Non-Taxi Held the Line. Taxi Didn't.
Q1 2022 net revenue rose 40.39% YoY to Rp673.98 billion from Rp480.05 billion, and the company swung to a Rp47.1 billion net profit attributable to owners - a real reversal from Q1 2021's Rp28.3 billion loss. Both segments stayed operating-profitable for a second consecutive quarter, extending Q4 2021's first quarterly operating profit since the pandemic began. On a YoY basis, that's an unambiguous improvement, and the full-year framing this site has used since the pandemic began would read this quarter as confirmation that Q4's turnaround held.
The sequential comparison tells a sharper, less comfortable story. Consolidated operating margin fell from Q4 2021's 12.00% to 5.18% this quarter - not because the business slipped back into a loss, but because Taxi's margin, which hit a coverage-best 10.03% just one quarter earlier, collapsed to 2.11%. Non-Taxi, by contrast, barely moved: 14.78% this quarter against Q4's 15.71%, a genuinely small give-back. This is exactly the split Q4 2021's post flagged as the open question - whether the double-digit Taxi margin represented a durable operating-model improvement or a mechanical bounce off restrictions easing. One quarter later, the answer leans toward the latter for Taxi specifically, even as Non-Taxi's steadier, corporate-and-logistics-driven margin looks like the more durable of the two segment stories. Indonesia's Omicron wave, which peaked in the first half of this quarter with a temporary tightening of Jakarta's mobility rules, is the most obvious sequential headwind for a segment as exposed to day-to-day ride demand as Taxi - Non-Taxi's contract-based corporate and logistics revenue is structurally less sensitive to that kind of short-term mobility dip, which is consistent with why it held up so much better this quarter.
The Prescription
Blue Bird should stop presenting Q4 2021's 10%+ Taxi margin as evidence of a structurally improved cost base without immediately qualifying it against what this quarter just showed - a single quarter of double-digit Taxi profitability, achieved during the sharpest reopening rebound in the segment's post-pandemic history, was never strong enough evidence on its own to call it durable, and this quarter's pullback proves the skepticism was warranted. What it should do instead: lean into Non-Taxi as the segment actually demonstrating a repeatable, resilient margin - two consecutive quarters in the 14-16% range, through both a reopening surge and a subsequent Omicron-driven mobility dip, is a far stronger durability signal than Taxi's one strong print has yet provided. What it should stop doing: letting management compensation swing as sharply as it did this quarter (see Beyond the Usual) without any visible tie to the segment-level margin story - Board compensation fell by more than a third from Q4 to Q1 in the same quarter permanent headcount kept growing, the mirror image of Q4's "both rising together" configuration, and neither move has ever been explained against a specific operating metric.
Key Financial Metrics
Q1 2022 vs. Q1 2021, standalone quarter
FX: IDR 14,349 = USD 1 (Bank Indonesia middle rate, March 31, 2022, as disclosed in this filing) - the Rupiah weakened slightly from Dec 2021's Rp14,269.
| Metric | Q1 2022 (IDR) | Q1 2022 (USD) | Q1 2021 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Revenue | Rp673.98B | ~$47.0M | Rp480.05B | ✅ +40.39% |
| Adjusted EBITDA» (Operating Income + D&A) | Rp142.82B | ~$10.0M | Rp73.75B | ✅ +93.66% |
| Operating Income» | Rp34.92B | ~$2.4M | -Rp46.60B | ✅ Swung to profit |
| Net Income» (attributable to owners) | Rp47.14B | ~$3.3M | -Rp28.25B | ✅ Swung to profit |
| Free Cash Flow» (Op. CF minus capex) | Rp54.86B | ~$3.8M | -Rp44.96B | ✅ Swung positive |
| Total Cash (period-end) | Rp1,067.15B | ~$74.4M | Rp928.11B | ✅ +14.98% |
| EPS (basic, quarter) | Rp18 | ~$0.0013 | -Rp11 | ✅ Swung to profit |
Sequentially, almost every one of those improvements gives something back. Against Q4 2021's Rp770.99 billion revenue, Q1 2022 revenue fell 12.58% - a normal seasonal step-down after the strongest quarter of the recovery, but paired with a much sharper 62.24% sequential fall in operating income (Rp92.5B to Rp34.9B) and a 36.22% fall in net income to owners (Rp73.9B to Rp47.1B). Operating margin fell from 12.00% to 5.18% and net margin from 9.59% to 6.99% - both still comfortably positive, both still well ahead of any 2020 or 2021 quarter other than Q4 itself, but a meaningfully weaker print than the one this site flagged four months ago as possibly the new baseline.
| Balance sheet metric | Mar 2022 (IDR) | Mar 2022 (USD) | Dec 2021 (IDR) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp6,651.81B | ~$463.6M | Rp6,598.14B | ✅ +0.81% |
| Total Liabilities | Rp1,456.55B | ~$101.5M | Rp1,450.56B | ⚠️ +0.41% |
| Total Equity | Rp5,195.27B | ~$362.1M | Rp5,147.58B | ✅ +0.93% |
| Debt-to-Equity Ratio» (total liabilities / total equity) | 0.28x | - | 0.28x | ➖ Flat |
Total bank loans fell further, from Rp839.5 billion at Dec 2021 to Rp805.8 billion, funded by a Rp33.7 billion long-term loan repayment this quarter - continuing the deleveraging this site has tracked since Q3 2020. This filing's own capital-management note states the debt-to-equity ratio at 0.26x for March 2022 and 0.28x for December 2021 - but a total-liabilities-over-total-equity calculation using this filing's own disclosed figures (Rp1,456.55 billion over Rp5,195.27 billion) works out to roughly 0.28x for March 2022, not 0.26x. See Beyond the Usual for how this compares with the multi-filing "0.37" comparative discrepancy this site tracked through 2021.
Segment Performance
Blue Bird still reports the same two operating segments - Taxi and Non-Taxi - unchanged since Q1 2016's two-segment collapse.
Taxi
Net revenue Rp512.99 billion, up 41.94% YoY from Q1 2021's Rp361.42 billion, and an operating profit of Rp10.82 billion - a 2.11% margin, swinging from Q1 2021's -10.94%. That YoY swing is real, but it obscures the sequential story: this is the same segment that posted a 10.03% operating margin just one quarter earlier, the best in this site's coverage of the company - and that margin gave back more than three-quarters of its gain in a single quarter, even as revenue kept growing YoY. Segment assets fell to Rp6,389.02 billion, down 6.59% from Mar 2021's Rp6,839.56 billion even as revenue grew - the segment is generating more revenue from a shrinking asset base, which is the more encouraging read buried underneath this quarter's margin disappointment.
Non-Taxi
Net revenue Rp161.06 billion, up 33.86% YoY from Q1 2021's Rp120.32 billion, with an operating margin of 14.78% - down only slightly from Q4 2021's record 15.71% and still comfortably the stronger of the two segments on a margin basis. This is now two consecutive quarters in the 14-16% range for Non-Taxi, through both a reopening surge and this quarter's Omicron-driven mobility dip - a far better durability signal than anything Taxi has shown yet. Segment assets fell 9.33% YoY to Rp1,604.84 billion, mirroring Taxi's asset-base shrinkage even as revenue grew.
Segment Comparison
| Segment | Revenue (Q1 2022) | YoY Growth | Operating Margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| Taxi | Rp512.99B (76.11%) | ✅ +41.94% | ⚠️ +2.11% (Q1 2022); 10.03% (Q4 2021) |
| Non-Taxi | Rp161.06B (23.89%) | ✅ +33.86% | ✅ +14.78% (Q1 2022); 15.71% (Q4 2021) |
Taxi's share of the two segments' combined revenue rose again, to 76.11% from FY2021's 72.82% - continuing the share gain this site first flagged reversing a multi-year trend toward Non-Taxi. But margin-wise, the gap between the two segments widened sharply this quarter rather than narrowing: Non-Taxi's operating margin is now nearly seven times Taxi's, versus roughly 1.5x in Q4 2021. The multi-year "Non-Taxi is the better business" thesis this site has tracked looks considerably stronger this quarter than it did four months ago, even as Taxi keeps winning the revenue-share fight.
Key Operational Metrics
- Weighted average shares outstanding: 2,502,100,000, unchanged since the IPO.
- Permanent employees (Group basis): 2,430 as of March 31, 2022, up from 2,422 at December 31, 2021 - a net addition of 8 people, a second straight quarter of headcount growth after Q4 2020's addition of 135 was the last time this site recorded two consecutive quarters of growth.
- Board of Commissioners compensation (Group basis, quarter alone): Rp1,057 million, up 30.49% YoY from Q1 2021's Rp810 million, but down 40.15% QoQ from Q4 2021's Rp1,766 million.
- Board of Directors compensation (Group basis, quarter alone): Rp1,345 million, down 23.41% YoY from Q1 2021's Rp1,756 million, and down 55.35% QoQ from Q4 2021's Rp3,012 million.
- Cash dividend paid: none this quarter - no dividend was declared or paid, consistent with every quarter since Q3 2021's Rp90,076 million payment.
- Total bank loans (current and non-current combined): Rp805.8 billion, down from Dec 2021's Rp839.5 billion.
- TAN's disclosed ownership: still not restated in this filing; last confirmed at 91.57% as of Dec 2019.
- Geographic revenue split (Jadetabek vs. outside Jadetabek) is still not disclosed, matching every prior filing.
- Still not available: any Gojek/GoPay integration volume or revenue metric, matching every filing since Q1 2020's first disclosure.
Beyond the Usual
Related-party rent's share snapped back to 73% after collapsing to roughly 19% just one quarter earlier
Q1 2022's related-party rent totaled roughly Rp11.66 billion of an estimated Rp15.95 billion total rent expense for the quarter - a 73.10% related-party share, essentially back to the level this site tracked climbing for four straight quarters through Q3 2021, before Q4 2021's standalone-quarter share fell to around 19%. That Q4 move was flagged at the time as unexplained and worth watching for whether it was a genuine shift or a one-quarter anomaly in lease-renewal or invoicing timing - this quarter's snap-back to a level matching the pre-Q4 trend is consistent with the latter. Nothing in this filing explains the swing in either direction.
The filing's own debt-to-equity figure no longer reconciles with a straightforward total-liabilities-over-equity calculation
This filing's capital-management note states the debt-to-equity ratio at 0.26x for March 31, 2022 and 0.28x for December 31, 2021. A total-liabilities-over-total-equity calculation using this same filing's own disclosed figures (Rp1,456.55 billion over Rp5,195.27 billion for March 2022) works out to roughly 0.28x, not 0.26x - the same method this site has used consistently across its coverage, and the same method that matched this filing's own Dec 2021 figure. This isn't the multi-quarter stale-comparative pattern flagged through 2021's filings - that was an unchanged prior-year figure; this is a fresh discrepancy on the current quarter's own number, and the note doesn't disclose what measure of "utang" (debt) it's using if not total liabilities.
Headcount kept growing while management compensation fell sharply - a new configuration in the pay-versus-headcount relationship this site has tracked since Q3 2020
Permanent headcount grew by 8 people this quarter, extending Q4 2021's first headcount increase in a year into a second straight quarter of growth - but Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors compensation both fell sharply QoQ (40.15% and 55.35% respectively) after both had risen the quarter before. This is the mirror image of Q4 2021's "both rising together" configuration, and a genuinely new shape in the relationship this site has tracked since Q3 2020: headcount growing while pay falls, rather than the reverse pattern (pay recovering while headcount fell) that characterized most of 2020-2021. No policy linking the two has ever been disclosed.
A pre-IPO land purchase commitment from 2012 is still only about three-quarters executed a decade later
Of the 133,133 square meters of land the Company conditionally agreed to buy from related parties (PBM, GBB, PCD, and certain shareholders) across various dates in December 2012 - ahead of Blue Bird's 2014 IPO, for a minimum total purchase price of Rp950.42 billion - only 99,615 square meters (about 74.8% of the committed area) had actually been purchased as of both March 31, 2022 and December 31, 2021. The note discloses no cancellations of the remaining unexecuted purchases, meaning roughly a quarter of a decade-old related-party land commitment is still sitting unresolved rather than either completed or formally terminated.
A related-party trademark license fee - currently zero - is contractually scheduled to start in 2023
The Company's non-exclusive license to use its own trademark from PT Pusaka Citra Djokosoetono (PCD), a related party, was signed July 25, 2013 for a 10-year term. Under its terms, the Company pays PCD nothing for the license's first nine years, but starting from the license's 10th year - which begins in 2023 - the fee becomes 2% of the Company's annual net revenue, payable at each year-end. On FY2021's Rp2,220.8 billion net revenue base, a 2% fee would run in the range of Rp44 billion annually - a real, currently invisible obligation to a related party that doesn't show up anywhere in this quarter's numbers but is contractually locked in to begin next year.
Target Valuation Range
Enterprise value ~Rp3,892B (~$271.3M), implying ~18.6x annualized P/E and ~0.69x P/B - fairly valued to modestly expensive against this quarter's own run-rate. A nearly flat share price combined with a meaningfully weaker quarterly earnings print than Q4 2021's pushes the annualized P/E up sharply even as P/B barely moved, which is the opposite of what "cheap and improving" would look like.
Blue Bird's stock closed Q1 2022 at Rp1,400, up just 1.45% from Q4 2021's Rp1,380 - a genuinely quiet quarter for the share price after two consecutive quarters of double-digit moves. That flatness is exactly why the valuation math below moved the way it did: the stock barely priced in anything new, but the quarter's own earnings run-rate weakened enough on its own to make the shares mechanically more expensive.
Against March 31, 2022 closing price of Rp1,400 (2,502,100,000 shares outstanding, unchanged):
| Market cap → enterprise value | Q1 2022 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp1,400 |
| Shares outstanding | 2,502,100,000 |
| Market capitalization | ~Rp3,502.9B (~$244.2M) |
| Total liabilities | ~Rp1,456.55B |
| Less: cash and equivalents | ~Rp1,067.15B |
| Enterprise value | ~Rp3,892.3B (~$271.3M) |
Market cap is up 1.45% from ~Rp3,452.9B at Q4 2021's close.
| Peer-multiple sanity check | Q4 2021 (annualized) | Q1 2022 (annualized) |
|---|---|---|
| P/E | ~11.7x | ~18.6x (Q1 2022 net income Rp47.1B × 4) |
| P/B | ~0.68x | ~0.69x (book value/share ~Rp2,038) |
| Annualized ROE | ~5.89% | ~3.72% |
| Annualized ROA | ~4.54% | ~2.88% |
Every annualized return metric moved in the wrong direction this quarter even as the share price stayed nearly flat - which is precisely why the valuation math got less attractive rather than more. P/B held essentially steady because both the price and the equity base moved together, but the earnings-based multiples (P/E, ROE, ROA) all deteriorated because the quarter's actual profit run-rate fell well short of Q4's. This is the clearest quantitative answer this site can offer to the question Q4 2021's post left open: whether that quarter's double-digit-margin, cheap-on-an-annualized-basis read was the start of a durable re-rating or a one-quarter reopening pop. One quarter later, the valuation case has weakened, not strengthened, even though the underlying business is still solidly profitable on both a YoY and absolute basis.
PT Blue Bird Tbk's consolidated financial statements as of March 31, 2022 and for the three-month period then ended.