A Record Year Built on a Weak Fourth Quarter
9M 2022's post closed with net income attributable to owners accelerating to 103.34% YoY and bank-only Total CAR extending its "turn" to 24.00%, alongside a newly-unified guidance table showing four of five FY2022 targets sitting outside their bands with one quarter left. The full-year numbers, on their face, look like a continuation of that story: consolidated net income attributable to owners reached Rp51,170,312 million for the year ended December 31, 2022, up 64.72% YoY from FY2021's Rp31,066,592 million - BRI's highest annual profit on record.
Subtracting 9M 2022's own cumulative figures from the FY2022 total tells a different quarter than that headline suggests. Standalone Q4 2022 net income attributable to owners came to roughly Rp12,014,079 million, up only 1.72% YoY from a standalone Q4 2021 of Rp11,810,342 million - a sharp deceleration from the 103%+ pace the first nine months had built, and nowhere near what a reader extrapolating from 9M's own trajectory would expect. More strikingly, standalone Q4's Net Interest and Net Premium Income, net, actually fell 8.27% YoY (Rp28,836,698 million vs. a standalone Q4 2021 of Rp31,437,820 million) - the underlying revenue line that funds everything else in the bank's income statement shrank in the same quarter net income barely grew. What kept Q4's bottom line from shrinking with it was provisioning: standalone Q4 impairment for financial assets fell 62.17% YoY, from Rp7,291,714 million to Rp2,757,990 million. A quarter where core revenue contracts and profit survives almost entirely because credit-loss charges came down that sharply is a materially weaker quarter than "BRI had its best year ever" communicates on its own - see Beyond the Usual for why that provisioning swing deserves its own scrutiny rather than being read as pure asset-quality improvement.
The Prescription
BRI should start disclosing standalone quarterly figures directly, rather than making a reader reconstruct them by subtracting a cumulative filing from the next one. This post's central finding - Q4 2022's revenue line actually shrinking YoY while the full-year number posted BRI's best result ever - was only visible by doing that subtraction; BRI's own presentation shows quarterly cumulative columns (Q1'22, 1H'22, 9M'22, FY'22) but never isolates the quarter alone. A bank whose provisioning swings can turn a shrinking-revenue quarter into a headline-record year owes readers the standalone number, not just the trend that flatters it.
What BRI should keep doing: the FY2022 guidance table (see Beyond the Usual) shows real, substantive fixes rather than just presentational ones this time - Loan Growth and NIM both moved from outside their bands at 9M to squarely inside them by year-end, the first time in this series' guidance-tracking history that BRI has actually closed out a miss rather than carrying it forward unexplained. That's the discipline 9M's Prescription asked for; BRI should extend it to Overhead Cost Growth, the one line that flipped from on-track to a miss this quarter, rather than letting a new miss go unaddressed the way NPL and Cost of Credit sat unexplained for most of the year.
Key Financial Metrics
Year ended December 31, 2022 vs. year ended December 31, 2021 (consolidated), unless noted
FX: Rp15,567.50 = USD 1 as of December 31, 2022, per BRI's own filed financial statements' disclosure - a 9.22% Rupiah depreciation from Dec 2021's Rp14,252.50 and a 2.24% depreciation from 9M's Rp15,227.50.
| Metric | FY2022 (IDR) | FY2022 (USD) | FY2021 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Interest and Net Premium Income, net ("Net Revenue" equivalent) | Rp126,174,396M | ~$8,105M | Rp115,137,504M | ✅ +9.59% |
| Operating Income (Profit from Operations) | Rp64,416,379M | ~$4,138M | Rp41,155,693M | ✅ +56.53% |
| Net Income (attributable to owners) | Rp51,170,312M | ~$3,287M | Rp31,066,592M | ✅ +64.72% |
| Net Income (total consolidated, incl. non-controlling interests) | Rp51,408,207M | ~$3,302M | Rp30,755,766M | ✅ +67.15% |
| EPS (basic, attributable to owners, full-year) | Rp338 | ~$0.022 | Rp238 | ✅ +42.02% |
| Impairment for financial assets | Rp27,384,906M | ~$1,759M | Rp35,806,312M | ✅ -23.52% (lower is better) |
Standalone Q4 2022 (FY2022 minus 9M 2022), vs. standalone Q4 2021
| Metric | Q4 2022 (IDR) | Q4 2021 (IDR) | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Interest and Net Premium Income, net | Rp28,836,698M | Rp31,437,820M | ⚠️ -8.27% |
| Operating Income (Profit from Operations) | Rp15,542,316M | Rp12,673,323M | ✅ +22.64% |
| Net Income (attributable to owners) | Rp12,014,079M | Rp11,810,342M | ⚠️ +1.72% (see above) |
| Impairment for financial assets | Rp2,757,990M | Rp7,291,714M | ✅ -62.17% (lower is better, but see Beyond the Usual) |
| Balance sheet metric | Dec 2022 (IDR) | Dec 2022 (USD) | Dec 2021 (IDR) | vs. Dec 2021 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Assets | Rp1,865,639B | ~$119,842M | Rp1,678,098B | ✅ +11.17% |
| Loans (gross) | Rp1,079,275B | ~$69,332M | Rp994,417B | ✅ +8.53% |
| Total Deposits | Rp1,307,884B | ~$84,015M | Rp1,138,743B | ✅ +14.85% |
| Total Equity (incl. non-controlling interest) | Rp303,395B | ~$19,489M | Rp291,787B | ✅ +3.98% |
| Total Cash and Cash Equivalents (per cash flow statement, period-end) | Rp268,192B | ~$17,229M | Rp153,925B | ✅ +74.24% |
See [Beyond the Usual](#beyond-the-usual) for what's actually driving the large cash and deposit jumps this quarter. Book value per share is discussed in Target Valuation Range below.
Key Operational Metrics
Bank-only, per BRI's own investor presentation, unless stated
- CASA»: 66.92% (Dec 2022) vs 63.30% (FY2021) ✅ and 9M's 65.65% ✅ - continuing the multi-year climb, with a notably large Q4 jump. See Beyond the Usual for what's actually driving it.
- Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR)»: 79.17% (Dec 2022) vs 9M's 88.92% ⚠️ - a sharp roughly 9.75-point drop in one quarter, driven by the same deposit surge as CASA above, not a loan pullback (gross loans still grew for the quarter).
- Net Interest Margin (NIM), bank-only: 6.80% (Dec 2022, full-year average per BRI's own OJK-format ratio calculation) vs 6.89% (FY2021) ⚠️ and 9M's 7.23% - a modest full-year dip. On the guidance table's own consolidated basis, NIM is 7.85%, now squarely inside the 7.7%-7.9% FY2022 band - see Beyond the Usual.
- ROA» (after tax, bank-only): 3.03% (Dec 2022) vs 2.23% (FY2021) ✅ and 9M's 3.21%, essentially flat with a slight Q4 dip.
- ROE» (book value, bank-only): 16.76% (Dec 2022) vs 14.09% (FY2021) ✅ and 9M's 17.58%, also a slight Q4 dip.
- CAR» (Total, bank-only): 23.30% (Dec 2022), down from 9M's 24.00% ⚠️ - giving back roughly 43% of the 1.61-point climb 9M had built off Q1's 22.39% low, though still above H1's 22.97% and Q1's 22.39%. This reverses, rather than extends, the "turn" 9M's post found. Tier 1 CAR: 22.30% (Dec 2022) vs 23.00% (9M) and 24.27% (FY2021).
- NPL ratio - gross (bank-only): 2.82% (Dec 2022) vs 9M's 3.14% ✅ and 3.08% (FY2021) ✅ - a third straight quarter of improvement, and the first full year this series has recorded BRI's gross NPL closing inside its own 2.8%-3% FY2022 band. NPL ratio - net: 0.73% (Dec 2022) vs 0.87% (9M) and 0.70% (FY2021).
- NPL Coverage Ratio (bank-only): 291.54% (Dec 2022) vs 275.88% (9M) ✅ and 278.14% (FY2021) ✅ - a new series high.
- Loan at Risk (LAR)» (bank-only, incl. Covid-19 restructuring): 17.11% of total loans (Dec 2022) vs 9M's 19.28% ✅ and 24.11% (FY2021) ✅ - continuing the steady multi-year improvement. LAR Coverage: 48.00% (Dec 2022) vs 44.90% (9M) and 35.56% (FY2021) ✅.
- Credit Cost (bank-only): 2.47% (FY2022) vs 3.42% (FY2021) ✅ and 9M's 2.88% ✅ - improving further, and comfortably inside BRI's 2.7%-2.9% FY2022 Cost-of-Credit band on this bank-only basis. The consolidated Cost of Credit BRI's own guidance table tracks came in at 2.55% - below, not inside, its 2.7%-2.9% band; see Beyond the Usual.
- BOPO» (Opex/Opr. Income, bank-only): 64.20% (FY2022) vs 74.30% (FY2021) ✅ and 9M's 62.59% - improved sharply YoY, though it ticked up from 9M's own reading as Q4 opex ran ahead of Q4 operating income. This is consistent with Overhead Cost Growth landing at 8.3% for the year, consolidated - breaching, not sitting inside, BRI's unchanged 6%-8% FY2022 guidance band, a genuinely new miss this quarter (see Beyond the Usual).
Business Lines: Loan Growth and Credit Quality
Bank-only, per BRI's own investor presentation, on the same "Loan Quality" section scale [9M's post used](/analysis/bbri/2022-09/#business-lines-loan-growth-and-credit-quality) - confirmed comparable this quarter (see [Beyond the Usual](#beyond-the-usual)).
Micro loans grew 13.3% YoY for the full year, again the fastest-growing large segment though a step down from 9M's 13.9%. Its NPL improved to 1.74% from 9M's 2.12%, though it's still worse than FY2021's 1.49% - the rapid-growth-driven credit-quality trade-off this series has tracked since 2021 continues, just less acutely than mid-year.
Consumer grew 8.3% YoY, accelerating from 9M's 6.3%; NPL improved to 1.83% from 9M's 1.98%, though still slightly above FY2021's 1.78%.
Small grew 6.2% YoY, a slight deceleration from 9M's 6.6%; NPL improved to 4.30% from 9M's 4.81%, though still above FY2021's 4.05%.
Medium turned positive for the year, +0.7% YoY - a reversal of the contraction every prior quarter this year had shown (9M was -1.1% YoY), meaning Medium's loan book actually grew in Q4 alone. Its NPL improved further to 2.26% from 9M's 2.53% and FY2021's 3.57% - both growth and credit quality moved the right direction at once, the first segment to do so this quarter.
Corporate grew 4.8% YoY, a marked acceleration from 9M's 0.5% - Corporate did most of its full-year growing in Q4 alone. NPL improved slightly to 4.68% from FY2021's 6.68%, though it ticked up marginally from 9M's 4.64% - the only segment whose NPL moved the wrong way quarter-over-quarter this period.
Segment Comparison
Total bank-only loan growth held at 9.1% YoY, essentially in line with 9M's 8.2% pace. Micro remains both the fastest grower and the segment carrying the highest NPL of the retail categories - a trade-off this series has tracked without a break since 2021, though it eased slightly in Q4. Medium and Corporate both flipped from contraction/near-flat at 9M to real growth in Q4 - Medium's flip came with its NPL improving further (the "smaller but cleaner" pattern from H1 has now become "growing again and cleaner"), while Corporate's growth acceleration came with its only YoY NPL uptick of any segment this quarter, a small but real reversal of its multi-year cleanup. Every segment's NPL improved YoY for the full year except Micro, Consumer, and Small, all three of which stayed slightly above FY2021's own reading even as they improved from 9M - a reminder that Q4's quarter-over-quarter gains haven't yet fully offset the credit-quality cost of this year's faster retail growth.
Beyond the Usual
This quarter's source documents are BRI's audited FY2022 annual report and consolidated financial statements (with full notes, unlike the condensed quarterly OJK format this series has relied on for interim quarters) alongside its FY2022 investor presentation. The fuller footnotes below reflect that.
The Guidance Scorecard Closed the Year With Two Misses Fixed, One New One Added
BRI's FY2022 investor presentation states final-year actuals against its own unified FY2022 guidance for all five lines. Two of the four lines 9M had flagged as outside their bands closed the year back inside them: Loan Growth finished at 9.2% against a 9%-11% band, and NIM finished at 7.85% against 7.7%-7.9% - both genuinely resolved, not just presentationally cleaned up. But the scorecard didn't simply improve across the board. Overhead Cost Growth, the one line 9M had called "on track" at 7.3%, finished the year at 8.3% against its unchanged 6%-8% band - a newly-added miss. And the two lines that stayed outside their bands, Cost of Credit (2.55% against 2.7%-2.9%) and NPL (2.67% against 2.8%-3%), both flipped direction from 9M's overshoots into undershoots - BRI beat its own targets on credit cost and asset quality by more than the band anticipated, rather than falling short of them. Read narrowly by band membership alone, the year closed with three of five lines outside their range instead of 9M's four - net progress - but only one of those three (Overhead Cost Growth) represents a genuine unfavorable miss; the other two are the guidance bands turning out too conservative for how well BRI's credit book actually performed.
Q4's Profit Resilience Came Almost Entirely From a Provisioning Swing, Not Revenue Growth
Subtracting 9M 2022's cumulative figures from the FY2022 total (see above) shows standalone Q4 2022's Net Interest and Net Premium Income actually falling 8.27% YoY, while standalone Q4 impairment for financial assets fell 62.17% YoY - the swing that kept Q4 net income (+1.72% YoY) from shrinking outright. A large one-quarter drop in provisioning during a period when the underlying revenue line contracted is not concerning on its own - BRI's gross NPL and LAR both kept improving through Q4, supporting a genuine case for lower charges - but it means the quarter's profit resilience is a provisioning story, not a revenue-growth one, and that distinction doesn't come through in the full-year 64.72%-YoY headline at all.
CASA's Big Q4 Jump Is Substantially a Related-Party Deposit Surge, Not Retail Behavior Change
BRI's cash flow statement shows demand deposits alone rising Rp129.2 trillion during 2022, with the bulk of that increase concentrated in Q4 given 9M's own cumulative deposit growth was essentially flat. The annual report's related-party transactions note discloses that related-party demand deposits grew from 6.83% to 11.79% of total consolidated liabilities over the year - nearly doubling as a share of the balance sheet - while total related-party liabilities grew from 17.70% to 22.07% of the total. As a state-owned bank, BRI's "related parties" include government and other state-owned-enterprise entities, and a year-end placement surge from that category is a plausible, largely seasonal explanation for the sharp LDR drop (88.92% at 9M to 79.17% at FY) and the CASA ratio's own outsized Q4 gain - a genuinely useful piece of context for a reader who might otherwise read the CASA jump as a shift in retail low-cost-funding behavior likely to persist into 2023.
A Related-Party Securities Exposure That's Been Quietly Shrinking
Related-party assets fell from 24.22% to 19.81% of total consolidated assets over FY2022, driven almost entirely by a decline in related-party securities holdings (from 19.28% to 15.35% of total assets) - the single largest related-party asset category by far. BRI doesn't specify which related entities hold these securities, but given the concentration and BRI's state ownership, this most plausibly reflects government bond holdings rolling off or being reallocated rather than any change in a commercial counterparty relationship. It's a genuinely interesting footnote-level detail about how much of BRI's balance sheet sits with government-linked counterparties, not a criticism of the bank.
The Audited Segment Note Shows BRI's SME Segment Posted a Pre-Tax Loss for the Year
The annual report's Segment Information note (a five-way split into Micro, Consumer, SME, Corporate, and Others/Subsidiaries - a different segmentation than the bank-only "Small"/"Medium"/"Corporate" scale used in the presentation and above) shows the SME segment posting an income-before-tax **loss of Rp6,609,959 million** for FY2022, driven by Rp13,778,790 million of provision for impairment losses in that segment alone - the highest of any segment, including Corporate. None of BRI's investor-facing materials disclose this segment-level loss; it appears only in the audited financial statements' own segment footnote. Whether this reflects one-off conservative provisioning against a specific SME exposure or a genuinely weaker book than the bank-only "Small"/"Medium" NPL readings above suggest isn't disclosed, and it's worth watching whether BRI addresses it directly in a future quarter rather than letting the two segmentation schemes quietly diverge.
The Garuda Restructuring's Terms Are Economically Softer Than BRI's Own "No Risk" Characterization Suggests
BRI's legal-cases disclosure confirms the Garuda Indonesia PKPU (court-supervised debt restructuring) reached a permanent, legally final settlement in 2022, with BRI holding registered claims of roughly Rp4.6 trillion. Under the settlement's own terms, remaining interest is paid at just 0.1% per year, semi-annually, with the restructured principal due as a single balloon payment 22 years after the settlement date. BRI's own disclosure characterizes this exposure as carrying no incremental risk to the bank. That characterization addresses whether the *principal* will eventually be recovered, not whether a below-market interest rate locked in for 22 years represents a real economic cost via foregone time value of money - a cost that doesn't show up as a loss in nominal accounting terms but is real all the same for a claim of this size.
A Rp2.2 Trillion Buyback Ran Through the Same Year CAR Reversed
BRI ran a shareholder-approved buyback of up to Rp3 trillion through 2022, repurchasing 479,454,100 shares across three tranches (April-July, then August-December) for a total acquisition cost of roughly Rp2,187,544 million per the cash flow statement, at average prices between Rp4,440 and Rp4,632 per share. A small portion of the resulting treasury stock (7,064,100 shares) was then reissued in August 2022 as part of a bonus share program at a price below the shares' acquisition cost, with the shortfall absorbed into additional paid-in capital rather than expensed. None of this is disclosed as a capital-adequacy tradeoff in BRI's own materials, but the buyback consumed capital in the same year bank-only Total CAR gave back part of its 2022 climb (see Key Operational Metrics above) - a real, if modest, competing use of capital against a bank that's also funding double-digit loan growth.
Stock Price
BRI's stock closed at approximately Rp4,940.00 on December 30, 2022 (the last trading day of the year), up 10.02% from 9M's Rp4,490.00 close. Over the trailing two years (January 2021-December 2022), the stock ranged from a trough near Rp3,372.67 in July 2021 to a peak of Rp4,980.00 in November 2022 - a ~47.7% trough-to-peak gain, with the year's final close sitting just below that November peak. As in prior quarters, BRI hasn't split its stock since 2017, so every price referenced here is directly comparable to prior quarters' own figures with no adjustment needed. This is a large enough two-year move to warrant its own section rather than folding straight into valuation: the climb from mid-2021's Covid-era trough to late-2022's high tracks the broader re-rating of Indonesian banks through the post-pandemic recovery and the 2022 rate-hiking cycle, not a BRI-specific catalyst in isolation.
Target Valuation Range
~14.62x P/E, ~2.50x P/B. Bottom line: BRI's full-year profit still grew more than twice as fast as BCA's (64.72% vs. 29.6%), yet the P/E gap between the two barely moved this quarter while the P/B gap actually narrowed - a more defensible valuation picture than 9M's widening gap, but one built substantially on BRI's own Q4 growth having decelerated sharply rather than on the market re-rating BRI's shares.
FY2022's basic EPS of Rp338 against the Rp4,940.00 close gives a P/E» of approximately 14.62x - up modestly from 9M's ~13.00x annualized estimate, as the share-price gain outran the full-year (rather than annualized) EPS increase.
Book value per share is approximately Rp1,974 (Rp299,294,011 million total equity attributable to owners ÷ 151,559,001,604 shares outstanding, unchanged since Q3 2021).
| Market cap → book value | FY2022 |
|---|---|
| Share price (period-end) | Rp4,940.00 |
| Shares outstanding | 151,559,001,604 |
| Market capitalization | ~Rp748,701B (~$48.09B, using this quarter's disclosed Rp15,567.50/USD rate) |
| Total equity attributable to owners (book value) | Rp299,294B |
| P/B» | ~2.50x |
| Peer-multiple sanity check | Q3 2022 | FY2022 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E» | ~13.00x (annualized) | ~14.62x (full-year) | ⚠️ up modestly - share-price gain outran the full-year EPS increase |
| P/B» | ~2.29x | ~2.50x | ⚠️ up - tracking both the share-price gain and further book-value growth |
BBCA's own FY2022 post reported a full-year P/E of ~25.9x and a P/B of ~4.77x, using the same methodology - a gap of roughly 11.3x on P/E and 2.27x on P/B versus BRI's ~14.62x and ~2.50x. The P/E gap is essentially flat against 9M's ~11.2x, but the P/B gap actually narrowed from 9M's ~2.68x - the first quarter this series has recorded that gap closing rather than widening. BRI's own full-year net income attributable to owners grew 64.72% YoY versus BCA's 29.6%, a growth-rate gap of a bit more than two times in BRI's favor - narrower than 9M's four-times gap, since BRI's own Q4 (see above) decelerated sharply while BCA's Q4 kept accelerating. The narrowing valuation gap this quarter looks at least partly explained by that convergence in growth rates, rather than the market suddenly re-rating BRI - a more mechanically consistent picture than 9M's divergence, even if the underlying reason (BRI's Q4 slowdown) isn't itself a reason for optimism.
A full DCF still isn't included here, for the same reasons every prior post in this series has given - the peer-multiple read above remains the more reliable lens until a longer run of genuinely clean, comparably-consolidated quarters builds up around this one.
PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk's audited consolidated financial statements as of December 31, 2022 and for the year then ended, its unaudited OJK-format published financial report for the same period, and its FY2022 investor presentation.