The Quarter the Lockdown Actually Arrived
Q1 2020 closed with Blue Bird's numbers already collapsing - net revenue down 9.38% YoY, the Taxi segment posting its first-ever pretax loss - before Jakarta's PSBB large-scale social restrictions had even taken effect on April 10, 2020. Q2 2020 is the answer to the question that post left open: what happens once the lockdown is actually in force for a full quarter. The answer is that Q1 wasn't close to the bottom. Standalone Q2 net revenue (calculated by subtracting this filing's first-quarter figures from its six-month cumulative total) fell 71.63% YoY to Rp266.2 billion from Rp938.1 billion, and Adjusted EBITDA» - which still held at Rp155.0 billion in Q1 - collapsed to just Rp3.2 billion, down 98.54% from Rp216.7 billion a year ago. Both operating segments swung to a loss simultaneously for the first time this site has tracked; in Q1, only Taxi's pretax result had gone negative while operating income stayed barely positive in both segments.
What's different this quarter isn't just the severity - it's that management finally reacted. Where Q1's filing showed a company still running its pre-pandemic playbook (fleet capex actually up 15.3% YoY, no dividend suspension, no visible pay cuts), Q2's numbers show real capital-preservation moves: capex fell to almost nothing, the Board of Directors' own compensation fell 97.2% YoY, permanent headcount dropped by 270 people in three months, and the interim cash dividend paid in H1 2019 (Rp168.5 billion) wasn't paid at all in H1 2020. See Beyond the Usual for the numbers behind each of those moves.
The Prescription
Blue Bird's Q2 response - cutting management pay, headcount, and capex almost in unison - is the correct playbook for a demand shock with no visible end date, and it should keep applying that discipline rather than reverting to pre-pandemic capex levels the moment PSBB eases. What it should do differently: treat the near-total capex freeze (Rp11.2 billion this quarter, down from Rp365.7 billion in Q1) as the new baseline until Taxi's segment economics show a real recovery, not just a policy relaxation - restarting fleet renewal on the old schedule the moment restrictions lift would repeat exactly the capital-discipline problem flagged in FY2019 and Q1 2020. What it's doing right: suspending the dividend and cutting its own directors' pay before cutting the rank-and-file further is the right sequencing - management absorbed the pain first, and the 270-person headcount reduction (-7.7% in three months) is modest next to a 71.6% revenue collapse, suggesting the company hasn't yet resorted to mass layoffs as its main lever. The open question, not yet answered by this filing, is whether the Gojek/GoPay integration signed in February - targeted for a formal signing by June 2020 - has actually gone live; this filing discloses no volume or revenue tied to it, same as last quarter.
Key Financial Metrics
Q2 2020 vs. Q2 2019, standalone quarter (derived by subtracting Q1 figures from each period's six-month cumulative total)
FX: IDR 14,302 = USD 1 (Bank Indonesia middle rate, June 30, 2020, as disclosed in this filing).
| Metric | Q2 2020 (IDR) | Q2 2020 (USD) | Q2 2019 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Revenue | Rp266.2B | ~$18.6M | Rp938.1B | ⚠️ -71.63% |
| Adjusted EBITDA» (Operating Income + D&A) | Rp3.2B | ~$0.2M | Rp216.7B | ⚠️ -98.54% |
| Operating Income» | -Rp129.0B | -~$9.0M | Rp89.6B | ⚠️ Swung to loss |
| Net Income» (attributable to owners) | -Rp107.4B | -~$7.5M | Rp69.6B | ⚠️ Swung to loss |
| Free Cash Flow» (Op. CF minus capex) | +Rp32.3B | ~$2.3M | -Rp52.7B | ✅ Swung positive |
| Total Cash (period-end) | Rp653.5B | ~$45.7M | Rp436.3B | ✅ +49.77% |
| EPS (basic, quarter) | -Rp42.9 | -~$0.003 | Rp27.8 | ⚠️ Swung to loss |
Operating margin went from +9.55% (Q2 2019) to -48.45% this quarter, and net margin from +7.42% to -40.35% - both steeper than anything Q1 2020 recorded, confirming the lockdown quarter is genuinely worse than the pre-lockdown one, not just a continuation of the same trend.
| Balance sheet metric | Jun 2020 (IDR) | Jun 2020 (USD) | Dec 2019 (IDR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp7,630.1B | ~$533.5M | Rp7,424.3B | ⚠️ +2.77% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp2,317.0B | ~$162.0M | Rp2,016.2B | ⚠️ +14.92% |
| Total Equity | Rp5,313.1B | ~$371.4M | Rp5,408.1B | ⚠️ -1.76% |
| Debt-to-Equity Ratio» (total liabilities / total equity) | 0.436x | - | 0.373x | ⚠️ Up |
The DER kept climbing from Q1's already-elevated 0.42x to 0.436x, but the mechanism flipped: total bank loans actually fell 3.55% QoQ, from Rp1,262.4 billion (Mar 2020) to Rp1,217.6 billion (Jun 2020) - the company paid down more debt than it drew (Rp165,984 million in bank-loan payments this half against Rp293,276 million in new draws, per the cash flow statement) - so this quarter's DER rise came from equity shrinking under the net loss, not from renewed borrowing.
Segment Performance
Blue Bird still reports the same two operating segments - Taxi and Non-Taxi - unchanged since Q1 2016's two-segment collapse.
Taxi
Q2 2020 standalone net revenue Rp172.8B (-76.58% YoY from Rp737.6B), operating income swung to a loss of Rp102.2B from a Rp61.0B profit a year ago, and operating margin collapsed to -59.16% from +8.28%. This is a materially deeper collapse than Q1's near-zero 1.26% margin - Taxi didn't just stay weak, it went from barely profitable to losing money on every rupiah of revenue it books.
Non-Taxi
Q2 2020 standalone net revenue Rp94.9B (-53.02% YoY from Rp202.0B), operating income swung to a loss of Rp26.9B from a Rp28.4B profit a year ago, and operating margin fell to -28.35% from +14.06%. Non-Taxi's revenue held up meaningfully better than Taxi's this quarter (-53.02% vs. -76.58%), and its margin compression (-42.4 points) was also somewhat gentler than Taxi's (-67.4 points) - but both businesses are now losing money on an operating basis, a first for this site's coverage.
Segment Comparison
| Segment | Revenue (Q2 2020) | YoY Growth | Operating Margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| Taxi | Rp172.8B (64.9%) | ⚠️ -76.58% | ⚠️ -59.16% |
| Non-Taxi | Rp94.9B (35.7%) | ⚠️ -53.02% | ⚠️ -28.35% |
For the first time this site has recorded for Blue Bird, both segments posted an operating loss in the same quarter - a step beyond Q1's finding that both margins had merely fallen to "low single digits simultaneously." Taxi's share of consolidated revenue kept sliding (64.9%, down from Q1's 78.2% and FY2019's 79.5%), continuing the multi-year mix shift toward Non-Taxi tracked since Q2 2017 - but this quarter that shift is driven entirely by Taxi collapsing faster, not Non-Taxi growing; both segments' revenue fell YoY, and Non-Taxi's absolute revenue is also down sharply from its own year-ago level.
Key Operational Metrics
- Weighted average shares outstanding: 2,502,100,000, unchanged since the IPO.
- Permanent employees: 3,237 as of June 30, 2020, down from 3,507 at March 31, 2020 (a reduction of 270 people, -7.70%, entirely within this quarter) and down 8.74% from 3,547 a year earlier (June 30, 2019). Q1's headcount change was negligible (-1.13% QoQ) - the real reduction happened once the lockdown was actually in force.
- Board of Commissioners compensation: Rp245 million this quarter (Rp1,236 million H1 2020 minus Rp991 million Q1 2020), down 85.5% YoY from Rp1,690 million in Q2 2019.
- Board of Directors compensation: Rp82 million this quarter (Rp1,914 million H1 2020 minus Rp1,832 million Q1 2020), down 97.2% YoY from Rp2,886 million in Q2 2019.
- Interim cash dividend: none paid in H1 2020, versus Rp168.5 billion paid to owners of the parent in H1 2019 - see Beyond the Usual.
- Total bank loans: Rp1,217.6 billion (Jun 2020), down 3.55% QoQ from Rp1,262.4 billion (Mar 2020) but up 11.68% from Rp1,090.3 billion (Dec 2019).
- TAN's disclosed ownership: not restated in this filing's disclosed notes reviewed for this post; last confirmed at 91.57% as of Dec 2019.
- Geographic revenue split (Jadetabek vs. outside Jadetabek) is still not disclosed, matching every prior filing.
- Still not available: any Gojek/GoPay integration volume or revenue metric, even though the three-year agreement signed in February was targeted for a formal signing by June 2020 (see The Prescription).
The Stock Rose While the Business Cratered Further
Over the trailing two years, Blue Bird's stock ran from a Rp2,630 close in July 2018 to a peak of Rp3,470 in March 2019, then fell as low as Rp960 in May 2020 - a 72.3% peak-to-trough decline, the steepest multi-year drawdown this site has tracked for the company. But the last leg of that move is the one worth pausing on: after crashing 61.24% in Q1 2020 alone to close at Rp965, the stock actually rose 12.95% over Q2 2020, closing the quarter at Rp1,090 - even as net revenue, operating income, and net income all cratered further than Q1's own record collapse. Read one way, this is the market pricing in that Q1's crash already captured the worst of the demand shock and Q2's ugly print was expected. Read more skeptically, it's a market that priced in a bottom before either Blue Bird's operating segments had actually turned lossy or Jakarta's PSBB had run a full quarter - the same disconnect flagged in Q1 2019, just in the opposite direction on price versus fundamentals.
Beyond the Usual
Director compensation fell 97.2% and headcount dropped 270 people - concentrated entirely in this quarter, not Q1
Q1 2020's filing showed only modest declines in management pay (Commissioners -24.1% YoY, Directors -15.3% YoY) and headcount (-1.13% QoQ) - a company still largely running its pre-pandemic cost structure even as revenue was already falling. Q2 2020 standalone figures (H1 2020 minus Q1 2020) show a much sharper response: Board of Directors compensation fell to Rp82 million from Rp2,886 million a year ago (-97.2% YoY), Board of Commissioners compensation fell to Rp245 million from Rp1,690 million (-85.5% YoY), and permanent employee count dropped by 270 people in three months (3,507 to 3,237, -7.70% QoQ) after barely moving in Q1. This is a genuinely large swing in the timing of management's own belt-tightening - it lines up with when PSBB actually took effect (April 10), not with when the demand shock first appeared in the numbers (Q1).
The interim dividend was suspended entirely, not just reduced
Blue Bird paid Rp168.5 billion in cash dividends to owners of the parent entity during H1 2019 (per this filing's comparative cash flow statement); H1 2020 shows zero dividend payments to either parent-entity owners or non-controlling interests. This wasn't disclosed as a formal dividend suspension anywhere in the filing's narrative sections - it only shows up as an absent line in the financing-activities section of the cash flow statement. Combined with the near-total capex freeze (see Key Financial Metrics) and management's own pay cuts above, this is a genuine capital-preservation quarter, even though the filing itself never states that framing directly.
The subsequent-events note still describes PSBB as a hypothetical risk, even though this entire quarter was reported under it
This filing's Note 30 (Events After Reporting Date) states the Group "may experience negative impacts... should the Government decide to apply large-scale social restrictions ('PSBB') for an undetermined period" - almost verbatim the same conditional, future-tense language used in Q1 2020's filing, even though Jakarta's PSBB had already been in force for the entirety of the quarter this filing covers, and this filing was authorized on July 24, 2020, well after PSBB took effect. The same note also states the Rupiah's depreciation "resulted into higher foreign exchange gain recognised by the Group in the first quarter of 2020" - correctly describing Q1, but not updated to reflect that the Rupiah actually strengthened during Q2 (from Rp16,367/USD at March 31 to Rp14,302/USD at June 30), which produced a smaller FX gain than Q1's. Whether this reflects a templated disclosure that wasn't refreshed for the quarter it's actually attached to, or a genuine view that PSBB's economic impact remains open-ended even in hindsight, the note itself reads as stale relative to what this filing's own numbers already show happened.
The tax-rate cut flagged as unresolved last quarter is now reflected in the numbers
Q1 2020's filing disclosed that Indonesia's corporate income tax rate cut (25% to 22% for fiscal years 2020-2021, enacted by government regulation on March 31, 2020 - the last day of that quarter) hadn't yet been applied to that quarter's tax figures. This filing states plainly that "the measurements of current and deferred tax assets and liabilities... as of June 30, 2020 were adjusted to reflect the impacts of the regulation" - the lower rate is now built into H1 2020's Rp13.2 billion current tax expense and the associated deferred tax balances, closing the gap flagged last quarter.
The related-party share of rent expense fell further, but a new lease accounting standard makes the comparison less clean than it looks
Related-party rent expense to the family-owned entities (PT Pusaka Bumi Mutiara, PT Blue Bird Taxi, PT Pusaka Citra Djokosoetono, PT Golden Bird Metro, PT Golden Bird Bali, and PT Pusaka Buana Utama) totaled Rp20.4 billion for H1 2020, but its disclosed share of total rent expense fell to roughly 39.6% from roughly 66.1% for H1 2019 - a much steeper decline than FY2019's already-noted drop from 86.32% to 66.33%. Part of this acceleration likely isn't a pure business shift: this filing adopted PSAK 73 ("Leases," Indonesia's equivalent of IFRS 16) for the first time this period, under which many leases that would previously have flowed through as a rent expense are now capitalized as right-of-use assets instead. The filing states the standard's overall impact "is not material," but a footnote-level shift this large in the related-party share of what's still being expensed as rent is worth flagging as a comparability issue rather than a clean continuation of the trend, at least until a full year under the new standard is available to compare.
The Acer tablet-PC dispute resurfaced in a separate civil suit, distinct from the arbitration this site previously reported resolved
FY2019's post reported that the Supreme Court dismissed PT Acer Indonesia's cassation appeal on December 2, 2019, closing out the BANI arbitration dispute in Blue Bird's favor. This filing discloses a related but separate proceeding: the Company is pursuing its own civil lawsuit (case no. 600/Pdt.G/2018/PN.Jkt.Pst.) seeking to cancel the underlying 2015 Cooperation Agreement for Acer tablet PCs used in the Blue Bird fleet, and as of this filing's authorization date, the Company was filing a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court against a Central Jakarta High Court decision (No. 532/PDT/2019/PT.DKI) on that case. A reader relying on the FY2019 post alone could reasonably assume the entire Acer relationship was settled; this filing shows a second, still-unresolved track of the same underlying commercial dispute.
Target Valuation Range
Enterprise value ~Rp4,391B (~$307.0M), implying P/E not meaningful (net loss quarter) and ~0.52x P/B - still cheap on book value, but the price and the business are now moving in opposite directions. The market is pricing in a recovery this filing's own numbers don't yet support.
Against Q2 2020 numbers (2,502,100,000 shares outstanding, unchanged), using annualized quarterly figures (Q2 2020 × 4) for comparability with prior non-annual-filing quarters on this site, and the June 30, 2020 closing price of Rp1,090:
| Market cap → enterprise value | Q2 2020 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp1,090 |
| Shares outstanding | 2,502,100,000 |
| Market capitalization | ~Rp2,727.3B (~$190.7M) |
| Total liabilities | ~Rp2,317.0B |
| Less: cash and equivalents | ~Rp653.5B |
| Enterprise value | ~Rp4,390.8B (~$307.0M) |
Market cap is up 12.95% from ~Rp2,414.5B at Q1 2020's close - the stock's first up quarter since FY2019's close, even as this quarter's fundamentals were the worst on record.
| Peer-multiple sanity check | Q1 2020 (annualized) | Q2 2020 (annualized) |
|---|---|---|
| P/E | ~43.9x (artifact) | not meaningful - net loss quarter (annualized loss ~Rp429.7B vs. market cap ~Rp2,727.3B) |
| P/B | ~0.45x | ~0.52x (book value/share ~Rp2,084) |
| Annualized ROE | ~1.03% | ~-8.15% |
| Annualized ROA | ~0.73% | ~-5.60% |
The valuation picture flipped from Q1's "cheap for the wrong reason" to something closer to genuinely hard to read. P/B ticked up slightly to ~0.52x even though book value per share fell, because the stock price itself rose 12.95% this quarter - the opposite direction from operating income, net income, and Adjusted EBITDA, all of which cratered further than Q1's own record decline. Neither ROE nor ROA offers a floor here: both turned negative for the first time this site has tracked for Blue Bird, meaning the company destroyed shareholder capital on an annualized basis this quarter. A P/B below 1.0x can be a genuine value signal when a business's earnings power is temporarily depressed but structurally intact - whether that's still true for Blue Bird depends entirely on how long PSBB-style restrictions persist into Q3 2020, which this filing has no way of answering.
PT Blue Bird Tbk's consolidated financial statements as of June 30, 2020 and for the six-month period then ended.