BBCA Is a 43% Profit Jump Too Good to Be True?

A Record YoY Number Sitting on Top of a Broken Streak

Q4 2022's post closed FY2022 with net profit up 29.6% for the year, NIM at a fresh record 5.9%, Corporate lending back to growth, and - for the first time in five quarters - the restructured loan book's worst collectability tier actually shrinking. Q1 2023 answers what happens next, and the answer splits cleanly into two different stories depending on which comparison a reader picks. Against a year ago, this is BCA's best quarter yet: standalone net profit rose 43.0% year-over-year to Rp11,530 billion, the fastest YoY growth this series has recorded for BCA, on the back of a fourth straight quarter of NIM near its record high. Against the prior quarter, the picture is quieter: net profit actually fell 2.1% quarter-over-quarter from Q4's Rp11,781 billion - the first sequential decline after the four straight quarters of QoQ growth (Rp8,064bn → Rp9,985bn → Rp10,905bn → Rp11,781bn) that same FY2022 post highlighted as a streak covering the entire calendar year.

The YoY number looks spectacular mostly because Q1 2022 was a weak base - Bank Indonesia had barely started its 2022 hiking cycle by March of that year, and BCA's own NIM was still compressing at 4.9% then versus 5.6% (bank-only) now. That's a real, durable margin advantage, not an illusion - but it's also not new information; it's the same CASA-funded NIM story this series has tracked all through 2022. What actually moved this quarter, and what Q4's post left as open questions, is whether the two threads it closed favorably - Corporate lending's rebound and the restructured book's NPL-tier improvement - held into the new year. Corporate loans essentially flattened (-0.5% QoQ after Q4's +5.3%), and the restructured book's NPL tier didn't just stop improving - it reversed and grew 7.5% quarter-over-quarter again, undoing Q4's decline (see Beyond the Usual). None of that shows up in the headline 43.0% YoY profit figure, which is exactly why it's worth separating from it.

The Prescription

BCA should keep leaning into the CASA^»-funded margin advantage that's now driven four straight quarters of NIM sitting at or near a record - even as CASA's own growth cooled this quarter (see Key Financial Metrics), the underlying funding-cost gap versus any bank funding itself with time deposits is still the single biggest lever behind this quarter's YoY profit jump, and it compounds for as long as depositors keep parking cash in low-cost accounts rather than chasing rate. Digital-channel growth (mobile transaction value keeps climbing per BCA's own presentation) is the mechanism sustaining that CASA base - it deserves continued investment ahead of anything that would trade deposit stickiness for a marginally higher-yielding book.

What BCA should stop doing: letting the YoY profit comparison stand in for the full picture when the QoQ trend just broke in the opposite direction. Q4's post already flagged the gap between "the restructured book improved" and "commitment quality improved" as two different sentences; this quarter adds a third distinction BCA's own presentation doesn't draw for a reader - the difference between a genuinely strong YoY comparison and a standalone quarter that's actually softer than the one before it. A bank that finished 2022 on a four-quarter QoQ winning streak, in the presentation's own investor materials, going straight into a table of only YoY and QoQ percentage deltas without ever noting that the streak itself just ended, leaves a reader to spot that on their own.

Key Financial Metrics

Q1 2023 vs. Q1 2022 (P&L, consolidated unaudited interim figures), and 31 March 2023 vs. 31 December 2022 (balance sheet, consolidated)

FX: IDR 14,994.5 = USD 1 (31 March 2023, per BCA's own filed financial statements' Reuters middle-rate disclosure) - a 3.7% Rupiah appreciation from Dec 2022's Rp15,567.5.

Unlike Q1 2022's abbreviated OJK transparency-format filing, this quarter's downloaded document is BCA's full consolidated interim financial statements, carrying the same depth of notes - related-party transactions, off-balance-sheet commitment quality by credit stage, the collectability-tier restructured-loan schedule, and the product-based operating-segment note - that only the FY2022 annual report previously offered in this series. See Beyond the Usual for what those notes show this quarter.

Metric	Q1 2023 (IDR)	Q1 2023 (USD)	Q1 2022 (IDR)	YoY
Net Interest Income	Rp18,482,049M	~$1,232.7M	Rp14,421,272M	✅ +28.1%
Non-interest income (gross)	Rp6,449,086M	~$430.2M	Rp6,131,991M	✅ +5.2%
Net Revenue (Operating Income, NII + non-interest)	Rp24,931,135M	~$1,663.0M	Rp20,553,263M	✅ +21.3%
Operating Income (PPOP», consolidated)	Rp15,679,908M	~$1,045.7M	Rp12,771,379M	✅ +22.8%
Net Income (attributable to owners)	Rp11,529,784M	~$769.1M	Rp8,064,433M	✅ +43.0%
EPS (quarter, consolidated)	Rp94	~$0.0063	Rp65	✅ +44.6%

The YoY jump is broad-based, not concentrated in one line: NII grew 28.1% as NIM widened, non-interest income grew a more modest 5.2%, and provisioning expense actually fell 48.2% YoY (Rp2,818bn → Rp1,460bn per BCA's own presentation) - the combination of wider margins and a much lighter provisioning charge is what turns a 22.8% PPOP gain into a 43.0% net-profit gain. But the QoQ read (see above) shows standalone net profit down 2.1% from Q4's Rp11,781bn, even as PPOP itself kept climbing (+1.3% QoQ per the presentation) - provisioning ticked back up rather than down, consistent with a bank-only cost of credit of 0.8% this quarter versus Q4's 0.4%, still far below Q1 2022's own 1.9% peak but the first sequential increase since Q3 2022.

Balance sheet metric	Mar 2023 (IDR)	Mar 2023 (USD)	Dec 2022 (IDR)	QoQ
Total Assets	Rp1,321,722,691M	~$88.15B	Rp1,314,731,674M	✅ +0.5%
Third Party Funds (deposits)*	Rp1,038,750,000M	~$69.28B	Rp1,039,718,018M	⚠️ -0.1%
CASA»*	Rp843,334,000M	~$56.25B	Rp847,938,000M	⚠️ -0.5%
Total Loans (outstanding)*	Rp713,822,000M	~$47.61B	Rp711,262,000M	✅ +0.4%
Total Equity (attributable to owners)	Rp211,261,029M	~$14.09B	Rp221,018,606M	⚠️ -4.4%

*Third Party Funds, CASA, and Total Loans (outstanding, consolidated including sharia financing) per BCA's own investor presentation, the same sourcing convention used since Sep 2019's post.

CASA fell 0.5% quarter-over-quarter - the first sequential CASA decline this series has recorded since well before FY2022's steady climb to a record 81.6% ratio - pulling the CASA ratio down slightly to 81.2% (see Key Operational Metrics). Total loan growth stayed positive but decelerated sharply, +0.4% QoQ versus Q4's 4.3%, almost entirely because Corporate flattened out (see Segment Comparison). Equity fell 4.4% QoQ - a bigger drop than any single quarter's dividend distribution alone typically explains, because BCA's 16 March 2023 AGM formally appropriated the entire FY2022 dividend (Rp25,271,385M, Rp205/share) as a liability the moment it was declared, even though Rp20,956,758M of that wasn't due to be paid until 14 April 2023, just after this quarter closed (see Beyond the Usual). Operating cash flow was strongly positive at Rp25,256,970M (~$1,684.7M), a sharp turnaround from Q1 2022's own -Rp19,257,380M, driven by a large swing in securities-purchased-under-agreements-to-resell (a Rp22,370,379M net cash inflow this quarter, versus a Rp53,996,356M outflow a year earlier) rather than any change in the underlying deposit-taking business. Cash and cash equivalents closed the quarter at Rp161,601,269M (~$10.78B), up modestly from Dec 2022's Rp160,422,371M.

Key Operational Metrics

Bank-only (individual) unless noted, from BCA's own filed financial-ratio disclosures and investor presentation:

• CASA ratio: 81.2% (Mar 2023, consolidated, per BCA's own investor presentation) vs Dec 2022's 81.6% ⚠️ - the first quarterly dip this series has recorded after a multi-quarter climb to a record high.
• LDR^» (LFR in BCA's own terminology): 65.6% (Mar 2023, per the presentation) vs 65.2% (Dec 2022) ⚠️ - a further small increase, loan growth still outrunning deposit growth.
• NIM^»: 5.6% (Mar 2023, quarterly, per the presentation) vs Dec 2022's record 5.9% ⚠️ - the first sequential narrowing after four straight quarters of widening, though still far above Q1 2022's own 4.9%.
• ROA^»: 3.4% (Mar 2023, quarterly, per the presentation) vs 3.7% (Dec 2022, quarterly) ⚠️.
• ROE^»: 22.3% (Mar 2023, quarterly, per the presentation) vs 24.7% (Dec 2022, quarterly) ⚠️.
• CAR^» (bank-only): 28.9% (Mar 2023, per the presentation) vs 25.8% (Dec 2022) ✅ +3.1pp - see Beyond the Usual for why most of this jump is a regulatory formula change, not fresh capital.
• NPL ratio - gross (bank-only, point-in-time): 1.8% (31 Mar 2023, per BCA's presentation) vs 1.7% (31 Dec 2022) ⚠️ - a small uptick, though still well below Mar 2022's 2.3%.
• NPL Coverage (Provision/NPL, bank-only): 285.4% (Mar 2023, per the presentation) vs Dec 2022's record 287.3% ⚠️ - a slight pullback from the record, still comfortably the strongest coverage level this series has tracked outside Q4 2022 itself.
• Cost-to-Income Ratio^»: 35.1% (Mar 2023, quarterly, per the presentation) vs 32.5% (Dec 2022) ⚠️ - worse QoQ, though still better than Q1 2022's own 35.8%.
• Cost of credit (bank-only): 0.8% (Q1 2023, per the presentation) vs 0.4% (Q4 2022) ⚠️ - a second straight quarterly increase after Q3 2022's near-zero trough, though still far below Q1 2022's 1.9% peak.
• Loan at Risk^» (ex-Covid, share of total loans): 9.5% (Mar 2023, per the presentation) vs Dec 2022's 10.0%, a further improvement and a fresh low for this series.
• LAR Coverage with Restructured Covid & off-B/S: 57.9% (Mar 2023) vs Dec 2022's 53.8% ✅, continuing the multi-quarter climb.

The coverage-ratio gap this series has tracked since 2021 - Provision/NPL coverage minus LAR-including-Covid coverage - narrowed to 227.5 percentage points (285.4% minus 57.9%), down from Dec 2022's 233.5pp - the same mechanical story as before: LAR coverage keeps rebuilding faster than NPL coverage, itself modestly higher than Provision/NPL coverage's own small QoQ pullback. Worth reading alongside Beyond the Usual's restructured-book finding below: LAR (an aggregate that also nets in the restructured book) improved again this quarter even as the specific NPL tier inside that same restructured book grew - the same bifurcation earlier posts in this series have flagged before.

Segment Performance

BCA reports three lending segments (consolidated, per this quarter's investor presentation): Corporate, Commercial & SME, and Consumer. Q4's post closed with Corporate's return to growth (+5.3% QoQ) driving the whole quarter's loan acceleration - that growth essentially stalled here.

Corporate

Corporate loans stood at Rp320,468 billion (Mar 2023), up 11.7% year-over-year but down a marginal 0.5% quarter-over-quarter - reversing Q4's 5.3% QoQ rebound almost entirely, back to something closer to Q3 2022's own contraction than Q4's recovery. Its share of the total book eased to 44.9% from Dec 2022's 45.3%.

Commercial & SME

Commercial & SME loans reached Rp211,127 billion (Mar 2023), up 11.8% year-over-year and a modest 0.5% quarter-over-quarter - a fifth straight quarter of growth, though decelerating further from Q4's 3.2% QoQ. Unlike the prior three quarters, this quarter's Mar-2022 comparative figure (Rp286,879bn for Corporate, Rp188,803bn here) matches that quarter's own contemporaneously-reported numbers exactly - see Beyond the Usual for why that's notable given the pattern the last three quarters established.

Consumer

Consumer loans reached Rp174,503 billion (Mar 2023), up 12.7% year-over-year and 1.8% quarter-over-quarter - the fastest-growing segment on both counts again, continuing the pattern the last several quarters have shown. Within Consumer, mortgages grew to Rp109,589 billion (+1.2% QoQ, +11.6% YoY) and vehicle lending to Rp47,892 billion (+3.8% QoQ, +15.2% YoY) - vehicle lending's YoY growth is now the fastest this series has recorded for that book, extending Q4's own record reading.

Segment Comparison

Segment	Mar 2023 (Rp bn)	Mar 2022 (Rp bn, own contemporaneous figure)	YoY	Dec 2022 (Rp bn)	QoQ	Share (Mar 2023)
Corporate	320,468	286,879	✅ +11.7%	322,176	⚠️ -0.5%	44.9%
Commercial & SME	211,127	188,803	✅ +11.8%	210,162	✅ +0.5%	29.6%
Consumer	174,503	154,803	✅ +12.7%	171,347	✅ +1.8%	24.4%
Total (three segments, consolidated)	706,098	630,485	✅ +12.0%	703,685	✅ +0.3%	98.9%*

*Remaining ~1.1% is sharia financing (Rp7,725bn), reported separately from the three core lending segments; the consolidated total-loans figure elsewhere in this post (Rp713,822bn) includes that sharia book.

Corporate's stall is the whole story behind this quarter's much slower 0.4% QoQ total loan growth (down from Q4's 4.3%) - Commercial & SME and Consumer both kept growing, but a segment representing 45% of the book going from +5.3% to -0.5% QoQ swamps two smaller segments' modest gains. Whether this is the same kind of one-quarter pause Q1 2022's Corporate stall turned out to be, or something more structural, isn't yet clear from one data point - worth tracking into Q2.

Beyond the Usual

Unlike Q1 2022's abbreviated OJK-format filing, this quarter's downloaded interim financial statements carry the same depth of notes the FY2022 annual report offered - related-party transactions, off-balance-sheet commitment quality by credit stage, the restructured-loan collectability schedule, and the product-based operating-segment note. The findings below come from those notes.

The Restructured Book's Worst Tier Reversed Course, Undoing Q4's Improvement

BCA's Covid-19 restructured loan book (bank-only) kept shrinking overall - down to Rp57.4 trillion at Mar 2023 from Dec 2022's Rp62.2 trillion, a 7.7% quarterly decline that continues the multi-quarter contraction this series has tracked. But the collectability breakdown inside that book, disclosed directly in the filing's own restructured-loans note, shows the NPL tier grew 7.5% quarter-over-quarter to Rp10,167,637 million (~Rp10.2tn) - reversing Q4's 11.5% QoQ decline, which that post explicitly flagged as "the start of a reversal, not yet proof the year's damage has been undone." One quarter later, the reversal itself reversed: the tier is back to growing, and at Rp10.17tn it's now higher in absolute terms than at any point Q4's post recorded, including Dec 2021's Rp8.9tn base. Both the Current tier (down to Rp40.1tn from Rp46.0tn) and Special Mention (up slightly, Rp6.8tn to Rp7.2tn) still net to an overall-shrinking book - it's specifically the worst tier, again, that's moving the wrong way while the aggregate total looks like continued improvement.

A New OJK Capital Formula Inflated CAR by Roughly 3 Points This Quarter

Bank-only CAR jumped to 28.9% at Mar 2023 from Dec 2022's 25.8%, a headline 3.1-point quarterly gain that on its own would read as a genuine capital-strength improvement. BCA's own presentation attributes most of it to a regulatory change rather than fresh capital: effective 1 January 2023, OJK's revised risk-weighted-asset formula lowered the risk weight on retail and property-backed loans, capped the net-interest-income component of operational-risk RWA at 2.25% of earning assets (previously uncapped), and adopted a progressive multiplier that's on average lower than the prior flat 15% charge - all RWA-denominator effects that mechanically raise the CAR ratio without the Bank adding a single Rupiah of new capital. The presentation does disclose this plainly as a formula change, which is more transparency than a bank flattering a ratio silently would offer - but a reader skimming just the ratio table would still read "CAR up 3.1 points" as organic strengthening rather than largely a denominator effect.

The Segment Reconciliation Gap That Ran Three Straight Quarters Doesn't Show Up Here

This quarter's presentation restates Mar 2022 as the year-ago comparative for Corporate, Commercial & SME, and Consumer loans - and for the first time in several quarters, that restated figure matches the quarter's own contemporaneously-reported numbers exactly (Rp286,879bn, Rp188,803bn, and Rp154,803bn respectively, all to the million). Q2, Q3, and Q4 2022's posts all found the same unexplained multi-trillion-Rupiah swap between Commercial & SME and Consumer whenever the presentation restated a Dec-2021 comparative - this quarter restates a Mar-2022 comparative instead, and the gap simply isn't there. That's genuinely useful information on its own: it suggests whatever caused the earlier mismatch was specific to how the Dec-2021 figures in particular got carried forward, not a standing definitional drift between the two segments every quarter. Whether the gap reappears the next time a presentation restates a December comparative (Q4 2023's post, restating Dec-2022) is the real test this finding sets up.

The Grand Indonesia Lease Grew, Not Shrank, Despite Ongoing Amortization

Q4 2022's post first disclosed BCA's related-party office lease with PT Grand Indonesia, running to 30 September 2035, and noted the right-of-use asset was amortising down over time (Rp248,556 million a year earlier to Rp227,939 million at Dec 2022). This quarter, both figures moved the other way: the right-of-use asset rose to Rp235,354 million and the outstanding finance lease obligation jumped to Rp69,167 million from Dec 2022's Rp58,593 million, an 18.0% quarterly increase. The note itself doesn't explain the reversal (a remeasurement of future lease payments, an FX effect on the lease's original USD-denominated terms, or an exercised expansion option are all plausible under the same disclosure, but none is stated) - worth watching whether this was a one-quarter accounting adjustment or the start of the Bank actually drawing on the lease's disclosed option for an additional 3,264.80 sqm of space.

BCA's Board Formally Locked In a Record 62% Payout Ratio for FY2022, Split Across Two Payments

BCA's 16 March 2023 AGM approved the full FY2022 dividend of Rp25,271,385 million (Rp205 per share) - a 62.0% payout ratio, per BCA's own presentation, up from FY2021's 56.9% and the highest this series has recorded. Of that total, Rp4,314,627 million was already paid as an interim dividend on 20 December 2022 (the mechanism Q4's post first detailed), leaving a Rp20,956,758 million final tranche that was due to be paid 14 April 2023 - two weeks after this quarter's period end. Because the appropriation was formally resolved at the AGM (16 March 2023, inside this quarter), the entire remaining amount became a recorded liability immediately, which is the main driver of this quarter's 4.4% QoQ drop in total equity (see Key Financial Metrics) even though most of the cash hadn't left the Bank yet.

Undrawn Credit Capacity to Customers Shrank by a Quarter in Three Months

BCA's commitments note discloses unused (uncommitted) credit facilities extended to customers fell to Rp68,631,119 million at Mar 2023 from Rp91,165,108 million at Dec 2022 - a 24.7% quarterly decline in undrawn lending capacity, a far larger single-quarter move than the loan book's own +0.4% QoQ growth would suggest by itself. This isn't concerning on its own - a bank shrinking its unused facility headroom can simply mean customers drew down more of what they'd already been offered, or that facilities expired and weren't renewed - but a quarter-on-quarter move this large in a footnote-only figure is exactly the kind of number a headline loan-growth reading wouldn't surface.

Coverage Table

Metric	Q1 2023	Q4 2022	QoQ	Why it matters
Net profit (standalone)	Rp11,530bn	Rp11,781bn	⚠️ -2.1%	Ends the four-straight-quarter sequential growth streak Q4's post tracked
NIM (bank-only, quarterly)	5.6%	5.9%	⚠️ -0.3pp	First sequential narrowing after four straight quarters of widening
Restructured loan NPL tier (bank-only, QoQ)	+7.5%	-11.5%	⚠️ Reversed	Undoes Q4's first-ever decline in this metric
Corporate loans (consolidated, QoQ)	-0.5%	+5.3%	⚠️ Reversed	Almost the entire loan-growth deceleration this quarter traces to this one segment
CAR (bank-only)	28.9%	25.8%	✅ +3.1pp	Mostly a regulatory formula change, not new capital - see Beyond the Usual

Target Valuation Range

P/E of ~23.3x and P/B of ~5.11x - Bottom line: BCA's shares are fairly valued here, if anything slightly cheaper on a forward basis than Q4 2022's close - the trailing P/E actually compressed this quarter even as the share price rose, because Q1's annualized earnings run rate outpaced the price gain, and neither of this quarter's two reversals (restructured NPL tier, Corporate stall) has shown up in the multiple yet.

BCA's shares closed at Rp8,750 on March 31, 2023, up 2.3% from Dec 2022's Rp8,550 close and up 9.7% year-over-year from Mar 2022's Rp7,975. Over the trailing two years, shares are up 40.8% from Mar 2021's Rp6,215 close - a window that includes a trough of Rp5,970 in July 2021 and a high of Rp9,300 reached in November 2022 before easing back, a peak-to-trough swing of roughly 55.8%, comfortably wide enough to warrant this dedicated section for a third straight quarter.

• P/E^»: ~23.3x, annualizing Q1 2023's Rp94 EPS to Rp376 against the Rp8,750 close - down from FY2022's ~25.9x on the full year's actual EPS, though the two aren't a clean apples-to-apples comparison since one annualizes a single quarter and the other is a full year's actual result.
• P/B^»: ~5.11x, using book value per share of Rp1,714 (total equity attributable to owners, Rp211,261,029 million, divided by 123,275,050,000 shares outstanding, unchanged this quarter) - up from Q4's ~4.77x, as the AGM's full dividend appropriation (see Beyond the Usual) shrank book value per share faster than the modest 2.3% share-price gain.

Market cap → book value	Q1 2023
Share price (period-end)	Rp8,750
Shares outstanding	123,275,050,000
Market capitalization	Rp1,078,657B (~$71.95B)
Book value (equity attributable to owners)	Rp211,261B (~$14.09B)
P/B»	~5.11x

P/E and P/B	FY2022	Q1 2023 (annualized)	Change
EPS	Rp330 (actual)	Rp376 (annualized)	✅ up
P/E»	~25.9x	~23.3x	✅ down (basis differs, see note above)
Book value per share	Rp1,793	Rp1,714	⚠️ down
P/B»	~4.77x	~5.11x	⚠️ up

A full DCF still isn't attempted here, for the same reason as every prior post in this series: this quarter surfaced two reversals (the restructured NPL tier, Corporate's stall) that are each one data point so far, not yet enough history to say whether either is noise or a genuine turn, and a valuation model built on either untested assumption would be more precise-looking than actually reliable. The peer-multiple comparison this section would normally lean on also isn't available yet - no other IDX bank in this backlog has a post covering the same March 2023 quarter to compare against.

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