 2026, Uber replaced EUR4.0 billion of that bridge commitment with a dedicated term loan credit agreement, and separately signed a new $7.7 billion revolving credit agreement (replacing a $5.0 billion predecessor). As of September 30, 2026, none of the bridge, the EUR4.0 billion term loan, or the new $7.7 billion revolver had been drawn - Uber has now stacked three large, mostly undrawn credit lines on top of a bond sale whose own stated purpose has nothing to do with the deal they were raised alongside.
Three Deals Closed This Quarter, a Fourth Agreed the Week After the Quarter's Numbers Were Locked
Beyond the Delivery Hero bid, Uber closed three separate acquisitions inside the thirteen weeks of this quarter and agreed to a fourth days after it ended. On July 1, 2026, Uber completed its acquisition of Getir's food-delivery business in Turkiye for $361 million in cash - a lower final price than the roughly $465 million estimated in the Q2 2026 post before the deal closed. On July 31, 2026, Uber increased its stake in Careem Technologies (the non-ridesharing half of the Careem joint venture with e&) to approximately 60%, obtaining control and beginning to consolidate its results for the first time (see Beyond the Usual below for the purchase-price detail). On August 13, 2026, Uber acquired Blacklane, a Berlin-based global chauffeur-service provider, for $554 million in cash. Then, on October 5, 2026 - five days after this quarter's close but disclosed in this filing as a subsequent event - Uber agreed to acquire ezCater, a U.S. platform for catering and workplace meals, for approximately $2.3 billion in cash, expected to close in the coming months. Four deals, inside roughly fourteen weeks, on top of the much larger Delivery Hero process already underway: this is a company moving from steady organic compounding into an active roll-up phase, and the debt raised this quarter (above) is part of how that phase gets paid for.
The Prescription
Uber should put a public ceiling on how much of its balance sheet the Delivery Hero deal and its smaller bolt-ons are allowed to consume before the takeover offer actually closes. The deal isn't expected to close until the second half of 2027, and every quarter between now and then is another quarter where a EUR14.2 billion bridge facility, a EUR4.0 billion term loan, and a $7.7 billion revolver sit drawn against nothing, while Getir, Careem, Blacklane and the pending ezCater deal each add integration risk and purchase-price exposure of their own without any of them individually being large enough to justify a standalone update to investors. A company willing to name a specific dollar ceiling on non-Delivery-Hero acquisitions before that deal closes gives a reader a real test to hold it to; right now there is no stated limit, only a growing list of completed and pending deals that each show up as a footnote. At the same time, Uber should stop letting the share buyback absorb whatever cash is left over after acquisitions and debt service. Repurchases were $750 million this quarter - up from Q2 2026's $510 million, but still well below the $1.5-2.5 billion quarterly pace Uber held through most of 2024 and 2025, as the Q2 2026 post's Prescription noted - and management has not said whether the buyback is being deliberately throttled to fund the M&A spree or whether it is simply what's left over once other capital calls are met. A disciplined capital-allocation story needs a stated buyback floor, not a number that moves wherever acquisitions and bond issuance happen to leave it.
Key Financial Metrics
US$ billion; margin is operating income as a percent of net revenue, per quarter. Values are standalone quarters; 3 derived from annual, half-year or nine-month figures (Q4 2023, Q4 2024, Q4 2025).
Q3 2026 vs. Q3 2025 - consolidated, reported in USD
| Metric | Q3 2026 | Q3 2025 | YoY | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $14,766M | $13,467M | +10% (+10% constant currency) | Gross Bookings growth, partly offset by the UK Mobility reclassification above |
| Gross Bookings | $59,819M | $49,740M | +20% (+20% constant currency) | Trip volume growth across all three segments; a fifth straight quarter of 20%+ constant-currency growth per CEO Dara Khosrowshahi; within Uber's own guided range |
| GAAP Income from Operations | $1,447M | $1,113M | +30% | Fourteenth straight positive quarter; restructuring and legacy-award charges rose sharply (see Beyond the Usual) |
| Adjusted EBITDA» | $2,963M | $2,256M | +31% | Margin 5.0% of Gross Bookings, up from 4.5% a year ago; no longer management's primary non-GAAP measure (see Beyond the Usual) |
| Non-GAAP Operating Income | $2,304M | $1,675M | +38% | New primary non-GAAP operating measure this quarter |
| Net Income attributable to Uber | $512M | $6,626M | -92% | Weak comp only: Q3 2025 included a $4.9B tax valuation release plus a $1.5B equity-revaluation gain; Q3 2026 instead carries a $476M net pre-tax equity-revaluation loss |
| Non-GAAP EPS | $0.88 | $0.65 | +35% | Top of Uber's own $0.84-$0.88 guided range |
| Free Cash Flow | $2,535M | $2,230M | +14% | Operating cash flow $2,639M less $104M capex |
Balance sheet: Dec 2025 vs. Sept 2026
| Balance sheet metric | Sept 2026 | Dec 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and Cash Equivalents | $9,558M | $7,105M | up 35% |
| Total Assets | $71,067M | $61,802M | up 15% |
| Total Liabilities | $42,104M | $33,719M | up 25% |
| Long-term Debt, net of current portion | $15,664M | $10,521M | up 49%, on the Euro Senior Notes (above) |
| Equity Method Investments | $3,498M | $287M | up more than 12x, almost entirely the Delivery Hero stake |
Cash actually rose this quarter, unlike the prior two quarters' declines - the new Euro bond proceeds more than offset the cash spent on acquisitions, the term-loan payoff, and buybacks. Equity method investments of $3,498 million is now almost entirely the Delivery Hero stake ($3,372 million; see Beyond the Usual for the purchase-accounting detail) after Careem Technologies' prior equity-method balance fell to zero on its reconsolidation as a controlled subsidiary.
This was a genuinely strong operating quarter - Gross Bookings and EPS both landing at or near the top of guidance, a fourteenth straight positive operating quarter - but the number that will actually determine the next eighteen months is the EUR14.2 billion of acquisition financing sitting undrawn against a deal that may not close until late 2027, not any single line on this quarter's income statement.
Where Q3 2026's Revenue Went
Net revenue, and how much of it was left as operating profit and net income, in one view. Figures are the same standalone-quarter figures as the metrics table.
US$ million, Q3 2026. General & administrative, Operations & support and Depreciation & amortization are grouped as "Other operating costs" ($2,134.0M).
Segment Results
Uber reports three segments - Mobility, Delivery, and Freight - and all three grew Gross Bookings faster this quarter than a year ago, though the mix behind that growth differs sharply by segment.
Gross Bookings and Segment Operating Income, Q3 2026 vs. Q3 2025
| Segment | Gross Bookings Q3 2026 | YoY | Segment Op. Income Q3 2026 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mobility | $29,512M | +18% (+17% cc) | $2,362M | +27% |
| Delivery | $28,539M | +22% (+23% cc) | $1,057M | +30% |
| Freight | $1,768M | +35% (+35% cc) | $(33)M | narrowed from $(40)M |
Not attributed to any segment. The three segments earned $3,386 million of Segment Operating Income (revenue less each segment's own direct and allocated costs, the measure Uber itself uses to evaluate segment performance) this quarter, but GAAP income from operations was $1,447 million - a $1,939 million gap, or 57% of the segments' own total. The table below follows the 10-Q's own reconciliation (US$ million; a bracket is a deduction):
| Step | Q3 2026 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Mobility Segment Operating Income | 2,362 | 1,864 |
| Delivery | 1,057 | 811 |
| Freight | (33) | (40) |
| Total Segment Operating Income | 3,386 | 2,635 |
| Not attributed to any segment: Corporate G&A and Platform R&D | (1,082) | (960) |
| Amortization of acquired intangible assets | (82) | (72) |
| Legal, non-income tax, and regulatory reserve changes and settlements | (484) | (479) |
| Goodwill and asset impairments / loss on sale of assets | — | (2) |
| Acquisition, financing and divestitures related expenses | (55) | (6) |
| Restructuring and related charges | (186) | (3) |
| Settlement of legacy awards | (50) | — |
| GAAP Income from Operations | 1,447 | 1,113 |
Corporate G&A and Platform R&D - costs not attributed to any one segment, covering shared finance, legal, HR, IT, mapping and payment infrastructure - is by far the largest piece of the unattributed total, which is why the group figure sits so far below the sum of the segments. Restructuring and related charges and the new "settlement of legacy awards" line both grew sharply this quarter (see Beyond the Usual); the filing does not itemize either one further.
Mobility
US$ billion; margin is segment operating income as a percent of segment revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment revenue (quarterly_report.htm); profit is the segment Operating Income (Loss). Values are standalone quarters; some are derived from half-year, nine-month or full-year figures in the filings. Shows the 7 quarters the segment's definition and disclosures allow.
As the section above explains, Mobility's headline revenue decline is an accounting artifact of the UK reclassification, not a demand problem - Mobility Gross Bookings actually grew 18% (17% constant-currency), and Mobility Segment Operating Income grew 27% to $2,362 million on that same Gross Bookings growth plus a $41 million decrease in insurance expense from a lower rate per mile, partially offset by a $201 million increase in employee compensation costs including stock-based compensation.
Delivery
US$ billion; margin is segment operating income as a percent of segment revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment revenue (quarterly_report.htm); profit is the segment Operating Income (Loss). Values are standalone quarters; some are derived from half-year, nine-month or full-year figures in the filings. Shows the 7 quarters the segment's definition and disclosures allow.
Delivery revenue grew 23% to $5,488 million, roughly in line with its 22% Gross Bookings growth (23% constant-currency) - unlike Mobility, nothing here is distorted by an accounting change. Segment Operating Income grew 30% to $1,057 million, driven by the revenue growth itself, partially offset by a $430 million increase in Courier payments and incentives, a $177 million increase in employee compensation costs, and a $67 million increase in insurance expense tied to higher miles driven.
Freight
US$ billion; margin is segment operating income as a percent of segment revenue, per quarter. Revenue is the segment revenue (quarterly_report.htm); profit is the segment Operating Income (Loss). Values are standalone quarters; some are derived from half-year, nine-month or full-year figures in the filings. Shows the 7 quarters the segment's definition and disclosures allow.
Freight remains the smallest segment and the only one still posting an operating loss, but that loss keeps narrowing - $(33) million this quarter, improved from $(40) million a year ago, on 35% Gross Bookings growth (both reported and constant-currency) driven by higher gross booking per trip as well as trip volume, a different mix of drivers than Mobility and Delivery's trip-volume-led growth this quarter.
Comparing the three: Delivery is now growing both Gross Bookings and Segment Operating Income faster than Mobility on a percentage basis (22% and 30% versus 18% and 27%), though Mobility remains the larger absolute profit contributor ($2,362 million versus $1,057 million) and the higher-margin segment on Gross Bookings. Freight stays the clear outlier - the only segment still losing money - but its trajectory has kept improving rather than worsening for several consecutive quarters now.
Beyond the Usual
A GBP2.6 Billion UK Tax Dispute, Most of It Already Paid
Uber's 10-Q discloses that HMRC has assessed approximately $3.4 billion (GBP2.6 billion) of unpaid VAT against Uber for the period from March 2022 through December 2025, disputing Uber's application of the UK's VAT Order 1987 (which allows VAT to be remitted on a calculated margin rather than on Gross Bookings). Uber has already paid $1.9 billion (GBP1.4 billion) of the assessed amount and expects to pay the remaining $1.5 billion (GBP1.2 billion) in order to proceed with its appeal - a payment the filing is explicit does not represent acceptance of the assessments. The amounts paid are carried as a receivable on Uber's balance sheet rather than an expense, because Uber states it believes it will ultimately win the appeal and have the payments returned with interest; the company is still waiting to obtain hearing dates from the Tax Tribunal. This is a materially larger and more recent dispute than the $733 million UK VAT settlement Uber paid in late 2022, covered in the FY2022 post, which resolved a separate, earlier period (through March 2022); the current assessment covers the period right after that settlement and is roughly 4.6 times larger.
Australia's High Court Just Ruled Against Uber on Payroll Tax, Two Days Before This Filing Was Signed
On November 3, 2026 - two days before this 10-Q was signed - the High Court of Australia ruled against Uber in its challenge to New South Wales payroll-tax assessments covering July 2014 through June 2020. The filing states Uber is still evaluating what this "unprecedented" ruling means for its exposure in other Australian states and territories, which implies the financial impact disclosed for NSW alone may understate the company's total exposure once that evaluation is complete. Because the ruling landed so close to the filing date, the 10-Q does not yet quantify the amount at stake beyond what is already accrued for the NSW matter specifically - this is worth checking closely in the next quarter's filing for both a dollar figure and whether other states follow NSW's lead.
A New "Record" Margin on a Metric That Didn't Exist Until This Quarter
This is the quarter Uber stopped treating Adjusted EBITDA as its primary non-GAAP measure: the filing states plainly that "Adjusted EBITDA is no longer a key measure used by management," replaced by a trio of new measures - Non-GAAP Operating Income, Non-GAAP Net Income, and Non-GAAP EPS - introduced for the first time this quarter (with a recast prior-year comparative). CFO Balaji Krishnamurthy's quote in the press release calls the resulting 3.9%-of-Gross-Bookings Non-GAAP Operating Income margin a "record." That characterization cannot be independently checked against a multi-quarter history, because the measure itself has no history before this quarter's filing - only this quarter's figure and a single recast comparative (Q3 2025's 3.4%) exist anywhere in Uber's disclosures. The comparison against that one prior data point is real and favorable, but "record" implies a longer track record than two data points actually support.
Restructuring Charges Nearly Sixty-Fold, a New Line Appears, Neither Explained
"Restructuring and related charges," one of the items excluded from both Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP Operating Income, jumped to $186 million this quarter from just $3 million a year ago - a 62-fold increase. Alongside it, a brand-new line, "Settlement of legacy awards," appears for the first time at $50 million, with no comparative figure a year ago. Neither the 10-Q's MD&A nor the press release's non-GAAP reconciliation tables explain what drove either charge beyond the line-item label itself; both simply appear as deductions in the segment and non-GAAP reconciliations (see the segment table above). Combined, these two new or enlarged items total $236 million this quarter, versus just $3 million a year ago - a bigger swing than the $49 million increase in Uber's separate acquisition-related expense line, even though this was also a heavier acquisition quarter (above) - worth watching for detail in the next quarter's filing.
Four Acquisitions' Worth of Purchase-Price Detail, Including a Change in Control at Careem
Careem Technologies - the non-ridesharing half of Uber's 2023 joint venture with Emirates Telecommunication Group ("e&") - had been a roughly 45%-owned equity-method investment since Uber increased its stake earlier in 2026. On July 31, 2026, Uber acquired additional ownership taking its stake to approximately 60%, giving it control for the first time; Uber now consolidates Careem Technologies rather than accounting for it as an equity-method investment, and e&'s remaining roughly 40% is classified as a redeemable non-controlling interest (e& can require Uber to buy out its remaining stake starting in December 2031). The preliminary purchase-price allocation assigns $375 million to goodwill and $164 million to intangible assets (a 1-to-14-year useful life, 7 years weighted-average), against $378 million of total net assets acquired; goodwill was assigned to the Delivery segment. Separately, the Blacklane acquisition ($554 million cash, closed August 13, 2026) allocated $439 million to goodwill and $95 million to intangibles within the Mobility segment, and the Getir Turkiye deal ($361 million cash, closed July 1, 2026) allocated $297 million to goodwill and $74 million to intangibles within the Delivery segment. None of these three deals, individually or combined, contributed a material amount of revenue or loss to this quarter's results, per the filing - their effect on the numbers above is essentially zero so far.
The Delivery Hero Stake's Accounting Detail, One Quarter Later
Last quarter's post flagged that the shift of Uber's Delivery Hero stake to equity-method accounting, and the $1.0 billion gain recognized on that transition, were disclosed only in footnotes without the combined "37% economic interest" figure that only appeared on the earnings call. This quarter's filing adds detail that still didn't appear last quarter: the $3.0 billion difference between what Uber paid for its Delivery Hero stake and its proportionate share of Delivery Hero's reported net assets - the "basis difference" in equity-method accounting - breaks down as $2,520 million of equity-method goodwill (not amortized) and $696 million of intangible assets (amortized over a weighted-average 7.2 years), net of a $192 million deferred tax liability. Separately, the filing discloses that the fair value of Uber's Delivery Hero stake, based on its quoted market price, was $3.1 billion as of September 30, 2026 - below the $3,372 million carrying value the same note reports. Uber's stated ownership also fell slightly during the quarter, from the 24.99% stake built last quarter to 24.5% at quarter-end; the filing does not state why, so a reduction coming from Delivery Hero's own share issuance rather than any Uber sale is this post's own inference, not something the filing says.
A Related-Party Loan to a Vehicle-Fleet Operator Keeps Growing
Among Uber's unconsolidated variable interest entities is a $449 million term loan to Moove Cars Mobility, up from $384 million at the end of 2025. Moove became a related party in 2021 when Uber made an equity investment, extended this term loan, and entered a commercial partnership agreement with the vehicle-fleet operator; Uber's maximum exposure to loss across all of its unconsolidated VIEs, including this loan, was $1,260 million as of September 30, 2026. The loan itself isn't new, but its continued growth - rather than being drawn down - is a small, easy-to-miss indicator of how Uber keeps deploying capital into the driver-supply side of its Mobility business well outside the headlines this quarter's acquisitions generated.
Stock Price Over the Trailing Two Years
Uber's stock closed the quarter at $68.51, its lowest quarter-end close since the end of 2024, continuing a decline that has now run through three of the last four quarters. From a two-year peak close of $97.97 at the end of Q3 2025, the stock has fallen 30.1% over the trailing twelve months to this quarter's $68.51, including a 5.1% decline just this quarter from Q2 2026's $72.16 close. Against the two-year window's own low - $60.32 at the end of 2024 - this quarter's close is still roughly 14% above that trough, meaning the stock's current level sits closer to its two-year low than to its two-year high, even as operating income has stayed positive in every one of the last fourteen quarters (though not every quarter in that run was higher than the one before it). Q2 2026's post already flagged this disconnect between a strengthening income statement and a weakening stock price; this quarter's answer looks less like "broader market conditions" and more like the balance-sheet story above - a large, multi-pronged set of debt-funded acquisitions, with the biggest one (Delivery Hero) not expected to close for another year or more, is exactly the kind of uncertainty that can weigh on a stock price independent of a genuinely strong quarter's numbers.
Target Valuation Range
Uber is cheaper than last quarter on revenue, even though its trailing revenue grew. It traded at an EV/Revenue» multiple of roughly 3.05x against trailing-twelve-month revenue as of this quarter's close, down from Q2 2026's 3.3x, because the stock's decline this quarter outpaced the growth in trailing revenue and liabilities both rose.
With 2,041,898,070 shares outstanding as of October 30, 2026 (per the 10-Q's cover page, the closest point-in-time count to this quarter's September 30, 2026 close) and that quarter-end close of $68.51, Uber's market capitalization was approximately $139.9 billion. Against total liabilities of $42.10 billion and cash and cash equivalents of $9.56 billion, enterprise value was roughly $172.4 billion - down from the $179.9 billion calculated in the Q2 2026 post, as the lower closing price more than offset the higher total liabilities. Against trailing-twelve-month revenue of roughly $56.53 billion (Q4 2025's derived $14,366M + Q1 2026's $13,203M + Q2 2026's $14,191M + this quarter's $14,766M), that implies an EV/Revenue of roughly 3.05x.
| Sept 2026 | Jun 2026 | Mar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| TTM Revenue | $56.53B | $55.23B | $53.74B |
| Enterprise Value | $172.4B | $179.9B | $174.9B |
| EV/Revenue | ~3.05x | ~3.3x | ~3.3x |
The multiple compressed for the first time in two quarters, even though trailing revenue kept climbing - a genuine re-rating downward rather than a flat multiple on a growing base, the pattern the last two quarters had shown instead.
| Company (latest post) | Period and basis | EV/Revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Uber (this post) | Q3 2026, September 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap plus total liabilities less cash; trailing twelve months of revenue | ~3.05x |
| DoorDash | Q3 2026, September 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap less cash and investments plus convertible notes, net; TTM revenue | ~4.5x |
| Grab | Q3 2026, September 30, 2026 close; EV = market cap less net cash liquidity; trailing four quarters of revenue | ~1.9x |
| Lyft | Q2 2026, June 30, 2026 close (has not yet reported Q3 2026); EV = market cap plus total liabilities less cash; TTM revenue | ~1.55x |
On revenue, Uber (~3.05x) now sits between DoorDash's richer ~4.5x and the much cheaper Grab (~1.9x) and Lyft (~1.55x) - each of the four ride-hailing and delivery peers compared here traded at a different multiple this quarter, with none of the four EV builds computed identically (DoorDash nets convertible notes against cash; Grab and Lyft strip net cash rather than adding total liabilities), so the comparison is directional rather than exact. Uber's own multiple moving from roughly in line with its Q1-Q2 2026 range down toward Grab's territory is the more reliable read: among companies with a genuinely comparable business, the market priced Uber modestly cheaper this quarter than it did three months ago.
Uber Technologies, Inc.'s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2026, filed with the SEC on November 5, 2026; and Uber's Q3 2026 earnings press release, furnished as an exhibit to a Form 8-K filed the same day.